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
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DETENTE AND ALLIANCE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA:

STRATEGIC DILEMMAS IN UNITED STATES - WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

BY

SCHUYLER FOERSTER

THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (D. PHIL.),
SOCIAL STUDIES FACULTY (POLITICS), OXFORD UNIVERSITY

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DÉTENTE AND ALLIANCE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA: STRATEGIC DILEMMAS IN UNITED STATES - WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

Throughout the postwar period, détente has been a central issue in relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. This thesis argues that détente is inherently limited: as a strategy for achieving objectives that have remained remarkably consistent throughout the postwar period, détente is predicated on the maintenance of a strong alliance; to the extent that it raises basic and perhaps irresolvable questions within the alliance, it tends to threaten alliance cohesion and thus undermine its own foundation.

How the US and FRG have viewed the nature and utility of détente and the manner and style with which it might be pursued is the central focus of this study. Each is acutely sensitive to the commitment of the other to the alliance; each has interests, both unique and complementary, in détente. Détente has also corresponded with a change in the US-FRG relationship and with the increasing interdependence of the international system. "Linkage" has been a key instrument in managing these changes in the face of the continued adversary nature of East-West relations.

The thesis begins with a discussion of détente as it has evolved since 1969: what it is and what it is not, its achievements and its limitations. After an analysis of détente as an issue of alliance politics, the thesis then examines the historical legacy of the "German Problem" as it affects contemporary perceptions of European security. With this background, alliance views on the prospects and requirements for an East-West détente are developed in three historical segments.

From the onset of the Cold War until 1958, the alliance concentrated on the consolidation of Western strength as the precondition for a settlement, on Western terms, of the postwar division of Germany and Europe. The effect was to create a bipolar structure in which pressures for détente were generally viewed as a threat to Western strength and Western interests. Western vulnerability, especially after 1957, and the intractability of Germany's division suggested strategies both to stabilise and to transform the status quo. The US and FRG sought both to encourage and to constrain each other in the pursuit of détente, while manoeuvring within the "ground rules" that had been established.

By the end of the 1960s, changed political conditions and new opportunities made possible the "era of negotiations" that ensued after 1969. The thesis analyses US-FRG interaction in the development and execution of Ostpolitik and in the formulation of arms control policies for the 1970s. Reflecting the basic dilemma of détente and alliance politics, the strategic détente and the West German Ostpolitik were motivated to a significant extent by the need to preserve alliance cohesion. The pursuit of détente has continued to reflect a complex interplay between strength and vulnerability in the Western alliance. For the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, dependent on each other for the achievement of national goals, this remains a fundamental element in their relationship.

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DÉTENTE AND ALLIANCE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA:
STRATEGIC DILEMMAS IN UNITED STATES - WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
Social Studies Faculty (Politics),
Oxford University

by

SCHUYLER FOERSTER
Merton College
Trinity Term, 1982

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PREFACE

There are many to whom I am grateful for their assistance in the preparation of this thesis. My deepest obligation is to Janet, my wife, and Allyson and Jennifer, my children, whose support and understanding throughout this endeavour, beyond all reasonable expectations, leave me a debt that can never fully be paid. To them go my love and my first - not last - acknowledgement.

Any timeliness that this thesis might possess is to the credit of my supervisor, Professor Michael Howard, who nudged me out of a vague interest in contemporary alliance security issues into an examination of United States-West German relations, and who harboured fewer doubts than I about my ability to acquire a working knowledge of a language in which I had no previous background. His encouragement, keen historical sense, and probing questions were both inspirational and compelling. For the challenge he offered, I shall remain grateful. I also thank Professor Hedley Bull, who, while not officially my supervisor, made available to me time that his own obligations could ill afford. His insightful comments on early formulations of the argument of this thesis provided the germ for many of the ideas presented.

My principal institutional debts are to the United States Air Force, the Dean of Faculty and the Department of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, and the United States Air Force Institute of Technology for sponsoring and supporting me for three years at Oxford; and to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College for receiving me. I am especially grateful to Colonel Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, for giving me this opportunity. I also thank the British Ministry of Defence and Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Goodman for their hospitality at the Royal Army School of Languages.

I wish also to acknowledge the generous support of the libraria and staffs of the Bodleian Library, Codrington Library, and Social Studies Faculty Centre in Oxford; the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Royal United Services Institute in London; the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Clipping and Analysis Service, the Army Library, and the Library of Congress in Washington; the Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik in Bonn; and the NATO Information Service in Brussels.

To name all who assisted me in this thesis is an impossible task. Many, in official employment, would prefer to remain anonymous. I am especially grateful to the following individuals who took valuable time to speak with me and to offer suggestions, advice, and a fuller picture of some of the people and events discussed in this thesis: Dr. Christoph Bertram, Mr. Jeff Brady, Ambassador Jonathon Dean, Dr. Dorothy Fosdick, Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, Dr. Günter Joetze, Dr. Josef Joffe, Herr Bodo Karkow, Professor Catherine Kelleher, Dr. Martha Mautner, Dr. Edwina Moreton, Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts, Herr Reinhold Schenk, Herr Klaus Schütz, Mr. William Smyser, Dr. Theo Sommer, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Mr. James Sutterlin.

I particularly wish to thank Herr Heinz Schulte. He is directly or indirectly responsible for whatever facility I possess in the German language. More than that, he was an invaluable Gesprächspartner in thrashing out many of the subtle aspects of the perceptions of and relations between our two countries. In assisting me in making contacts in the Federal Republic, and in alerting me to certain source materials, he has contributed immeasurably to this thesis.

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As an active duty military officer, I am obliged to state that the views and opinions expressed or implied in this thesis are my own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense or the United States Government. Notwithstanding the aforementioned acknowledgements, I am responsible for any shortcomings that remain in this thesis.

Schuyler Foerster
Oxford, 15 July 1982

"If others regard us as incalculable, then we become a source of possible conflict."

Helmut Schmidt

The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Superpowers (London: William Kimber, 1971), p.212.

"...once embarked on a confrontation it is more dangerous to stop than to proceed... Confrontations end when the opponent decides that the risks are not worth the objective, and for this the risks must be kept high and incalculable."

Henry A. Kissinger

White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1979), p.1112.

PART 1

INTRODUCTION: DÉTENTE AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

> The development of an awareness of parallel Soviet-American interests during the years since the Cuban crisis, in the sense of both tacit and explicit understanding about the rules by which deterrence can be maintained while war may be avoided, has led neither to a superpower condominium... nor to a significant expansion in the area of political détente... The existence of two superpowers, despite the greater facility of their communication, has not produced a new world order... The bipolar relationship remains primarily an adversary one.
>
> Alastair Buchan, 1972[1]

This thesis examines détente as an issue of alliance politics, in particular the relations between the United States (US) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). On one level, it argues that the change from "Cold War" to "détente" in international relations did not constitute any fundamental change in the basic nature of East-West relations. Expectations of a radical transformation of the inte national order established in the wake of World War II have been disappointed. Rather than an end in itself, détente has been an element of national strategy designed to fulfil national objectives which themselves have remained remarkably consistent throughout the postwar period.

This thesis also suggests that détente has accompanied a change in the US-FRG relationship. Détente has been a source of tension within the alliance in two respects: first, détente as a national strategy to fulfil certain objectives raises the question of competing national objectives within that alliance; second, détente, by its very nature, calls into question the purpose of the alliance itself and the respective roles played by members of the alliance. This is not to suggest that détente necessarily creates tension between allies; rather, it is a catalyst for conflicts within the alliances because of the questions it raises. These questions exist on two levels: on the one hand, they relate to the nature and utility of a détente strategy; on the other hand, they relate to the manner and style with which that strategy is pursued. More significantly, these are questions which are never fully resolved or readily answered: they involve issues of vital interest that may often be submerged in tentative and ambiguous resolutions. The function and balance of nuclear and conventional forces in alliance military strategy; the search for appropriate forms of leadership in an alliance of sovereign nations in which power is neither fully concentrated nor equally distributed; the relationship between national and alliance interests and obligations - all are examples of the kinds of issues that have been involved in the consideration of détente strategy in the Western alliance in the postwar period.

---

[1] In the 1972 Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures, published as Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973), p.16.

While these arguments will be developed more fully later, it is appropriate to state the conclusion at the outset. The détente that has existed to varying degrees and at various times in the postwar era is inherently limited. In itself, this is not a novel conclusion. But it is generally explained in terms of the differing interpretations that allies and adversaries alike place on it. More fundamentally, détente is limited by the fact that international stability in the contemporary era presumes and to some extent has even come to depend upon a certain adversary nature in East-West relations. The pursuit of a détente strategy by the West has been predicated on the existence of a strong alliance, based on the traditional assumption that only through the [illegible] [illegible] of the Western alliance could the central activity of détente - negotiation - be successfully conducted. To the extent that the process of formulating such a strategy threatens alliance cohesion, it tends to undermine its own foundation. This has been, to this author, consistent in Western approaches to détente, during periods of both confrontation and negotiation.

Analysis of the alliance relationship of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany is appropriate for three reasons. First, the US-FRG relationship can be said to provide the core of the NATO alliance. Ultimately, the security of the alliance depends on the nuclear guarantee and overall deterrent power of the United States. Whatever else has changed since the formation of NATO, that has not. Likewise, the FRG, which contributes the largest share of NATO's conventional forces, constitutes the front line of that alliance. Détente has not removed the basic East-West adversary relationship that provided the raison d'être for the alliance. Second, the issue of détente has had its most profound impact on the US and the FRG because its greatest manifestation is found in the security relationship between the superpowers and their respective alliance systems and in the issue of Germany's role in Europe. Hence, détente directly relates to the resilient legacy of the "German Problem" which in itself provided additional justification for the creation and maintenance of the alliance structure. Third, the US-FRG relationship has undergone a substantial transformation in the postwar era. The FRG was largely a creation of the Western alliance, and from the beginning was a client to its American patron. Détente, and the West German corollary to it, Ostpolitik ("Eastern Policy"), marked a significant change in the nature of that alliance relationship. It did not remove Bonn's need for the alliance, but it changed the nature of that dependency. It did not suddenly make the US dependent upon the Federal Republic, because that dependency had existed before. Yet in the wake of the Ostpolitik, the US-FRG relationship has become a more normal alliance relationship. As expressed by one long-time observer, it has become a relationship of "equivalence": not a symmetry of power or dependency, but a relationship in which neither can successfully maintain its international position and basic interests without the other.[2]

In examining détente and the US-FRG alliance relationship, this thesis covers a broad historical span. It is not intended to provide a definitive and detailed history of the postwar period nor of every aspect of the détente experience. Nonetheless, it is necessary to examine the postwar period in its totality because the prospect of détente has always been a factor. Even in the most rigid moments of the Cold War, détente was an issue; the pursuit of Cold War at least implicitly entailed the rejection of détente, while the dangers of the Cold War induced a desire for détente. Part 2 of this thesis examines the period between 1945 and 1958 as a period in which the postwar alliance framework was established and the "ground rules" for relaxing the tensions of the Cold War were likewise identified. Part 3 examines the period 1958-1968 in which many of those ground rules were both applied and circumvented in various ways and by different alliance members in the pursuit of often disparate objectives. Part 4 then examines what is commonly known as the period of détente, 1969-1973, in which the US and FRG both cooperated and to some extent competed in a redefinition of the adversary relationship.

By the end of this thesis, it should be clear that détente is not a precisely identifiable condition and that elements of détente can be discerned even during periods of Cold War. The inherent limitations of détente as an alliance strategy relate to the interplay between perceptions of strength and perceptions of vulnerability within the alliance, with each providing an incentive for and an incentive against such a strategy. Moreover, these perceptions may apply differently to each alliance member according to how the strategy is shaped. This is a function of "linkage", common to both détente and Cold War strategies and an instrument in managing both alliance and adversary relationships.

---

[2] William R. Smyser, German-American Relations, The Washington Papers No.74 (Washington: SAGE, 1980), pp.12-14.

Before beginning the historical analysis of détente and US-FRG relations in the postwar era, we need to examine the two issues whose confluence provides the framework for this thesis: détente and the "German Problem". Because détente is a politically loaded word, it is useful to start by reviewing what has and has not happened during the period after 1969 to which that term is generally applied. With this empirical foundation, we can proceed to an analysis of détente itself: what it is; what it is not; if or in what respects it is distinct from "Cold War"; the elements of a détente strategy and its relation to "linkage"; and the dynamics of détente in an alliance context, particularly with respect to the US-FRG relationship. Finally, because these issues relate directly to the role of the FRG in the alliance and in the broader international system, we turn to a discussion of the "German Problem": it preceded and gave structure to the Cold War; it persisted in different forms and provided the cornerstone of détente; and it remains a central element in assessing the strength and vulnerability of the Western alliance and, as such, the nature and utility of détente.

CHAPTER 1

The Legacy of Détente

The period 1969-1973 witnessed the formalisation of a relationship between East and West that has been known as détente. In particular, it has taken the form of a variety of treaties involving, on the one hand, the United States and its European allies and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union (USSR) and its European allies. The cumulative effect of these treaty arrangements has been to recognise the existing political structure of Europe, to regulate in some respects the strategic military relationship between the two alliance systems, and to increase to some degree the level of transactions between East and West through commerce, exchange, travel and communication.

On the strategic level, this relationship was highlighted by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and the USSR, culminating in 1972 with the Interim Agreement and Protocol on Strategic Offensive Missiles and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, known collectively as SALT I.[3] The superpowers also signed a Basic Treaty of Relations Between the US and USSR and an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.[4] To some, these treaties represented an attempt to "codify" the superpower relationship. There were similar agreements limiting underground nuclear weapon tests, biological and chemical warfare, and the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space and the seabed. While SALT negotiations then proceeded in the hope of reaching follow-on agreements, discussion also began in 1973 between the members of the two alliances - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO or Warsaw Pact) - concerning the proposed reduction of conventional forces in Europe, generally known as Mutual and Balanced Free Reductions (MBFR). Almost simultaneously, the framework was further broadened in the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), whose agenda included not only security problems, but also economic relations and the issues of human rights, travel and communication.

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[3] On 26 May 1972. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Arms Control And Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, 1980), pp.139-57.

[4] On 26 May 1972 and 22 June 1973 respectively. See Survival (Vol.XIV, No.4, July-August 1972), pp.191-99 and ACDA, op.cit., pp.158-60.

Within this détente framework, the issue of Germany has been central. The division of Germany after World War II had preceded the eruption of the Cold War; the Cold War has sustained and hardened that division. Détente did not constitute an end to that division; rather, it was an attempt to overcome its injurious effects, while accepting that division. Indeed, if the diplomacy of the post-World War II period has accomplished anything in East-West relations, it has facilitated the process by which a variety of political forces have adjusted to that division. Thus, a keystone of the détente framework after 1969 has been the *Ostpolitik* of the Federal Republic of Germany. The *Ostverträge* ("Eastern Treaties") that the FRG concluded with the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia recognised the existing territorial boundaries of Central Europe and sought the normalisation of mutual relations.[5] More importantly, the FRG accepted the division of Germany into two states as a political fact. The FRG's interpretation of the Grundlagenvertrag ("Basic Treaty of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic") denied recognition of the GDR under international law and endorsed the continued aspiration to German reunification.[6] Nonetheless, the classical Junktim ("linkage") of West German foreign policy - that German reunification was a necessary element of East-West détente - had clearly been altered.

---

[5] The Moscow Treaty, signed on 12 August 1970, and the Warsaw Treaty, signed on 7 December 1970, were the key treaties. The Prague Treaty was not signed until 11 December 1973 and involved detailed legal considerations surrounding the validity of the 1938 Munich Agreement. See Bundespresse- und Informationsamt, *Dokumentation zur Entspannungspolitik der Bundesregierung: Ostpolitik* (Bonn, 1980), pp.13-28 and 50-62.

The essential linchpin between these two aspects of the détente framework was the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.[7] Signed by the US, USSR, United Kingdom (UK) and France on 3 September 1971, it reaffirmed continued Four Power responsibility for Berlin as established in the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945, provided explicit guarantees for Western ground as well as air access to West Berlin, and acknowledged the "organic ties" between the FRG and West Berlin. In short the reality of a divided Berlin - as well as a divided Germany - was accepted, while the parties emphasised the regulation of existing lationships so that Berlin would no longer be a focus of conflict or a lever of intimidation in the continuing competition between East and West. The FRG, while not a signatory to that agreement, played a key role in the coordination of the Western position. Ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in the West German Bundestag depended on a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin, while the US viewed Soviet cooperation on Berlin as a test of good will and the feasibility of a long-term détente relationship. Specifically, progress on SALT and

---

[6] Signed 21 December 1972. See Bundespresse- und Informationsamt, Dokumentation zur Entspannungspolitik der Bundesregierung: Deutschlandpolitik (Bonn, 1980), pp.43-73.

[7] See Survival (Vol.XIII, No.11, November 1971), pp.384-89.

CSCE, both seen as substantially in the Soviet interest, was linked in the American and official NATO views to progress on Berlin. Thus, the Berlin accord represented both an impetus for and a limitation to the broader East-West détente: successful agreement provided the foundation for further negotiations aimed at easing tensions across the East-West divide; simultaneously, it ensured that the process would be conducted within the existing alliance structure.

In addition to the negotiations on the strategic level and those relating to the European framework, there was a host of trade agreements and scientific, technical and cultural arrangements. On a more ephemeral level, détente was accompanied by a general hope that the increased interaction between East and West in a relatively cooperative atmosphere free from the unpredictability of crisis would allow some further reconciliation of mutual interests. Instead, one could argue that the increased interaction between East and West brought attention not so much to the existence of a common basis for mutual reconciliation but to the interests that remained in conflict.

This frustration occurred on virtually every level of interaction. The SALT process became a source of controversy within the NATO alliance and particularly in US domestic politics. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter withdrew the belatedly signed SALT II treaty[8] from ratification proceedings in the US Senate. President Reagan subsequently announced that he wanted to negotiate a new strategic arms control framework called START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), yet it was indicative of the prevailing scepticism that many viewed the offer as a rhetorical ploy. Negotiations in Geneva on Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

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[8] For the text, see ACDA, *op.cit.*, pp.207-39.

(LRTNF) began in November 1981; again, there was little expectation that agreement short of outright Soviet concessions - or a retreat from the NATO position - would preclude the controversial deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II weapons systems in NATO according to the December 1979 NATO "double decision".[9]

On related security issues, there were similar grounds for pessimism. Negotiations on MBFR seemed as fruitless as they were endless, although many discerned value in the very process of consultation and negotiation. Given NATO's persistent conventional inferiority and inherent reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, the increasing economic constraints on Western defence efforts gave little hope that this would change. MBFR cost little; even if it was unlikely to achieve either "balance" or "reduction", the possibility remained for agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) which rendered the existing state of affairs more stable. The CSCE had produced an agreement in Helsinki in 1975,[10] but its impact seemed marginal: to the extent that it contributed to domestic unrest in Eastern Eur its impact may even be viewed with ambivalence. Subsequent review sessions in Belgrade and Madrid offered a forum not only for mutual reconciliation but also for the exchange of hostile rhetoric, especially after the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. A concern for human rights, however justifiable, was not an issue that facilitated a détente process but one that brought ideological differences into sharper relief.

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[9] For the Foreign and Defence Ministerial communiqué see NATO Final Communiqués, 1975-1980 (Brussels: NATO Information Serivice, 1981), pp. 121-23.

[10] For the CSCE Final Act, signed 1 August 1975, see Survival (Vol.XXII, No.6, November-December 1975), pp.295-301.

One measure of the limitation of détente, and a source of frustration about it, was its effect on defence spending in the West. If détente were to reflect an end to the basic adversary relationship of East and West, one would have expected to see a relaxation in the confrontation of military forces across the European divide. That has certainly not happened. The debate over Soviet defence spending notwithstanding, there is no evidence that détente has entailed a lessened investment in defence in the East. Likewise, in the West, the defence investment remains constrained more by domestic political and economic factors than by any assessment that the potential military threat has decreased; in fact, since the mid-1970s, NATO governments have consistently emphasised a perceived deterioration in the East-

Fig. 1.



West military balance, as both sides continue to modernise their military forces. This is not the place to assess the complexities of the East-West military relationship; it is to stress that détente in general and arms control in particular have not resulted in any overall diminution of the imperative for continued investments in defence as a means to deter war. As Figure 1 suggests, national investment for defence, particularly in the FRG, UK and France, have shown a real increase throughout most of the 1970s. If one views defence spending in in terms of per cent of government spending, there is a decline in both the US and FRG, with the US making a marked increase beginning in 1980, while French and British expenditures show greater oscillation but ending the decade also on an increase. As a per cent of GNP, however, the FRG, UK and France have all remained within a range of 0.7% between 1970 and 1980, likewise with the US between 1975 and 1980.[11] By and large détente has had little long term effect on aggregate measures of Western defence investment. The greatest change has bee in the US, where defence spending witnessed, not surprisingly, a re decline after the war in Southeast Asia and significant increases after 1978, matched by a dramatic decline in public opposition to increases in defence spending.[12]

While the European divide seemed in many ways as resilient as ever, détente could perhaps have developed a foundation in superpower agreement to contain conflicts throughout the world and maintain general international stability. Yet no sooner had this prospect been raised than it was challenged in virtually every Third World region. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War has been cited as an example of such superpower cooperation, reflected in mutual restraint from encouraging one's client to pursue decisive victory. Paradoxically, this also involved an apparent "brinkmanship" in which both superpowers invoked military alert procedures to signal the involvement of their vital interests in the area.[13] Moreover, the Arab oil embargo and its profound reverberations on Western industrial economies highlighted a Western vulnerability to events outside the European theatre. The fall of Saigon in 1975, the increased employment of Cuban and East German "proxy" forces in Africa, the demise of the Shah of Iran and the humiliation associated with the American hostages in Tehran, plus the Soviet use of force in Afghanistan, all served to emphasise this Western and particularly American vulnerability.

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[11] Data on defence spending from International Institution for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance (London, annual issues 1975/1976 - 1980/1981).

[12] For an analysis of US attitudes on defence spending, based on Roper, Harris, and Gallup opinion polls, see Gebhard Schweigler, "Spannung und Entspannung: Reaktionen der Öffentlichkeit im Westen", in Josef Füllenbach, Eberhard Schulz, eds., Entspannung am Ende: Chancen und Risiken einer Politik des Modus Vivendi (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1980), pp.71-105, particularly pp.85-94.

Against this backdrop, détente began to be associated, from the mid-1970s onward, with the decline of American power. With the debates in the Western alliance over sanctions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or martial law in Poland and over the LRTNF modernisation in NATO, détente was further associated with a fragmentation of the alliance structure itself. Some declared détente to be dead. Others noted that it never really lived. Still others argued that détente could never have been more than a process of coping with the continued antagonism between East and West. Clearly, détente was an ambiguous notion, a metaphor for a host of state activities, associated benefits, and desired objectives, often of a conflicting nature depending on the viewpoint of its advocate. Equally clearly, détente - whatever it was - had not resolved the basic conflict of power and ideology between East and West. Yet some things had changed. The world had not altogether reverted to the brinkmanship of the Cold War. While the rhetoric often seemed threatening, neither antagonist seemed inclined to challenge directly the other's vital interests, particularly if that challenge involved military force.

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[13] See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 545-615. For an interesting quantitative analysis, suggesting that the period of détente has been associated with an increase in both conflict and cooperation indicators, see Daniel Frei and Dieter Ruloff, "Détente on Record: Applying Social Science Measurement Techniques to East-West Relations in Europe, 1975-1979", in Frei, ed., Definitions and Measurements of Détente: East and West Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981), pp. [illegible].

Moreover, the period had witnessed the settlement of some disputes between East and West, notably in Europe, resulting in an increase in East-West interaction, socially, economically and politically. It was not as much as many had expected or hoped, but the limitations reflected less a conscious desire to avoid interaction than an inherent limitation, given the distinct social, economic and political systems. Fundamentally, the world had become more interdependent. industrialised world (the "North") had become as dependent on the resources increasingly controlled by the power in the Third World (the "South") as the South was dependent on the technological capacity of the developed economies. Interaction between East and West, particularly in the economic domain, facilitated interdependence as well, even if it took the form of a debtor-creditor relationship in which neither could tolerate default. Within the respective alliance structures of East and West, interdependence increased, although not necessarily in the same ways. Fundamental differences in the two alliances notwithstanding, neither superpower could claim total dominance over its alliance partners. Thus, power had diffused, not only on a global scale, but also within the alliance structures that reflected the resilient bipolar structure of East-West security relations.

Détente was both a cause and an effect of this process of growing interdependence; détente was designed both to restrain it to make it manageable and to facilitate it. The first half of the 1970s represented a period of intense East-West negotiation that has, for a variety of reasons, not been maintained. Yet it has left the international system somewhat more interdependent, even if only coincidentally, so that even if détente were "dead", the world had surely not returned to the status quo ante. The fact that neither superpower could dictate to its alliance with impunity is partly a result of the increased interaction between East and West that affects some members more than others. Moscow did not necessarily derive any added leverage over Warsaw by the fact that 90% of Poland's total revenue was consumed by debt service in 1979 while only 18% of the Soviet Union's was:[14] to cause a collapse of that debt structure may well be a liability to the Soviet economy as well. Moreover, with West German banks holding a third of Poland's debt, the United States recognised that there were unacceptable costs both to the Federal Republic and to the other allies if it precipitated a default in dealing with the Polish crisis.[15]

In large measure, the debate over the utility of détente concerns the desirability of this interdependence. This is particularly marked in the US-FRG relationship, where the benefits of détente have been unevenly distributed. Here, arguments over economic policies are really a reflection of a deeper political debate about the extent to which increased interaction between East and West has changed the basic international structure. Yet East-West trade cannot be totally correlated with détente. In terms of absolute price value, East-West trade has certainly increased substantially in the 1970s. Raw figures, however, do not give an accurate picture because of the effect of inflation, the costs of energy, or the vagaries of exchange rates. Even assuming a real increase in trade flows between East and West, they have not always kept pace with the total expansion of trade. As Figure 2 indicates, the portion of total trade that the US, France and FRG have conducted with the Warsaw Pact did receive a substantial boost in the early 1970s, only to decline largely because of market and credit constraints; for the UK, there has in fact been a relatively steady decline since 1970.[16] Even though the FRG is generally viewed as the greatest economic beneficiary of the détente in Europe, and therefore the most vulnerable to its demise, West German trade with the Warsaw Pact has always been substantially more than that of the US, in doll value, irrespective of whether it was a period of détente or Cold War. In fact, in absolute terms, US trade with the Warsaw Pact grew faster in the 1970s than West German trade with the Warsaw Pact did. Moreover, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the portion of West German trade directed to the Warsaw Pact in 1979 is not substantially higher than it was in the late 1950s.

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[14] Data from the US National Foreign Assessment Center, cited in the Guardian, 28 September 1981.

[15] Thomas Blau and Joseph Kirchheimer, "European Dependence and Soviet Leverage: the Yamal Pipeline", Survival (Vol.XXIII, No.5, September-October 1981), p.211. On President Reagan's decision to subsidise American banks by covering Poland's debt payment to avoid a Polish default, see Washington Post, 2 February 1982. US banks held $2 billion of Poland's $16 billion indebtedness to the West; see the Economist, 28 December 1981.

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[16] Data for figures 2 and 3 compiled from the annual report, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries (1963-1980), supplemented by the following periodic sources: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Highlights of US Export and Import Trade; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade: A Supplement to International Financial Statistics; United Nations (UN), Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistische Jahrbuch für den Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Fig. 2.

Comparison of total trade (exports + imports) with the Warsaw Pact as a percentage of total world trade conducted by:



This is not to suggest that East-West trade has not produced a form of Western vulnerability. More to the point, it has created a differentiated vulnerability that has a direct bearing on relations between the United States and Western Europe. In 1979, for example, 18% of the US exports to the USSR were manufactured goods, including high technology items; in contrast, such goods constituted 96% of exports to the USSR from the FRG, Japan and Italy, 91% from the UK and 33% from France. Thus, the net export dependency of Western Europe is localised in the industrial and high technology sectors and, for the

US, in agriculture. US exports to the USSR dropped over 50% in 1980 by virtue of the embargo placed by President Carter on grain sales above the levels agreed upon in a 1975 multiyear contract.[17] We shall return to the implications of this differentiated vulnerability in the subsequent discussion on détente and linkage, but it is clear that not only has détente been accompanied by greater interdependence, it also takes on different forms.

A closer look at West German trade with the Warsaw Pact reveals a further irony in the relationship between détente and interdependence. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* had its primary political effect on its relations with the GDR, whose existence as a state had previously not been acknowledged; secondarily on its relations with Eastern Europe, with which normal diplomatic relations were established as a part of the *Ostpolitik*, and least of all with the USSR, with which Bonn had had diplomatic relations since 1955. Yet in trade terms, the positive effects have been in reverse order (see Figure 3): the portion of Bonn's trade that is with the GDR decreased somewhat after the *Gru lagenvertrag*, having already fallen dramatically during the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1962 from which it never recovered. Moreover, an increasing portion of that trade - considered "intra-German" trade by Bonn rather than foreign trade - is covered by Bonn's "swing credit"

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[17] Data from the *Economist*, 26 December 1981. For a more general discussion of FRG export dependency, see Claudia von Braunmühl, "Ist die 'Ostpolitik' Ostpolitik?", and Michael Kreile, "Ostpolitik und ökonomische Interessen", in Egbert Jahn and Volker Rittberger, eds., *Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Triebkräfte, Widerstände und Konsequenzen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1974), pp.13-28 and 71-94.

Fig. 3.



arrangement.[18] The increase in the portion of trade to Eastern Europe is accounted for predominantly by the increased trade with Poland, largely financed by West German banks.

The social dimension of détente likewise has its greatest impact in issues which uniquely affect West German interests. Bonn's acceptance of the political division of Germany into two states did not overturn its obligation under the Grundgesetz ("Basic Law" or FRG

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[18] See Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik: Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969-1979. Bericht und Dokumentation (Bonn, February 1980), pp.28-29.

Constitution) to seek reunification of the German nation.[19] Hence, Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was a policy to create conditions conducive to the free movement of Germans between the two German states - in many cases allowing the reunification of families - and the repatriation of German nationals in Eastern Europe and the USSR. To some extent it has been successful, particularly in the latter aspect, as Table 1 demonstrates.[20]

Year	USSR	Poland	Czech.	Hungary	Rumania	Total
1973	4494	8902	525	440	7577	21938
1974	6541	7825	378	423	8484	23651
1975	5985	7040	514	277	5077	18893
1976	9704	29366	849	233	3764	43916
1977	9274	32861	612	189	10989	53925
1978	8455	36102	904	269	12120	59850
1979	7226	36274	1058	370	9663	54591
1980	6954	26637	1733	590	15770	51684
Total	58633	185007	6573	2791	73444	326448
Estimated Remaining	1936000	?	61900	220000	316000	?

Table 1 - Migration of German Nationals to the FRG by Country of Origin, 1973-1980

Partial success, however, has highlighted the limitations of the process. The emigration of German nationals from Eastern Europe and the

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[19] See the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling, 31 July 1973, that the *Grundlagenvertrag* was not incompatible with the *Grundgesetz* because it "provides grounds in law for the Federal Government to do everything within its powers to change and do away with these inhuman conditions [at the intra-German border]", Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *op.cit.*, pp.232-243.

[20] Data kindly provided by the Bonn Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). See also the *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die grosse Anfrage der Fraktion der CDU/CSU vom 23. Dezember 1980: Zweites Folgetreffen der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa in Madrid*, prepared 16 June 1981. The estimates of the size of the remaining German national minority are according to the governments concerned; Poland denies a distinct German national minority.

Soviet Union represents perhaps 10% of the potential flow, with the most significant jump in emigration - from Poland - having been tied to economic arrangements agreed to in 1975.[21]

The limitations of détente are particularly marked in the case of intra-German relations, the improvement of which was the principal intent and justification of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. The GDR has consistently resisted Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, both in its formulation and in its implementation, through a policy of *Abgrenzung* ("demarcation").[22] Egon Bahr, Brandt's primary advisor in the formulation of his *Ostpolitik*, thus remarked six months after the signing of the *Grundlagenvertrag*, "Formerly we had no relations; now we have bad relations."[23] This is evident in the central measure of these relations, from Bonn's point of view: the flow of Germans across the intra-German border and within Berlin. Between 1970 and 1972, over a million East Germans travelled legally to the FRG and West Berlin each year. But all of these qualified for the exit permit because they were pensioners. After the *Grundlagenvertrag*, this number increased to a steady annual flow of 1.3 million pensioners. Some who were not categorised as pensioners were allowed to travel to the FRG and West Berlin after the Grundlagenvertrag, but the GDR has restricted this flow to approximately 40,000 per year, only 2% of the total. Meanwhile, refugees continued to flee to the West through the mid-1970s at a rate (over 5000 per year) consistent with the refugee flow of the latter half of the 1960s, declining to 3000-4000 per year after 1977.[24]

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[21] In October 1975, Poland and the FRG signed agreements on Pension and Accident Insurance, Payment of Pension Claims (entailing a 1.3 million DM "contribution" from the FRG), and Guarantee of Financial Credit (in which Bonn guaranteed 1 billion DM paid out over 3 years, to be repaid between 1980-2000 at 2.5% interest), to which a Protocol was added providing for the emigration of 120-125,000 German nationals over the next 4 years. See Bundespresse- und Informationsamt, *Ostpolitik*, pp.29-41.

[22] See N. Edwina Moreton, *The Impact of Détente on Relations between the States of the Warsaw Pact: Efforts to Resolve the German Problem and their Implications for East Germany's Role in Eastern Europe, 1967-1972* (PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1976), for an excellent analysis of the GDR's approach to *Ostpolitik* and the role played by the Soviet Union.

[23] See Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, *Summary Report of the Sixth European-American Conference: Europe between the Superpowers*, June 1973, p.44.

Flows from West to East in Germany have been considerably larger: after the Grundlagenvertrag, travel from the FRG doubled from an annual rate of 1.25 million in 1970-1972 to just under 3 million per year. West Berliners, denied crossing before the Quadripartite Agreement came into force (except for certain holidays in 1963-1966 and 1972), began to travel to East Berlin and the GDR at an annual rate of over 3 million.[25] Here the GDR balances the desire to restrict travel with a desire for the hard currency it gains by demanding that each entrant convert a specific amount into East German marks (1:1) that is not then reconvertible upon departure. Moreover, this provides the with a lever of manipulation on Bonn, as evidenced by its increas this amount in October 1980.[26]

Ostpolitik thus did not confer automatic benefits on the FRG. The increased interaction between the FRG and GDR has been sustained largely by a West German willingness to pay for these benefits. In addition to "swing credits" and duty-free trade, the individual cost of travel to the East, and the practice of paying "head money" to "buy" the emigration of certain individuals in the East, Bonn has also provided the bulk of the capital expense of creating the infrastructure for greater interaction: construction of the Berlin-Hamburg Autobahn (1.2 billion DM), repair by the GDR of transit waterways to Berlin (120 million DM) and the Teltow Canal in Berlin (70 million DM), plus the growth between 1970 and 1978 from 34 to 941 telephone lines.[27] There is broad bipartisan support in the FRG for these efforts, stemming from the continued desire of most West Germans for reunification despite the fact that few expect it to be achieved.[28]

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[24] See footnote 20, supra; also Bundesministerium für innerdeutschen Beziehungen, op.cit., p.44, and passim for various commercial and noncommercial flow measures.

[25] Ibid.

[26] On 10 October 1980, the GDR announced a new requirement for all adults to convert 25DM, 7.50DM for children aged 6-16. Previously it had cost 13DM to cross into the GDR, 6.50DM to cross into East Berlin, with pensioners and children under 16 exempt. Within the first week, the eastward flow fell to 60% of the previous rate. See the Economist, 18 October 1980 and 21 February 1981.

The central issue, though, is the price that should be paid for the benefits - both actual and political - of détente. On the one hand, one can argue that the FRG is a "hostage" to détente, because these benefits derive from a willingness to make certain concessions, either economically or politically. Clearly, détente, whatever its limitations, has brought greater benefits to the FRG than to its allies. That was to be expected, simply because the potential for improvement was so much greater, because the benefits were more tangible and direct, and because the issues that were resolved during this period of détente were all (except for SALT) German issues. For other members of the alliance, the US especially, détente has produced few tangible benefits; perhaps fewer were expected, however, because the issues were not defined the same way as they were in the FRG. Yet the rest of the alliance members remain "hostages" to détente in their own ways as well, not only because of the economic interaction that has ensued, but also because of the persistent need to regulate the military relationship, a primary motivation behind détente in the first place. In this sense, the alliance remains a principal element in this process, hence the argument over the effects of détente on the alliance. It emerges in different forms: debates over levels of defence spending, methods of crisis management, and discreet forms of East-West interaction which reflect the differentiated vulnerability and distribution of benefits among alliance members. This thesis argues that such issues are symptomatic of a deeper issue within the Western alliance that has special significance to US-FRG relations: specifically, the need to adapt to a more interdependent international environment in which détente has played a part in increasing that interdependence, yet in which détente has also not resolved the basic postwar adversary conflict. Before going any further, it is therefore necessary to analyse, in the light of this legacy, what détente is and how it relates to the dynamics of alliance politics.

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[27] Hansjürgen Schierbaum, Intra-German Relations: Development, Problems, Facts (Munich: Tuduv, 1979), pp.48ff.

[28] An Allensbach opinion poll of August 1981 showed that 62% "greatly desired" reunification, including 44% under the age of 30, and 72% among those who associate themselves with the opposition Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). Only 13%, however, believed reunification would occur. These results were virtually unchanged from a previous poll in 1976. Economist, 23 August 1981.

CHAPTER 2

Détente and Alliance Politics

Literally a "relaxation of tensions", détente has a fuller meaning suggested by its usage outside of the realm of international relations. Derived from the French détendre, it connotes, like the German word Entspannung, a release of built-up tension, as an archer releasing the drawn string of a bow. Likewise, a trigger on a firearm is a détente. In fluid dynamics, it refers to the process of expansion following compression, as in a jet engine. These connotations suggest that détente is a process of returning to a normal state of calm and relaxation: the tension of a tight fist (être dur à la détente) is artificial and contrived, just as the cocking of a gun, the pulling back of a bow string, or the compression of an airflow are somehow disruptive of the "natural order".

In applying these connotations to international politics, we might define détente as the relaxation of tensions between states, which tension is sufficiently relaxed to allow a more "normal" condition in interstate relations to emerge. Three implications follow. First, détente entails a transition from a condition of high tension, presumed to be abnormal as in mutual confrontation, to a condition of lesser tension, perhaps cooperation or mutual understanding (entente). Second, détente assumes the pre-existence of an adversary relationship, so that one would not expect to find the term applied to a relationship among allies. Third, détente is a unidirectional process: while it makes sense to characterise the transition from confrontation to cooperation as détente, it does not follow that the increase of tension accompanying a change from cooperation to confrontation can also be called a détente. Thus, détente might describe a transition from the mutual confrontation of adversary states to a more normal interstate relationship, brought about by the relaxation of tensions that had previously characterised that confrontation.

This definition, however, begs certain questions. What is a "normal" relationship: is "normalisation" synonymous with détente? Much has been written to elaborate the differences between supposed Western notions of détente and the Soviet formulation of radzriadka, the latter referring to "international conditions leading to the fulfilment of the principles of peaceful coexistence".[1] The etymological roots of the word détente suggest that conflict is an abnormal state of affairs, but this contrasts with the Marxist-Leninist presumption that conflict is normal and "peaceful coexistence" is a different form of conflict: "Détente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it alter, the laws of the class struggle."[2] In the physical world, the definition of détente leads one immediately to a consideration of what follows, because that is identifiable, subject to physical laws, and, in the examples cited above, virtually immediate: the bow string and trigger return to their previous positions having released their projectiles; the compressed gases expand to produce thrust. In the political world, however, what follows détente may not be identifiable; it is certainly ambiguous; moreover, it may be immaterial. Arguably, the relaxation of tensions as manifested in the adversary relationship may in itself be a good thing, even if, as in the Marxist-Leninist view, the underlying tensions of the basic conflict remain. As such, it may be more meaningful to think of détente not as a transitional phenomenon but as a characterisation of an interstate relationship. That relationship may remain an adversary one, but reference to détente would imply that the outward manifestation of tension is somewhat less than that which obtained in mutual confrontation.

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[1] See, for example, Albert L. Weeks, The Troubled Détente (New York: New York University, 1976) and Richard Pipes, "Détente: Moscow's View", in Pipes, ed., Soviet Strategy in Europe (New York: Crane Russak, 1976), pp.3-44.

[2] Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, 24 February 1976, in Survival (Vol.XVIII, No.3, May-June 1976), pp.123-26.

Since détente need not be seen as a transition of an adversary relationship to a non-adversary one but as an alternative to mutual confrontation in which a conflict of basic interests remains, this brings us closer to what is more commonly known as détente as it is applied to the East-West relationship at various times since 1945. Détente is thus seen as the condition of international relations that superseded a previous condition called the Cold War. Yet, this is still not a very precise notion. Most discussions focus on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, examining the nature of, potential for, or limitations to a superpower détente. Others examine détente less as a global phenomenon between two superpowers but rather look to its European setting, drawing attention the relationship between the countries of Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Alternatively, discussions tend to be functionally oriented, emphasising détente in the contexts of, for instance, arms control, crisis management, economic relationships or human rights. What then is the scope of détente? Can it be limited geographically, or to certain functional relationships? How much tension must be abated, and for how long, before one can properly declare the existence of a détente? Does détente necessitate substantive agreement between adversaries on specific issues, or is the attenuation of hostile polemic sufficient? These questions are largely rhetorical, since they depend upon variables which cannot be measured and which are dynamic over time and contingent upon context. Thus, one cannot even associate détente with *rapprochement*, because the lessening of tensions does not necessarily imply an increase in cooperation or even a convergence of views; mutual indifference, as in the respect for spheres of influence, may suffice.

While there may be no way to view détente as an objective condition in international relations, we may still view it as a kind of relationship. In this way, we can accept definitions of détente such as a "limited adversary relationship"[3] or as a "mode of management of adversary power".[4] The former highlights by its ambiguity the imprecision of the concept while acknowledging that the adversary nature of the relationship is somehow mitigated but not altogether eliminated. The latter suggests even more directly that détente is a process of state interaction, distinct from other kinds of state interaction, according to the nature of tension in that relationship or at least the form in which that tension manifests itself. This brings us to two questions which are important to our understanding of détente in the postwar world: what is the nature of the adversary relationship, and what role does tension play in it?

In the post-1945 international order, the central adversary relationship has been that between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other. It has been both a clash of ideology and a rivalry of power, restrained not by geography but by the limitations of military power as an acceptable means of resolving conflict, both despite and because of the role of nuclear weapons. It is a clash of vital interests, which gives rise to the tensions of the adversary relationship that distinguish it from the tensions that may also exist in other interstate relationships. The management of tensions is inherent in this bipolar conflict: it is how that tension has been managed that defines the nature of that adversary relationship. A simple distinction between "Cold War"and "détente" thus suggests itself: the maintenance of tension is a characteristic of Cold War, while the reduction of tension is a characteristic of détente. In neither Cold War nor détente has the basic conflict of ideology or power rivalry been resolved, because that conflict remains defined in terms of vital national interests. As such, the conflict is viewed in terms of a zero-sum game: as in war, gain on one side is loss on the other.

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[3] Marshall D. Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1966), p.100.

[4] Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era* (London: Martin Robinson, 1977), p.1.

Clashes of vital interests, however, take place not in a vacuum but in the context of specific disputes. One can distinguish between the basic conflict between East and West and the disputes which gi form to that conflict. The former is broader, perhaps inherent in the structure of the international system in which the competition of power and ideology can only be resolved by the internal transformation of one or the other adversary, their surrender of vital interests or war. The latter is issue-specific and potentially more amenable to resolution. Thus, while the basic conflict exists in a largely zero-sum framework, the disputes need not be: certain disputes may, under certain circumstances, contain sufficiently common ground so that agreement might be possible despite the resilient conflict. In this way, we can account for the persistence of conflict between East and West into the 1980s while understanding those political forces that allowed, for example, the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, the evolution of arms control, an increase in East-West trade, or, notably, the West German *Ostverträge* and the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement.

There are essentially three ways in which disputes can be resolved. First, there can be an externally contrived settlement, either because a superior power outside of the conflict imposes and enforces a settlement on the adversaries, or because the adversaries themselves agree to surrender themselves to arbitration or adjudication by a third party. Secondly, the adversaries can resort to mutual negotiation, either bilaterally or with the help of mediation. Finally, one adversary can impose a settlement on the other because it possesses sufficient power, influence, or leverage to compel or induce acceptance by the other. In the absence of a superior state or supranational power capable of imposing and enforcing a settlement between the superpowers, agreement has only been possible in the instance of mutual interest (such as the examples listed above) or when one or the other has been faced with predominant power forcing it to yield (for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis).

Although there is no exact definition of détente, one is able to point to certain times in the postwar period when it existed or had the potential for existing. Their common element has been either the achievement of agreement settling certain disputes (Austria, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT, the Ostverträge, and Berlin) or the anticipation of such agreement (the Berlin and Geneva Conferences of 1954, 1955 and 1959; the "Spirit" of Geneva and Camp David; the 1967 Johnson-Kosygin meeting at Glassboro; the Nixon/Ford-Breshnev summits of 1972-1974; and the launching of CSCE and MBFR negotiations). We can therefore suggest a further distinction between Cold War and détente. Détente is characterised by the recognition of shared interests by adversaries, sufficient to motivate them to seek mutually acceptable agreement on certain disputed issues, notwithstanding the continued existence of the basic conflict that divides them. This is distinct from Cold War, in which one or both of the adversaries views such disputes as embodying the same zero-sum framework that characterises the basic conflict: because those disputes are defined in the context of the same vital interests in which the broader conflict is defined, they are seen as no more negotiable than the basic conflict.

The complexity of détente derives from three main sources: the proliferation of actors, the multiplicity of disputes and the elasticity of vital interests. This suggests that détente and Cold War can exist simultaneously: they are not mutually exclusive conditions of international relations but reflect two distinct processes that characterise the adversary relationship under different circumstances as the adversaries themselves manage the tensions of their relationship. This raises the possibility that détente is divisible, applying either to certain issues or to certain relationships in the East-West framework. The key variable is the definition of vital interests, which ma change over time; be identified differently by each member of an liance structure; and be applied uniquely to individual disputes either because the dispute itself does not involve vital non-negotiable interests, or because adversaries have redefined these vital interests in terms that allow negotiation where it was not possible before. The former case may not necessarily involve a détente, because, if the dispute was not initially defined in terms of a clash of vital interests, its resolution may not entail a relaxation of tension in the adversary relationship. Agreement on consular practices, or the agreement not to exploit Antarctica for military purposes may not be indicative of détente.[5] If there is a redefinition of vital interests as applied to a dispute, however, that will generally be accompanied by a relaxation of tensions; we may more properly associate that with détente. The reformulation of German reunification that accompanied Brandt's Ostpolitik not only allowed the signature of the Ostverträge but contributed to the achievement of other agreements that had heretofore been impeded by the Western insistence that German reunification be an integral part in the settlement of East-West disputes. Likewise, Soviet redefinition of its interests in Austria in the mid-1950s facilitated agreement on the Austrian State Treaty.[6]

Settlement of these disputes did not remove the basic adversary conflict. The appearance of a détente stemmed from agreement on substantive issues that had previously been viewed in a zero-sum framework. It also lent credibility to the idea that agreement in one area might lead to the identification of other areas of common interest and a further relaxation of that zero-sum framework. That has only happened to a limited extent. But the analysis so far suggests another perspective by which we might understand détente. Because a key variable is the definition of vital interests by individual states in an adversary relationship, we may examine détente not so much as something that exists, but as something that states do. Rather than taking a detached view of the international system, in which we observed the interaction of adversary states, we now focus on the state actor and speak in terms of a détente policy. As such, we can distinguish between détente as a policy goal, to be pursued by a state for its own value, and détente as a strategy that states pursue because it leads to the fulfilment of other goals. The latter suggests that détente is not an absolute value but has value relative to particular circumstances. If détente is a relative value, however, then the value of tension in adversary relations is equally relative.

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[5] The Antarctica Treaty, signed 1 December 1959, was the first postwar arms control agreement. See ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, 1980), pp.19-27.

[6] See Bohlen's account, as US ambassador to Moscow, to Secretary of State Dulles, of Moscow's reasoning behind its acceptance of the Austrian State Treaty, in Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p.375. For the treaty, see Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pp.226-39.

The notion of détente thus presumes the pre-existence of an adversary relationship, characterised by a conflict of vital interests, in which the presence of tension is a manifestation of that conflict. While tension derives from conflict, there is a cyclical relationship between conflict and tension: on the one hand, one needs to eliminate the conflict before one can remove the tension, since the symptom will remain as long as its causes exist; on the other hand, one can attempt to treat the symptoms, assuming that the abatement of tension will facilitate the resolution of conflict. If we pursue a medical analogy, we can discern a further complication of this cyclical relationship. To take aspirin to relieve a fever caused by infection does not affect the source of infection: it merely returns the body temperature to normal. This obviously has its utility because the symptom of fever has its own harmful effects independent of the threat posed by infection. Yet to treat only the symptom may in fact exacerbate the original threat to the body's health: without an antibiotic, the infection may continue to rage unchecked. In that case, what has been accomplished is the suppression of a natural mechanism by which the body warns that it is in danger. In the same way, tension can play a useful role in international relations: it can signal the existence of conflict and stimulate appropriate measures to deal with that conflict;

conversely, the abatement of tension, while useful to mitigate the adverse effects of tension (for instance, war), may also induce a false sense of health, in which the search for a resolution of the conflict may appear unnecessary.

One difference between this analogy and the reality of international conflict is that, while it is generally just as easy to take an antibiotic and treat the infection as it is to take aspirin and treat its symptoms, it is not always as easy to resolve conflict as it is to deal with the tension it creates. This difference does not invalidate the analogy as much as it gives it greater poignancy. Because it is sometimes easier to deal with the tensions created by conflict, there may be political pressure to do so, even if it militates against a satisfactory treatment of the conflict. An extreme illustration of this is appeasement: making unilateral concessions to an aggressive power in the hope that, in treating the symptom (e.g. territorial demands), one can somehow cure the disease (e.g. the aggrandisement of power). Indeed, there are those who would liken détente in the postwar era to the appeasement of an insatiable expansionist power. But this is an extreme application of the analogy: it assumes that one adversary represents an infectious agent, the elimination of which constitutes the only possible resolution of conflict since it threatens the organic health of the other adversary.

To some extent, this extreme application of the analogy reflects a classic Cold War attitude that prevailed in the official position of both Washington and Bonn through most of the 1950s. The essence of "containment" and the "policy of strength" was that the basic conflict of power and ideology could not be resolved through negotiation: settlement of disputes was synonymous with victory in the Cold War. Military power played a central role, not because it was directly usable as a means of resolving either the basic conflict or individual disputes, but because it was a symbol of political power. Western strength was the antidote to the "infection" of Communism; any relaxation of tension threatened to undermine Western unity and the willingness to sacrifice necessary to create and sustain that strength. Thus, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that "the cement of Western unity disintegrates when there is less fear", as he bemoaned what he saw as a diminution of Western resolve in the aftermath of the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955.[7]

Yet, to return to the analogy, suppose that the fever was not caused by an infection at all, but reflected a chronic condition to which there was no specific antidote, which nonetheless created recurring fever, but which in itself did not constitute a vital threat to the body's general health. The cure may itself be more dangerous than the condition; it is appropriate to ameliorate the symptoms by taking aspirin, because the greatest danger is the persistence of a high fever. Indeed, to let the body's tocsin sound may itself exacerb the condition by reducing the body's resistance. For a state to pursue, rather than avoid, a détente strategy, therefore, would be like taking aspirin in this case: the fever of tension is more dangerous than its cause. Thus, while Dulles worried about the effects of détente on Western cohesion, he further noted:[8]

> No one would want to re-create that fear. And do not forget this has also had some effect on the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. We cannot see it in progress all the time, but we can be sure there is more assertion of independent rights and processes. These are great but invisible gains...

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[7] Dulles, in a background briefing to newsmen in October 1955, in Robert Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1960), p.156.

[8] Ibid.

Contained within that statement are two elements of détente that continue to be cited in the West in its favour: not only is there utility in dealing with the detrimental effects of tension that arise from the adversary relationship; it may also be useful as a weapon against the chronic condition that remains.

Simple analogies often lose their usefulness when rigidly applied to complex issues; this is no exception. Nevertheless, it highlights a dilemma for states engaged in an irreconcilable adversary relationship characterised by high tension: the relaxation of tensions has a conditional utility. If we view détente as part of a state's strategy in managing an adversary relationship, then the decision to pursue a détente strategy will rest on how a state diagnoses the cause of tension in the adversary relationship and assesses the risks or utility associated with that tension.

Détente is thus a strategy of managing an adversary relationship by attenuating the outward manifestation of tension to achieve certain ends. Its value is relative; its ends are ambiguous. It may be a weapon employed by a state to further its objectives in resolving the adversary conflict to its own advantage. Indeed, both sides have remained suspicious that détente was in reality only an expedient by which the adversary changed the medium of conflict: not in fact relaxing the basic tensions of the adversary relationship but modifying the context in which those tensions were manifest, perhaps even hoping that tensions within the opposing alliance would increase. There are some in the West who remain convinced that the Soviet Union has pursued détente to freeze the status quo and gain Western endorsement of its postwar sphere of influence. Likewise, the East has seen in détente a capitalist attempt to defend the status quo in the face of inexorably rising "correlation of forces" in favour of the socialist system. Conversely, socialist countries have feared that détente was a veiled attempt by the West to restore lost German territories, undermine Soviet control in Eastern Europe, and destabilise the postwar system. Similarly, the West has sometimes viewed détente as a Soviet bid to undermine Western resolve, solve its economic problems, and pursue aggressive designs on the periphery of the central conflict.

These mutual suspicions justifiably arise because détente has not involved a resolution of the basic postwar adversary conflict. Détente contains both a defensive and an offensive element: on the one hand, a vehicle to stabilise the balance of power between East and West; on the other hand, a vehicle to undermine the adversary's alliance system. In this respect it resembles the Cold War: "containment" and "liberation" by other means. What distinguishes it from Cold War is that there also exist certain shared interests, because circumstances have effected a redefinition of vital interests relating to some disputes sufficient to allow negotiations to proceed with the prospect for agreement. In addition to the examples cited previously, we sho also point to some willingness on the part of the US and USSR to contain conflict in parts of the world which threaten to embroil them in war; to regulate their strategic relationship to avoid war through accident or miscalculation; and to pursue arms control to stabilise the military relationship, preclude surprise attack and decrease the economic burdens of arms procurement. This common desire to avoid war existed throughout the Cold War as well. Yet, both sides viewed military power as a measure of political strength and focused on the increase of military power as a means of securing its objectives in the Cold War through political pressure. This was inherent in the Western insistence on securing a position of strength before entering into negotiations in which Soviet concessions were to be expected. This is still an element of Western approaches to negotiations.[9] But while strength may remain a precondition to negotiation, vulnerability provides an impetus for negotiation. As this thesis demonstrates, the pursuit of détente, especially in the military realm, is particularly influenced by the interaction of both strength and vulnerability and the definition of vital interests in the context of these two factors.

The existence of a basic adversary conflict, coupled with a common desire to avoid a war that might destroy both adversaries, suggests that it was always possible to pursue a détente strategy designed to establish certain "ground rules" as to how that conflict would be managed. As such, it would be unnecessary to resolve that conflict or even to settle those disputes which were irreconcilable. Even if one could not relax the tensions of the basic conflict, one could at least reduce the tension that stemmed from the fear of war, thereby minimising the adverse effects of tension. This has been the argument for a military détente ever since the mid-1950s. A central question has been whether a military détente should exist in isolation to the political disputes that accompany the basic conflict. In other words, it is an issue of "linkage".

"Linkage", like "détente", is an ambiguous concept. On the one hand, linkage is used to describe a causal relationship between specific disputes: that a resolution of one dispute is a prerequisite to the resolution of another because of the structure of those disputes. For instance, agreement on the reunification of Germany necessitates agreement on the status of Berlin. That is a structural linkage rather than a contrived linkage: one does not *choose* to link them; a *de facto* link exists. More commonly, however, "linkage" is used to describe an element of strategy in dealing with a set of issues which are not necessarily linked but which are deliberately linked, so that one chooses to make the resolution of one issue a precondition to agreement on another issue. Thus, while Henry Kissinger described the linkage between Brandt's Ostpolitik, Four Power agreement on Berlin, and other issues as "inherent", he was not talking about a necessary link but about a desired link made possible by existing political circumstances:[10]

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[9] See, for example, President Ronald Reagan's State of the Union Message, 26 January 1982, *New York Times*, 27 January 1982.

> The Federal Republic did not have the bargaining tools to conduct its Ostpolitik on a purely national basis... Linkage was inherent. If Ostpolitik was to succeed, it had to be related to other issues involving the Alliance as a whole; only in this manner would the Soviet Union have incentives for compromise.

In the same way, President Nixon spoke, in his first press conference, of the need to relate progress in strategic arms talks to "progress on outstanding political problems at the same time".[11]

This notion of linkage as an element of strategy is important to this discussion because it relates to one's view of the utility of détente strategy. In viewing a potential negotiating agenda on which a détente relationship between adversaries might be built, the strategic question is this: within the array of disputed issues contained within the basic adversary conflict of power and ideology, are the issues in which shared interests exist to be negotiated in isolation, or are they to be linked to the resolution of other issues that in themselves are less amenable to resolution? If so, which issues are to be linked with which other issues? Thus, Nixon and Kissinger began by making progress on SALT dependent on Soviet cooperation on other issues, explicitly the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and, eventually, Berlin. Ultimately, a complex linkage network emerged relating to SALT, MBFR, CSCE, Berlin, FRG ratification of the Ostverträge, and trade and exchange agreements.

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[10] Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1979), p.411. Emphasis added.

[11] White House Press Conference, 27 January 1969, discussed in Bernard Kalb and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (London: Hutchinson, 1974), pp.104-05, and David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (London: Robson, 1974), p.126.

Linkage was not, however, an American invention. Willy Brandt, as the Mayor of Berlin, advocated such a strategy in 1962:[12]

> As far as we can comprehend, [Khrushchev's] purpose is threefold: (1) to avoid atomic war; (2) to weaken the Western alliance; and (3) to draw the uncommitted nations into his orbit. On one point his interests coincide with our interests: we both want to prevent a military collision of the nuclear powers. That is the point when leverage can be applied to extend the range of common interests, the point of urgency where all want to see coexistence established on a firmer footing and when arguments for joint action by the rivals are possible - joint actions that could have far broader ramifications than the question of arms control with which they are directly concerned.

Brandt was responding to a growing interest in the US in arms control as a means of regulating the superpower strategic relationship to limit the adverse effects of tension, independent of the solution of outstanding political issues. Not unlike Kissinger's later application of linkage, this was a means of inducing Soviet cooperation on other issues which, for Brandt, meant "overcoming" the division of Germany and Berlin in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall.

But this kind of linkage can be an element of both Cold War and détente strategies. In advocating linkage, Brandt and Adenauer shared a desire to avoid a military settlement that froze the division of Germany. Yet there was a fundamental difference. Brandt advocated linkage to expand the area of agreement on issues which he believed to be negotiable: the increase of contacts between East and West Germany and within Berlin. Adenauer employed linkage to restrict the area of agreement: the *Junktim* was designed to keep German reunification and arms control as a package; emphasis on partial solutions relating to Berlin or Germany only threatened to lead to an acceptance of the *status quo*. The difference between linkage as a détente strategy and as a Cold War strategy is in the extent to which it is applied: the increased willingness to pursue arms control independent of progress on German reunification, for example, is a characteristic of Western détente strategy, particularly as it evolved after 1962. In many respects, American willingness to continue a détente strategy with the Soviet Union related to its willingness to pursue arms control independent of its view of Soviet cooperation in other issues. Likewise, West German pursuit of détente was directly related to Bonn's willingness to set aside the demand for reunification and to broaden East-West interaction without that precondition.

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[12] The Gustav Pollack Lecture at Harvard University, October 1962, published as The Ordeal of Coexistence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1963), p.19.

We can therefore relate a state's attitude about linkage and the extent of its application to its view of détente as an appropriate strategy for dealing with the adversary relationship. What a state deems appropriate for inclusion in a linkage framework is related to how expendable the benefits are that would be derived from agreement on that issue in isolation. If, for example, trade produces certain mutual economic benefits, then to withhold that trade as a means of inducing concessions on other issues denies that benefit not only to the adversary but also to the state employing linkage. Perhaps of greater significance, if a state makes participation in arms control negotiations dependent on an adversary's cooperation in other issues, it implies both a willingness to forego those benefits if that cooperation is not forthcoming plus an assumption that the adversary state needs those benefits more than the state employing linkage. To the extent, however, that mutual vulnerability was the basis for a shared interest in arms control, then such a linkage may not in fact apply.

Agreement on arms control or on other disputed issues may also produce a variety of associated benefits: an ability to manage crises more effectively; simplification of security problems to more calculable dimensions; prospects for the reallocation of budgeting resources; new trade, marketing and investment patterns; minority emigration and regime liberation; increased travel and enhanced opportunities for scientific and academic exchange; technology transfers; even greater opportunities for intelligence penetration. Within an alliance and even within an individual state's pluralistic and bureaucratic structure, these benefits will be valued differently, as will be the costs associated with securing these benefits. In the final analysis, advocates for détente may be advocates for the particular benefits that they associate with such a strategy.

This contributes to the political volatility that has accompanied the formulation of a Western détente strategy and the employment of linkage within it. Kissinger's critics in the US urged the extension of linkage to Soviet domestic practices, making the approval of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status for the USSR contingent upon evidence of increased Jewish emigration from the USSR.[13] President Carter varied the application of linkage, pressing the human rights aspect but not agreeing that arms control should be dependent upon Soviet good behaviour in other areas. Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, SALT seemed good for its own sake; subsequently, Soviet "adventurism" was grounds for removing the controversial SALT II treaty from Senate ratification proceedings and imposing economic sanctions including an embargo on grain sales to the USSR.[14] The Reagan Administration has further modified the application of linkage. While declaring its abiding belief in linkage, it nonetheless lifted the grain embargo as more costly to the US economy than to the Soviet economy.[15] Moreover, the US continued discussions in Geneva on Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), despite the imposition of martial law in Poland, acknowledging a "fundamental advantage to the West as well as to the East" in the continuation of a dialogue seeking control of nuclear weapons.[16] While Reagan pressured the alliance to impose sanctions on the USSR, grain sales and arms control were not a clear part of that linkage strategy.

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[13] With the Jackson-Vanik amendments to the Soviet Trade Bill of 1974, leading to Soviet renunciation of the 1972 joint trade agreement. See Michael Kaser, "Soviet Trade Turns to Europe", Foreign Policy (Number 19, Summer 1975), pp.123-35.

This brief summary of American linkage politics since Kissinger suggests three distinct sources of vulnerability contributing to decision-making. One is a strategic vulnerability, which remains an argument for arms control, although it may also be employed as an argument against it. A second is a vulnerability to domestic politic pressures, not only for exploiting linkage to affect Soviet behaviour both in international crises and in domestic affairs, but also not to exploit certain issues such as grain sales or arms control. Finally, there is a vulnerability to alliance pressure, certainly evident in the US agreement both to initiate and to continue LRTNF negotiations. Linkage is therefore a constrained policy instrument, as is the employment of a détente strategy acceptable to diverse political elements. In short, if, in the Cold War, linkage was restricted by the paucity of levers that existed as a result of low East-West interaction, détente, in expanding the levers of influence to manage the adversary relationship, creates its own limitations because of the costs of exploiting this linkage.

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[14] See Carter's speech of 4 January 1980, in Survival (Vol.XXII, No.2, March-April 1980), pp.66-68.

[15] See Reagan's interview in Reader's Digest (February 1982), pp.49-54.

[16] Secretary of State Alexander Haig at a news conference on 6 January 1982 during the visit of FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. "START" negotiations, deferred by the Reagan Administration because of the "deterioration" of the situation in Poland (Washington Post, 22 January 1982), were again emphasised in Reagan's Eureka, Illinois speech (New York Times, 10 May 1982) and began on 30 June 1982.

Linkage is not only an instrument to tie agreement on one issue to other issues. It also has a broader, more positive approach:[17]

> Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis... By acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it could lose by a return to confrontation.

In this way, Kissinger explained why it was not useful to withhold the benefits of agreement in one area until agreement in all other areas was forthcoming. Linkage was thus a strategy of balance and contradiction: withholding the carrot until Moscow made certain concessions while at the same time delivering the carrot as an inducement to further cooperation:[18]

> Over time, trade and investment may lessen the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

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[17] Statement of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, "The Process of Détente", delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 September 1974, in Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, Third Edition, 1977), pp.143-76, here pp.149-50.

[18] Ibid., pp.159-60.

Kissinger hoped to encourage a redefinition of vital interests on the part of the Soviet Union so that the continuing adversary relationship did not threaten a stable world order. It derived from the premise that the lack of interaction in the Cold War had not succeeded in transforming the Soviet system into a "legitimate" power; by inducing greater interdependence between East and West, the West might in fact enjoy greater leverage by threatening to withhold the new benefits.

This, too, was not a novel concept. In employing a détente strategy to induce a transformation of the adversary's view of the international order, it resembles the ideas advocated at various times by de Gaulle, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Gerhard Schröder and Egon Bahr. Bahr, as Brandt's Press Secretary in 1963, introduced the concept of Wandel durch Annäherung ("change through coming together") into the West German debate, suggesting that German reunification would result from a "process of many steps and stations": rather than inducing East German cooperation by isolating the Pankow regime, thus reinforcing the ties between the USSR and the GDR, reunification could be advanced by "overcoming" the division of Germany through the creation of a network of social and economic and eventually political interaction.[19] Schröder, the West German Foreign Minister from 1961 to 1966, applied a similar assumption, but expressly directed his Politik der Bewegung ("Policy of Movement") at Eastern Europe in the hope of isolating the GDR and inducing greater Eastern European independence from Moscow.[20]

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[19] See Bahr's speech to the Protestant Academy of Tutzing, 15 July 1963, in Boris Meissner, ed., Die Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation) (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp.45-48.

[20] See Schröder's speech, "Deutschland, Europa, und die freie Welt", at the CDU Party Convention at Dortmund, 11 June 1962, in Meissner, op.cit., pp.33-34; also his reply to a question about Bahr's speech in an interview with Deutsche Fernsehen, 19 July 1963, ibid., pp.49-53.

Like both Schröder and Bahr, Brzezinski and de Gaulle resisted détente strategy that was based on a mutual Soviet-American interest in maintaining the status quo. Like Schröder, Brzezinski and de Gaulle emphasised interaction with Eastern Europe to undermine Soviet influence and isolate the GDR. Unlike Schröder, however, both urged FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and posited the unification of Europe in advance of any unification of Germany. What distinguishes de Gaulle and Brzezinski was the issue of alliance leadership: de Gaulle hoped to assert France's independence of the Western alliance, while Brzezinski advocated "peaceful engagement" as a means of retaining American leadership in the alliance.[21]

What Bahr, Schröder, de Gaulle and Brzezinski had in common was a shared interest in transforming the status quo in Europe by initiating East-West interaction designed to break down the division of Germany and Europe. Clearly, there were significant differences among them, to which we shall return later. While Kissinger shared their desire to create an interdependence to be exploited for particular ends - a form of linkage - he also sought to induce a Soviet interest in maintaining what he saw as a stable international order, even if that entailed an acceptance of an "organic relationship" between the Soviet Union and

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[21] Compare Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), pp.131ff. and Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp.164-65 and 172. This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 13.

Eastern Europe.[22] Linkage, then, involves specific political issues, different political targets, and disparate political goals that need to be related to a state's assessment of the utility of a détente strategy. It is this which gives the question of détente poignance in an alliance context.

In its simplest sense, an alliance is a voluntary association of states so that a collective benefit will derive from collective action. In practical terms, this implies that each member surrender - perhaps jealously - at least some degree of its independence or freedom of action for the good of the collective group. Such an act is generally undertaken out of national self-interest, in which each member associates its own security with the security of the alliance as a whole. In short, a state gives up some options in return for some guarantees. When the fear of a common adversary provides the catalyst for creating an alliance, we can view it as a "latent war community",[23] for, even in the absence of military conflict, there remains the preparation for its occurrence. This characterisation applies to NATO, in that it is a long term peacetime alliance designed not only to defend in war but to deter war itself.

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[22] Reference is to a remark made by State Department Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt at a briefing in London in December 1975. Sonnenfeldt denied that he intended to advocate Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. See Washington Post, 31 March 1976. Nonetheless, its emphasis was on the stability of the European situation, rather than Brzezinski's concern for transforming Eastern Europe. Compare Brzezinski, "US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus", Foreign Affairs (Vol.51, No.4, July 1973), pp.708-27, and Sonnenfeldt, "Russia, America, and Détente", Foreign Affairs (Vol.56, No.1, January 1978), pp.275-94.

[23] The phrase was coined by Robert E. Osgood in Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1968), p.19. See also Francis E. Beer, ed., Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970).

Yet for an alliance to sustain its cohesion indefinitely is not an easy matter. While nuclear weapons are a means of deterring war, they have also provided an argument against the surrender of sovereignty in an alliance framework.[24] Moreover, the long term success of the alliance in deterring war may lessen the fear that brought the members together in the first place. As such, the raison d'être of the alliance is subject to continuous examination as member states assess the costs and benefits of membership. In December 1967, NATO adopted the "Harmel Report" to reaffirm its purpose in anticipation of East-West détente:[25]

> The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. The first is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur... The Allies will maintain, as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.
>
> In this climate, the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions.

The Harmel Report was a compromise, designed to place a détente strategy in the context of broader alliance security strategy. The independent pursuit by one member of the alliance of a détente relationship with the adversary could be construed by other members of the alliance as tantamount to seeking a "separate peace" with the "enemy".[26]

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[24] See the argument for an independent French force de frappe by General Pierre Gallois, Stratégie de l'Age Nucléaire (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1960).

[25] "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance", NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974 (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975), p.199. Emphasis added.

In the case of the US-FRG relationship, this has been a significant source of alliance tensions. The FRG has harboured a persistent fear that the US (as well as Britain and France) would make a deal with the Soviet Union over Germany's head, thereby sacrificing German national interests. Likewise, the US (and not only the US) has feared that the FRG would seek an independent accommodation with Moscow to gain German reunification at the expense of its position in the Western alliance. On the one hand, Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and the broader linkage framework of the Western détente strategy after 1969 have served to eliminate that mutual suspicion by removing reunification from the negotiating agenda. Yet that has not altogether happened. In the decade since the *Ostverträge*, Washington continued to voice warnings about West German "self-Finlandisation", fearing that the increased interaction between the FRG and the East made Bonn susceptible to Soviet pressure and therefore unduly deferent to Soviet demands. By the same token, Bonn was wary of an American emphasis on bilateral arms control, fearing that the SALT process might lead to a US-Soviet strategic balance, an imbalance in theatre nuclear and conventional weapons, and a concomitant de-coupling of the American commitment to Central Europe.[28]

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[26] See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 19[illegible]), pp.58ff.

[27] The phrase was used by Zbigniew Brzezinski when he was President Carter's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, but it is a long-standing and resilient fear. For three somewhat different perspectives, see Philip Windsor, *Germany and the Western Alliance: Lessons from the 1980 Crises* (Adelphi Paper No.170, London: IISS, Autumn 1981); Josef Joffe, "The Enduring Crisis", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.59, No.4, Spring 1981), pp.835-51; and Fritz Stern, "Germany in a Semi-Gaullist Europe", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.58, No.4, Spring 1980), pp.867-86.

Throughout most of the postwar period, the US and FRG have faced continuing dilemmas about the desirability of changing the postwar bipolar structure. Within the US, the desire to overturn Soviet postwar gains in Eastern Europe has always been in conflict with the need to mitigate the dangers inherent in the superpower relationship. Likewise, the US desire for an independent, self-sufficient and democratic Western Europe has clashed with the requirement to maintain control over the Western alliance. In the FRG, the desire for a secure and equal position in the Western alliance system did not advance the cause of reunification. Similarly Bonn's desire for increasing freedom of manoeuvre in European politics has clashed with the need to secure a lasting US commitment to Western Europe. Détente has been justified both on the grounds that it will preserve the status quo and that it will transform it; it has been argued both as a means of relieving the US of that commitment and to sustain it; it has been advocated both to enhance the FRG's freedom of movement in Europe and to advance its integration into the Western alliance.

A central argument of this thesis is that the preservation of alliance cohesion is a vital interest for both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; these two states, perhaps more so than the other alliance members, are vulnerable to the loss of that cohesion. The position of the FRG is complex, relating to the historical legacy of the German Problem and the process in the postwar period through which the FRG sought to redefine its identity both domestic-ally and in terms of its relation to the rest of the world. We shall focus on that in the next chapter. For the United States, it has been a question of its relationship to Europe and its position of leadership in the alliance. As one American analyst noted in assessing détente:[29]

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[28] This was the reasoning behind Helmut Schmidt's Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London in October 1977, which initiated the public debates on LRTNF. See Survival (Vol.XX, No.1, January-February 1978), pp.2-10.

> If détente is to be equated with the *status quo*, then the intelligent management of this détente requires that each superpower exercise maximum control over its allies in the process, lest disarray in either alliance system jeopardize the very foundation of the *status quo* and hence détente... It is not now, nor has it ever been, a question of the United States resisting détente in Europe, but rather *how best to manage the process* while minimizing the disarray *in each* alliance structure caused by competing national interests.

Clearly, alliance cohesion is a source of strength, and the Harmel Report reflected a concern for negotiating from a position of strength. To attempt a relaxation of tensions and settle certain disputes presupposed the continuation of the basic adversary conflict, for otherwise there would be no foundation for the alliance. Without the alliance structure, there could be no confidence in a process designed to maintain a stable international order.

The imperative of alliance cohesion, however, is not only a restraint on détente. It was suggested earlier that a state's assessment of the utility of a détente strategy is influenced by the interaction of both strength and vulnerability. Vulnerability is a motivation for détente if the military relationship makes it desirable to negotiate on means to ensure that tension does not lead to war. An alliance perspective suggests another form of vulnerability as well that continues to serve as a motivation for some kind of détente. As Senator

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[29] Kenneth A. Myers, *Ostpolitik and American Security Interests in Europe* (Georgetown University monograph, 1972), pp.72-73. Emphasis added.

Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wro in 1966:[30]

> If... the United States fails to lead the West in the building of bridges to the East, then Western Europe will almost certainly continue to build bridges of its own, drawing away from the United States in the process.

For the US to resist alliance pressures for a détente would jeopardise its leadership position in the alliance. It was a fear that motivated both Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, who hoped, on the one hand, to counter de Gaulle's efforts in the 1960s to seek an independent détente with Moscow and, on the other hand, to control the West German Ostpolitik.

To the United States, therefore, the formulation of a détente strategy was in part a strategy of alliance management as well as a strategy for managing the adversary relationship. Similarly, Bonn's Ostpolitik has always been a part of its Westpolitik. Not only did the success of the Ostpolitik depend upon solid Western support, but, more importantly, the impetus for Bonn's Ostpolitik was precisely to maintain its position in the Western alliance. To Bonn the US-FRG relationship rested on two foundations: on the one hand, allied commitment to the forward defence of Germany in NATO; on the other hand, allied promise to support Bonn's claim to be the sole legal representative of all Germans and to seek the peaceful reunification of Germany.[31] These two foundations represented a conflict in that the former was designed to maintain the status quo while the latter sought to resist it. The Ostpolitik was a decision to alter the second foundation, thus removing an allied obligation to support claims for territorial revision. Hence, ratification of the Ostverträge was justified as a necessary contribution to détente and a means of avoiding isolation in the West.[32]

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[30] J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), p.212.

[31] See Kurt Birrenbach, "Deutschland-Amerika: Probleme einer Allianz", Aussenpolitik (Vol.17, February 1966), p.73.

The Ostpolitik did not fully resolve this contradiction. West German policy is still "revisionist", if we include in that term a desire to break down the wall which literally divides Berlin and figuratively divides Germany and Europe and which remains a symbol of a continuing adversary relationship that could make Germany the battlefield in any future European war. This "revisionism" no longer includes a desire to alter the territorial boundaries of Central Europe or even an expressed desire, as we shall see in the next chapter, to subsume the GDR into a reunified German state. Yet, this contradiction is potentially more destabilising in the post-Ostpolitik period than it was before. Previously, the essence of the "policy of strength" was to resolve the contradiction by making the objectives sequential: the accomplishment of a strong, cohesive alliance was supposed to facilitate the achievement of reunification. Having removed institutic reunification from the sequence altogether, Bonn has thus had to balance two processes that have proceeded in parallel: to secure the cohesion of the alliance and Bonn's position within the alliance and to pursue an improvement of relations with the East. When relations between the superpowers began to deteriorate in the latter half of the 1970s and into the 1980s, those two processes began to be viewed more as mutually exclusive rather than mutually complementary. Hence, beginning in January 1982, Bonn reportedly began a reassessment of Ostpolitik, based on the premise that "Ostpolitik increasingly threatened to be in opposition to our alliance policy".[33]

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[32] For example, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel's speech to the Bundestag on 23 February 1972. See Manfred Knapp, "Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ostpolitik der BRD und der deutsche-amerikanischen Beziehungen", in Egbert Jahn and Volker Rittberger, eds., Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Triebkräfte, Widerstände, Konsequenzen (Opladen: Westdeutsche, 1974), pp.156-79.

The evolution of détente strategies in the Western alliance, in some respects from the latter half of the 1950s onwards, has coincided with the evolution of the alliance itself. The diffusion of power within the alliance has exacerbated the problems of balancing collective alliance interests and individual state interests. Raymond Aron has suggested that "the leader of the coalition is the only one that is inclined to identify the coalition's interests with its own".[34] This was particularly the case when the alliance leader, such as the US in NATO, saw the alliance as an extension of its own power rather than an alliance to which it had to surrender some of its freedom of action. To the extent that other alliance members, such as France, were uncomfortable being dependent on the US, the collective interests were less important. Yet, the US-FRG relationship was different: Bonn equally identified the alliance interests with its own interests. In the words of one American observer:[35]

> In the Adenauer era, and thereafter for a time, it scarcely seemed to matter whether we guessed right or wrong about what moved a German player in his own game or how our moves resonated inside his machine. Those players were so conscious of the frailty of their own machine, and so determined to hang onto us regardless, that we then possessed wide latitiude for ignorance. They had no history save what we had bequeathed them in our occupation since the war, and we knew it - or thought we did - as well as they.

For a large part of the postwar era, Washington and Bonn enjoyed a patron-client relationship. There was a greater reciprocal exchange of benefits in that relationship, even when Bonn's dependency seemed the highest.[36]

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[33] See Der Spiegel, 25 January 1982, and International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1982.

[34] Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p.45.

[35] Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University, 1974), p.114.

The confluence of détente and Ostpolitik marked a change in that relationship, where it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of an "equivalent partnership". As we noted earlier, Bonn and Washington retain a fundamental mutual dependency. What is most important, however, is that the image of a patron-client relationship is no longer appropriate. This distinction is highlighted by a West German opinion poll in late 1981 during a period of turmoil over the proposed LRTNF deployment in NATO: while 56% favoured closer cooperation with the US (as against 36% in 1973), and 80% wanted to stay in NATO, only 28% thought that the FRG should follow the US unconditionally.[37] While the discussion so far has focused on the problem of differing assessments of the nature and utility of a détente strategy, it is equally important to consider the issues on a different level: even if there is an alliance consensus on the utility of a particular form of détente strategy, involving arms control or the settlement of particular disputes or increased East-West interaction, there remains the question of how that consensus is developed and carried forward into specific policy. The manner and style with which a détente strategy is pursued in the alliance project an image about the distribution of power and influence within that alliance and the place that individual member states hold.

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[36] One mark of a patron-client relationship is not only mutual symbiosis in the pursuit of goals, but also that the distribution of benefits does not always favour the patron. See Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Free, 1975), p.26. See also Paul M. Johnson, "Washington and Bonn: Dimensions of Change in Bilateral Relations", International Organization (Vol.33, No.4, Autumn 1979), pp.481-90.

[37] In addition 53% supported the NATO "double decision" of 1979 to deploy LRTNF while pursuing arms control negotiations. See the Economist, 19 September 1981, for a report on the Allensbach poll.

The issue of "linkage" is significant here as well. Interdependence, particularly in an economic dimension, among allies and between East and West has combined with the declining utility of military force as an instrument of policy to produce at least one significant result: states, particularly in the Western alliance, have few levers to employ in affecting other states' behaviour, since they generally rebound to the user's detriment. We have already seen this with the exclusion of American grain sales from an advocacy of sanctions in retaliation against the imposition of martial law in Poland. Yet Reagan did impose an embargo on US contracts involved with the controversial Yamal pipeline designed to bring 40 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe by the end of the century, half of which would go to the FRG and France.[38] Washington consistently opposed the pipeline and pressured the Western Europeans to cancel it because of a fear that it would provide unacceptable leverage to the USSR once the Western investment was made. While Washington did not view grain sales as an appropriate lever to affect Soviet behaviour, it was not so reluctant to attempt to pull levers that involved Western European interests. Moreover, this largely unilateral American policy was resented in Western Europe: not only were the costs largely to be borne there, but it was also apparently outside previous NATO contingency planning in which sanctions were envisaged in response to Soviet military intervention in Poland but not necessarily in response to an imposition of martial law by the Polish government.[39]

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[38] See Thomas Blau and Joseph Kirchheimer, "European Dependence and Soviet Leverage: The Yamal Pipeline", Survival (Vol.XXIII, No.5, September-October 1981), pp.209-14.

[39] Private information, London, 19 January 1982.

The technicalities of this particular issue do not concern us here. Dependency and leverage are political judgements, while the empirical reality may only change marginally. As one official asked rhetorically, with respect to West European dependence on energy from the USSR, "Can we say that 3% dependence is acceptable, a 3.5% dependence is unacceptable, and 5% dependence terrible?"[40] The question relevant to this discussion concerns the nature of the alliance relationship in formulating a détente strategy and managing the process that ensues. It is similar to the criticisms levelled against the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights as a "test case" for détente in the mid-1970s. Thus, French President Giscard d'Estaing warned Carter in 1977 that the human rights campaign represented a "unilateral change in the definition of détente, thereby threatening all progress".[41]

These are not isolated examples, nor do they exist only in the period after 1973 when linkage was applied in different ways to manage both adversary and alliance relationships. The application .of linkage by one ally has generally involved the interests of other allies. As we shall see, the US appeared willing to threaten to jeopardise Bonn's Ostpolitik by tying it to Soviet behaviour in other areas. Before that, the process to some extent was reversed, in that the US resisted the West German Junktim in the early 1960s as impeding attempts to defuse the Berlin crisis or to regulate the superpower relationship. Indeed, the tumultuous questions of nuclear control sharing within the NATO alliance and the increased pressures on Bonn in the 1960s to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are also pertinent here.

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[40] Etienne Davignon, Common Market Commissioner for Energy Policy, to the European Parliament, 18 February 1982, quoted in the Guardian, 19 February 1982.

[41] See Giscard's interview in Newsweek, 25 July 1977.

While there was no explicit link involved with the NPT, Bonn felt it represented a concession to the USSR without any counter-concession relating to reunification or any other issues of intra-German relations. Since Bonn did not aspire to the possession of nuclear weapons, the issue did not essentially invoke questions of the utility of a détente strategy based on arms control. The crisis in US-FRG relations on this issue existed on a different plane: the abrupt abandonment of Multilateral Force (MLF) proposals by the US projected an image of dependency on the part of the FRG that was not welcomed in Bonn. It highlighted to the West Germans their unique place in the Western Alliance, resurrecting the vision of a discriminated state whose allies seemed increasingly unwilling to consider its vital interests.

We shall return to these issues later in this thesis. They are important here to highlight the central dilemma posed by the issue of détente as an alliance strategy. Détente is a strategy of managing the adversary relationship between East and West. The basic conflict of power and ideology remains unresolved, yet some of the disputed elements of that relationship, notably in Europe, have been settled through negotiation. Those negotiations have been possible because states defined or redefined their vital interests in ways that made them reconcilable where previously they had not been. Détente, however, remains primarily an issue of security; in this respect, the alliance structure has continued to be an important element of that security. Nonetheless, the pursuit of a détente strategy, however limited by the requirements of maintaining the alliance structure, has facilitated a process that existed independently, namely a growing interdependence not only within the alliance but also between adversary states and on a more global level. Linkage, a strategy unsuccessful in expanding the areas of agreement between East and West, has remained an important tool of managing the détente process and managing the alliance. But it is itself a source of considerable tension. Clearly there exists the potential for disagreement on the nature and utility of a détente strategy, based in part on differing assessments of risks and the function of tension in the international system. There is also the question of how specifically, or if at all, linkage is to be applied, either in expanding or restricting a détente strategy. Furthermore, the alliance must cope with the disruptive effects of that decision-making process, particularly if linkage is unilaterally applied by one ally to control the efforts of others.

How an ally approaches these issues is a function of its perception of strength and its perception of vulnerability. For the US and FRG, these issues have been significant because each views the cohesion of the alliance as a vital interest and is especially vulnerable to its demise. The issue of a détente strategy is central to these perceptions. As this thesis demonstrates, Bonn and Washington enjoyed a remarkably close relationship throughout most of the 1950s, largely because to each the strengthening of the alliance was a first priority and a strategy of détente was to be eschewed because it was seen as undermining that priority. In the 1960s, however, Bonn and Washington, in their different ways, both advocated a détente strategy and cautioned against the other's pursuit of such a strategy. SALT and Ostpolitik dominated the détente strategies of 1969-1973, as each pursued complementary and interlinked policies: both the US and FRG pursued policies that were motivated in part by a sense of vulnerability that derived from a variety of sources, yet both succeeded because of the strength that each gave to the other's bargaining position.

Nevertheless the dilemmas did not subsequently dissolve. SALT and Ostpolitik represented not only complementary policies but also potential and perceived threats to the alliance foundation. The alliance relationship had changed, and the emphasis became one of controlling a process of interdependence that had an independent source of momentum. The fear in the FRG that a US-Soviet bilateralism would leave West Germany more rather than less vulnerable was echoed by a US fear that West Germany was becoming more vulnerable anyway. As one observer pointed out, what had changed was the predictability of the alliance relationship:[42]

> As for Central Europe, it is a zone of balance... If West Germany were too weak or too strong, if it were either "Finlandized" or aggressive, if East Germany were attracted by it, or were the victim of any violent agitation - it would in one way or another call into question the whole balance of the continent. Indeed, the swiftness of mental transformation in Germany leads us to think that after having been the most predictable country of Europe, Germany is now again beginning to display the famous and worrying "incertitudes allemandes".

In a sense, such a predictability derives from an agreement among state actors about the "ground rules" of acceptable state behaviour on certain issues. Before we examine the evolution of the early "ground rules" of the Western alliance with respect to détente and East-West relations in general, we must examine an issue which dominated the evolution of the Cold War, which pervaded all considerations of détente, which remains a significant element in the Western alliance's management of its effects, and for which predictability is a vital concern: the "German Problem".

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[42] Pierre Hassner, Europe in the Age of Negotiation, The Washington Papers No.8 (Washington: SAGE, 1973), p.71. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER 3

The "German Problem": Past and Present

In 1871, an Austrian statesman observed after the Franco-Prussian War and the formation of Bismarck's German Reich:[1]

> I doubt whether this new nationalist state, the Reich, can ever be a national state in the sense that it would draw all German-speaking people into its orbit. There is for this new state only one chance, namely, to dominate the whole of Europe, an ambition in which no European nation has ever succeeded so far. If the new Reich does not succeed in this, it is in permanent danger and one day it will be divided.

By 1945, Germany had twice sought to dominate Europe through military means, had failed on both occasions, and did indeed find itself divided. Moreover, the total defeat of Hitler's Third Reich afforded the opportunity for a clean break in German history. Clearly such a break occurred in Germany's domestic political structure,[2] but whether such a break occurred in Germany's role in European security is less clear. By 1949, two German states had emerged from the Four Power occupation structure; in 1955, each received full sovereignty from allied patrons; yet each claimed to embody the legitimate "democratic" successor to the German Reich, the social and political core around which a reunified German state, if it were to be realised at all, would have to be formed. The wartime allies which were patrons of one or the other German state were themselves adversaries in a profound conflict of interests between East and West. This ideological and political confrontation between two patron-client structures is the essence of the Cold War in Europe, in which the "German Problem" is an integral part - but not the whole - of that adversary confrontation.

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[1] Former Austrian Prime Minister Belcredi, quoted by Golo Mann in "The Second German Empire: The Reich That Never Was", in E.J. Feuchtwanger, ed., Upheaval and Continuity: A Century of German History (London: Oswald Wolff, 1973), p.33.

[2] See the discussion by Alfred Grosser in Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years (London: Pall Mall, 1971), p.1.

If we were to view the "German Problem" as merely the issue of German reunification, its elements would include the creation of a recognised successor to the Reich with which a final peace treaty could be signed by its former enemies in World War II. Such a treaty could settle the question of Germany's frontiers and determine Germany's place in an international security framework, both issues which were deferred in the original postwar agreements. To define the "German problem" in this way, however, is to limit its scope to the largely legal questions arising out of the broader postwar disputes about the role that Germany should play in the world. These questions reflect the more fundamental nature of the "German Problem", which both predates and arguably transcends the Cold War.

In one sense, the legal questions have been overtaken by events. Both German states have evolved mutually distinct social, political and economic structures of their own. It is no longer possible, if it ever were, to forge a unified German state from the existing structures. Although one can point to the resilience of a German Kulturnation, there has also developed within each German state a state identity of its own: the creation of a unified German Staatsnation appears more remote than at any time in the postwar era.[3] The issue of a postwar territorial settlement is moot: both German states have recognised the finality of the Oder-Neisse line as the western boundary of Poland and renounced all claims to German territory held in 1937 but lost in the provisional postwar agreements. Brandt's Ostpolitik, while designed to create conditions conducive to a Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl ("a feeling of belonging together") within the German nation, proceeded from the premise that there were two German states within one German nation.[4] Moreover, the GDR's response to the West German Ostpolitik was Abgrenzung, specifically designed to resist Bonn's attempts to promote the cohesion of the nation.[5] Thus, while Bonn continues to define relations with the GDR as "of a special kind... in which they are not foreign countries to each other", the entry of the two German states into the United Nations in 1973 symbolised a solution to the "German Problem" insofar as that problem is defined in terms of German reunification.

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[3] For a detailed argument of this point, see Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, National Consciousness in a Divided Germany (London: SAGE, 1975), passim.

In this context, Brandt's Ostpolitik represents a landmark in German history no less significant than the break afforded by Hitler's defeat. Furthermore, it was largely a product of internal change within the Federal Republic: the change in Bonn's policy toward the E and on Germany seems to have followed rather than led public opin which had itself expanded the boundaries within which the Gover could safely and legitimately operate. As Figure 4 indicates,[6] the first half of the 1960s witnessed a marked change in public opinion in

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[4] See Brandt's opening statement to the Bundestag of 28 October 1969 and the Bericht über die Lage der Nation im gespalteten Deutschland of 14 January 1970, in Boris Meissner, ed., Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation) (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp.380-84 and 415-26.

[5] Compare Willi Stoph's remarks in "Unser Staat-Hauptinstrument zur Schaffund der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft in der DDR" Einheit (Vol.XXVI, No.4, April 1971), p.375, and Egon Bahr's interview in the International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1973. See also David Childs, "The Ostpolitik and Domestic Politics in East Germany" and Geoffrey N. Roberts, "The Ostpolitik and Relations Between the Two Germanies", in Roger Tilford, ed., The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1975), pp.59-95.

[6] Extracted from Schweigler, op.cit., pp.153 and 156, based on a compilation of opinion surveys from eight separate polling activities between 1953 and 1973.

Fig 4.

FRG Public Opinion and the Postwar Settlement



the FRG with respect to the willingness to recognise the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line. One might also deduce from the gap between those willing to recognise the Oder-Neisse line and those who felt the Eastern Territories were lost forever that the 1960s was a period of considerable frustration in West German politics. This is evident also in the fact that, in 1965, those who named reunification as the most important question for the Bonn Government remained at a high of 45%, subsequently dropping to 3% in January 1971.[7]

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[7] Schweigler, op.cit., pp.167-68 and footnote 21, p.221. The figure had dropped to 20 % in 1961, overshadowed by the immediacy of the Berlin Crisis, but then rose again to the consistent level of the 1950s. See also Josef Korbel, Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton: Princeton University, 1972), pp.156 and 184, and W.E. Paterson, "The Ostpolitik and Regime Stability in West Germany", in Tilford, ed., op.cit., pp.23-44.

The frustration felt within West Germany in the mid-1960s led some to suggest that the postwar framework should be discarded as unworkable rather than something to which the FRG should simply adapt. Nostalgic references to the policies of Bismarck and Stresemann were made with increasing frequency.[8] It is not the purpose of this thesis to examine the domestic conflict within the Federal Republic over the issue of reunification. But the agonising process through which the Federal Republic defined its identity in the postwar world is important because of its impact on the West German position within the Western Alliance and its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In that respect, German reunification does not in itself constitute the "German Problem".[9] More precisely, the "German Problem" is the issue of defining an acceptable role for Germany within Europe. It is fundamentally a security issue; it was the central issue on the immediate postwar agenda only to become entangled, as we shall see in the next chapter, in the tensions of the Cold War. In large measure, the question of a postwar détente between East and West continued to involve the question of the nature of German power and how that power is to be exercised in the maintenance of European security.

From the standpoint of the victorious allies in 1945, the "German Problem" was largely understood as a problem of containing German power. From the standpoint of the Germans themselves, however, the problem was how to recover from that defeat and return themselves to a respectable position in the international system. Since there were two German states, it is more correct to say that each had to seek its rehabilitation within the existing framework of opposing alliance systems. Within the Western context - since that is the focus of this thesis - the development of the Cold War altered the definition of the "German Problem". In short, German power, specifically the power of the Federal Republic, was needed to fulfil the requirements of Western strategy in the Cold War. From the Western point of view, the containment of German power meant, more precisely, the harnessing rather than the denial of that power. The Cold War, therefore, created a form of mutual dependency between the victorious Western allies and their German client which made it possible for the Federal Republic to pursue some of its own aims.

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[8] For example, Fritz Baade, "Neugestaltung unserer Politik in Nahe- und Mittelost", Aussenpolitik (Vol.16, November 1965), p.743ff., and Paul Seethe, "Öffnung nach Osten", Die Zeit, 4 October 1966.

[9] See the discussion in Philip Windsor, German Reunification (London: Elek, 1969), pp.1ff.

It is in this context of mutual dependency in the Western Alliance that the nostalgia for alternative German strategies is important to this discussion. Such nostalgia has always been an element in the West German debate, although only a minority one and not one which has received serious consideration in the formulation of policy. The Federal Republic is a creation of the Western alliance and its continued participation in that framework has enjoyed broad domestic support, although not without periodic and intense debate about the costs of that participation. What is important about this nostalgia is that it reflects a resilient aspect of the "German Problem" that has survived the apparent solution embodied in the Ostpolitik: Germany's vulnerability, both to isolation and to the costs of alliance. In this sense, even if in no other, the Federal Republic is a truncated successor to preceding German states since 1871. To the extent that nostalgia for the past has emerged within the FRG, so also has the fear emerged among those who depend upon the FRG that the past might be repeated. It is thus necessary to understand why the past continues to haunt the present.

Germany lies within the middle of Europe and has always played a determining role in the European balance of power. Even when there was no single German state, Germany's role was pivotal. German states collectively served as a buffer zone among the great continental powers of the post-Westphalian European state system, with individual German states often existing as protectorates of one great power or another. As Prussia developed into a great power in its own right, it alone provided the geographical link among the other centers of European power. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the still-fragmented core of Europe served as a buffer in an integrated state system designed to maintain the balance of power and protect the status quo against the revolutionary forces of nationalism. Thus, the formation of a unified German state in 1871 disrupted the existing balance of power, with destabilising effect:[10]

> Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition that has not been swept away... The balance of power has been entirely destroyed.

The self-contained multipolar European system that had previously maintained its stability at the expense of German unity was unable to cope with a unified German state that dominated the European landscape.

From the standpoint of the victors in 1945, concern about the "German Problem" derived from the fact that the strategic choices Germany made between 1871 and 1945 were often unhappy ones for its neighbours. This is obvious in the regimes of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1890-1918) and Adolf Hitler (1933-1945), in which attempts to dominate Europe led to general war. This in itself is sufficient to account for the allies' insistence after World War II on containing German power and their reluctance to restore any of that power. But there is another aspect of the "German Problem" that is both equally persistent and more subtle. Writing of the evolving West German *Ostpolitik* during the Grand Coalition of the late 1960s, former US Under Secretary of State George Ball articulated that concern:[11]

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[10] British Prime Minister Disraeli's speech of 9 February 1871, quoted in William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp.13-14.

> It is not, however, the current statistics of the German military establishment that revive old nightmares among the Western neighbors; it is a deep suspicion of German intentions... Throughout the history of German politics there have always been two distinct schools of thought in foreign policy; one favoring Eastern ties and the other Western. The "Easterners"... have generally won these intramural debates... Today the key to the lock of reunification lies in the East, which exerts a strong pull on many Germans *to point policy in a more traditional direction*, repudiating the historical novelty of Adenauer's heresy.

Other observers have spoken of the "enduring vulnerability" of the Federal Republic to the "shifting and uncertain tides" of European politics.[12] The point is not whether these fears are justified: historical parallels can be misleading guides to contemporary politics, and Ball's concern is no exception. What is important is that the references to historical antecedents remain an element of contemporary perceptions.

Postwar Western definitions of the "German Problem" have been directed not only to the need to prevent the resurgence of an expansionist Germany but also to the need to prevent what has been seen by some to be a natural association with the East. Hence this concern re-calls the periods of Bismarck (1870-1890) and of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) in which German leaders focused more on the need to prevent isolation than directly as a desire to dominate Europe. The legacy of these two periods, summarised under the notion of *Schaukelpolitik*, or "see-saw" policy of balancing between East and West, has had a significant impact on post-1945 concerns about the "German Problem".

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[11] George W. Ball, *The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure* (London: Bodley Head, 1968), pp. 153-64. Emphasis added.

[12] Walter F. Hahn, *Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views* (London: SAGE Foreign Policy Papers no.3, 1975), p. 4.

If the emergence of a unified German state was a source of alarm for its neighbours - and perhaps because of it - a resilient characteristic of the German state has been its vulnerability. It is a vulnerability rooted in its central geopolitical position and one that has generated arguments both for and against alignment with foreign powers. The *Schaukelpolitik* reflected that vulnerability: on the one hand Germany sought the security of alliances and, on the other hand, resisted the commitments that such alliances generate. That vulnerability is inherent in Germany's position, even if the *Schaukelpolitik* is not a necessary or pre-determined means of dealing with Bismarck sought, perhaps above all, to establish a predictability in the system that allowed him to overcome his "nightmare of coalitions". As he cautioned in 1887 concerning Austria's Balkan aspirations which threatened to lead to a conflict with Russia, "We have no intention of allowing ourselves to be bound to the tail of the Hungarian comet, but to establish a regular orbit of *calculable* dimensions."[13] Almost a century later Chancellor Helmut Schmidt - who was decidedly *not* practicing a *Schaukelpolitik* - echoed such a plea for "calculability" in alliance relations with the East.[14] While the worlds of Bismarck and Schmidt are quite distinct in many respects, they do share one common feature: in both instances, German national interests were vested in an alliance system that rested on a balance of power, the disruption of which was seen to be detrimental primarily to German interests. German leaders since Bismarck have faced a comparable strategic dilemma: how to secure Germany's position in the European state system without inducing self-isolation, while at the same time not unduly compromising vital German interests in the alliance relationships designed to avert that isolation.

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[13] Quoted in Langer, *op.cit.*, p.370. Emphasis added.

[14] See Schmidt's interview in the *Economist*, 29 September 1979. It is a persistent theme in Schmidt's speeches.

Bismarck's sense of vulnerability stemmed from the existence of a German state which held a dominant position in Europe, and which was basically a _status quo_ power that had already achieved a revision of the European order to its advantage. Consolidation and maintenance of that position presumed French hostility, at whose expense the German state had been created. As Bismarck once remarked to an enthusiastic advocate for German colonies:[15]

> Your map of Africa is very beautiful but my map of Africa is in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and here we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa.

The strategy, until 1890, entailed the formation of overlapping defensive alliances designed to maintain the revised _status quo_. The alignments were designed not to commit Germany but to constrain others. In a fashion similar to deterrence theory in the nuclear age, war was to be too dangerous an adventure because the risks were too great that it would embroil all the powers entangled in the system. The system was fragile; stability was based on an equilibrium of constant tension. It required good relations with Austria, England, and, most particularly, Russia. Yet Germany was unable to commit itself fully to any of its prospective allies, both because Bismarck sought to avoid entangling himself and because support of any one partner was almost bound to alienate at least one of the others, thereby upsetting the whole system. A precondition of success, however, was Russian willingness, first, to maintain the relationship with Berlin while foregoing expansionist activity in the Balkans and, second, not to yield to the temptation to ally with France. In the end, despite its vulnerability to Russian alignment, Germany was unwilling to make the concessions necessary for Russia to prefer a link with Germany over one with France.

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[15] Quoted in Gordon A. Craig, _From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), p.24.

The accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the fall of Bismarck in 1890 led to the break-up of an already deteriorating relationship with Russia, followed in 1894 by a Franco-Russian alliance. The ensuing two decades witnessed an inexorable realignment in European politics, in which Germany and Austria were virtually isolated between East and West. While it would be inappropriate to divert this discussion to examination of the causes, much less the responsibility of Germany, for World War I, we might disentangle one significant thread. On the one hand, it can be argued that a German drive - fuelled by complex domestic factors - for European hegemony, for colonies, and for naval supremacy after 1890 led to its isolation and eventual defeat. On the other hand, it can be argued that Germany's isolation induced it to seek security through a self-sufficient power base capable of defeating opposing coalitions. Undoubtedly, the resultant crisis was partially due to the interaction of these factors. Germany's search for "a place in the sun" clearly led to a polarisation of the state system and its isolation; yet the very anticipation of such an opposing coalition, as suggested by the drafting of the Schlieffen Plan in 1894, made general war virtually inevitable once conflict was imminent.[16] The important point is that the emergence of a German state had created a strategic problem with which Germany and the rest of Europe had not successfully coped and which persisted after a brutal conflict. The balance of power in Europe was restored by the entrance of the United States into the war, but the failure of the US to sustain its commitments in that balance was a major factor in post-1918 European instability.

Four characteristics, pertinent to this discussion, distinguished the world of the Weimar Republic from that faced by Bismarck. First, Germany was weak. It was not the dominant power in Europe as it had been after 1871. Germany's weakness, however, was not so much the result of wartime destruction or occupation, but largely a product of the punitive provisions of the postwar settlement and the general political, economic and even social fragmentation that ensued in the early 1920s. Secondly, Germany was revisionist. Its leaders did not enjoy the position of Bismarck, who had sought to consolidate the fruits of his successful revision of the European system. Weimar's revisionism existed in three dimensions: it was directed against the specific provisions regarding reparations and disarmament; it sought the re-acquisition of territory either occupied by the allies or detached from Germany altogether; and, in a more general sense, it aimed at the restoration of Germany's position in Mitteleuropa. Perhaps the most significant of these revisionist aims relates to the third distinguishing characteristic of post-1918 Europe: the existence

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16 See Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p.348, and A.J.P. Taylor, Politics in Wartime and Other Essays (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), pp.61-64. For the role of the military in this process, see Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University, 1975), pp.217-86.

of a Polish state, for the first time in over a century, on territory provided largely at Germany's expense. Finally, Tsarist Russia had been replaced by Soviet Russia, weak but revolutionary.

A net effect of these four characteristics was to induce the leaders of Weimar Germany to pursue policies that created a legacy of distrust that has carried over into the period after 1945. The significance of this memory is partly explained by the fact that, at first glance, the four characteristics of Weimar Germany discussed above existed in similar form after 1945. In short, Weimar's inability to satisfy revisionist aims by itself motivated its leaders to seek a relationship with the Soviet Union, formalised by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 and the Treaty of Berlin in 1926. While the fulfilment of German revisionist aims rested largely with the West, as the author and enforcer of the armistice, the emergence of the Soviet Union gave the European state structure the character of an East versus West conflict which found Germany in the middle.[17] Relations with Moscow provided Weimar Germany an instrument to exploit that East-West conflict satisfy its national aims.

The notion of a Rapallopolitik, as recalled by some in the period after World War II, is associated with an assumption of "an overpowering attraction between Germany and Russia", stimulated by the existence of Poland that was the target of revisionist aspirations, a characteristic of both postwar periods:[18]

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[17] Some would say this really marks the beginning of the Cold War. See, for example, André Fontaine, History of the Cold War (Volume I): From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1965).

[18] John Wheeler-Bennett, in the Introduction to Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), pp.xi, xvii.

> The existence of an independent Poland had once again proved the irresistible magnet which, in the case of Frederick and Catherine, and of Seeckt and Lenin, had... drawn together Hitler and Stalin.

One can dispute the degree to which Russo-German relations were characterised by such irresistability. If Poland brought Hitler and Stalin together in the 1939 non-aggression pact as a tactical expedient on the eve of war, it did not constitute such a magnet in the years after 1933, when Hitler terminated the Soviet-German collaboration of the Weimar Republic. Indeed, during the 1920s, it was a limited and reluctant relationship, born of expediency and the opportunity for mutual exploitation between two weak outcast states.

The re-establishment of Germany's links with Russia began before Germany's defeat and after the Bolshevik Revolution. As long as the war continued, Berlin concluded that any goverment other than the Bolsheviks "is either immediately or within a short time a friend and ally of the Entente":[19]

> Let us rather be content with Russia's impotence... We are not working with them, we are exploiting them... It is good policy to exploit the Bolsheviks as long as they have something to give.

By the subsequent spring, however, the war was over, and Communist uprisings in Germany had been put down by an alliance of the Reichswehr and the governing Social Democrats. Vulnerable to the demands of the victors, Berlin offered to fight with the Entente against the Bolsheviks.[20] But any support for the entente dwindled once the terms of Versailles were known. In October, Germany refused to join an Alliance blockade against the Bolsheviks and, in the next year, refused passage to French troops to Poland. Meanwhile, clandestine military collaboration with the Soviets began on a limited scale. In May 1921, after French occupation of the Ruhr ports and the promulgation of the London Ultimatum on reparations payments, Berlin announced a provisional treaty agreement with Moscow. When, in October 1921, the Allies detached Upper Silesia from Germany, the narrow political base for Chancellor Wirth's Erfüllungspolitik - or "fulfilment" of Allied demands - was undermined. At the Genoa Conference in April 1922, when the French and British hoped to form a Western trade consortium against Moscow, Foreign Minister Rathenau and Chicherin slipped off to sign the Treaty of Rapallo. In that treaty, both renounced any debts and claims from the war; granted diplomatic, consular and most-favoured nation trade relations; and endeavoured to support their mutual relations by prior consultation, thereby precluding any effective anti-Soviet trade consortium.

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[19] Foreign Minister Admiral von Hintze to the Kaiser, August 1918, quoted in Freund, op.cit., pp.25-26.

[20] See the warning to the cabinet by General Groener, Chief of the Army High Command, ibid., p.43.

The Rapallo agreement was less a rapprochement between two states with common purposes than a link of convenience, if not necessity. [illegible] like Bismarck's relationship with Tsarist Russia, any new relationship had to overlook a basic ideological incompatibility which surfaced periodically in Communist attempts to foster revolution in Germany. Lenin had already echoed earlier German expressions of cynicism about the relationship:[21]

> I am not fond of the Germans by any means; but at the present time it is more advantageous to use them than to challenge them... Germany wants revenge, and we want revolution. For the moment, our aims are the same, but when our ways part, they will be our most ferocious and greatest enemies.

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[21] Speech in December 1920, quoted in Freund, op.cit., pp.81-83.

While the West was in shock over this German "treachery",[22] the debate in Germany was not about whether the Rapallopolitik should be pursued, but about the degree to which relations with Soviet Russia should be pursued to the exclusion of any efforts at reconciliation with the West.[23] In Germany, the common premise was German weakness and an inability to influence its fate. Few disagreed with at least this observation by General von Seeckt, Chief of the Army High Command and a principal advocate of closer relations with the Soviet Union:[24]

> I do not look to the formal contents of the treaty but rather at its moral effect. It is the first but a substantive strengthening of German influence in the world. The reason for this is that more is suspected than is actually justified... Our power is small. The eyes of our enemies must magnify it.

To Rathenau, who had sought "to save Germany from throwing in her lot with Bolshevik Russia",[25] the delicate balance in German domestic politics,[26] coupled with the possibility that France (under Poincaré) might strike an agreement with the Soviets, proved compelling.

The essence of the Weimar Schaukelpolitik evolved in the aftermath of Rapallo. Whereas Rapallo represented a symbiotic relationship between two outcasts, neither signatory could be classified as a true pariah past the middle of the decade. French occupation of the Ruhr, Germany's campaign of "passive resistance", the subsequent collapse of the German economy, and the abortive Communist (and right wing) attempts to stimulate a German revolution in 1923, combined to force a reappraisal of German policy. Stresemann, as Chancellor and then Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929, sought a more balanced policy, creating some distance from the Soviet Union without breaking the link. "Fulfilment", an end to "passive resistance", coupled with a British desire to prevent a chaotic Germany from succumbing to Communism, led to the Locarno Treaty of October 1925. The treaty assured the French by guaranteeing the western frontiers of Germany, but it did not deny the possibility of a revised frontier with Poland. Reparations were revised; France withdrew its occupation troops from the Ruhr and eventually the Rhineland; the International Military Control Commission was withdrawn; and Germany entered the League o Nations as a Great Power. In the meantime, the Soviet Union gai diplomatic recognition from several key Western states, limited its revolutionary activity in Europe, and sought broader economic relations with the capitalist West.

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[22] See the article by Archibald Cary Coolidge for an apt description of the treaty's impact in the West: "K", "Russia after Genoa and the Hague", in Foreign Affairs (Vol.I, No.1, September 1922), reproduced in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1972), p.25 and pp.10ff.

[23] See Freund's discussion of the internal politics behind the Rapallo Treaty, op.cit., pp.103ff. Also John Hiden's summary, Germany and Europe 1919-1939 (London: Longman, 1977), pp.86ff. As for the treaty debate, compare the "Promemoria" of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (German Ambassador to Moscow), dated 15 August 1922, and von Seeckt's reply, in Freund, op.cit., pp.131-38.

[24] Quoted in Freund, op.cit., p.122.

[25] Quoted, ibid., p.103.

[26] See A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1968), for an excellent discussion of the domestic determinants of Weimar foreign policy.

In this setting, Stresemann found himself wooed by both East and West. The Soviet leaders held few illusions about where Germany's basic bourgeois nature would direct its loyalties.[27] The British defined the problem in similar terms:[28]

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[27] See the commentary in Izvestia, 13 April 1927, cited in Harvey Leonard Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p.17.

[28] British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain to French Premier Aristide Briand, May 1927, quoted in Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (London: Oxford University, 1978), p.511.

> We are battling with Soviet Russia for the soul of Germany. We had won a success at Locarno. We had confirmed it when Germany entered the League; but the more difficult our relations with Russia became, the more important it was that we should attach Germany solidly to the Western Powers.

For Stresemann, the link with Russia was necessary both as a means of securing conservative support and for inducing the West to make concessions. He demonstrated his leverage by announcing a trade treaty with Moscow as he boarded the train to Locarno. Like Bismarck, Stresemann hoped to avoid an alliance commitment that automatically made Germany the battlefield in a European war, and he was able to secure exemption from Article 16 of the League Covenant which made participation in League sanctions, notably against the USSR, mandatory. Nevertheless, this leverage also implied vulnerability. Chicherin threatened what Stresemann feared most - a Franco-Polish-Soviet combination[29] - unless there was a new security pact with Moscow as well. The Treaty of Berlin, in which Berlin and Moscow promised neutrality if the other were attacked, was signed in April 1926.

The Berlin Treaty was undramatically reaffirmed in 1931. The rationale within Germany for continuing the relationship which had been born out of the desperation of political exile remained a fundamentally negative one. There were three positive benefits that had been anticipated, but none developed according to expectations. The first was a revision of the Polish frontier which remained a primary objective all through the 1920s. The second was the development of trade not only for its own sake as a boost to the German economy but also as a means of inducing a degree of Soviet dependency on Germany. The third was the clandestine development of military collaboration that allowed Germany to circumvent the Versailles prohibition of rearmament. While Germany had been successful in restoring itself to a position of importance in European affairs, as reflected in its membership in the League and the steady removal of many of the punitive aspects of the postwar settlement, there was no prospect of revising the eastern frontier. Poland, in the meantime, had become a significant force of its own. The rapid success in revising Germany's status put greater focus on the Polish border; the longer the desire for revision went unfulfilled, however, the greater the dependence on Russia, not only to appease domestic German disillusionment over the Erfüllungspolitik, but also to prevent an opposing coalition of East and West. This became an even greater concern after 1930, when France, having withdrawn from the Rhineland, sought to strengthen its links to both Poland and Russia.

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[29] Freund, op.cit., p.224.

Trade and armament collaboration were never sufficiently beneficial to Germany to justify the relationship on their own. In 1924 and 1925, Soviet trade with Germany was less than with either Britain or the US.[30] With the help of a $300 million mark credit in 1 Germany was still able to capture only 24% of the Soviet import market, as compared to the pre-1914 level of 50%, a level it would not reach again until 1932 during the Western depression.[31] Germany also hoped that trade would further secure the political end of maintaining Russian dependency; the Foreign Office conceived a scheme in 1926 by which Germany would direct the flow of foreign capital into the USSR, "in order that the economic strengthening of Soviet Russia does not lead to a political development which is independent of us".[32] The scheme was stillborn, as the Soviet Union managed to circumvent Germany by offering advantageous trade terms to Western countries. Neither did trade succeed in influencing the structure of the Soviet regime by inducing a gradual evolution to the right, as Lenin's New Economic Policy had suggested. Coinciding with Stalin's first Five Year Plan in 1928, the Comintern sought to stimulate a new round of revolutionary activity in Europe which helped to galvanise a right wing reaction in Germany. As for armaments collaboration, the Soviet Union was the principal beneficiary of the 5000 German technicians ultimately sent to the USSR.[33] Unless Germany were to maintain a long-term alliance in which rearmament could be achieved on Soviet soil, the benefits were minimal.

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[30] Hiden, op.cit., p.94.

[31] Dyck, op.cit., p.127, and Hiden, op.cit., p.96.

[32] Dyck, op.cit., p.55 and pp.48-61.

In sum, German relations with the Soviet Union persisted through the Weimar Republic not because they offered positive long-term benefits but because successive leaders heeded Brockdorff-Rantzau's warning in March 1927 against "losing the east without gaining the west".[34] Because the West could not be "gained" for Germany's purposes, there could be no change in policy. In March 1931, Foreign Minister Curtius' policy directive to Dirksen, the Ambassador to Moscow, reflected the dilemma:

> Especially at the present moment of tensions with France and the disappointment of our Locarno hopes, the policy of the Rapallo treaty and the Berlin treaty is a compelling foreign policy necessity...
>
> We need an elastic relationship with Russia, because we must be in a position to break off this relationship when the tendencies in Russia directed towards world revolution become more active or when the dangerous strengthening of our new revolutionary energies force us to take counter-measures.

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[33] Fontaine, op.cit., p.61.

[34] Quoted in Dyck, op.cit., p.105.

Dirksen's reply expressed frustration and a vain hope: "no side had offered political concessions in any form for an abandonment of our political relations with Russia".[35]

Despite the features that distinguished the world of Weimar Germany from that of Bismarck, both leaderships based their policies on the assumption of French hostility, an assumption requiring good relations with Britain and Russia. Because of Anglo-Russian competition, Germany was unable to satisfy both. Because of the weakness and revisionist aspirations of Weimar, that requirement was even greater but, because of the fear of Bolshevism, even less possible. The resulting strategies of balance contained a common element: Germany needed foreign alignment, at least for security if not also for status, yet it hoped to avoid alliance commitments that automatically made Germany the battlefield in a European war. It is a dilemma that has remained significant in the post World War II environment of opposing alliances in which the Federal Republic - and others - struggled to define the proper role of West Germany in the Western Alliance.

The strategies of both Bismarck and Weimar derived largely from a fear of isolation and the inability to secure national goals in a condition of isolation. In subsequent periods, both Wilhelm II and Hitler shared less a desire to avoid isolaton but rather a presumption of that isolation. The strategies of both Bismarck and Weimar were - for a variety of reasons distinctive to the international environment and domestic pressures in which each had to operate - also incompatible with the fulfilment of national aims as defined. Subsequent leaders chose to pursue a self-sufficient base for the pursuit of national ends.[36] After 1890, the presumption of isolation meant general war if conflict occurred. After 1933, conflict was assumed to be the means of achieving national goals which had been redefined according to Hitler's racial world view and antipathy towards the Slavic east. In both cases, the presumption of isolation required that conflict be anticipated in a European state system that was inherently unstable, an assumption that, because of Germany's geopolitical position, may have helped precipitate that conflict. The Second World War was to alter the nature of the European balance of power and provide an alternative solution to Germany's vulnerability. It did not, however, remove that vulnerability. It certainly did not remove the fear of its implications.

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[35] Quoted in Dyck, op.cit., p.231ff.

Within a decade of the end of the Second World War, Germany and Europe were divided between East and West. Western Germany was a stable sovereign political entity, on the road to being the strongest European economic power, and embarking on a process of rearmament as a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Yet a divided, rearmed Germany had not been the intended result of any ally's postwar planning, nor of the Germans themselves. The historian A.J.P. Taylor warned at the start of the 1950s:[37]

> Germany is at the centre of Europe and had scored repeated successes by playing off her neighbours to east and west. If these neighbours are united, or even reasonably friendly, then the Germans will not harm us nor even themselves. Nowadays the problem is put in a different form: how can we build up Germany as a Great Power and use her as an ally against the Soviet Union without risk of her turning against us? The answer to this is also simple: it is not possible, and those who attempt the impossible will sooner or later pay the penalty.

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[36] On this theme for the Third Reich, see William Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression: A Study in German Foreign Policy, 1933-1939 (London: Edward Arnold, 1972).

[37] A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Developments Since 1815 (London: Hamish Hamilton, rev.ed., 1951), p.9.

Stated this way, the "German Problem" presumes that uncontrolled German power is intolerable because the German state will exercise it to the detriment of the state system. Yet, if our brief analysis of the legacy of the "German Problem" is at all accurate, it suggests that German vulnerability - first, to geopolitical isolation, and, second, to being in the centre of any European war - has been the primary cause, with the pre-World War II Schaukelpolitik a product of that vulnerability.

In the conflicts of the Cold War, the stakes involved in a West German Schaukelpolitik are arguably much higher than before, while Germany's division provided a revisionist incentive not unlike that after World War I. Yet the post-1945 international system is different from the preceding periods in several essential respects which affect the position of the truncated West German state. One is the role of nuclear weapons which, while increasing the vulnerability of Germany to total destruction in a war, have arguably decreased the probability of that war occurring. Second is the commitment of the United St to the security of Western Europe. While this, in reality, also necessitates the commitment of the FRG to that same alliance system, it removes the basic instability that characterised the balance of power between 1871 and 1939. Moreover, it removes the need for the FRG to possess its own nuclear weapons. Third is the end of the intense hatred and antipathy (Erbfeindschaft) that formerly characterised Franco-German relations, a hostility that was a central premise of German policy from Bismarck to Hitler. The postwar Franco-German reconciliation was in part facilitated by the second factor, the US commitment; when that later became subject to some doubt, France bolstered its confidence by resort to the first factor, the force de frappe. The fourth, which follows from the third, is the integration of the FRG into a broader Western European framework, even if the framework has not achieved the supranational quality for which many had hoped. Finally, the fifth difference is the existence of a powerful Soviet state. Previous German flirtations with Russia - never based on a foundation of common values - had been considered possible because Russian strength was not dominant. After 1945, any bilateral alignment of the FRG or even a united Germany with the USSR would be one in which the USSR was the dominant partner.

The net effect of these five mutually reinforcing features of the post-World War II international system has not been to eliminate German vulnerability or the fear of isolation: that has remained a feature of the Federal Republic's foreign policy thinking, and presumably the GDR's as well. Nor did they remove the need for Germany to secure its own vital interests: the FRG has always assessed its role in the Western alliance system in terms of its ability to fulfil its national interests, and the alliance has generally been concerned with accommodating - within limits - those national interests. Nor, it should be stressed, are any of these features immutable; postwar alliance tensions can often be traced to a suspicion that one or the other has changed and anxiety about the possible implications of such changes. Nevertheless, these features have combined to provide an acceptable alternative to the precedents of German history: they provide a framework in which the FRG and its allies can attempt to resolve the inevitable conflicts between alliance interests and respective national interests. Within the framework, the vulnerability of the Federal Republic to the "shifting and uncertain tide" of European politics has been directed more to the West than to the East, in which West German dependency created reciprocal allied responsibilities for the interests of the Federal Republic. It is, however, one of the ironies of history that this alternative framework was neither planned nor anticipated, but can be said to have evolved incrementally out of the dilemmas of postwar politics and the failure of the victors to define their own national interests in terms acceptable to each other. The development of Western strategy in the Cold War and the definition of the parameters of an acceptable détente strategy to resolve the conflicts of the Cold War, to which this discussion now turns, need to be understood in the context of the "German Problem" as it was viewed in the postwar period.

PART 2

SETTING THE GROUND RULES:

THE "GERMAN PROBLEM" AND THE POLITICS OF STRENGTH, 1945-1957

> Simply to divide Europe between East and West not only would give a wholly undesirable inflexibility to the postwar political system but would in addition outrage the sensibilities of Europeans of all kinds... Since Germany is the only nucleus within Europe around which forcible consolidation could take place, the first problem is to discover the strategic controls which would render the fresh rise of an expansionist Germany impossible...
>
> William T.R. Fox, 1944[1]

In one of the few wartime reflections on the nature of a postwar European settlement, Fox articulated a dominant perspective of the "German Problem". His purpose was to advocate the postwar collaboration of the "super-powers" - the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union - in ensuring that "there should be no consolidation of Europe under a single hegemony either by one of themselves or by a power within Europe".[2] He also defined the condition for its success:[3]

> Whatever scheme is chosen, it will be implemented only if there is a continuing will on the part of all the major victors to enforce the terms of peace upon Germany in so far as they relate to the reduction of German power.

This notion of a Great Power condominium, embodied in the structure not only of the United Nations (UN) Security Council but also of the Allied Control Council in Germany, fell victim to the clash of national interests in the developing Cold War.

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[1] William T.R. Fox, The Super-Powers (New York: Harcourt, Brown, 1944), p.112.

[2] Ibid., p.111.

[3] Ibid., p.113.

By 1957, the division of Germany and Europe and the alliance of Western Europe and the United States had become established realities in the politics of the Cold War. By definition, any strategy of détente grows out of an environment characterised by tension. As such, we may view the development of the Cold War as the obverse of détente, in that the politics of the Cold War proceeded from the assumption that an acceptable negotiated settlement of differences between adversaries was not possible under existing conditions; attention was focused on the differences between adversaries rather than the interests that might be shared. If détente is a strategy to achieve certain ends through the relaxation of tensions between adversaries, the Cold War marked a strategy to achieve certain ends through the maintenance of those tensions. Nonetheless, it is in this period that we find many of the ends defined and the boundaries of acceptable means established that were to become significant in the later formulation of Western détente strategy.

Although the Cold War did not end in 1957, that date marks a milestone of a different sort - the demonstration of American vulnerability to Soviet military power by the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union. While the launch did not precipitate an abrupt volte-face in American foreign policy, it did give substantial impetus to alternative political and military strategies that were already being considered. These strategies, which dominated American policy-making through the 1960s, were to affect US relations not only with the Soviet Union but also with the Atlantic Alliance. The year 1957 marked a related achievement as well: the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM[4] symbolised the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western alliance structure on more than just a common defence foundation. The entry into force of the Paris Treaties and associated protocols in May 1955[5] had ended the occupation of West Germany, restored full sovereignty to the FRG, and brought the FRG into membership in the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The formation of the EEC marked the limit of the movement in the 1950s toward the broader integration of Western Europe. By 1957, Bonn had acquired the tangible benefits of sovereignty and proximate equality in the Western European framework it had sought: its subsequent policy imperatives were to maintain that position while pursuing the remaining goal of German reunification.

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[4] For the text of the Final Act, see RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.450-52.

As we shall see, the end of 1957 revealed a certain irony in Western strategy in the Cold War. In essence that strategy was to consolidate the Western position with the assumption that such demonstrable strength would induce the Soviet Union to make concessions on the central issues of the Cold War, including German reunification. Moreover, alliance strategy was in part based on the agreement that no efforts to settle outstanding issues with the Soviet Union would be made unless the interests of all alliance members were satisfied.[6] Yet the attainment of that consolidated Western position, in a period marked by a very high degree of consensus between Bonn and Washington, coincided with the emergence of a new form of Western vulnerability, to which Sputnik attested. These two countervailing realities - the search for strength and the recognition of vulnerability - provided the structure in which Western détente strategy later developed.

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[5] For the pertinent texts of the Paris Agreement of 23 October 1954, see RIIA, Documents, 1954, pp.28-30, 102-07. For their implementation, see RIIA, Documents, 1955, pp.156-57.

[6] See the Berlin Declaration of the US, UK, France and the FRG, 29 July 1957, in RIIA, Documents 1957, pp.97-99.

AD-A126 950 DETENTE AND ALLIANCE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA: 2/5
STRATEGIC DILEMMAS IN U..(U) AIR FORCE INST OF TECH
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH S FOERSTER JUL 82
UNCLASSIFIED AFIT/CI/NR-82-77D F/G 5/4 NL


1.0
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1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

In attempting to define the "ground rules" for a Western détente strategy, this part of the thesis examines the period 1945-1957 in five segments. Chapter 4 centres on the origins and early evolution of the Cold War. It is not within the purview of this thesis to assess the origins of the Cold War or to pass a verdict on the responsibility for the division of Germany and Europe. Instead, the discussion assumes that each of the victorious allies faced the "German Problem" with different and often ambiguous definitions as to what constituted adequate security in the postwar world: one's definition of the problem and the specific choices that followed had the effect - not altogether intended - of dividing Europe and Germany between East and West. By 1947, at least, the "German Problem" had become part of a global conflict of interests that, first, negated Fox's prescription, and, second, defined the parameters of the Western responses. Chapter 5 examines the development of Western, particularly American, strategy after 1947 in attempting to build a position of consolidated Western strength as the means to resolving the conflicts of the Cold War. Since the integration of West Germany into the Western alliance structure was the foundation of that "position of strength", chapter 6 examines the West German response.

While American and West German policies were highly compatible, their implementation in the 1950s must be seen in the context of the changing conditions of that decade. Specifically, a strategy that defined the requirements for an East-West détente in very rigid terms had to deal with an environment that appeared conducive to a détente, if that strategy could be more flexible. How the US-FRG alliance responded to these conditions is the subject of chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 analyses the implications of the change in the American Administration in 1952 and the flurry of East- West negotiations between 1953 and 1955; chapter 8 examines the dilemmas posed by the resulting pressures for a military détente in Central Europe, particularly its impact on Adenauer's largely restrictive Ostpolitik. This period reflects an early version of a "double-decision": the integration of the FRG into the Western alliance required credible Western attempts to seek a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, designed to attenuate the conflicts of the Cold War and to offer an alternative solution to the "German Problem" to the one that had evolved in practice since 1945.

CHAPTER 4

Allied Occupation: Choice and Effect

After Hitler's defeat, there was no immediate opportunity for Germany to choose among the historical precedents that had given rise to the prevalent concern about the "German Problem". The Germany of 1945 did not retain a tangible political entity. The destruction of the war, the allied demand for unconditional surrender, and the physical consequences of occupation and expropriation created a prostrate land in which all of the choices were left to the victorious allies. There was general agreement at the end of the war on the need, as Fox had suggested, for international control to prevent a resurgence of German power. But that agreement extended only to negative features of the occupation, such as demilitarisation, disarmament and denazification. There was no underlying agreement on the nature of postwar Germany, its obligations, or its relation to the rest of Europe and the international system. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the US, UK and USSR recognised their intention to establish a unified German state at some appropriate time in the future.[7] This formulation also served as a means of deferring what by then were already irreconcilable political issues, such as the nature of the German state (beyond a contested definition of "democracy"), its boundaries, or its place in the international system. While the three powers agreed to administer Germany as an economic unit, there was no allied programme for meeting that objective. This was not simply a manifestation of the developing Cold War. Although France was not represented at Potsdam, France did exercise a veto in the Allied Control Council and objected to any form of centralised administration of Germany. In the absence of agreement, therefore, authorities in each ally's occupation zone operated autonomously. The temporary expedient of military partition was inexorably transformed into the more intractable framework of political division.

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[7] See J.K. Sowden, The German Question, 1945-1973 (London: Bradford University, 1975), Chapter 2.

The political division of Germany and Europe - the most obvious manifestation of the Cold War - reflected not deliberate allied intentions but, as it continues to do, the perhaps inevitable consequences of the broader conflict between East and West. During the war, two alternatives were considered: dismemberment or unification. The former implied the partition of Germany into several component parts (Prussia, Bavaria, the Rhineland etc.) as a means of solving the "German Problem". It had its advocates, mostly in France and, to a lesser extent, in the United States and Britain. Stalin appeared to be ambivalent, willing to accede to whatever decision the US and Britain made.[8] The Potsdam decision thus resulted from an Anglo-American consensus, after some oscillation and indecision, that a unified Germany under Allied control was preferable to an imposed partition. While this will be examined shortly, the point here is that the bifurcation of Germany in the middle of Europe, however stable the result may have become, was then largely viewed as Fox saw it: undesirable, inflexible and outrageous.

To understand this more fully, and to see how this "solution" to the "German Problem" evolved in the context of the Cold War, it is necessary to turn to each ally's view of the "German Problem" and how that defined each ally's postwar security requirements. The Soviet Union, which occupied the largely agricultural eastern zone, clearly sought a weakened Germany that could be dominated, plus the exploitation of Germany's industrial resources which were located largely in the West. While consolidating control over its own zone, Moscow demanded $10 billion in reparations and Four Power control over the Ruhr, giving Moscow a veto over the use of those resources. What was in no case negotiable was Soviet control over Eastern Europe, especially Poland, necessary as a buffer against future German ambitions. German unification, while not a clear preference, nonetheless provided a framework for potential Communist control, especially if the US were to return to an isolationist posture.[9]

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[8] See John H. Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 1978), pp.17-27, and Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1972), pp.22-76.

France shared the Soviet desire for German weakness and remained adamant in its opposition to any form of centralisation in Germany. Moreover, France sought separation of the Rhineland from Germany international control over the Ruhr, and economic fusion of the Saar with France. For de Gaulle, the long term problem of European secur was not the Soviet Union but Germany. Articulating a theme that would reappear beginning in the late 1950s, de Gaulle also warned of the ascendency of two rival power blocs which would decide the fate of Europe without Europeans. Speaking in Belgium in October 1945, he sought:[10]

> ...to persuade the states bordering on the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to join together on the political, economic

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[9] President Roosevelt had earlier indicated to Stalin that US forces would remain in Europe for only two years. See Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy , 1917-1973* (New York: Praeger, 2nd ed., 1974), pp.388-93 on Stalin's ambivalence.

[10] Quoted in F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (London: Oxford University, 1968), p.16. The emphasis is mine. See pp.7-31 for a discussion on the Gaullist "French thesis" on Germany.

> and strategic planes... to make this organisation one of three planetary powers and, should it one day be necessary, the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps.

De Gaulle resigned in January 1946, but the French continued throughout the year to veto any measures which envisioned the centralised administration of Germany.[11] Any basis for Franco-Soviet cooperation, however, was undermined by the Soviet refusal in 1946 and in 1947 to support the separation of the Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany or economic fusion with the Saar. In May 1947, faced with isolation and economic troubles and with the Communist party out of the French cabinet, the official French attitude began to converge with British and American positions.

Prime Minister Churchill had argued late in the war that France should be included in the Allied Control Council and given a zone of occupation because he feared, like the French, that the US would shortly leave Europe.[12] Whereas the French sought a US commitment to guarantee against a resurgent Germany, Churchill was more concerned about what the Soviet Union might do in the face of Western weakness. In May 1945, Churchill advised the new US President, Truman, in a fashion which anticipated his celebrated "Iron Curtain" speech ten months later:[13]

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[11] See the argument of this position by French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, "Agreement on Germany: A Key to World Peace", Foreign Affairs (Vol.24, No.4, July 1946), pp.571-78.

[12] See Francis L. Loewenstein et al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: Saturday Review, 1975), p.600. Also André Fontaine, History of the Cold War (Volume I): From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1965), p.170. For examples of the comparable French concern, evident still in the ratification debate for the North Atlantic Treaty, see Willis, op.cit., p.56.

[13] Telegram of 12 May 1945, reproduced as Appendix 2, in Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965 (London: Constable, 1966), pp.797-98.

> An iron curtain is drawn down upon this front... Meanwhile the attention of our people will be occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance if they chose to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic... To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others.

Despite the alarm of this warning, security concerns were then defined primarily in economic terms. Depending on one's point of view, German economic weakness represented both a reprieve and a burden; economic strength both a threat and an asset. For the US and the UK, the dominant belief was that a dismembered, weakened and disarmed Germany would place a severe political, economic and military burden on the occupying states.[14] Fear of Soviet Communism and the fear of a long term economic commitment to the European continent had their origins in separate bureaucratic contexts and from conflicting political assumptions. Nonetheless, they merged in their implications for policy in the incremental evolution of Western strategy in the Cold War. Th is particularly so for the US, which was the only ally in a posit to deal with the sources of both fears.

American designs for the postwar international order rested on the hope that the victorious allies would, as Fox had suggested, cooperate in maintaining power and security. This hope originated in a Wilsonian tradition of collective security, including the assumption that nations would, if given the opportunity for self-determination, choose democracy and liberal economic philosophies. On one level, the clash with the Soviet Union stemmed from a rejection of what was assumed to be an antipathetic and equally universalist view.[15] The focus of this issue was initially more on Eastern Europe than on Germany in that it rejected spheres of influence as a means of maintaining security. There remained a minority view, expressed by George F. Kennan from Moscow, advocating "a prompt and clear recognition of the division of Europe into spheres of influence and of a policy based on the fact of such a division".[16] But the dominant view was highlighted by US Senator Arthur Vandenberg before the Yalta Conference:[17]

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[14] For a discussion of this dilemma, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Chapter 4.

> Russia's unilateral plan appears to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly, of a surrounding circle of buffer states, contrary to our conception of what we thought we were fighting for in respect to the rights of small nations and a just peace. Russia's announced reason is her insistent purpose never again to be at the mercy of another German tyranny. That is a perfectly understandable reason. The alternative is collective security... America has the same self-interest in permanently, conclusively, and effectively disarming Germany and Japan.

President Roosevelt had counted on the postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union; Truman and his advisors, while more sceptical of Soviet intentions, nonetheless did continue to press for that cooperation, although the essential criterion of cooperation - self-determination in areas dominated by the Soviet Union - precluded any real basis for reconciliation.

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[15] This is very much at the heart of the "traditionalist" vs. "revisionist" debate on the origins of the Cold War. I agree with the balanced assessment by Stanley Hoffmann in "Revisionism Revisited", in Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W. Presser, eds., Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1974), pp.3-26. See also Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967) and Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1973).

[16] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Origins of the Cold War", Foreign Affairs (Vol.46, No.1, October 1967), p.408. See Schlesinger's The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power and Violence in America (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), pp.99-104, for a discussion of "universalism" versus "spheres of influence" in the Cold War.

[17] Speech on 10 January 1945, reproduced from the Congressional Record in a collection of documents by Richard D. Challener, ed., From Isolation to Containment, 1921-1952: Three Decades of American Foreign Policy from Harding to Truman (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), pp.118-19.

The problem for US policy was how to induce Soviet cooperation, once it seemed that the Soviet leaders had their own understanding of their security requirements in Eastern Europe. One answer was provided by the US Ambassador to Moscow, W. Averill Harriman, who argued, in March 1944, that economic assistance was:[18]

> one of the most effective weapons at our disposal to influence European political events in the direction we desire... [to] avoid the development of a sphere of influence of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

The employment of such "linkage" was not integral to either Roosevelt's or Truman's policies, although there did emerge under Truman a more general consensus that Soviet economic dependency - both for aid and US cooperation on reparations - would induce the Soviet government, as Harriman put it, "to play a decent role in international affairs".[19] An adjunct to this policy was pursued by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes who, in late 1945, first offered Stalin a twenty-five year Four Power Treaty guaranteeing German demilitarisation. This commitment of the US to the security of Europe was designed to allay Soviet (and French) fears about a future Germany, thereby undermining Stalin's rationale for control over Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) and Soviet reparation claims. A similar guarantee was offered again in 1946, and again, by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in April 1947.

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[18] Quoted in Kuklick, op.cit., p.103. Similarly, Harriman's 9 September 1944 cable, quoted, pp.105-07.

[19] W. Averill Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), pp.42-43.

Despite all hopes, it had long been clear that East-West cooperation would be difficult. The prospect of postwar East-West competition militated even more against an imposed partition of Germany. A dismembered Germany would not only be an economic burden, it would also be a focus for German revanchism: as a State Department memorandum of July 1944 warned, the Great Powers "would find themselves bidding for German support by promising to work for the reunification of Germany".[20] Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was a fact that was undesirable but did not constitute the threat that Soviet domination of Germany would pose. As John Foster Dulles, then a consultant to the State Department, warned in early 1947:[21]

> The Germans concededly are the heart of the problem of Europe. Never before has a people so numerous and so potentially powerful had so unique an opportunity to bargain between two opposing groups. If the Germans would combine again with Soviet Communism as they did in the fall of 1939, that combination could sweep Europe.

Dulles' warning was a clear Cold War declaration, in that it called for the mustering of Western strength against a Soviet threat. But in terms of its implications for the administration of occupied Germany, it was consistent with a policy line that had developed not only out of internationalist assumptions but also out of an isolationist desire to avoid the indefinite commitment of American resources to support an impotent German economy. In the period between 1945 and 1947, the immediate problem was that none of the four zones of occupation - and particularly the western zones - was by itself economically viable; differences with France and the Soviet Union precluded Four Power agreement. In these conditions, economic and security issues were fused.

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[20] Quoted in Backer, op.cit., p.26. See his discussion, pp.[illegible]ff. The minority dissenting opinion was expressed by former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, in Time for Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), especially pp.[illegible]ff.

[21] [illegible] in [illegible] Bown, Cold War to Détente (London: Heinemann, 1976). [illegible] speaking from opposition in the British House of Commons, had expressed a similar fear a year earlier. Hansard, 20 [illegible]
pp. 218-29.

US policy on the postwar German economy had evolved in a debate between the State and Treasury departments, in which the latter, under Henry Morgenthau, advocated the dismemberment of the German state and the "pastoralisation" of its economy. The prevailing State Department view was not originally rooted in any desire to utilise German strength in an anti-Soviet crusade but derived more from a reluctance to deny to Europe German resources for its own economic recovery since that implied an indefinite subsidy from the United States. These views converged, however, in US reparations policy which in many respects constituted the basis for the first real clash with the Soviet Union. Truman's instruction to the Allied Commission on Reparations on 18 May 1945 declared:[22]

> It is and has been fundamental US policy that Germany's war potential be destroyed, and its resurgence as far as possible be prevented... [We oppose] any reparations plans based on the assumption that the US or any other country will finance directly or indirectly any reconstruction in Germany or reparations by Germany.

Morgenthau's views in fact reinforced the broad consensus against heavy reparations, not because he wanted a strong German economy but because he did not want the reconstruction of the German industrial base which would be necessary for the payment of reparations.[23]

Formal US occupation policy reflected some of the punitive elements of the Morgenthau Plan, despite the opposition of virtually every senior official charged with its execution.[24] It was not officially changed until July 1947, although the alteration of its basic premises was clear in Byrnes' "restatement" of US policy at Stuttgart on 5 September 1946:[25]

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[22] See Harry S. Truman, Vol. I. Year of Decision, 1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955) p.232.

[23] For the debate on the Morgenthau Plan, see Backer, op.cit., pp.31ff., and Kuklick, op.cit., pp.47-73.

> It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a power or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West...
>
> Germany is a part of Europe, and European recovery... will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse...
>
> Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. We are staying here and will furnish our proportionate share of the security forces.

This much heralded policy statement was, to Byrnes, a reply to a speech made by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov three months earlier, in which Molotov criticised the alleged US policy of "agrarianisation" and "annihilation" of the German economy. Not only did Byrnes want to be clear about US intentions with respect to German recovery; he also wanted to deter Soviet intransigence by eliminating any expectations that the US would return to an isolationist posture.[26]

Although the highly publicised Morgenthau plan did not represent US policy, it had become increasingly important to eliminate the ambiguities that remained in both the rhetoric and execution of US policy. In the middle of 1946, General Clay, then the Deputy Military Governor in Germany, ordered a halt to dismantling in the US zone and ceased the shipment of industrial equipment to the Soviet zone, the latter move ostensibly because the USSR refused to account for its own dismantling in its reparations claims.[27] He justified his action as a means to force a decision on economic unity - a move aimed equally at the Soviet Union and France - fearing the indefinite requirements of an annual $200 million subsidy to the US zone.[28] The broader issue for US policy was that the failure of Four Power control had created a competition for German loyalty, in which conflicts over the administration of German economic recovery took on the broadest political implications. Ten days after Byrnes' Stuttgart speech, the Report of the Secretary's Policy Committee on Germany expressed an essential element of US policy that dominated not only the Cold War but the future politics of East-West détente as well:[29]

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[24] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 was replaced by JCS Directive 1779 on 11 July 1947. See John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1968), pp.5ff.

[25] See James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (London: William Heinemann, 1947), pp.189ff.

[26] Molotov's speech was in Paris at the Council of Foreign Ministers on 10 July 1946. For the speech and Byrnes' assessment of it, see *ibid.*, pp.179-81. Also Fontaine, *op.cit.*, pp.315ff.

> The United States should press vigorously and persistently for the unification of Germany. A split of Germany would gravely endanger both the stability and prosperity of Europe and the country that sponsored it would incur the permanent enmity of the entire German national community. If ever there should be such a split, it must be clear to the whole world that it was in spite of United States policy and not because of it.

Byrnes had already proposed the fusion of the US zone with other occupation zones, a proposal accepted only by the British. While primarily designed to facilitate solution of the economic problem, this also seemed a step toward German unity. Ultimately, however, it led (with French agreement in 1947) to the fusion of the three Western zones and a deeper East-West partition of Germany.

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[27] Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (London: William Heinemann, 1950), pp.150ff.

[28] See Clay's cable to the War Department on 24 May 1946, ibid., pp.73-78, and Gimbel, op.cit., pp.56-60. See also Clay's comments to Byrnes in November 1946 in Backer, op.cit., p.146.

[29] Quoted in Backer, op.cit., p.117. Emphasis added.

In bilateral talks after the unsuccessful London Four Power Conference in December 1947, British Foreign Secretary Bevin and US Secretary of State Marshall reaffirmed their conviction that "we must always aim at an eventually reunified Germany. Then any German irredentist movement for unity would come from the west and not from the east."[30] Yet that was a problem that could only be solved in the long term. The more immediate problem was, as Clay argued, that economic chaos in Germany was "favourable to the development of Communism in Germany and a deterrent to its democratisation... We were now engaged in a competitive struggle, not with arms but with economic resources, with ideas and ideals."[31] Marshall complained in May 1947, "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate";[32] one month later he announced the Marshall Plan, reflecting US determination to take steps of its own to circumvent the stalemate. Marshall aid was offered to the USSR and Eastern Europe as well, and Four Power cooperation remained theoretically possible. Nevertheless, the implications for Soviet control in Eastern Europe were such that Soviet acceptance was neither forthcoming nor expected.[33] Despite the shared British and American hope for the eventual reunification of Germany, Harold Macmillan suggested to the House of Commons in August 1947 that the *de* facto partition of Germany be recognised;[34] similarly, Marshall reported after the London Four Power Conference, "We cannot look forward to a unified Germany at this time. We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt."[35] One month later, Bevin told the House of Commons, "We are thinking now of Western Europe as a unit."[36]

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[30] From the expurgated record of those talks sent to Bidault, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter referred to as *FRUS*), *1948, Volume III - Western Europe* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1974), pp.1-3.

[31] Clay, *op.cit.*, pp.77-78, 364-48. The original text is emphasised with italics.

[32] Quoted in Gimbel, *op.cit.*, p.5.

[33] See Charles E. Bohlen, *The Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), pp.87-92. For Marshall's speech and the subsequent diplomatic exchanges, see RIIA, *Documents, 1947-1948*, pp.17-115.

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[34] Hansard, 4 August 1947. See Macmillan, op.cit., p.123.

[35] Quoted in Gimbel, op.cit., p.194.

[36] Speech of 22 January 1948. See RIIA, Documents 1947-1948, pp.211-12.

CHAPTER 5

Toward a Position of Strength: US Policy and the Consolidation of Western Europe

The breakdown of a Four Power approach to postwar Germany coincided with an American definition of a global struggle between two powers whose mutual antagonism was total. Such was the assumption behind the Truman Doctrine, announced in April 1947, articulated two months earlier by then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson as he attempted to justify the policy to a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders:[1]

> Only two great powers remain in the world... the United States and the Soviet Union. We have arrived at a situation unparalleled since ancient times... Moreover, the two great powers were divided by an unbridgeable ideological chasm... And it was clear that the Soviet Union was aggressive and expanding. For the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Communist subversion was not to pull British chestnuts out of the fire; it was to protect the security of the United States - it was to protect freedom itself.

Total bipolarity on a global battlefield was the premise of US policy in the Cold War. To define the conflict in universalistic terms made the American commitment to that struggle more justifiable, not only in moralistic terms, but also in terms of the resources that were required. The struggle did not yet exist in a predominantly military dimension but in an economic and ideological one. The assumption behind Marshall Aid and the military assistance of the Truman Doctrine was that the United States would provide resources for self-help and self-defence.

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[1] On 27 February 1947, as recounted by a witness, in Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking, 1955), pp.138-41.

These policy steps reflected the prevailing view that there were no discernible possibilities for an acceptable settlement of the issues dividing the US and USSR. With respect to Germany, reunification had to be postponed until the Soviet Union would, as Harriman had earlier put it, "play the international game in accordance with our standards".[2] What constituted an acceptable basis for a détente between East and West depended on how one defined the problem. If the problem was the division of Europe, with opposing armies of occupation confronting each other, then the situation involved the surrender of either the US or the USSR to the other's designs for a united Europe, or it entailed a mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from both Western and Eastern Europe. The latter would only be acceptable if there developed a united Europe, with a German centre that was dismembered, with individual German states integrated in a larger European system. If, however, the problem was the division of Germany, then unification could only occur on the basis of neutrality, unless either West or East accepted a German state allied with the other. Yet a neutral Germany not tied to a broader international framework of control was unacceptable to its neighbours. Whether that Germany was weak or strong, it would be vulnerable to isolation and could exploit the East-West conflict with a new Schaukelpolitik. To the United States, neutrality, even for a state like Sweden, "can only serve to invite aggression".[3] For Germany it was unthinkable.

Within this zero-sum-game framework, Western strategy was to "contain" Soviet expansionism throughout the world, while hoping that time and the accumulation of Western strength would induce Soviet willingness to negotiate on terms acceptable to the West. The doctrine of "containment" received its first public exposition in Kennan's anonymous article in Foreign Affairs, published in July 1947.[4] For Kennan, Soviet policy stemmed from "the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism" which precluded "any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist". Any apparent Soviet desire to cooperate was only an expedient: the policy of antagonism was "basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us... until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed". Kennan proceeded to explain that Soviet policy respected power, sought to fill the voids of power, and would acquiesce in the face of "unassailable barriers in its path". Thus, US policy had to be "a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies... by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts maneuvers of Soviet policy...". Nevertheless, "the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin". The Kremlin lacked the ability to sustain its empire, given its social and economic weakness and the fragile "crust" of Soviet power facing an inevitable trauma of leadership succession. This provided the US with the opportunity "to increase enormously the strain under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection... and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power".

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[2] Quoted in Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1972), p.107.

[3] See Marshall's advice to Truman regarding Sweden's neutrality policy, 3 June 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol.III, p.134.

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[4] See "X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs (Vol.25, No.4, July 1947), pp.566-82. For Kennan's retrospective discussion of this controversial article, see George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), Chapter 15. Quotations in this paragraph are all from the "X-article".

That Soviet power would expand and therefore needed to be confronted by American power was generally accepted.[5] The Administration's most influential critic, Walter Lippmann, shared this premise but disagreed with the strategy that Kennan had outlined.[6] Lippmann rejected the suggestion that the US would have to maintain a defensive posture against Soviet expansionism: such a prospect was based on an unproven and optimistic assumption of Soviet impermanence; it kept the initiative with Moscow; it demanded an orchestration of national resources incompatible with the nature of American politics; and it required constant intervention in the affairs of nations along the Soviet periphery in the creation and maintenance of subordinate alliances subject to American control. America's "natural" allies of the Atlantic Community would eventually realise that the policy "will collapse by frustration, cannot be enforced and cannot be administered successfully, and that it must fail". The threat of eventual war, in which Europe would be the battlefield, would induce "every European nation... to extricate itself from the Russian- American conflict". Thus, for Lippmann, the real problem was the division of Europe, maintained by the presence of non-European military forces:

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[5] The exception that perhaps proves the rule is Henry A. Wallace, Vice President under Roosevelt and Secretary of Commerce under Truman, who was asked to resign after his controversial Madison Square Garden speech of 12 September 1946. See Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., *American Foreign Policy, Present to Past: A Narrative with Readings and Documents* (New York: Free, 1974), pp.344-51.

[6] Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1947). Quotations in this paragraph are from this volume.

> ...if these armies withdraw, there will be a very different balance of power in the world than there is today, and one which cannot easily be upset. For the nations of Europe, separately and in groups, perhaps even in unity, will then, and then only, cease to be the stakes and the pawns of the Russian-American conflict.

Lippmann accepted that the return of Soviet and American troops to their homelands required a treaty on Germany and Austria that no longer justified the maintenance of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Hence, his primary opposition to the Administration centered on the "German Problem": such a treaty would have to deny German unity in the hope that European unity would develop, yet US policy was to restore the western portions of Germany, "encouraging the Germans to want something - namely, national unity - which we cannot give them except by going to war with Russia". Moreover, Lippmann warned that Russia was in a position to satisfy German unity, and "the precedents of history and the logic of the situation tell us that when she is strong enough to be a useful ally to anyone, she will become the ally of Russia".

In a sense, the answer to Lippmann's critique was to pursue original containment strategy more intensely, with the view not only toward inducing the Soviet leadership to yield to Western strength but equally toward ensuring that West Germany was not tempted to seek the fulfilment of its national goals independent of the Western alliance. Thus, the unification of Germany was contingent upon the West's ability to mount a successful negotiating strategy. Yet within that strategy, there was nothing that was negotiable. If a West German state could only be created under certain controls, clearly a unified German state needed at least comparable controls. Therefore, a united Germany was only acceptable in the framework of a united Europe - in which the Soviet Union surrendered control not only over East Germany but Eastern Europe as well - or in the framework of a unified Western Europe -

which was no more acceptable to the Soviet Union. The dilemma with respect to Germany was that German unity required a successful settlement of the division of Europe, although there were those, beginning with Lippmann, who noted that a settlement of the division of Europe need not include the unification of Germany and, indeed, was only possible without German reunification.

The implementation of a strategy of containment occurred in the context of two fundamental policy dilemmas for the US. On the one hand, the US was publicly committed to the unification of Germany, yet was compelled to take policy steps that consolidated only the western zones. On a broader level, the US had committed itself to a total global confrontation, yet remained unwilling to commit its resources to an interminable support for its allies. An intellectual resolution of these dilemmas was found in the notion of Western European unity, a concept advanced by Dulles in early 1947[7] and pursued actively by Bevin throughout 1948.[8] It was a vague concept, involving political consultation, economic coordination and cooperation in mutual security efforts. Kennan, as head of the Policy Planning Staff, reinforced the prevailing view in the State Department, that "only such a union holds out any hope of restoring the balance of power in Europe without permitting Germany to become again the dominant power".[9] American support for a Western European Union already had a foundation in Marshall

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[7] In a speech to the National Publishers Association, 17 January 1947, "Europe Must Federate or Perish". See John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1968), pp.121-22.

[8] See, for example, "Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union", transmitted to Marshall on 13 January 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol.III, pp.4-6.

[9] See Kennan's memorandum to Marshall, 20 January 1948, ibid., pp.7-8.

Aid, and both reflected the American requirement for overt European initiatives before US guarantees could be considered politically acceptable.[10] Nonetheless, once the decision had been made to focus on the strengthening of Western Europe, French rather than Soviet cooperation was the vital ingredient. The French political situation was unstable, and the fear of Germany dominated any worries about the Soviet Union. What was required before French cooperation could be assured was a British and ultimately an American security guarantee.

The British had taken the first step in signing the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk, explicitly directed against future German aggression.[11] In February 1948, the US, UK, France and the Benelux countries met in London to work out arrangements for the fusion of the three Western occupation zones. Three agreements resulted: creation of the International Authority on the Ruhr (IAR) to guarantee a French supply of coal while not separating the Ruhr or Rhineland from Germany; establishment of a Military Security Board (MSB) to monitor German demilitarisation; and provision for a consituent assembly to w a constitution for a German federal republic.[12] These agreements were a departure from the original Gaullist "French thesis" of a Germany reduced to a dependency relationship with a dominant France. Yet developments since 1945 had placed the French in a weak position, and Bidault warned the French National Assembly that a rejection of the London Agreements would be economically disastrous.[13] What made the restoration of a strong German state palatable was the goal of "a peaceful Germany [integrated] in a united Europe, in which the Germans, feeling secure in their position, will be able to give up all ideas of dominating Europe".[14] Moreover, during the March recess of the London Conference, the European participants had signed the Brussels Treaty, establishing the Western European Union (WEU) with an assurance of American backing.[15]

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[10] See, for example, the exchange between the British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel and US Under Secretary of State Lovett, 27 January - 7 February 1948, *FRUS, 1948, Vol. III*, pp.14-23.

[11] See RIIA, *Documents 1947-1948*, pp.194-97.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp.564-74.

[13] See F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (London: Oxford University, 1968), p.24.

The Brussels Treaty was designed as a prelude to an American commitment to European security, needed, as Bevin advised Marshall, to allay French doubts about rebuilding a strong western Germany and to provide a secure base for the integration of Western Europe.[16] The eventual result was the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into effect in August 1949.[17] Anglo-American efforts to consolidate West Germany into a strengthened Western Europe occurred in the context of Soviet moves to consolidate its own position on its periphery: the successful Prague coup and the Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland in early 1948 and, after currency reform in West Germany, the beginning of the blockade of Western land access to Berlin in June. While Soviet moves may have been an attempt to deter Western initiatives, the effect was to add greater urgency to a process in which the consolidation of Western strength took on an increasingly military flavour. Two dangers dominated US deliberations: one was that Stalin would underestimate US will and would seek to expand; the other that "the free world" would be intimidated by the sheer proximity of Soviet power in the absence of tangible US support.[18] Of particular concern was the threat of "fifth column" subversion on the Czech model, with France and Italy potential targets, plus the fear of neutralism, particularly in Scandinavia. Bevin's proposal of an "Atlantic Approaches Pact" was the necessary "bold move" to restore morale and confidence in Europe.[19]

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[14] Bidault's speech to the National Assembly, February 1948, in RIIA, *Documents 1947-1948*, pp.223-24.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp.225-29. With US pressure, the Brussels Treaty did not specify the German threat like the Treaty of Dunkirk, although its preamble retained explicit reference to Germany. It was amended after the FRG acceded to the WEU in 1955.

[16] Even in late 1948, Clay complained that the French in practice continued to delay West German economic recovery. See Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London: William Heinemann, 1950), pp.414-16. For examples of Bevin's pressures on Marshall, see *FRUS, 1948, Vol.III*, pp.32-33, 46-48, 79-80, 122-123, 130. See also Harry S. Truman, *Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), pp.234-76.

[17] For the text of the treaty, see RIIA, *Documents, 1949-1950*, pp.257-60.

Working level US-British-Canadian security consultations between 22 March and 1 April 1948 produced a document that was treated as a US State Department position paper.[20] It concluded that the US should support the Brussels Treaty and negotiate a Defence Agreement for the North Atlantic Area. With respect to Germany, the paper noted:

> 6. When circumstances permit, Germany (or the three Western Zones), Austria (or the three Western Zones) and Spain should be invited to adhere to the Five-Power Treaty and to the Defense Agreement of the North Atlantic Area. This objective, which *should not be publicly disclosed*, could be provided for by a suitable accession clause in the Defense Agreement.

By the time Truman approved the National Security Council (NSC) position on 2 July, the reference to Germany, Austria and Spain was somewhat milder, noting that they "logically might belong in the Brussels

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[18] See the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs' 8 March 1948 memorandum to Marshall, in *FRUS, 1948, Vol.III*, pp.40-42.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp.46-48.

[20] The French were originally not included because they were considered a "security risk". For the minutes of the meeting, see *ibid.*, pp.59-61, 64-72. For the paper itself, see pp.72-75. Emphasis in the quoted section is in the original.

Treaty Group".[21] In subsequent security talks among the WEU members and the US between July and September, the scope of the North Atlantic Pact was an important area of contention, particularly as regards Italy, Greece and Turkey, French North Africa, and central Europe; the issue of German membership was generally avoided through the euphemistic device of whether or not a country bordered on the North Atlantic area.

A key issue in this debate related to the nature of American assistance. An early American concern about support for the Brussels pact was that emphasis on military assistance would undermine Congressional support for economic assistance. To meet demands for an American security guarantee, the US focused on providing a *political* commitment that would *not* require a long term *physical* commitment. Such was the intent of Senator Vandenberg, whose Senate resolution of 4 June 1948 provided the necessary domestic political basis for US participation in a North Atlantic Pact.[22] Likewise, during the Senate ratification debate, Secretary of State Acheson emphatically denied that the US was "going to be expected to send substantial numbers of trops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of those countries' capacity to resist".[23]

The corollary of this requirement for an association based on "effective self help and mutual aid" was that Western Europe should organise itself to meet its own security requirements in the long term. In May 1948, the Brussels Treaty Military Commission assured the US that they would pool their resources and coordinate their efforts with the determination "to fight as far east in Germany as possible... that sufficient time for American military power to intervene decisively can be assured".[24] While the American guarantee provided, especially for the French, an alternative to a German contribution to European defence,[25] American thinking already provided the logical foundation for eventual German rearmament. Furthermore, it reinforced US advocacy for a united Western Europe, whose economic viability, political cohesion and capacity for self-defence would provide an acceptable framework for renewed West German strength plus a defence against Communist subversion and expansion. It would also obviate the need for an indefinite commitment of American resources.

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[21] *FRUS, 1948, Vol. III*, p.140. NSC-9 went through several drafts, in which references to these countries was alternatively included and excluded.

[22] For the text of the Vandenburg Resolution, 11 June 1948, see *ibid.*, pp.135-36.

[23] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), pp.285-90. More generally, see Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), pp.31ff.

In the dawn of the atomic age, therefore, a global defence of free world interests demanded that Western Europe contribute substantially to its own regional defence. While the struggle between East and West was not seen to be a military struggle, military power was a necessary component of Western strength because of the psychological benefits it provided. As Harriman advised Marshall and Defense Secretary James Forrestal in July 1948, Europeans assumed that the US would fight but would have to liberate Europe after the fact; tangible evidence of US military support was necessary.[26] The US remained determined "to keep Germany out of the Soviet orbit" and to integrate West

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[24] FRUS, 1948, Vol.III, pp.123-26.

[25] See Foreign Minister Schuman's comments to the French National Assembly in July 1949, quoted in Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years (London: Pall Mall, 1971), p.304.

[26] Harriman was then US Special Representative to Europe under the 1948 Foreign Assistance Act. FRUS, 1948, Vol.III, pp.183-84.

Germany into Western Europe.[27] The problem remained to allay French fears and to meet a persistent French demand for short term rearmament.[28]

This approach to Western Europe was consistent with Kennan's earlier prescription for concentrating on the creation of "unassailable barriers" to Soviet expansionism. Yet Kennan and State Department Counselor Charles Bohlen dissented from the increasing emphasis on "military containment". Kennan's views on the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty are worth citing at length because they elucidate the problem of consolidating Western strength without consolidating the division of Europe:[29]

> A particularly unfortunate effect of going beyond the North Atlantic area would be that we would thereby raise for every country in Europe the question: to belong or not to belong... If individual countries rejected membership or were refused membership, the Russians could make political capital out of this either way. If, on the other hand, most of the ERP countries are permitted to join, and did so, this would amount to a final militarization of the present line through Europe. Such a development would be particularly unfortunate, for it would create a situation in which no alteration or obliteration of that line could take place without having an accentuated military significance. This would reduce materially the chances for Austrian and German settlements, and would make it impossible for any of the satellite countries even to contemplate anything in the nature of a gradual withdrawal from Russian domination, since any move in that direction could take on the aspect of a provocative military move...
>
> Unquestionably there is already a strong tendency in this direction; and it may not be possible to prevent a progressive congealment of the present line of division. But our present policy is still directed... toward the eventual peaceful withdrawal of both the United States and the USSR

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[27] See Lovett's long outline of American policy to Harriman of 3 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, pp.300-10.

[28] See particularly the minutes of the allied security discussion on 3 September 1948, ibid., pp.228-32.

[29] See the Policy Planning Staff memorandum to Lovett and Marshall of 24 November 1948, ibid., pp.283-89, particularly p.287. Emphasis added.

> from the heart of Europe, and accordingly toward the encouragement of the growth of a third force which can absorb and take over the territory between the two.

In many respects, the dilemma remained as it had in 1945: the best solution to the problem of European security was, arguably, the unification of Europe, free from the military confrontation of two superpowers. Within that unified Europe would be a unified Germany, disarmed yet a viable partner in the European system. But the confrontation existed *a priori*; only a détente between East and West was possible to end it. Moreover, Kennan had insisted that it was a fundamental conflict that offered no possible solution until Western strength proved "unassailable". That was to some extent borne out in the successful Western response to the Berlin blockade. The Berlin blockade was significant in another respect in that West Germany - and West Berlin under Mayor Ernst Reuter - became, in the eyes of Western public opinion, allies in a common cause rather than a defeated and occupied former enemy. With the unexpectedly early detonation of Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and the successful Chinese Communist revolution a month later, it seemed all the more imperative to consolidate the strength of the Western "camp". The subsequent review of American policy in NSC-68 created the logical foundations - independent of the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 - for an increased emphasis on the build-up of Western military power, including the rearmament of the new German Federal Republic. It became an axiom of American policy that any détente - through which German reunification could be achieved - would have to wait for the attainment of a new position of strength.

Such was the view expressed by Acheson in an oft-quoted speech of 16 February 1950:[30]

> The only way to deal with the Soviet Union... is to create situations of strength... When we have reached unity and determination on the part of the free nations - when we have eliminated all the weaknesses that we can - we will be able to evolve working agreements with the Russians.
>
> No good will come from our taking the initiative in calling for conversations at this point... It is clear that the Russians do not want to settle those issues as long as they feel there is any possibility they can exploit them for their own objectives of world domination.

With the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, the primary issue between East and West in the public eye was no longer the problem of a postwar settlement but the regulation of atomic energy. The US had proposed the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy in June 1946, but subsequent discussions in the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) gave no hope for agreement: the US, with a monopoly, insisted on a system of international control along the lines of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of April 1946 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly, but the Soviet Union refused to agree to any form of systematic international control and inspection. Disarmament negotiations foundered on this stalemate until technological advances made possible an agreement on a Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. It is significant at this point in the discussion because the issue of disarmament became integral to the issue of European security and the settlement of the "German Problem". The confluence of these issues, and the prevailing belief that one could not be solved without the resolution of the other, defined the precondition for détente in the 1950s. Acheson's speech came within a month after the Soviet delegates walked out of the UNAEC. It anticipated the conclusions of a major review of American foreign policy and security objectives that began with Truman's decision, on 31 January, to proceed with the development of thermonuclear weapons.[31]

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[30] *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter *DOSB*), 20 March 1950, pp.427-29. For a discussion comparing Acheson's and Kennan's views, see Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), pp.28ff.

The assumption of NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" was that "conflict has... become endemic" in the international system.[32] Its conclusions with respect to US objectives were compatible with those expressed in November 1948 in NSC 20/4, but the threat was now more "immediate" in light of the recent events in the Cold War. Specifically, the report projected a Soviet atomic stockpile of 200 bombs by 1954, with the assumption that at least half could be successfully delivered on targets in the US, sufficient to "seriously damage" the US. More pertinent to our analysis are the views expressed in the report regarding the policy responses necessary to meet US objectives, and particularly the role of negotiations in US Cold War policy and the relationship between the called for increases in military strength and the prospects for a déten with the Soviet Union.

In stating US objectives, Paul Nitze, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and primary drafter of the report, affirmed many of the assumptions of Kennan's containment thesis:[33]

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[31] For the NSC Special Committee report on the development of the "super", see *FRUS, 1950, Vol.I - National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), pp.513-23. For Truman's memorandum of 31 January, launching NSC-68, see pp.141-42.

[32] Truman received a draft of NSC-68 on 7 April 1950; this draft was approved with minor changes on 30 September. See *ibid.*, pp.235-92 for the report, and p.400 for the President's acceptance of its conclusions as policy.

[33] *Ibid.*, p.252. Emphasis added.

> As for the policy of 'containment', it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

These four ends represented, in effect, minimum and maximum objectives for US policy. This formulation of containment, moreover, went beyond Kennan's original thesis in two essential respects: one was that agreement might be reached with the Soviets even without an internal transformation of the regime; the other, reflecting Lippmann's earlier critique and anticipating the Republican Party's campaign rhetoric of 1952, was that containment as a defensive policy was insufficient. Hence:[34]

> Beyond thus affirming our values, our policy and actions must be such to foster a fundamental change in the nature of *the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration* of the [Kremlin] designs is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society...
>
> It is not an adequate objective merely to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership.
>
> It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the preconditions for workable agreements can be created... Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence in tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world.

What was required, in any case, was "superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combinations with other like-minded nations":

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[34] FRUS, 1950, Vol. I, pp.241-42. Emphasis added.

specifically, Nitze meant "superior aggregate military strength", without which containment "is no more than a policy of bluff".[35]

The problem, Nitze emphasised, was that Western power was not only not superior, it was in relative decline vis-à-vis Soviet power. Here Kennan had again dissented, having noted to Acheson in February that there was "little justification for the view that the Cold War had suddenly turned to US disadvantage".[36] Nitze and Kennan also disagreed on the necessary policy response, especially with respect to the role of atomic weapons and the increasing emphasis on military power. In early 1950, US defence policy was based almost by default on a primary reliance on the atomic bomb, described by the Chairman of the JCS, General Omar Bradley, as "our principal initial weapon in any war".[37] Kennan's lengthy memorandum of 20 January argued that the US should relax its conditions for agreement with the Soviet Union on the international control of atomic energy, even if that meant an imperfect system of control and verification; he dismissed the notions th the US should place primary reliance on the atomic bomb as an es tial part of the military arsenal or that the US should link atomic disarmament with conventional disarmament.[38] Nitze agreed that the existing war policy "may impede the establishment of those conditions under which a more general relaxation of tensions between the USSR and ourselves might be possible", and likewise preferred a "war policy restricted to retaliation against prior use by an enemy".[39] Nevertheless, it did not, to Nitze, follow that one could then negotiate an imperfect control arrangement with the Soviet Union on that basis: an inadequate inspection scheme would be unstable; it would not be acceptable to the allies; and it was "not practicable... except in a broader program for the relaxation of tensions between East and West" in which progress was also necessary on disarmament of conventional weapons or on a peace settlement on Germany and Japan.

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[35] FRUS, 1950, Vol. I, p.253.

[36] See Kennan's draft memorandum to Acheson, circulated to the Policy Planning Staff, 17 February 1950, ibid., pp.160-67.

[37] As quoted by Nitze, ibid., p.16.

[38] See ibid., pp.22-24 and Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp.471-76.

The resolution of this debate in Nitze's favour was evident in the draft of NSC 68. The report recognised the "present risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points". Moreover, US atomic capability was not viewed as an effective instrument of war fighting since it could not prevent a Soviet occupation of Western Europe or inflict sufficient damage on the Soviet Union to cause the Kremlin to sue for peace. Thus, it concluded both that the US atomic capability needed to be increased and that the US should reduce its dependency on it.[40] Moreover:[41]

> At least a major change in the relative power position of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated... The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable.

The central recommendation of NSC 68 was to effect this "major change in the relative power position".

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[39] See Nitze's criticism of Kennan's draft paper, to Acheson, 17 January 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol.I, pp.13-17.

[40] Ibid., pp.264-68.

[41] Ibid., p.271.

Against these assumptions, what then was the role of negotiations? There was, after all, considerable public pressure in the United States and Europe for an attempt to find a settlement to the disputes of the Cold War and particularly to regulate the control of atomic weapons. To meet that public demand, to gain support for the long term build up of Western strength, and to minimise the immediate risks of war, it was necessary, as Acheson publicly reiterated, for the US to be ready at all times to take the initiative in negotiations. In a speech at Berkeley in mid-March, Acheson had listed seven areas where the Soviet Union could "modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable security", including agreement on peace treaties in Europe and the Far East, withdrawal from "satellite areas", armament control, and cooperation in the UN.[42] Significantly, negotiations were not seen as a process for effecting compromise, because US positions were stated in terms of US vital security interests. As NSC 68 noted:[43]

> In short, our [negotiation] objectives are *to record*, where desirable, *the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union* and to facilitate that process by making negotiations, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

In fact, because of the disadvantageous US position, "For some [illegible] after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech... could only be a *tactic*."[44]

The US position on negotiations also demanded that individual disputes could not be handled separately. Reflecting the primacy of the atomic energy issue, NSC 68 reaffirmed that, at a minimum, any negotiations should provide for effective control of all armaments by the UN or a successor organisation. Soviet refusal on this point would thus put the onus of failure on to them. Yet the US reliance on atomic weapons also required caution on this point:[45]

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[42] Acheson's speech to the University of California at Berkeley, 16 March 1950, *DOSB*, 27 March 1950, pp.473-78.

[43] *FRUS, 1950, Vol.I*, p.274. Emphasis added.

[44] *Ibid.*, p.273. Emphasis added.

> For the time being the US and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic force and weapons and perhaps on other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan, and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

In sum, negotiations, while being a positive element of public diplomacy, could also be dangerous: a détente could induce a false sense of security and undermine the necessary programme of consolidating Western strength:[46]

> Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the US and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength. The only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and no influence... The idea that Germany or Japan... can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal...

In the short term, it was "desirable" for the US to conclude agreements with Japan, the FRG and Austria without the USSR, "to enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world".[47] In this respect, negotiations with the Soviet Union were useful in that they demonstrated to these potential allies that the USSR was not prepared to accept peace treaties with adequate safeguards for security and guarantees of free elections and democratic processes.

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[45] FRUS, 1950, Vol. I, p.275. Emphasis added.

[46] Ibid., p.279. Compare the memorandum by Charles W. Yost, Director of the Office of East European Affairs of 15 February on Basic Negotiations with the Soviet Union in which this same conclusion is reached, pp.153-59. Yost's memorandum provided the background for Acheson's Berkeley speech a month later.

The view that negotiations were potentially dangerous but a necessary part of public diplomacy, if used to restate the categorical Western position, found ample opportunity for expression throughout the 1950s. In essence, US policy changed little but continued to struggle with the problems of feeling insufficiently strong to negotiate what it wanted. In the absence of such strength, sufficient to compel a settlement on its own terms, the *status quo* of a divided Germany and Europe was a satisfactory interim solution to the problems left from 1945. In reality, US policy remained focused on the defensive aspects of containment, namely to block Soviet advances, both militarily and politically. As such, it struggled with the dilemma already noted by Lippmann: to create the necessary "unassailable barriers" entailed an excessive commitment of American resources. This was not simply an issue of fiscal conservatism and neo-isolationism, although that continued to find sufficient political expression well into the 1950s in the wing of the Republican Party led by Senator Robert A. Taft. It was also a question of priorities, suggested even within NSC 68 itself:[48]

> The problem is to create such *political* and *economic* conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw and eventually change its policies drastically.

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[47] *FRUS, 1950, Vol. I*, p.275.

[48] *Ibid.*, p.272. Emphasis added.

The report recognised that the necessary build-up of strength was "a necessary though not a sufficient condition" for the achievement of US policy objectives.[49] Critics were quick to emphasise however that the threat described by NSC 68 was fundamentally ideological and political, yet the prescription was for the expansion of Western _material_ strength. As the most penetrating internal criticism of the draft pointed out, it was "exerting decisive influences in the wrong direction in some places, such as West Germany"; placing too great a reliance on military force; creating an open ended demand on economic resources; and curtailing domestic programmes and recovery efforts.[50] As such, it threatened to lead to defeat in the Cold War rather than to its successful resolution. While this reflected a central issue in American policy in the Cold War throughout the 1950s, it was overshadowed by the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950.

The shock of the North Korean attack created the impetus for what had already been anticipated in earlier US and British thinking on the formation of NATO, had been categorically ruled out by France in ratifying the NATO treaty, and had been hypothetically rejected by the German Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, the year before:[51] the rearmament of Germany. Although both Field Marshal Lord Montgomery and General Clay had publicly urged it in the autumn of 1949, Acheson assured a Congressional committee twenty days before the outbreak of the Korean War, "We are proceeding from that basis... that Germany is to be demilitarized."[52] Two months later, however, he told a similar committee:[53]

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[49] _FRUS, 1950, Vol. I_, p.284.

[50] See the critique by William F. Schaub, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, on 8 May 1950. _Ibid._, pp.298-306.

[51] See Adenauer's interviews with _L'Est Républicain_, 11 November 1949, and the _Cleveland Plain Dealer_, 3 December 1949. More generally, James L. Richardson, _Germany and the Atlantic Alliance_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1966), Chapter 1, and Gerhard Wettig, _Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1945-1955_ (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967), pp.281ff. Note that what Adenauer rejected was the notion of a purely national army or German troops fighting under a foreign flag: he did not reject German participation in a European armed force.

> A progress for Western Europe which does not include the productive resources of all the countries of Western Europe... Western Germany as well as France, and... the military manpower of all of Western Europe... Western Germany as well as France, will not be effective in the long range political sense.

It was not, however, a sudden reversal in American thinking about Germany, since the logic of rearmament had preceded its catalyst. Neither did the US anticipate a direct invasion of Western Europe except in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union sought general war.[54] What was feared most was a loss of confidence in Western Europe, leading to the growth of neutralism, the break-up of NATO, and the "defection" of Germany.[55] The Defense Department pointed out that the US position in Korea was unique because it was the only area outside of Western Europe in which the US had forces with which to respond: there was no way to defend other peripheral areas, and further commitments which might lead to a long term war of attrition should be avoided.[56] On 17 August, Adenauer requested authority from the th

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[52] Testimony of 5 June 1950, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), p.116.

[53] Testimony of 30 August 1950, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, in Bundy, op.cit., pp.116-18.

[54] This was the general consensus, reflecting Kennan's influence. See the papers relating to the drafting of NSC 73, 25 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.I, pp.324-38 and 375-89.

[55] See Bohlen's assessment of 13 July and Kennan's of 8 August 1950, ibid., pp.342-44 and 361-67.

[56] See the Joint Memorandum of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to the Secretary of Defense, 1 August 1950, ibid., pp.353-57.

Allied High Commissioners to establish a federal police force, citing the threat of a Soviet and East German attempt to "liberate" West Germany.[57] Despite the fact that the US did not view such a threat as imminent, the request nevertheless provided a convenient and not unexpected opportunity for action in the hope of consolidating the Western position, solidifying the commitment of the FRG to the West, and providing a long term solution to the resource deficiency in the defence of Western Europe.

At the September NATO Ministerial, Acheson proposed a package to the allies designed to induce the acceptance of German rearmament: the US would provide an American Supreme Allied Commander to an integrated NATO military structure and would increase both financial aid and the number of US troops in Europe, if the allies approved the mobilisation of ten German divisions under NATO command.[58] France was ultimately the only ally that refused to countenance German rearmament, although European publics were generally alarmed at the prospect. The counterproposal of the Pleven Plan provided for the establishment of small German "combat teams" to be integrated into a European army, subordinate to a European Minister of Defence. Since it also envisaged a supranational Council of Ministers, a European Parliament and a common European defence budget, the French plan was, in effect, a postponement of German rearmament until the political integration of Western Europe was achieved. Subsequent negotiations for the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) continued until signature of a treaty in May 1952, only to falter later on the failure of the French to ratify it. The ultimate result was provision for twelve German divisions under NATO command, with the FRG a fully sovereign member of both the WEU and NATO.

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[57] See Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-1953 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), pp.275-78.

[58] For a full discussion of the events leading to German rearmament, see Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1971).

The rearmament of West Germany was the culmination of a process of consolidating Western strength in the Cold War, in which the criteria of Western strength were increasingly expressed in military terms, necessitating, in turn, the visible commitment of regional resources in a global conflict. It was the logical extension - reached reluctantly - of earlier assumptions about the nature of the Cold War and the prerequisites for its successful resolution, in which the Korean conflict played an accelerating role. It is significant that Korea represented most of all a political threat rather than a direct military one. Three weeks after the entry of the PRC into the conflict, the US ambassador to Moscow provided this assessment to Truman to which Truman agreed:[59]

> I felt that the Soviets were gaining so much by bleeding the United States in particular, and the Western world in general, through the war in Korea, that it would not be to their immediate advantage to move against us.

US pressures for rearmament stemmed not so much from the need to defend against an immediate military threat to Western Europe, but from the need for a symbol of Western will, both to enhance Western confidence and to justify the investment of US resources already called for in NSC 68.

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[59] Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Alan G. Kirk with the President, 19 December 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol.I, pp.481-84.

One result, implied even in policy steps of the late 1940s, was to internalise the "German Problem" as a problem of the Western alliance. Acheson's recollections are pertinent here:[60]

> As our analysis of the German problem deepened, our conception of the principal objective changed. At first we had discussed the relative merits of placing primary importance either on the reunification of all Germany or on the strengthening of West Germany. However, we soon came to believe that *our chief concern should be the future of Europe, and that the reunification of Germany should not be regarded as the chief end in itself*... If reunification ranked first in importance, the price which might probably be paid for Soviet cooperation could be very high indeed. If, however, one attached first importance to the future of Europe and if the Soviet price for the reunification of Germany imperiled or destroyed prospects for the future of Europe, then that price should not be paid...

Given this definition of the problem, rearmament followed:[61]

> The probability was that we would lose Germany politically and militarily, without hope of getting it back if we did not find means for that country to fight in event of an emergency... If there was to be any defense at all, it had to be based on a forward strategy. *Germany's role must not be secondary but primary* - not only through military formations, but through emotional and political involvement... The real question was not whether Germany should be brought into a general European defense system, but *whether this could be done without disrupting everything else we were doing and giving Germany the key position in the balancing of power in Europe*.

US policy was thus directed toward the firm placement of a rearmed Federal Republic into the Western alliance system. No possible settlement of European security issues in the Cold War could be considered until this vital component of Western strength had been secured.

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[60] Acheson, *op.cit.*, p.290. Emphasis added.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp.436-37. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER 6

The West German Response: Die Politik der Stärke

A key element in this process of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the alliance was the compatability of views between the leaders in Bonn and Washington. Much significance has been placed on the fact that the West Germans had little choice in the issues that confronted them. Technically this is true. The division of Germany was imposed, even if the allies had not originally intended it. Despite the establishment of the Federal Republic in September 1949, the FRG remained an occupied state until 1955. Undoubtedly, the occupying powers would not have permitted the creation of a sovereign West German state with its accompanying economic strength and certainly its military prowess unless that state were firmly embedded in a framework of exclusive association with the West, just as the USSR would never relinquish control over the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which was established in October 1949 and subsequently rearmed. However "penetrated" a state system might be by external political forces,[1] there remain domestic political forces that must be considered, even in the absence of a fully sovereign state instrument in which those internal forces can find legitimate expression.

In the case of West Germany, it is not enough to say, in retrospect, that its political elite had no choice. Because of the impact that German rearmament had on the alliance, it was highly significant that the issue be treated as one of responding to a West German request for means of providing self-defence. Acheson recognised this in his report to Truman after the September 1950 NATO Conference:[2]

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[1] Reference to a "penetrated" political system is from a concept of James H. Rosenau's, in which external actors determine the internal political decisions of a state. For its application to the case of the FRG, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford: Stanford University, 1967), especially pp.228ff.

> I think we showed that it was quite possible to deal with the German Government on this issue, not as supplicants, but merely as agreeing to proposals already made by Adenauer to contribute units of European forces, and to force him to accept conditions to our acceptance of his proposal.

In vain or not, the contenders for political power in the new Federal Republic did anticipate distinct foreign policy options. Adenauer dominated that contest and viewed the Federal Republic's foreign policy in terms of its integration with the West. He later wrote:[3]

> There are three courses that Germany can take... One is that we join Soviet Russia. The second is that we join the West. And the third is that we join neither, but stand on our pride and depend upon our resources. Soviet Russia would like to see us take the last stand. I deliberately refrain from using the word neutralisation, for that is no neutralisation. A neutral country is one which has the power of defending its neutrality against all comers. A country that survives only by the tolerance of others is not a neutral... We want the integration of Europe, and we want to be allied with the West. For us there can be no doubt or scruples about that.

It is more accurate to say that Adenauer and the West chose each other. It is clear that without this consensus, rearmament would not have been a cement to the evolving alliance between the US and the FRG, but could have been a source of alliance disintegration. Instead, the US and the FRG continued to reinforce and justify each other's policy preferences.

The internal German debate was not about whether West Germany should be associated with the West, but about the nature of that association: specifically, how did such an association relate to the fulfilment of German national interests? Those interests were reflected in three policy goals: German reunification; the security of both a unified German state and the provisional Federal Republic; and the restoration of the German state to a position of equality in international affairs. In the late 1940s, the choices were not as clear as Adenauer later described them in 1955. When the London Conference called for a West German constitution in 1948, the German delegates resisted any suggestion of a new German state. Instead, they framed a Grundgesetz, or "Basic Law", defining a provisional political entity which alone had the right to represent the interests of all Germans (Alleinvertretungsrecht) until such time as reunification was possible. Reunification was not then an abstract goal to be pursued over a matter of decades; it was something to be achieved in the short term. Neither did the new Federal Republic enjoy full sovereignty and a position of equality: one of its first acts was to accept a revised occupation statute, based on the London Agreements, accepted international control over the Ruhr, economic fusion of the Saar with France, and demilitarisation controls; it could not conduct bilateral diplomatic relations until 1951 and did not achieve full sovereignty until 1955; even then Berlin and the issue of Germany as a whole remained the responsibility of the four Occupying Powers. Neither was the FRG necessarily secure: it was disarmed and dependent on the occupying powers for its defence.

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[2] Truman, Volume II. Years of Trial and Hope, 1956-1953 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), pp.255-256. See also Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), pp.48-54.

[3] Konrad Adenauer, World Indivisible (New York: Harper and Row, 1955), pp.54-55, as cited in Walter F. Hahn, Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views (London: SAGE Foreign Policy Series no.3, 1975), p.5.

The problem, from the German point of view, was how to balance these three vital foreign policy objectives. As with the evolution of the Cold War, the attempt to resolve problems that did not require Soviet agreement exacerbated the problems that did require Soviet agreement. By 1955, the FRG had achieved virtually full sovereignty and was a member of NATO and an expanded Western European Union (WEU). In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) superseded the IAR arrangement. In 1957, a plebiscite had returned the Saar to the FRG, and the creation of the Common Market and EURATOM promised a fuller integration of Western Europe. Those restrictions which did remain were voluntarily assumed rather than formally imposed: for example, FRG renunciation in 1954 of the production of atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) weapons, and the acceptance of WEU limits on German armament. In a larger sense, the notion of an integrated Western Europe, with supranational authority, provided the FRG with both sovereignty and equality: the voluntary restriction of one's own sovereignty is itself a sovereign act; moreover, by inducing others to surrender some of their sovereignty in that same integrated framework, a form of equality was created.[4] In addition, such an integrative framework was the only politically acceptable setting for a reunified German state. Four Power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole was based on the Potsdam Agreement and desirable from the point of view of both the Western allies and the FRG: the agreement remained the legal basis for allied presence in West Berlin; it deferred the final determination of Germany's eastern frontier until a final peace treaty, thus denying to Poland an outright claim to the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line; and it implied an allied obligation to seek the reunification of Germany. Moreover, the FRG had gained an explicit Western promise to seek the reunification of Germany through free elections, an endorsement of the FRG claim of Alleinvertretungsrecht, and an agreement that the Oder-Neisse line was only a temporary boundary pending a final peace treaty with a unified German state.[5] But these last gains were only future prospects which, to many in the FRG, were in fact jeopardised by the achievement of other goals: the integration of West Germany into Western Europe seemed likely to preclude the integration of a united Germany into a united Europe.

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[4] See the discussion in Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University, 1958), p.130.

The political debate within the Federal Republic took place in the context of a political system that had been transformed, not only constitutionally but also with regard to its political parties.[6] From the first western Länder elections of 1947, two political parties dominated: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with its Bavarian affiliate the Christian Social Union (CSU), a relatively new attempt at forging an anti-totalitarian conservative mass party, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), an established party with a history of opposition to both reactionary and Communist political elements in Germany. Both parties found themselves with internal conflicts that in different ways reflected the dilemma of a divided Germany. Adenauer, Mayor of Cologne during the Weimar Republic, dominated the CDU, having prevailed over his Berlin-based rival Jakob Kaiser, an advocate of a reunified German state that would serve as a "bridge" between East and West.[7] Kurt Schumacher, who had spent most of the period of the Third Reich in Nazi concentration camps, led the SPD in the western zones and broke with the East German SPD when it joined the Communists in the Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

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[5] See, for example, the communiqué from the New York Three Power Foreign Ministers' Conference, 19 September 1950, in RIIA, Documents, 1949-1950, pp.333-36. Also, the Deutschlandvertrag, or Bonn Convention of 26 May 1952, which entered into form on 5 May 1955, in RIIA, Documents, 1952, pp.105-11.

[6] Gordon Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp.34-43 and 85ff.

[7] William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1978), pp.47ff.

The SPD ended the war with the belief that it was the natural heir to political power in Germany. Because of their consistent opposition to Hitler, its leaders rejected any responsibility for the Third Reich and resented occupation policies designed to predetermine Germany's future development. As Schumacher pointed out in a mass rally in 1947, "We fought the Nazis... before anyone else in the world bothered about it."[8] Because the SPD retained the image of the party that had "sold out" Germany after World War I, Schumacher sought to build a political base founded on his own ardent nationalism and to preempt the growth of a right-wing nationalism.[9]

A central element of Schumacher's nationalism was violent opposition to the Soviet Union, against both Communism and Russia. In that respect, he shared a premise with others in the West determined to build a democratic Western Europe against Soviet expansionism, even if his vision implied an unfettered restoration of the German nation in a socialist democratic framework:[10]

> In Europe, the socialist parties have the task of being the strongest phalanx against the Communists. The political war on European soil will be decided in the struggle between Social Democrats and Communists. For the Germans, the question is: Social Democrat or Communist-German or Russian. Therefore, any action is to be welcomed which concentrates the democratic world and which shows the Communists that they will face opposition from the first to the last.

Schumacher distrusted any attempts to submerge a Rhine-centered West Germany in a largely Catholic and capitalist association with France or continental Western Europe. Instead, the SPD preferred a broader European union, including a unified German state with a strong central government. As Carlo Schmid pointed out in the late 1940s:[11]

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[8] Quoted in Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1965), p.146.

[9] See, for example, Schumacher's speech on this theme in January 1946, quoted in William E. Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration* (London: Saxon House, 1974), p.8.

[10] Schumacher, "Die Sozialistische Aufgabe", SPD Press Service, 22 April 1948, in Karl Dickel, ed., *Zur Militärpolitik der SPD* (Berlin: Ministerium für nationale Verteidigung, 1958), p.28.

> Europe can only fulfil its world political role as a third power between the two superpowers... Germany should remain apart from this integrative process until a state was reached where it could bear the load of a reunified Germany.

Any attempt at the integration of Western Europe merely complicated and ultimately foreclosed the prospects for German reunification.

The SPD was thus in direct conflict with the CDU. Both Schumacher and Adenauer were anti-communist; both sought to restore Germany to a position of respect and equality in the international system. But for Adenauer, Germany did not possess the option suggested by Schmid. As he stressed in his memoirs, "We had to join the one or the other side if we did not want to be ground up between them."[12] The key for Adenauer was France, which, no less than the Soviet Union, enjoyed a veto over the restoration of the German state. When Adenauer becar Chancellor - by one vote - in 1949, he declared his willingness to participate in the IAR. When the SPD registered its outrage at this infringement on German sovereignty, Adenauer reminded the Bundestag:[13]

> I must emphasise yet again that the method of German foreign policy must be to advance slowly and gradually. It must have a psychological basis and be calculated to win back the trust that we Germans largely lost through the National Socialist regime... It is not true to say that we are giving up sovereign rights by sending a member to the IAR. Because... we do not possess those rights; they were taken away from us by the unconditional surrender and by the London Agreement.

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[11] Quoted in Dickel, op.cit., p.13.

[12] Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-1953 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp.78-79.

[13] To the Bundestag, 24 November 1949, quoted in W.E. Paterson, op.cit., pp.28-29. See also Adenauer's opening speech to the Bundestag, 20 September 1949.

For Adenauer, the immediate problem was to restore the confidence of the German people, reflecting the allies' similar concern for the link between security and economics. In the autumn of 1949, there were 1.6 million unemployed in the FRG, and industrial dismantling continued, albeit on a smaller scale than before. The economy had to absorb an increasing flow of refugees into the FRG, which by 1955 totalled close to 12 million, potentially 20-25% of the electorate.[14] Western economic integration, beginning with the ECSC, allowed the restoration of German industry while not granting to the FRG total sovereignty over those resources.[15]

Adenauer prevailed in the internal debate because the policy of Western integration brought not only political benefits but economic ones as well. His major coalition partners in 1949 and 1953 - the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party (DP) - supported the emphasis on rebuilding a free market industrial economy. However, neither was enthusiastic about West European integration and both sympathised with the SPD argument on reunification. Moreover, the refugees - mostly from the East - did not share Adenauer's feelings of community with the West and were insistent on the active pursuit of reunification. Nonetheless, Adenauer's policies secured the business climate; the expanding economy was able to absorb the refugees and integrate a potentially alienated segment of West German society; even the trade unions, the largest base of SPD support, wavered with the prospect of expanding jobs. In the final analysis the SPD's dilemma was that the alternative to integration was not reunification but continued occupation, whereas Adenauer argued that integration symbolised the "equal partnership" of the FRG with the rest of Western Europe.

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[14] Bundespresse- und -informationsamt, Bulletin (hereafter cited as Bulletin), 12 May 1955.

[15] See French Foreign Minister Schuman's explanation of this feature of the ECSC in his Stevenson Memorial Lecture, 1954, cited in F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (London: Oxford University, 1968), p.104.

While the West was agreed on the need to rebuild a strong, democratic, and ultimately united German state, there was no desire to relinquish control over that state. What was necessary was a healthy, self-sustaining economic unit to relieve the burdens of external assistance; there was no haste in restoring a German state capable of exploiting the conflict of East and West to its own benefit, except that a denial of those national aspirations could be detrimental unless another outlet - European integration - was created.[16] Yet the central issue for Europe was security; while the FRG did not enjoy the autonomy of Bismarck's Reich or the Weimar Republic, it did retain a central position in European security. Adenauer was successful in achieving his immediate foreign policy goals within the alliance framework by providing what was indispensable to Western strategy: agreeing to the rearmament of Germany, he lent credibility to West defence policy.

Within the Federal Republic, the debate over whether to rearm and the subsequent debate over the nature of that rearmament, including the role of nuclear weapons in the Bundeswehr, provided the central political issue throughout most of the 1950s. Not only did rearmament directly involve the core objectives of German foreign policy - unity, security and equality - it also generated its own political intensity because of the general aversion to any form of militarism in German political life and the widespread fear of the effects of war, atomic or otherwise, on German soil.[17] A much smaller set of public opinion, largely consisting of former members of the Wehrmacht, welcomed rearmament but protested against the prospect that German troops would be considered the "cannon fodder" of alliance defence.[18] This latter element exacerbated both French and German fears of remilitarisation, while the former element contributed to US fears of German neutralism.

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[16] See, for instance, Adenauer's warning to the allies on the implications if Germans continue to be deprived of a "sense of nationhood", in a speech to the Interparliamentary Union, 25 March 1949, cited in Paul Weymar, Konrad Adenauer: The Authorized Biography (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957), pp.246ff.

To Adenauer, German rearmament in the context of a West European alliance was intended to serve three goals: to regain sovereignty for the Federal Republic, to gain the security necessary to avoid Soviet intimidation, and to further the integration of Western Europe.[19] The proposed European Defence Community provided a satisfactory vehicle for the integration of Western Europe, provided that German forces participated on an equal basis, both in terms of arms and of organisational status. Any arrangement which provided for the forward defence of the Federal Republic with the assistance of the American atomic guarantee - both symbolised by the continued maintenance of allied troops on West German soil - met the requirements for security. The greater benefit for Adenauer, however, was the restoration of full sovereignty. Indeed, the tangible result of German participation in the EDC negotiations after January 1951 was the agreement by the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and France in September that:[20]

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[17] For a discussion of these feelings, manifested in the ohne mich ("without me") movement, see Theo Sommer, "Wiederbewaffnung und Verteidigungspolitik" in Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., Die zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Eine Bilanz (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1979), pp.580-603, particularly pp.584ff.

[18] On the role of the Verband deutscher Soldaten, see Willis, op.cit., pp.130ff.

[19] Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-1953, p.270.

> ...the participation of Germany in the common defense must naturally be accomplished by the replacement of the present occupation statute by new relationships between the three governments and the Federal German Republic.

In February 1952, the Bundestag set its conditions to signature of the EDC Treaty, among them settlement of the Saar, provision for membership in NATO, removal of restrictions on German industry, equal sharing of defence costs (meaning aid), an end to occupation, and full sovereignty. The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 along with a package of related agreements, including the Deutschlandvertrag, that were to enter into force after ratification of the EDC.

Adenauer was in a position to trade German rearmament for guarantees of security and the reality of equality and sovereignty for the West German state. Without these immediately tangible benefits, there could be no domestic political foundation for German rearmament. Ultimately, the security of the FRG, like the security of all of Western Europe, rested on the visible commitment of the United States. Moreover, the US needed German rearmament to justify credibly its own commitment to the defence of Europe. The original US security guarantee, as we have seen, was made despite a reluctance to commit any more resources than necessary. Already in 1951 and 1952, with the shock of the Korean War waning, the US Senate had cut the Administration's requests for Mutual Security Assistance funds and in April 1951, approved the stationing of four additional divisions in Europe only with the following rider:[21]

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[20] Communiqué, 14 September 1951, in RIIA, Documents, 1951, pp.135-36.

> It is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such divisions should be sent to Europe in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further Congressional approval.

Notwithstanding the obvious West German dependency on the US, US reliance on the FRG was already an element in the politics of the alliance.

The opposition of the Social Democrats to German rearmament was substantial and persistent. Its direct impact, however, was not to delay that rearmament but, ultimately, to strength Adenauer's hand with the allies. Without concessions to Adenauer, on technical details of the EDC as well as on larger issues of sovereignty, the allies were made to fear that an imposed West German rearmament could well undermine the consensus upon which the integration of the FRG into Western Europe depended. Schumacher's argument against rearmament derived from his general opposition to Adenauer's policies: such an exclusive and binding alliance with the West in the climate of the Cold War would prejudice if not foreclose indefinitely the reunification of Germany. As he pointed out in late 1950:[22]

> The difference of opinion is not one between those who want to rearm and those who are absolute pacifists... The big difference is between those who simply want to push through rearmament under the present conditions and those who reject rearmament until certain national and international conditions are agreed to.

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[21] There was only one US division left in Europe in September 1950 when Truman announced his decision to increase US forces there. One more was sent in early 1951. The additional four brought the total to six. See Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (London: Chatto and Windus), p.54.

[22] Quoted in David Childs, Germany Since 1918 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1971), p.141.

The SPD was unable to offer a viable alternative, acceptable either to the majority of public opinion, to the government coalition dominated by Adenauer, or to the allies. With the FDP, the SPD consistently argued for *Gleichberechtigung* - equal rights, obligations and conditions within the alliance framework[23]- but in this Adenauer agreed and was able to use that argument effectively in procuring the tangible benefits of his policy in negotiations with the allies.

More fundamentally, Schumacher's position included a dilemma not unlike that faced by Kennan in the US debate. In July 1951, Schumacher declared:[24]

> The German military effort only makes sense if world democracy protects Germany *offensively* against the East, that is protects Germany from the worst of the destruction and intends seeking, in reply to a Russian attack, *the decisive military course of action east of Germany*. That is the first and intrinsically the only condition for the Yes and No to German rearmament. The great ability and will of the USA and the other democracies must become more visible here in Germany; that is, it is not necessarily a question of an increase in the number of occupation troops by one or two tank divisions, but the massive centralisation of forces. It is necessary to rebuild confidence in Europe and Germany by the concentration of decisive military forces on the Eastern border of the Federal Republic... *The decisive tactical mistake is an inadequate German rearmament which releases the Americans and the Great Powers as a whole from their obligation to concentrate massive military forces in West Germany*.

Unless the allies, and especially the US, were willing and able to establish a credible conventional forward defence in Europe, thereby providing the unquestionable and tangible security guarantee and creating the conditions of confidence necessary for a prosperous democracy, West German rearmament was a necessary component of that security. The political will for such a commitment was, as we have seen, lacking. Moreover, one could argue that, even if it did exist, the resources invested to that end would in the short term impede economic recovery outside Germany and in the long term erode support for any commitment at all.

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[23] See, for instance, *Das Jahrbuch der SPD 52/53*, p.282, in Dickel, ed., *op.cit.*, p.35.

[24] From Schumacher's speech at an SPD Executive Meeting in July 1951, quoted in W.E. Paterson, *op.cit.*, p.74. The emphasis is mine. Similarly, see Schumacher's speech to the Bundestag, 8 November 1950, in Dickel, ed., *op.cit.*, p.29.

Significantly, the rearmament debate raised two issues which have continued to dominate the politics of formulating a credible and acceptable security policy within the alliance: the coupling of US military power to the security of Western Europe and the role of the FRG within that alliance defence posture. The primary requirement of maintaining that US commitment played, in many respects, a determining role in West German foreign policy. The issue of the role of the FRG within the broader Western alliance was not contentious on its own merits: no significant political force in the FRG questioned the need to restore West Germany to a position of equality within that international framework. It was contentious because the definition of that role appeared to involve a trade-off between the maintenance of the US commitment and the prospect of securing unification through Four Power agreement.

Throughout the rearmament debate, the Soviet Union and East Germany attempted to coax the FRG away from its commitment to the West by offering the prospect of reunification. One month after the September 1950 NATO meeting which initiated the rearmament debate, the Prague meeting of the Soviet and East European Foreign Ministers called for the drafting of a German peace settlement, to create a unified and demilitarised Germany, beginning with the establishment of an all-German Constituent Council with equal representation of the FRG and the

GDR.[25] The Western position had previously been established in May and remained sacrosanct:[26]

> It is unrealistic to discuss or arrange the desired peace settlement until it is established that a unified German Government, freely elected, can be brought into being.

The FRG contribution was, similarly, to send periodic notes to the Four Occupying Powers, reminding them of their obligation to seek "reunification in peace and freedom", through "free, overall, secret and direct elections under international control in all four occupation zones", with guarantees of "personal and political freedom of action" as the precondition for the first step of holding elections.[27]

Within the existing climate, and given the various positions, there was hardly any prospect for agreement. By the spring of 1952, however, the Korean War was no longer a source of alarm and the EDC debate had been acrimonious. The Lisbon NATO Ministerial that February had endorsed the alliance goal of providing 96 divisions by 1954, with over one-third of those forces to be fully combat ready, and twelve divisions to be provided by the FRG. On 10 March, the Soviet Union sent a note to the US, UK and France outlining the provisions for a draft treaty.[28] The Soviet note appeared to indicate a serious effort to forestall German rearmament, and many have argued that it represented a genuine willingness to negotiate a settlement. In one essential respect it was a retreat from previous positions: it provided for national armed forces necessary for German self-defence. Yet, it also prohibited any coalition or military alliances with any power that had fought against Germany in 1945. While guaranteeing democratic processes, it also disallowed "the existence of organisations inimical to democracy and to the maintenance of peace", suggesting a long debate over a definition of those organisations. Furthermore, it limited the territory of the German state to the provisional border established in the Potsdam agreement, entailing the "surrender" of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, an issue vital to the Germans although considerably less so for the allies.[29]

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[25] See RIIA, Documents, 1949-1950, pp.167-68, for the communiqué of 20 October 1950.

[26] Identical Notes of the Three Western High Commissioners to the Soviet Military Governor, General Chuikov, 26 May 1950, ibid., pp.162-65.

[27] See the Bundestag Resolution of 14 September 1950, and Adenauer's 11 October letter to the Occupying Powers, ibid., pp.166-67. Also the discussion in Richard Löwenthal, "Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik", in Löwenthal and Schwarz, eds., op.cit., pp.606-19.

[28] In RIIA, Documents, 1952, pp.55-88.

The significance of the March 1952 note and the ensuing diplomatic exchanges is that nothing came of them. Schumacher wrote to Adenauer:[30]

> It is not known whether, within a not too remote period, another opportunity may be given for attaining the reunification of Germany by peaceful and democratic means... If it should turn out that even on the basis of the last note of the Soviet government there is no possibility of guaranteeing, by agreement between the four powers, the existence of the necessary conditions for conducting free elections in the four zones and in Berlin, then at least it will be clear that the Federal Republic has spared no effort in making use of the opportunity offered it to reunite Germany and contribute to the pacification of Europe.

The issue in German politics was not whether the Soviet plan was acceptable: it clearly was not. The issue was, on the one hand, whether the apparent willingness of the Soviet leaders to compromise should be taken as an indication of détente and an opportunity for a fruitful process of negotiation, or, on the other hand, whether it was a vindication of the politics of strength in which the continued determined pursuit of Western strength through rearmament would induce further Soviet compromises. Adenauer's position was straightforward:[31]

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[29] For instance, a London Times editorial of 21 September 1949: "...if Germany is to be welcomed into the European union, it does not follow that Europe accepts and supports all Germany's claims for frontier revision."

[30] On 2nd April 1952. In RIIA, Documents, 1952, p.94.

> Our policy must be to help make the West strong enough to induce the Russians to want to compromise... I believe the latest Russian proposals are a proof that if we continue to do this, the point will soon be reached when the Russians are ready to negotiate sensibly.

This incident became a volatile issue in the foreign policy debate in the FRG in early 1958, when the pressures for negotiations with the Soviet Union were much stronger and the level of frustration in West German politics was considerably higher.[32] Whether it was a "lost opportunity" for reunification remains a source of speculation.

For the allies and for Adenauer, the March 1952 note was merely an attempt to divert attention away from the EDC Treaty, signed two months later. As Kennan commented at the time:[33]

> Our government did not want any agreement with the Soviet government about Germany at this time and wished if possible to avoid any discussion that would carry us along that path; we were staking everything at the moment on the attempt to get the new contractual agreement with the West German government and the agreement on the European defense forces "in the bag" before any discussions with the Russians could complicate matters.

Kennan's assessment is basically accurate and compatible with thinking that had dominated the drafting of NSC 68. The Soviet offer was presumed to be a tactical manoeuvre, even if it was motivated by the fear of imminent German rearmament. The issue was really one of the role of negotiations: are they worthwhile as a means of reaching agreement, given indications that previous positions are no longer fixed; or are they only useful in "recording", as NSC 68 had suggested, the pre-existence of agreement based on one adversary's decision to accept the position of the other? At the time, given the stakes perceived by the US and the FRG, they could only be the latter.

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[31] His speech at Siegen, 16 March 1952; RIIA, Documents, 1952, pp.88-89. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 March 1952.

[32] See Bulletin, 4 February 1958, for excerpts from that debate. Also commentary in Das Parlament, 29 January 1958, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 and 31 January 1958, and Die Zeit, 31 January 1958.

[33] Excerpt from Kennan's record of consultation, 22-23 April 1952, prior to his becoming Ambassador to Moscow in May, in George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963 (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p.108.

Adenauer's position dominated the internal West German debate. Like the US, he departed from the axiom of the need to negotiate only from a position of strength. In that respect, the SPD concurred but disagreed on the implications of the specific course of building that strength. Arguably, Adenauer was not as committed to reunification as other political elements in the FRG. Clearly, reunification enjoyed a lower priority than Western integration, if only because he believed, like Stresemann before him, that close relations with the West were necessary for any revision of the political situation in the East. Schumacher and Adenauer also agreed on the necessity of a Western security guarantee. Yet to secure that guarantee on the basis of Gleichberechtigung required a West German contribution to the broader West European obligation to demonstrate fulfilment of the criterion of "self-help". With a Republican Administration and a fiscally conservative Congress in the US after 1952, US pressure to limit its own contribution to Western Europe only increased.

Although nothing came of the March 1952 Soviet note, public pressure in Europe to seek some sort of agreement with the Soviet Union increased, particularly after the successful American and Soviet tests of thermonuclear devices in November 1952 and August 1953, respectively. Significantly, that pressure was directed largely at the need to deal with the issues of European security, because the advent of the thermonuclear age generated a feeling of vulnerability in Western

Europe that did not obtain in the US until after the Sputnik launch in 1957. In the German context, the desire to obtain reunification was intensified by the desire to avoid the perils of an alliance commitment in which the defence of Western Europe increasingly depended on the threat of nuclear war. The appeal of German neutrality in the mid-1950s can be traced both to the desire for reunification and to the desire to avoid some of the inherent risks of alliance membership. Moreover, the pressure by some outside Germany to resolve the question of European security included the recognition, earlier suggested by Lippmann, that European security need not include the unification of Germany. As with German leaders before him, Adenauer's problem, once he had achieved the benefits of West German sovereignty and a measure of equality in a Western European framework, was to avoid isolation while not jeopardising uniquely German interests in sustaining alliance ties. He at least enjoyed the support of the US, which, with Dulles as the new Secretary of State, saw the problem in much the sa way that Adenauer did.

CHAPTER 7

To the Summit: German Rearmament and the Post-Stalin "Thaw"

With the election in November 1952 of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, the US entered a period in which a prevalent theme of American foreign policy was the limitation of American resources dedicated to far-flung global commitments. It was the first Republican Administration in twenty years and it was determined to balance the budget as soon as possible and to bring down the costs of the Federal Government. A month after the election, Eisenhower met with key members of his new Administration to map out the strategy for fulfilling what Walt Rostow later called "the Great Equation". Its implications for national security policy:[1]

> To liquidate the Korean War at once, accepting the stalemate. To proceed with a thorough-going examination of the military establishment and of the strategic estimates... in the *expectation that great savings would result*. Eisenhower made a strong point on the rapid obsolescence of weapons as a result of technical breakthroughs and insisted that military force and strategy must be reshaped around these new weapons for what he called "the Long Haul".

For Eisenhower the theme that dominated the politics of his tenure in the White House was a deep-seated desire not "to turn the United States into an armed camp".[2]

While the climate in American politics suggested a rejection of the policy and fiscal implications of NSC 68, this does not suggest that the US was at all considering a total disengagement from the Cold War. The emotional rancour of McCarthyism fed on a widespread fear of

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[1] Quoted from C.J.V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift", *Fortune*, January 1956, pp.86-87, in Walt W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp.301ff.

[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp.453-54.

Communism. To opt out of the struggle with Communism would be considered heresy, at least political suicide. It was therefore necessary to re-define the nature of the American response. Earlier in 1952, Dulles had done for the Eisenhower Administration what Kennan had done for Truman, by providing the intellectual framework within which policy was to be cast. Citing the "gigantic expenditure" of Truman's security policies, Dulles warned against a persistently unbalanced budget and high taxes, declaring that a "concentration on military matters is... 'inauspicious to liberty'":[3]

> Our present negative polices will never end the type of sustained offensive which Soviet Communism is mounting... Ours are treadmill policies which, at best, might perhaps keep us in the same place until we drop exhausted...

Dulles discounted a return to "impregnable isolation" as merely providing the basis for US "encirclement". Yet the free world could not afford to match the quantitative strength of Communist armed forces: "to attempt that would mean real strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere." Dulles concluded:

> There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to *retaliate instantly* against open aggression by Red Armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could strike back where it hurts, *by means of our choosing*...

This was the basis for the doctrine of "massive retaliation", officially announced in January 1954 with a virtually identical formulation.[4] Its rhetorical companion was the notion of "liberation":

> Once the free world has established a military defense, it can undertake what has been too long delayed - *a political offensive*...

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[3] John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness", *Life*, 19 May 1952, reproduced in Challener, ed., *op.cit.*, pp.163ff. Quotations in this paragraph are from this article, with emphasis added.

[4] Dulles' 12 January 1954 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, in *New York Times*, 13 January 1954. The phrase then: "a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."

> Courage will not be maintained in the satellites unless the United States makes it publicly known that it *wants and expects liberation to occur*.

Yet this was no military threat. Dulles posited:

> ...that within two, five, or ten years, substantial parts of the present captive world can *peacefully* regain national independence... We do *not* want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals.

In essence Dulles prescribed a strategy based on an economy of US resources, while intensifying the rhetoric of the Cold War as a means of mobilising political forces against the Soviet "camp". In application, it derived its flexibility from its inherent ambiguity.

Like Lippmann, Dulles rejected the implications of containment, both in its forces on the defensive and its open-ended demand on American resources. Like Kennan, Dulles wanted to move away from a concentration on military strength. But unlike Kennan, Dulles found his answer in the increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Further, unlike Lippmann, Dulles did not believe that a settlement on Germany could be a means of resolving the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union: the conflict was fundamental and universal. He retained many of the basic assumptions of the Acheson period about the role of negotiations, the need for strength, and the ultimate impermanence of the Communist system, even though he disagreed with the military strategy that had flowed from it. With respect to Germany, Dulles echoed Acheson's earlier remarks:[5]

> I think [reunification] is an indispensable goal, because a divided Germany would be a constant source of trouble in Europe. I do not think that it could be achieved so long as Western Europe was divided, and apt to fall apart. I believe with a strong and united Western Europe they will be in *a*

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[5] Testimony of 29 March 1955, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany* (84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955), p.19.

> *stronger position to bargain with the Soviet Union* than they have been up to this time.

What concerned Dulles most of all about Germany was that it be firmly rooted in the Western alliance framework. To Dulles, the "German Problem" still existed. His close relationship with Adenauer was based not only on their shared view of Communism as a moral evil but also on their shared fear that if Germany - or at least the Federal Republic - were not tightly integrated with the West, that process might be reversed by successive German leaders.[6] As Dulles later testified:[7]

> I believe that a Germany which was left in a position of neutrality, or some people call it disengagement, in the center of Europe, would be under *an almost irresistible temptation to play one side off against the other*, and that that would be a very dangerous situation, dangerous for the West, dangerous for the Soviet Union, and dangerous for the Germans themselves.
>
> ...I would not think it was wise or prudent to try to buy German reunification at the price of having Germany an independent country unrelated to the West. *I have expressed that view to the Soviets many times*, pointing out to them that from their own standpoint *they ought to want to have Germany reunited and closely tied together... with the other countries of the West*.

The demise of the EDC, designed as an interim step to the full integration of Western Europe, was a serious blow to Dulles.

With US forces tied up in Korea, alliances constituted a vital part of American strategy because they allowed the US to rely more heavily on local forces. Yet, while the US Government enjoyed the prospect of at least a four-year tenure, the governments in Britain, France, the FRG and Italy were, as one columnist pointed out, "longer in power, less secure in their tenure, and bitterly opposed by opposition parties in the whole area of foreign policy."[8] Successful ratification of the EDC was a cornerstone of US policy, precisely because it envisioned the unification of Europe and implied, at least in Washington, the eventual end to the need for a major American military presence in Europe. The US and UK promptly ratified the EDC Treaty, while the process in Bonn lasted until March 1953. The French, however, stalled until a procedural vote in the National Assembly on 30 August 1953 effectively killed the measure. In the interval between signature of the EDC and the final compromise in the Paris Agreements of October 1954, however, much had happened to change, or at least give the appearance of changing, the nature of the East-West conflict.

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[6] See the discussions in Robert Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, *Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), pp.39-61; Terence Prittie, *Adenauer, 1876-1967* (London: Tom Stacey, 1971), pp.230-31; and Gordon A. Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), pp.128ff.

[7] Testimony of 6 June 1958, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Review of Foreign Policy* (Part IV) (85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958), pp.804-05. Emphasis added.

Three external events occurred in 1953 that created pressures within the West to seek some kind of détente with the Soviet Union. The first was the death of Stalin on 5 March, which, together with the subsequent demise of Beria, was to some a harbinger of the long awaited transformation of the Soviet system. It served as a catalyst for the second event, the uprising in East Germany on 17 June, put down with Soviet force. To most observers, this provided evidence of the imminent disintegration of the Soviet empire, although these two events were also used as a vindication of the Policy of Strength. The third event was the announcement of a successful test of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union in August, suggesting to some a form of parity on the part of US and Soviet strategic programmes. These three events, while providing the potential basis for an East-West détente, also presented both sides with new forms of vulnerability that militated against a successful settlement of the Cold War.

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[8] See Joseph C. Harsch's four part series in the Christian Science Monitor, 16-19 February 1953.

The central issue during this period was, as we have seen, the prospective rearmament of West Germany and its integration as a sovereign member of the Western alliance structure, be it through the mechanism of the EDC or, after the London and Paris Conference of September-October 1954, the mechanism of NATO and the WEU. On the first day of the EDC ratification debate in Bonn, six weeks before Schumacher's death, Carlo Schmid expressed the SPD position, suggesting an alternative that set the tone for much of the later internal German debate:[9]

> ...to ally oneself with the West in forms which the East did not need to find threatening and to enter into a relationship of free exchange with the East which strenghens the West instead of weakening it.

Détente was to be served by finding a way to meet the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union while at the same time allowing the reunification of Germany. In the sense that Schmid tried to combine rather than distinguish between a Westpolitik and an Ostpolitik, it was a theme that was strengthened in the evolution of SPD thinking throughout the 1950s and provided the foundation for the Ostpolitik after 1969. Yet it also contained within it the kernel of the German dilemma: if one defined the problem in terms of making an agreement with the Soviet Union that protected Soviet security interests, then the solution, as Lippmann continued to remind his readers, entailed the sacrifice of what was regarded by the Germans as vital national interests. Hence, when Churchill proposed, on 11 May 1953, a Four Power Summit to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union on the basis of a "new Locarno",[10] many Germans inferred a Western desire to seek a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union at the expense of German interests, including the claim to the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. Adenauer's persistent fear of a "new Yalta" was only intensified by this proposal, and he became increasingly sceptical of British eagerness for a détente as the decade progressed.[11]

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[9] In the Bundestag, 9 July 1952, quoted in William E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (London: Saxon House, 1974), p.88.

[10] For excerpts from this speech, see RIIA, Documents, 1953, pp.57-65.

Adenauer arrived in Washington for his first visit one month after the death of Stalin and with the ratification of the EDC Treaty complete. He achieved his two purposes: to communicate his belief that the death of Stalin did not change his view of the problem, and to seek reaffirmation of the US commitment to reunification, with an eye to the forthcoming FRG elections in September 1953. The first he achieved before a sympathetic Senate Foreign Relations Committee:[12]

> I think there is only one very important event that happened recently, the death of Stalin. Nobody can predict what the consequences of his death will be,... but we must be prepared for the worst and never forget that we are faced here with a totalitarian state and nature.

The second was fulfilled in the communiqué:[13]

> There can be no lasting solution of the German problem short of a reunification of Germany peaceful means and on a free and democratic basis, and the present treaties, ratification of which will restore Germany's sovereignty, are a means toward that end.

While agreeing that "no opportunity should be missed to bring about a general relaxation of tensions", Eisenhower and Adenauer restated their commitment to vigilance, suggesting that, if the Soviets were interested in a détente, they could indicate that by allowing free elections in East Germany and releasing those Germans still incarcerated in the Soviet Union from the war.

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[11] See Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche, 1966), pp.201ff. Also Adenauer's letter to Eisenhower of 29 May 1953, again setting conditions for a successful resolution of the "German Problem", p.243. Likewise, Adenauer's caution to Dulles on the eve of the Geneva Summit, p.456.

[12] US Senate, Committe on Foreign Relations, Konrad Adenauer (83rd Congress, 1st Session, 9 April 1953), pp.4-5.

[13] Joint communiqué, 9 April 1953, RIIA, Documents, 1953, pp.42-44.

Eisenhower was personally inclined to negotiate with the Soviet leaders and chose Stalin's death as an opportunity to make his position clear. His "Chance for Peace" speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April was his own idea, just as his subsequent "Atoms for Peace" and "Open Skies" proposals.[14] Dulles was less enthusiastic and is reported to have noted privately:[15]

> There's some real danger of our first seeming to fall in with these Soviet overtures. It's obvious that what they are doing is because of outside pressure, and I don't know anything better we can do than keep up these pressures right now.

Nevertheless, Eisenhower's speech provides a useful glimpse of his view of a general détente and what would be necessary to achieve it. The problem to Eisenhower was that the Cold War seemed interminable. Significantly, it forced both superpowers to engage in an arms race which neither could afford. As such, Eisenhower's speech was the first official public declaration implying that the strategy of negotiating only from a position of strength had an internal contradiction: both sides would seek the advantage before negotiating; therefore, one could not readily expect to coerce the other to the negotiating table. The speech was thus a clear departure from previous rhetoric, by positing a détente based on the common interest of avoiding war and the costs of an arms race. Eisenhower's speech was not, however, a commitment to negotiate. The onus remained on the Soviet Union:[16]

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[14] For an account by Eisenhower's speech writer, see Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp.343-44.

[15] Ibid., p.109. Emphasis added.

[16] See RIIA, Documents, 1953, pp.45-51, here p.51.

> ...to use its decisive influence in the Communist world... to bring not merely an immediate truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia.
>
> ...to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own form of government.
>
> ... to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent UN control and inspection.

The issues remained as they had been, including the determination to seek a united Germany integrated into the Western Alliance.

The aftermath of Stalin's death did represent a period of détente, if we include in that concept an improvement in the atmosphere of East-West interactions. Kennan had been declared *persona non grata* by Stalin: Bohlen succeeded him in April 1953. There was at least a removal of the diplomatic "no contact" practice that had been a source of frustration for Kennan. In July, Bohlen reported to Dulles:[17]

> Emphasizing that the Soviet Union remained a totalitarian state which still regarded any country or organization it did not control as hostile, I listed as a reasonable assumption a *return by the Soviet Union to diplomacy* as a means of furthering its interests, especially preventing West German rearmament and averting a general war.

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden agreed: with the riots in East Germany, "signs of unrest" in Czechoslovakia, and the dismissal of Beria, Malenkov, the new Soviet Premier, needed a "pause".[18] In 1954 and 1955, East-West negotiations were restored in a series of conferences, the primary effect of which was a clarification of issues, even if they did not lead to their full resolution. On 27 July 1953, the Korean armistice was signed. Between 25 January and 18 February

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[17] See Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p.352. Emphasis added.

[18] Lord Avon, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle.* (London: Cassells, 1960), p.53.

1954, the Four Foreign Ministers met at Berlin to talk about Germany, and again that summer in Geneva to talk about Korea and Indochina. In May 1955, the Four Powers signed the Austrian State Treaty, leading to the Geneva Conference of 18-23 July 1955, with a follow-up by the Foreign Ministers in October and November. Although Western motivations for participation in these conferences varied, they reflected an informal "double decision": final agreement on a form of German rearmament, with its attendant benefits, required visible attempts to seek an alternative solution to European security through negotiation with the Soviet Union before that step could find any kind of bipartisan support in Western Europe.

Between 10 and 14 July 1953, the Foreign Ministers of the US, Britain and France met in Washington and agreed to a Four Power Conference on Germany. Dulles, as chairman, held a letter from Adenauer, agreeing to such a conference and proposing that it "should meet not later than this autumn", undoubtedly anticipating the Federal election in September; it cited the usual conditions as laid out in the 10 June Bundestag Resolution; significantly, it asserted that the EDC should be "the basis and starting point for a security system taking into account the security requirements of all European nations... [and] integrated into a system of general disarmament and security within the framework of the United Nations...".[19] The Washington Conference produced an invitation to the Soviet Union:[20]

> While recognising the fact that enduring peace can only be ultimately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can be dealt with, the United States

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[19] See Paul Weymar, *Konrad Adenauer: The Authorized Biography* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957), pp.502-03. For the Bundestag Resolution of 10 June 1953, see RIIA, *Documents, 1953*, p.73.

[20] Identical notes from each of the Three sent to the USSR on [illegible] July, RIIA, *Documents, 1953*, pp.77-78. Emphasis added.

> Government desires to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution.

To say that the German and Austrian peace treaties were problems capable of solution outside a disarmament agreement was a departure from previous thinking reflected in NSC 68. Then, one could only conceive of a German settlement in the context of a general resolution of the East-West conflict, including agreement on international control of armaments. What made their separation theoretically possible in 1953 was the presumption of German rearmament in the Western alliance.

Adenauer, however, was sceptical. His letter to Dulles had included a specific link to general disarmament. In reply, Eisenhower reassured him of the priority of the EDC both for Western defence and as a necessary step toward reunification.[21] What had long worried Adenauer was that the French might not ratify the EDC, creating pressures to seek some sort of interim settlement with the USSR on Germany. Theodor Blank, who later became the first FRG Defence Minister, had visited Washington in June to talk with Dulles abo alternatives to EDC, but Dulles reportedly refused to consider [illegible] likewise, when Dulles visited Bonn in the spring of 1954, Blank [illegible] the same response.[22] Dulles' commitment to the EDC was intense, derived as much from his hope for European unity as for the rearmament of Germany. He preferred to find a way to assuage French concerns but eventually threatened, in December 1953, an "agonizing reappraisal" of American policy to affect French calculations. He di[illegible] formally advise Eisenhower of alternatives to the EDC until September [illegible].[23] Above all, Dulles was firm that a Four Power Conference should not in any way interfere with the EDC: as he told Eden in October, such a conference had to be held in the near future; if the Soviet Union showed no signs of cooperating, "we would be able to extricate ourselves from it quickly".[24]

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[21] Letter of 23 July 1953, RIIA, Documents, 1953, pp.78-81.

[22] See the discussion in Drummond and Coblentz, op.cit., pp.84-96.

[23] See Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p.404.

Congressional opinion was already demanding something akin to an "agonising reappraisal" itself. Congressman Walter Judd had introduced an amendment to the 1954 Mutual Assistance Authorization Bill which made EDC ratification a precondition to the obligation of any funds for Western Europe. Eisenhower was forced to intervene personally with Judd in July, compromising on a formulation in which failure to ratify EDC was "grounds" for withholding such funds.[25] When the French did finally kill the EDC Treaty, and Eden proposed the final compromise at the September London Conference, Dulles was pessimistic: the WEU to which the FRG was to accede had no supranational features. As Eden recorded in his diary:[26]

> The idea of a United States of Europe had great appeal in his country... The rejection of EDC... would be used by opponents of foreign aid and by the isolationists... *The presence of American troops in Germany was an exception* and it was doubtful how long that exception could be maintained in face of Congressional pressure. It was really immaterial whether a NATO plus Brussels solution was better or worse than EDC. *Congress had been "sold" on the latter* as the means of uniting Europe, which would thus be capable of standing on its own feet without American help. In the new conditions... we must assume that continued American participation in Europe... was impossible and that *some reduction was inevitable*.

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[24] In Avon, *op.cit.*, p.55.

[25] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp.215-16. Illustratively, Truman's 1954 budget request for military security assistance had been for $7.6 billion, scaled down to $5.1 billion by Eisenhower, and finally approved by Congress at $4.5 billion.

[26] Eden's diary of 16 September 1954, in Avon, *op.cit.*, p.163. Emphasis added.

It was a drastic threat from Dulles, useful in the end in persuading the French that agreement on a rearmed FRG in NATO and the WEU was necessary. But for Dulles, it was a persistent problem, involving not only questions of fiscal conservatism but also the preservation of Executive control over foreign policy. Final agreement to German rearmament coincided with the return of Democratic control to Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Taft had been dead for over a year and McCarthy had been repudiated. Dulles subsequently enjoyed more flexibility, although he and his successors came under similar kinds of pressures. The seeds of the Mansfield Amendments that emerged in the latter half of the 1960s and threatened in the early 1980s were already visible.

The Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference did not interfere with the EDC. The EDC was rejected in France largely because of Gaullist opposition, concerned more with the provisions of the EDC than with any attempt to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union. With 100 [illegible] French troops tied down in Indochina, the Gaullists feared that supranational EDC would be dominated by the FRG. The Paris Agreements provided a framework for German rearmament based on an alliance of sovereign states, preferable to the EDC because it allowed France greater freedom of action in dealing with the Germans, as de Gaulle was to demonstrate after 1958.[27] The Berlin Conference was itself a prelude to the Geneva Summit eighteen months later; their combined significance is in the total lack of agreement on the "German Problem", with the result a divided and rearmed Germany tied into opposing alliance systems.

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[27] See the discussion in F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (London: Oxford University, 1968), pp.140ff.

At the Berlin Conference, Eden proposed a five stage process towards the achievement of German reunification, in which free elections under international supervision to create an all-German constituent assembly was the first step, and the signature of a peace treaty with a newly formed government for a unified Germany was the last. Molotov's counter-proposal was for a provisional all-German government, established by the two German parliaments as a first step. As with the 1952 Soviet draft treaty, the unified Germany was not to enter into any coalitions with its former adversaries in World War II. At first, Molotov suggested the withdrawal of all foreign forces from German territory except for those involved in "control" functions. Subsequently, Molotov insisted that, pending the formation of a provisional German government, all foreign forces should withdraw in any case within a period of six months, although they could re-enter Germany if German security were threatened. Molotov also proposed convening a conference on European security, in which European states (i.e. not including the US) would work out a collective security system, "to assure the neutralisation of Germany". The final communiqué, besides calling for a conference on Korea and Indochina, noted merely "an exchange of views" without any agreement.[28]

The Berlin Conference marked a milestone in the evolution of the Western Alliance in one important respect. For the first time, the FRG saw itself not as an "opponent" in Western negotiations but as a participant, having been invited to attend the allied Working Group deliberations that took place before Christmas. At the conference itself, the FRG, like the delegation from East Germany, held observer status outside the conference hall, despite Soviet efforts to gain a semblance of recognition for East Germany by their representation.[29] The conference reflected a comparable process in the Soviet relationship with East Germany, in that the Molotov proposals indicated less a concern for achieving German reunification even on its own terms than an emphasis on consolidating the East German regime and gaining recognition for it, while hoping to thwart German rearmament and gain the disengagement of the US. It was a subtle shift that became more evident in the Geneva Conference in 1955, but it reflected anxiety stemming from the June 1953 riots in East Germany and the September 1953 FRG elections in which the SPD lost significant ground against Adenauer.[30]

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[28] For the Eden and Molotov proposals, plus the final communiqué, see RIIA, Documents, 1953, pp.72-78.

The prevailing belief in the West in late 1954 and early 1955 was that the West was in the best position to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. It implied an abiding faith in the premise that one should negotiate from a position of strength, but it also implied that further delay would see a deterioration in that position. This combination of strength and vulnerability particularly motivated Eden, who had made the prospect of a summit part of his campaign for the 1955 elections in Britain:[31]

> I argued that this was the right moment at which to prepare for discussion with the Soviet Union. I thought it *unlikely that with the passage of time our relative position would improve*. On the contrary, I thought that *once saturation in thermo-nuclear weapons was reached, the relative military*

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[29] See Wilhlem G. Grewe, *Rückblenden, 1976-1951* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), p.175.

[30] With a much larger turnout than in 1949, the CDU/CSU gained 45.2% of the vote, as compared to 31.7% in 1949; the SPD held virtually even with 28.8% as opposed to 29.2% in 1949; Adenauer's coalition partner, the FDP, also dropped from 11.7% to 9.5%. The result was that the SPD no longer held the one-third required in the Bundestag to thwart a constitutional amendment.

[31] Avon, *op.cit.*, p.289, discussing a paper he circulated in March 1955. Emphasis added.

> strength of the West would decline. The ratification of the Paris Agreement might represent a high point of Western political cohesion. I was not hopeful that a general discussion of the hydrogen bomb, or disarmament, or the Far East, would get us anywhere. But I did want to see whether the conference could achieve something in Europe.

Likewise, French Premier Mendes-France urged a summit in his 22 November 1954 speech to the UN General Assembly, subsequently advising Dulles that, while France would ratify the Paris Agreement prior to the summit to assure a position of strength, French public opinion required the prospect of a summit to justify ratification.[32]

The next day, Eisenhower agreed to a four power conference, contingent upon ratification of the Paris Agreement and "provided there was evidence of a sincere desire for negotiations on the part of the Communist world, for example the Austrian Peace Treaty".[33] Editorial and public opinion in the US was generally supportive. Moreover, McCarthyism was dead: his Congressional resolution of 22 June 1954, that the conference agenda should include "the present and future status of the nations of East Europe and Asia now under Communist control" as a precondition for US participation, was defeated by a vote of 77-4.[34] There were few within the Administration, however, who urged a summit. The real question was how one approached it: did one emphasise the strength that one had, one's firm resolve not to be budged from previous positions, and one's determination to exact concessions from the other side; or did one take a milder tone, expressing the hope for some kind of progress towards détente and declaring one's interests in peace? In effect the US did both, the former through Dulles[35] and the latter through Eisenhower.[36] Both were necessary and complementary, in that each had utility depending upon the audience to which statements were directed. Fundamentally, Dulles reassured Adenauer, while Eisenhower reassured those who feared that US belligerency might precipitate a holocaust.

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[32] Drummond and Coblentz, op.cit., p.133.

[33] 23 November 1954 press conference, in the New York Times, 24 November 1954.

[34] Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p.115 and pp.102ff.

Bohlen's assessment to Dulles one month prior to Geneva suggests the significance of setting the rhetorical tone for participation in negotiations:[37]

> Judging from here, the Western powers go into the conference with a great advantage on their side, faced with an adversary considerably less sure of himself than in the past. It does not, however, follow that we should anticipate that the Soviets will be prepared at Geneva to make a series of concessions or will reflect, in the negotiations, elements of weakness or indecision. Indeed these present advantages of the West can be dissipated if they are stressed publicly or acted on too overtly since the Soviets, like all dictatorships, are mortally afraid of showing weakness or of appearing to yield to foreign pressures.

This unsolicited advice to Dulles reflected a growing recognition that a policy of negotiating only from strength, while necessary to defend one's position and to avoid being intimidated into making concessions did not necessarily create the conditions in which the other side would be intimidated into making concessions. Détente could perhaps be achieved through negotiations only if each side entered the negotiations in the belief that it held a position of strength. Yet if the adversary relationship is viewed as a zero sum game and the negotiating agenda is centered on issues, the resolution of which is viewed in terms of that zero sum game relationship, then one has little basis for expecting any tangible results from those negotiations.

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[35] For instance, Dulles' 24 May 1955 press conference after the Soviet Union agreed to the Austrian State Treaty, in Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University, 1968), p.93.

[36] For instance, Eisenhower's radio broadcast prior to his departure for Geneva, discussed in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp.504-09.

[37] In a 12 June 1955 memorandum from Moscow, in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp.381ff.

The question of what issues are on the agenda, and in which order they are to be addressed, therefore assumes some significance. The definition of this agenda, as well as the terms of reference for their deliberation, was the ostensible purpose for the Geneva Summit of 18-23 July 1955 in which the Heads of State were to work out a directive for the Foreign Ministers' Conference, held between 27 October and 16 November.[38] The "Spirit of Geneva" that surrounded the Summit itself derived from two sources. One was on a human level: after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May, Dulles and Molotov clasped hands on the balcony of the Belvedere Palace before a cheering throng; in Geneva there was a conspicuous absence of polemic in the meetings of Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Fauré. As Eisenhower recalled:[39]

> In spite of what happened thereafter, the cordial atmosphere of the talks... never faded entirely. Indeed, the way was opened for some increase in intercourse between East and West... These were small beginnings, but they could not have transpired in the atmosphere prevailing before Geneva.

Eden told the House of Commons, "Geneva has given the simple message to the world: it has reduced the dangers of war."[40] Secondly, the Summit showed promise of producing substantive results: the Final Directive recognised the link between German reunification and European security and *seemed* to record Four Power agreement on the condition of free elections:

> The Heads of Government have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by free

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[38] For documents relating to the Geneva Conference, see RIIA, *Documents, 1955*, pp.2-49 and 50-89, respectively.

[39] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p.530.

[40] Avon, op.cit., p.311. Similarly Harold Macmillan, Volume III:

> elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

Yet the improvement in the atmosphere of East-West relations extended to the realm of substance only with regard to Austria, not Germany. In October, with "European Security and the German Problem" as the first agenda item, it became clear, if it was not evident before, that the Soviet Union preferred the consolidation of the GDR to the prospect of German reunification.[41]

While this deadlock on Germany remained, the question was reduced to one of how the other issues - notably European security and general disarmament - were to relate to the deadlock. Two significant proposals were made at the Summit that generated surprise. One was Eisenhower's suggestion that the US and USSR exchange "a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end..." and provide "within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country...".[42] This "Open Skies" proposal was consistent with the determination that any reliable arms limitation agreement must include adequate inspection and control arrangements. Echoing Nitze's critique of Kennan in early 1950, Eisenhower prefaced this proposal:

> The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

But the proposal was a step beyond earlier disarmament thinking in two respects, both important in view of subsequent arms control efforts. The first was bilateralism. In making his statement, Eisenhower explicitly directed his remarks to the Soviet Delegation, and the proposal was phrased in terms of a bilateral exchange. Moreover, the proposal was aimed at an immediate practical measure "to develop the mutual confidence" necessary for further progress while focusing on the specific threat of surprise attack. It was not a general disarmament proposal, as Eisenhower admitted that the technology for verification was inadequate; neither was it linked to the solution of any other outstanding problems.

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[41] Nikita Khrushchev, then emerging as the dominant member of the Kremlin "collective leadership", declared as much at an SED rally in East Berlin on 26 July 1955. The subsequent USSR-GDR communique stated that a rapprochement between the FRG and GDR, including FRG recognition of the GDR, was a precondition to reunification. See RIIA, Documents, 1955, pp.198-200.

[42] See Eisenhower's statement on disarmament, 21 July 1955, ibid., pp.39-41. Also Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp.520ff.

The second surprise proposal at the Summit came from the British. All three Western Heads of State began with the position that the reunification of Germany was the first problem on the agenda, that it should be accomplished through free elections under neutral supervision as a first step, and that such a reunified Germany should have the freedom to join whatever collective security arrangement it chose (assumedly NATO), while the Four Occupying Powers could enter into mutual security agreements to guarantee against a resurgent Germany. Like Eisenhower, Eden departed from the premise that some kind of "confidence-building measure" (to borrow a later phrase) was necessary as a first step. He thus went beyond the original Western position and proposed discussions on limiting force and armaments on each side of Germany and in adjacent countries, with a demilitarised area between East and West and reciprocal inspection arrangements. Specifically, Eden suggested that the lack of security in Europe was the cause of Germany's continued division and that a détente, reflected in substantive military agreements on European security might have to precede reunification.[43] Bulganin emphasised this conclusion exclusively:[44]

> Our eventual objective should be to have no foreign troops on the territories of the States of Europe. Their withdrawal would remove one of the principal, if not the primary, sources of present distrust in international relations.

In this Bulganin echoed Lippmann, noting also that "conditions which would permit the reunification of Germany have not yet matured". By seeking to separate further Eden's plan for a military détente in Central Europe from Eden's original proposal for a phased reunification of Germany, beginning with free elections, Moscow set the theme for subsequent debates on European security. It succeeded in straining the alliance consensus, and threatened to isolate the FRG.

In the Western strategy meetings between the Geneva Summit and the Foreign Ministers' Conference, the West Germans protested against the second Eden proposal because it provided for a demilitarised zone without guarantees of progress on reunification. Inspection line would take on the character of a border between two German states. Tripartite Western proposal on the first day of the Foreign Ministers' Conference reflected this German pressure:[45]

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[43] For Eden's proposals, see RIIA, Documents, 1955, pp.17-20 and 41-43.

[44] Quoted in Eden's account of the Summit in Avon, op.cit., pp.298ff.

[45] On 27 October 1955, in RIIA, Documents, 1955, pp.51-53. See Grewe, op.cit., pp.265-70, for a discussion of the strategy sessions. Eden and Macmillan both claim that Adenauer had his own "disengagement" proposal and agreed with the British proposals as early as June 1955. The difference, however, was fundamental: Adenauer could only consider a demilitarised zone if it were centered on the eastern border of East Germany, not between the two Germanies. See Adenauer's speech to the Bundestag, in Bulletin, 21 July 1955; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955, pp.456ff.; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, p.535; Avon, op.cit., pp.293-94; and Löwenthal, op.cit., p.627.

> In a zone... on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries, levels for armed forces would be specified so as to establish a military balance which would contribute to European security and help to relieve the burden of armaments.

Reunification could proceed by stages (with free elections as the important first stage), concurrent with the phased implementation of a "Treaty of Assurance" to the Soviet Union. The Conference broke up in deadlock, although not prematurely because none of the Western Powers wanted the onus of making the break: on European security and Germany, there was no agreement on the necessary first step; on disarmament, there was no agreement on controls; on East-West contacts, some cultural exchanges and trade followed, but there was no agreement on restricting "propaganda instruments" or increasing the flow of people and ideas.

CHAPTER 8

Adenauer's Ostpolitik and the Disengagement Debate

In many respects, 1955 was a high point for Adenauer's foreign policy. Not only had he largely achieved the integration of the FRG into the Western alliance, but he had also been able, with Dulles' support, to bring his considerable influence to bear in the formation of Western strategy in dealing with the Soviet Union. As one observer pointed out in late 1954, the FRG had been transformed "into a partner, no longer dictated to but wooed - and all this by means of a consistently pro-Allied policy".[1] It was not a permanent condition, judging from Deputy Foreign Minister von Scherpenberg's letter to Foreign Minister von Brentano during the later Berlin Crisis:[2]

> I have the impression that, more and more, any foreign policy initiative and freedom of action escapes us, or more accurately, is taken away from us, and that we are sinking back into a situation in which we are only the object of the policies of others.

The fear of West German isolation within the Western alliance increased after the Geneva Conference. It stemmed from three sources. First, Adenauer's foreign policy had reached a plateau of success. The tangible reward of Western integration existed, while the pressure on the FRG to fulfil its obligations within the alliance - through financial support for Western troops stationed in the FRG, its own force build up, and the awkward adaptation to NATO's nuclear strategy

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[1] Lorenz Stucki, "Adenauer in Nöten", in Die Weltwoche (Zürich), 5 November 1954, quoted in Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), p.141.

[2] In October 1959, quoted in Arnulf Baring, Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer, 1949-1964 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974), p.281.

– increased. Second, it became increasingly difficult to keep reunification on the Western negotiating agenda in the face of Soviet insistence on the recognition of the GDR and persistent pressure (from both West and East) for some kind of regional military détente in Central Europe. Finally, pressure within the FRG for some kind of initiative with the East, while enjoying qualified support in some Western quarters, generated considerable anxiety that the FRG might seek a "new Rapallo" with the USSR.

It is in the context of these three disparate pressures that we must view the development of Adenauer's Ostpolitik. In June 1954, former Weimar Chancellor Heinrich Brüning had proposed in a speech in Düsseldorf that Bonn should resume diplomatic relations with Moscow to decrease FRG reliance on the West, and, using those relations as a lever, induce the Occupying Powers to agree to German reunification.[3] Adenauer warned against damaging Western confidence in the FRG, but both the FDP and SPD called for new initiatives with Moscow in advance of any treaty commitment to the West. Nonetheless, those treaty commitments, along with FRG sovereignty, went into effect in May 1955. A month later, the Kremlin invited Adenauer to visit Moscow, offering the prospect of normalised diplomatic relations and increased trade markets as enticements. Adenauer travelled to Washington, London and Paris for consultations and agreed to wait until after the Summit: he accepted the invitation on 12 August, a decision supported by all three major parties and 85% of public opinion in the FRG.[4] Washington left the decision up to Adenauer, with Adenauer's assurance that nothing would be done without prior consultation or to prejudice the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference; US Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant travelled to Bonn at the end of August to confirm Adenauer's position. According to Grewe, a 23 August planning meeting in Bonn produced this decision:[5]

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[3] Before the Rhine-Ruhr Club, 2 June 1954. See the New York Times, 5 June 1954, and Terence Prittie, Adenauer 1876-1967 (London: Tom Stacey, 1971), for Adenauer's reaction.

[4] Emnid Informationen, 9 July 1955, cited in Gerard Braunthal, "An Agreement with the Russians", in James B. Christoph, ed., Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1st ed., 1965), p.265. 8% were opposed; 31% saw it as a means to reunification.

> The goal of the Moscow trip of the Chancellor is *solely* to make contact. It is not intended to last more than 3 to 4 days. Any concrete decisions are not to be expected...

Moreover, if neither reunification nor the issue of the estimated 10,000 Germans incarcerated in the USSR were to be on the agenda, Adenauer would only agree to an exchange of "diplomatic agents".

Moscow had only agreed to an "exchange of views" on reunification, and the visit resulted in the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations; the release of prisoners was to be followed by an increase in trade, both of which were implemented slowly over the next few years. Bonn's apparent acceptance of "peaceful coexistence" with Moscow was conditioned by its emphasis on the issue of German reunification. Thus, the editor of *Die Welt* commented before the Moscow trip:[6]

> We would like to make clear that *we consider coexistence with the Soviet Union realistic politics*, despite her essentially different system. We would regard it as *unrealistic to gamble on a continuation of the Cold War* or a third world war *or even on the breakdown of the Soviet system*. Thus the only remaining alternative is coexistence. However, we would also like to condemn as unrealistic if the Soviet Union were to extend the idea of coexistence to the German zone she has occupied and set up.

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[5] From his memorandum of the meeting, in Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Rückblenden, 1976-1951* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), p.248 and more generally, pp.231-52.

[6] *Die Welt*, 11 August 1955. Emphasis added.

What is noteworthy in this assessment is the presumption of Soviet permanence, as opposed to earlier expressions in the US that the Soviet system was prone to disintegration. Adenauer justified diplomatic relations with Moscow because it was too important a state to be ignored, because other states had such relations, and because it created a channel for direct interaction on bilateral issues. The Soviet Union, he felt, needed a détente with the West; by making clear to Moscow directly that the FRG would not leave the West but was also not a threat to the USSR, a détente based on the reunification of Germany might be possible.[7]

Nevertheless, within a week of Adenauer's return from Moscow, the USSR and the GDR signed a treaty which was the counterpart of Bonn's Deutschlandvertrag. In the spring of 1956, with two German ambassadors in Moscow, the Soviet News Agency, TASS, suggested that the two German states negotiate on reunification. Die Welt wryly commented:[8]

> The only conclusion we can draw from this is that the Soviet Union does not wish the reunification of the German people... Now we have a direct wire connecting Moscow and Bonn, but it is difficult to see what we are supposed to say over it.

Fundamentally, Adenauer viewed reunification as the responsibility of the Four Powers and not an issue for bilateral negotiations. Other than the cautious approach to Moscow, his Ostpolitik was a negative policy. After the Moscow trip, Adenauer travelled to New York to gain allied affirmation of the separate elements of that policy: the reunification of Germany remained an obligation of the Four Powers; until reunification, Bonn was the sole legitimate representative of

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[7] See Adenauer's press conference, in Bulletin, 22 September 1955, plus his discussion in Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche, 1966), pp.491ff.

[8] Die Welt, 8 March 1956.

German interests (Alleinvertretungsrecht); there could be no agreement on the final frontier of Germany (e.g. the Oder-Neisse line) until a reunified Germany can negotiate a final peace treaty; and there would be no recognition of the regime in the Soviet zone of Germany.[9] The West German complement to this latter element, that the recognition of East Germany by a third party would be considered an "unfriendly act" (known as the Hallstein Doctrine), was agreed in a 22 September 1955 cabinet meeting, and applied two years later when the FRG broke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia after the latter recognised the GDR.[10]

Inevitably, there were those in the West who feared that a resumption of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Moscow would decrease FRG reliance on the West.[11] Adenauer's trip to New York was designed to allay those fears. In reality, West German dependence on the Western alliance - and on the US in particular - increased dramatically in the aftermath of Geneva and the Moscow trip. It has remained true that FRG initiatives in the East have created external and internal pressures on Bonn to shore up its links with the West to avoid being isolated. In the 1950s, the preservation of Bonn's Western ties had several, sometimes contradictory, motivations.

In the first place, reunification required agreement among all four of the occupying powers. Although the internal debate was often framed in a way that suggested that the Soviet Union was the key to reunification, Western support could not always be taken for granted, especially if the form which that reunification took seemed to undermine the increasingly stable European security framework that existed. In late 1954, Adenauer had complained that only "some" of the NATO Foreign Ministers continued to emphasise their support for Bonn's claim to Alleinvertretungsrecht, and stressed that reunification could only come from Western unity, "endangered as a result of the [1954] Geneva Conference and the failure of the EDC".[12] In January 1955, after Western pressure for a summit and Molotov's persistent declarations that rearmament of Germany would foreclose reunification, the official Bonn press organ, Bulletin, warned:[13]

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[9] For the joint US/UK/French statement of 28 September 1955, see RIIA, Documents, 1955, pp.203-04.

[10] Grewe., op.cit., p.252.

[11] This even led to mutual public recrimination between Adenauer and Bohlen. See Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), and Grewe, op.cit., pp.245-46, supplemented by personal interview with Grewe.

> Recently, an increasing number of comments on German reunification have appeared in the Western world... In one quarter, it was claimed that the Germans' heart-felt desire for reunification is not realistic; from another comes the advice that out of consideration for her allies in the Western European Union, the Federal Republic ought to give up all thought of reunification; and a third attempts to demonstrate the advantages of continuing German partition...
>
> Were developments to prove that the Chancellor's policy is built upon alliances with a Western world that no longer supports German reunification and no longer stands behind its promises given in the recent treaties - it might well lead to a complete reversal in German politics.

Significantly, such a warning had a broad foundation in West German politics. Both the conservative Die Welt and the SPD Neuer Vorwärts echoed this concern: armaments agreements or a European security arrangement which envisaged the continued division of Germany were possible, dangerous, and unacceptable.[14]

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[12] Adenauer's speech at the Paris Conference and his Government Declaration to the Bundestag of 15 December 1954, in Bulletin, 28 October and 23 December 1954.

[13] "Perilous Misconceptions", Bulletin, 20 January 1955. For a mild US echo, see Wall Street Journal, 7 February 1955. For commentary, particularly critical of France, see Münchener Merkur, 20 January 1955.

Adenauer's motivations for securing Bonn's ties to the West thus rested on two foundations. One reflected his priority for integrating the FRG into a broader Western European framework, even if that meant a delay to reunification. Indeed, he once cautioned SPD Chairman Erich Ollenhauer, who advocated an FRG initiative on reunification, "that the rest of the world may get weary of constant negotiating on the German question".[15] Secondly, Adenauer's *Ostpolitik* combined coexistence with Moscow, "without illusions", and non-recognition of the GDR which, because of the Hallstein Doctrine, also meant non-recognition of Eastern Europe. Allied cooperation was necessary if this were to have any effect on Moscow. It was a policy that made the FRG vulnerable to allied willingness to support Bonn's claims and to include these questions in negotiations with the USSR. Hence, it was necessary, to Adenauer, that Bonn cooperate fully in meeting and e assuming alliance commitments, not only to further Western inte tion, but also to allow Bonn to insist, in return, that the allies fulfil *their* obligations in the defence of German interests. After the 20th Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Conference and Khrushchev's articulation of "peaceful coexistence", Adenauer warned:[16]

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[14] *Die Welt*, 28 July 1955, and *Neuer Vorwärts*, 23 June 1955.

[15] During a Bundestag foreign policy debate. See *Bulletin*, 8 December 1955. Significantly, this was not totally accepted on the right. See *Die Welt*, 26 April 1956, and *Frankfurter Allgemein Zeitung*, 13 September 1956.

[16] Adenauer's speech at Yale University, in *Bulletin*, 21 June 1956. Similarly, von Brentano's speech to the Bundestag, in *Bulletin*, 7 February 1957. It was directed at the British, who had just received Bulganin in London, and in response to a memorandum from Kennan advocating peaceful coexistence and leaked to the press. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1955-1959*, pp.107-11 and 143.

> The West must not let the Soviets believe that, while it does pursue a common military policy, it is, on the other hand, possible for every single NATO member to pursue its own foreign policy - free from all restrictions - in relations with the Soviet Union.

This policy imperative accounts for Adenauer's sudden shift in position regarding the role of nuclear weapons in NATO: from warnings that an emphasis on nuclear weapons was a "mistake" that would turn Germany into an "atomic no-man's-land", to an insistence that renunciation of nuclear weapons by the FRG would mean "practically the dissolution of NATO".[17]

Among those who opposed German rearmament and had hoped that implementation of the Paris Agreement could be obviated by a successful resolution of the Cold War at Geneva, links to the West, and especially to the US, were equally vital. The central issue of the deadlocked Berlin Conference in January 1954 had been the issue of German neutrality, demanded by the USSR. Eden had aptly framed the problem in his report to the House of Commons:[18]

> Such a Germany would be bound to gravitate to one side or the other and, as a result, she could inevitably find herself playing off the East against the West to the danger of us all...
>
> Is Germany to be neutral and disarmed?... If so, who will keep Germany disarmed? Or is Germany to be neutral and armed? If so, who will keep Germany neutral?

Despite the dominant perception that Adenauer's opposition wanted a neutral Germany - a perception cultivated by Adenauer himself - an analysis of the opposition position, especially that of the SPD, suggests that it was not altogether a question of neutrality. As Carlo Schmid had earlier remarked, the SPD sought some form of collective security system in Europe that provided security for a unified Germany under a joint US-Soviet guarantee. In 1953 and 1954, this question was posed in West German opinion surveys: "Perhaps the Russians demand that, in the future, Germany shall not have an army or enter alliances with other countries. Should we accept those demands if they lead to reunification?" Those who rejected that opinion stayed constant (44% in 1953; 45% in 1954). Significantly, those who accepted it declined from 29% to 21%, while those who were undecided rose from 27% to 34%. Respondents who associated themselves with the SPD, moreover, were split evenly among all three responses.[19] Reflecting the inability of the SPD to translate this aspiration into realistic policy alternatives, Helmut Schmidt, then the youngest member of the SPD Parliamentary Party (Fraktion), complained in June 1954 that the SPD had policy on the military question.[20]

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[17] *Bulletin*, 21 August 1956 and 26 July 1956, and Adenauer's response to the anti-nuclear Göttingen Declaration, in *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 14 April 1957. See also James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1966), chapter 3.

[18] On 22 February 1954, in RIIA, *Documents, 1954*, pp.80-88. For comment, see Lord Avon, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), pp.75-76.

In essence, the issue reflected the core problem since 1945: [illegible] to find a way to reunify Germany in a way that met the security requirements of all powers concerned. Opposition to Adenauer centered on his determination to lock the FRG into alliance commitments which made the impasse even more difficult to break; this, rather than a desire for a neutral Germany, led members of both the SPD and the FDP

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[19] Data from Erich P. Neumann and Elisabeth Noelle, Antworten (Altenbach am Bodensee: Demoskopie, 1955), cited in Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford: Stanford University, 1967), p.260.

[20] See W.E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (London: Saxon House, 1974), pp.201-03.

(which split in 1956 on the issue) to talk of a Germany which belongs neither to NATO nor to the Warsaw Pact:[21]

> The claim that a reunited Germany should be a member of NATO is as much an obstacle to reunification as would be a Communist demand that a reunited Germany must be bolshevised. The suggestion that a reunited Germany should have the right to decide freely about joining military alliances would have the same effect, for if Germany were united and could exercise this right she would join the Atlantic Pact. We know that, and so do the Russians... With these ideas in mind the German Social Democrats for a number of years have been proposing a collective security system for Europe.

Erler recognised that some kind of détente had to precede this achievement; what he opposed was a refusal to consider a détente except in terms of Soviet surrender to Western conditions.

Thus, for most of Adenauer's opposition, the link to the US was also vital, not only because reunification depended on Four Power Agreement, but because, without a continuing US security guarantee and US confidence in the Germans themselves, a reunified Germany could not be safely created. In February 1957, Ollenhauer travelled to Washington and pledged that an SPD government would not seek a bilateral de with the USSR but sought a collective security system acceptable to the allies. He was quick to deny the charge of neutralism.[22] What gave impetus to the SPD campaign was the growing fear that none of the Four Powers were seriously interested in German reunification. Moreover, the crises in Suez, Poland and Hungary in 1956 demonstrated that each alliance remained in its own way fragile and vulnerable to serious disruption, thereby undermining the potential for a détente between them. The search for a way out of the impasse had as perhaps its greatest catalyst the increasing importance of nuclear weapons.

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[21] See Fritz Erler, "The Struggle for German Reunification", Foreign Affairs (Vol.34 No.3, April 1956), pp.380-93, especially pp.384-85.

[22] New York Times, 20 February 1957. For his similar proposal in June, see Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 June 1957, and his defence in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 and 11 July 1957. Likewise Erler's

Since the Lisbon NATO decision to muster 96 divisions by 1954, Western strategy had undergone a major change: the force goals, never realistic, were superseded by a NATO decision in December 1954, authorising NATO commanders to plan on the basis of the availability and probable use of nuclear weapons, reflecting a similar decision within the US in October 1953 by the adoption of NSC 16/2. Two years later, NATO approved a five year plan (MC-70) to deploy 30 front line divisions, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons under US control.[23] The acquisition of thermonuclear weapons had coincided with the development of small nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield, with the first successful US test in Aprl 1953, followed by the deployment of the first atomic artillery piece in October 1953. This "New Look" in Western defence policy posed several dilemmas for the alliance which persist today: since the purpose of nuclear weapons is primaily one of deterrence, does the deployment of sizeable conventional forces make the deterrent more or less credible; because nuclear weapons provide a form of defence substantially less expensive than that provided by the deployment of trained and equipped divisions, do they preclude a conventional defence and thereby force a "first use" decision upon the alliance; as a result of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons, is the user deterred from precipitating a nuclear war if he is a vulnerable target himself; finally, with nuclear weapons providing an extended deterrent, is the security of a non-nuclear state vulnerable to conventional attack, like the FRG, enhanced or degraded by reliance on a guarantee by a nuclear ally vulnerable only to nuclear weapons, such as the US?

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[23] See Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), chapter 5.

These issue were thrust into the West German debate beginning in late 1955, after the June "Carte Blanche" NATO exercise in which tactical nuclear weapons against a hypothetical Soviet invasion produced a projection of over five million casualties. Publication of these results brought home the problems associated with nuclear dependence and shook confidence in Adenauer's claim that membership in NATO would prevent the FRG from being the battlefield in a future war.[24] The next year, the press published a plan by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make substantial cuts in US ground forces both in Europe and the US.[25] This came less than a week after Adenauer's return from Washington, leading him to conclude that Dulles had deceived him. Actually, Dulles had not known of the memorandum and opposed the plan. While cuts of up to half of the US forces in Europe were not US policy, the plan *did reflect in* general terms the Administration's desire to compensate for a paucity of forces with nuclear weapons.[26] Moreover, it caught Adenauer in the middle of a vociferous debate on conscription; while it precipitated an abrupt shift in policy, it also demonstrated how vulnerable - and out of touch - Bonn was when it came to matters of alliance defence.

The persistent fear, even after the strain between Washington and Bonn had been healed, was that dependence on a nuclear deterrent required the threat of its use and meant nuclear war if the deterrent failed. Dulles talked of the need to be willing to "go to the brink": to lack that will meant there was no deterrent, for which the result would surely be war.[27] Henry Kissinger, among others, began to write about the possibility of limited nuclear warfare.[28] Yet on the public level, the emotional anxiety surrounding the nuclear issue - reflected particularly in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain and the _Kampf der Atomtod_ in the FRG in 1957 - fed pressure for _some_ kind of détente. The disengagement debate must be seen in the context of progressive efforts to achieve a détente in Europe to obviate the implementation of German rearmament and the introduction of nuclear weapons into the West German force structure, albeit under US control.

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[24] Osgood, op.cit., and Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University, 1975), chapter 2.

[25] In the New York Times, 13 July 1955. See Robert Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1960), pp.45ff.

[26] See Radford's testimony before the Subcommittee on Airpower, Senate Armed Services Committee. The Administration had to contend with conservative Republicans who sought budget cuts and Democrats like Senator Stuart Symington who charged that the US was behind the USSR in airpower. New York Times, 31 July 1956, and Baltimore Sun, 1 August 1956.

The enhanced role of nuclear weapons in the alliance, and correspondingly in the USSR, provided the potential for détente on three levels. On a solely psychological level, it is a source of strength and confidence, allowing one side to enter into negotiation with adversary with the belief that he might be able to intimidate other into concessions or at least to avoid intimidation himself. Dulles' announcement of the doctrine of massive retaliation just prior to the Berlin Conference suggests one illustration. The second level is ironic when placed next to the first, even if it is also complementary: substantially more than with atomic weapons, thermonuclear weapons create an unprecedented form of mutual vulnerability between adversaries, providing a common interest in war avoidance and a motivation to manage conflict before crises get out control. Such was the impetus for the arms control movement that began in the US in the late 1950s, but the premise of vulnerability was implied by Acheson's rejoinder to Dulles' massive retaliation speech:[29]

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[27] See James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War", _Life_, 16 January 1956, pp.70ff.

[28] Henry A. Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age", _Foreign Affairs_ (Vol.34 No.3, April 1956), pp.349-66, developed further in _Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy_ (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), but largely retracted in _The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy_ (New York: Harper, 1960).

> Strategic atomic bombing is not our first but our last resort... If it is said... that we cannot afford another war like Korea, the answer is that such a war is the only kind of war we or anyone else can afford.

Finally, and directly germane to the proposals for "disengagement" in Central Europe that grew out of the Geneva Conferences in 1955 and abounded in 1957-1958, nuclear weapons suggested to some an opportunity to solve the problem of European security and German reunification. Military forces facing each other across the partition of a divided Germany could perhaps be withdrawn, as they had been in Austria, since the nuclear arsenal of the US and USSR could provide for the security of Europe without those forces.

In the context of the nuclear debate, proposals by some in the SPD and FDP seemed appealing. The dominant characteristic was the attempt to induce Soviet acceptance of a reunified Germany by making German integration with the West and, in particular, the fulfilment of FRG defence obligations in NATO negotiable, while requiring some kind of joint US-Soviet security guarantee. In many respects, they resembled the proposals advanced by George Kennan and by members of the British Labour Party and those pressed by the USSR and its allies after Geneva beginning with the Polish Rapacki Plan for a nuclear free

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[29] In the New York Times, 28 March 1954.

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

zone in Central Europe (Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia).[30] While these proposals are often referred to collectively, stressing the common theme of "disengagement", there were some important differences that need to be noted.

In the first place, the SPD and FDP proposals were directed specifically at the goal of German reunification, urging the phased implementation of both reunification, beginning with free elections under international supervision, and a collective security system. What distinguished them from Bonn's official policy was the willingness to consider a regional security arrangement without the _prior_ condition of controlled general disarmament and German reunification. But because they shared Adenauer's demand for a reunified Germay based on free elections, they were incompatible with those proposed by the East: beginning in late 1956, East Germany proposed a confederation of the two German states, involving FRG recognition of the GDR and positing reunification only on the basis of "peace, democracy and socialism";[31] moreover, the Rapacki Plan and the earlier Soviet proposals for conventional force reductions contained no provision at all for reunification, but envisaged the accession of both the FRG and the GDR to the treaties. Neither did the disengagement proposals from Britain find universal acceptance in the West German opposition: they incorporated a demand for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the final boundary between Germany and Poland; they also conflicted with the common West German desire that any regional security arrangement in Europe should not discriminate against Germany by placing restrictions on Germany that did not apply to other states.

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[30] Kennan's BBC Reith Lectures of November-December 1957; Hugh Gaitskell's spring 1957 Harvard Lectures, "The Challenge of Coexistence"; and Denis Healey's _A Neutral Belt in Europe_ (Fabian Society pamphlet, January 1958). See Michael E. Howard, _Disengagement_ (London: Penguin, 1958) for a general discussion based on a Chatham House Study Group. For the Rapacki Plan, proposed 2 October 1957 in the UN and reformulated in February 1958, see RIIA, _Documents, 1957_, pp.157-59. Soviet proposals along these lines were pressed throughout 1956 and 1957 in both the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament and in bilateral exchanges with Eisenhower.

[31] In _Neues Deutschland_, 31 December 1956, then in a formal declaration on 27 July 1957. RIIA, _Documents, 1957_, pp.92-97.

Ironically, a credible and stable disengagement in Central Europe ultimately depended on the viability of the US strategic deterrent. Kennan, who had always resisted reliance on nuclear weapons, did not of course view the problem in these terms. In his discussion of the Reith Lectures, he stressed his opposition to "the view that NATO could not defend itself, if it wanted to, in a world where only conventional weapons existed".[32] Yet the world did not conform to that view: the Soviet Union had just launched *Sputnik*; the US was about to propose the deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe at the December NATO Conference; the British had, in May, detonated a thermonuclear device, and Defence Minister Duncan Sandys' 1957 White Paper embodied the decision to end national service and rely on a finite nuclear deterrent; the Fourth French Republic had already laid the foundation for de Gaulle's subsequent acquisition of a *force de frappe*; and the FRG, with a CDU/CSU 50.2% majority from the September election, was preparing for the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the Bundeswehr.[33]

In his lectures Kennan underscored a persistent problem in the US-FRG security relationship: the continued division of Germany, with an indefinite American presence, "expects too much, and for too long a time, of the United States, which is not a European power".[34] In the nuclear age, the security of Germany - either the FRG or a united Germany - depended on a nuclear guarantee. The US provided that guarantee, but the presence of US troops on German soil was the only tangible assurance that the guarantee would be effective in providing a deterrent. The German debate reflects this dilemma. What was clear to both Government and Opposition was that the American strategic nuclear deterrent was vital. For Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, disengagement was unacceptable because it posited the withdrawal of US forces, necessary not to defend Germany but to maintain the link to the deterrent (i.e. "coupling");[35] likewise, tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG and integrated into the Bundeswehr force structure were to insure that the nuclear threshold was low, so that an aggressor would have to anticipate a nuclear response and, eventually, the employment of US strategic forces. Opposition to tactical nuclear weapons was partly based, conversely, on the fear that they might well be used a limited war context, as an alternative to the employment of US strategic forces.[36] The increasing perception of American strategic vulnerability, particularly after Sputnik, only exacerbated this dilemma.

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[32] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963* (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p.247.

[33] See, among others, Andrew J. Pierre, *Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970* (London: Oxford University, 1972); Wilfred L. Kohl, *French Nuclear Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1971), and Kelleher, *op.cit.*

In many respects, the nuclear debate and the debate on disengagement as a means to reunification were two aspects of the same broad issue, reflecting broadly-based public pressure for some kind of East-

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[34] Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963, pp.242-43.

[35] See Strauss' rebuttal to Ollenhauer's proposals made during the latter's Washington trip, New York Times, 20 February 1957.

[36] Even Dulles, the author of massive retaliation, intimated as much. See his "Challenge and Response in United States Policy", Foreign Affairs (Vol.35, No.1, October 1957), pp.25-43.

West détente. As we have seen, the proposals of how one simultaneously achieved that, acquired a stable security base, and fulfilled individual national aims, held little in common. Fundamentally, all of the disengagement proposals were in conflict with the US position, which viewed the integration of the FRG into the Western alliance as vital: to Dulles disengagement was only a euphemism for neutrality. Eisenhower sincerely aspired to some kind of détente with the USSR, as evidenced by his exchange of correspondence with Bulganin throughout 1956 and his emphasis on inspection arrangements both as a precursor to disarmament and as a confidence building measure.[37] Nonetheless, he refused to agree to a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR: it contained nothing other than what was already binding to each in the UN Charter; moreover it would be counterproductive to create the "illusion of reconciliation" if in fact no reconciliation existed. In bilateral exchanges and in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, the US remained faithful to Adenauer's *Junktim*.

The *Junktim*, or "linkage", was Adenauer's way of preserving Bonn's position by insuring that the problems of the Cold War were not solved without also solving the "German Problem" which had preceded the Cold War and had been embedded in it. It was in part directed at the Soviet Union, just as the linkage policies of Henry Kissinger over a decade later were designed to induce the USSR into making concessions: détente, Adenauer assumed, was something Moscow wanted, but reunification was the price Moscow had to pay for it. Fundamentally, however, Adenauer's *Junktim* was designed to maintain alliance solidarity in the pursuit of West German interests. It was expressed all the more loudly after the Geneva Conference as he sought to remind the US, Britain and France of their alliance obligations while each in its own way sought marginal improvements in bilateral relations with the USSR. The *Junktim* contained within it some internal contradictions which, in the end, led to an immobile *Ostpolitik*, domestic impatience and increased isolation within the alliance.

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[37] For the letters, see RIIA, *Documents, 1956*, pp.575-614. Although they were mostly cordial, the tone steadily became polemical; Bulganin's 17 October letter included a personal criticism of Dulles and appeared in the press even before Eisenhower received it.

During the Berlin Conference, Jakob Kaiser, Bonn's Minister for All-German Affairs, declared that there could be no détente or peace in Europe "without first reunifying Germany, or there might be trouble in the most vulnerable place of all - Central Europe".[38] Yet after the Paris Agreements, Adenauer reversed this sequence, noting that "only through a lessening of tensions" could the Germans hope for reunification.[39] Subsequently, Adenauer urged a bold disarmament move by the US, designed "to achieve a general relaxation of tensions and in this connection to *bring about* the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom."[40] But the precondition of controlled disarmament, however necessary, was not sufficient. Commenting on the London Disarmament Conference, the *Bulletin* noted:[41]

> It would be a dangerous illusion... to believe that disarmament or any other reduction of the *symptoms* of international tension would by itself mean a removal of its underlying causes. Disarmament may well create a climate more favourable... one of the catalysts, but never a substitute for the re-uniting of a nation divided.

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[38] *Bulletin*, 28 January 1954.

[39] *Bulletin*, 28 October 1954.

[40] To the Bundestag, in *Bulletin*, 2 June 1955. Emphasis added. See also Harold Macmillan, *Volume III: Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.535.

[41] *Bulletin*, 22 March 1956. Emphasis added.

Thus, when French Premier Mollet stated that disarmament was a path to reunification, the Foreign Office quickly replied:[42]

> The German Federal Republic has repeatedly declared that *without reunification* and the establishment of a security system satisfactory to all countries, *it would not be possible to negotiate on disarmament* with any hope of success... No German Government will be willing to discuss seriously any proposals which aim at relaxing tension on the basis of Germany's division or of tacit acceptance of that division.

Clearly a *Junktim* existed, but its precise sequence was ambiguous. Just as clearly, the ambiguity existed because Bonn found itself reacting to external events and pressures for a military détente, either in Central Europe or in partial disarmament measures relating to strategic nuclear weapons. This ambiguity also allowed the alliance to agree on certain "ground rules" to deal with these issues, reflected in the Berlin Declaration, signed by the US, UK, France and FRG on 29 July 1957.

The Berlin Declaration served as a response to the GDR's formal proposal for a German confederation two days before, but its impetus had preceded that development. In March 1957, the London Disarmament Conference opened amid Western pressures for détente, disengagement and disarmament; with the US and Britain considering troop reductions in Europe and demanding support payments from Bonn; and with an increased official emphasis on nuclear deterrence and a correspondingly intense public opposition. Adenauer, facing an election in September, sent Brentano and Grewe to Washington in March and went himself in May. Concurrent Four Power Working Group meetings in Washington, Bonn and Paris led to the Berlin Declaration: the initiative was from Bonn, as was the draft of the declaration. The allies acknowledged and accepted the domestic political motives behind the Declaration, since they supported Adenauer's re-election.[43]

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[42] *Bulletin*, 12 April 1956. Emphasis added.

The document provides, in a sense, a list of "ground rules" for allied deliberations on Germany, European security, disarmament and related issues. Noting that "one of the basic reasons for the failure to reach a settlement [in the Cold War] is the continued division of Germany", it listed twelve points.[44] For the most part it reaffirmed previous allied positions, with a number of more ambiguous positions clarified in a single document signed by all four allies: German reunification, based on free all-German elections, was the precondition to any German peace treaty and remained a Four Power responsibility; reunification was a necessary condition to any lasting stability and security in Europe, and only through national self-determination would the German people feel bound to it; a reunified Germany should not be discriminated against by the imposition of neutral or demilitarised status or by denying it the right to determine its own foreign policy and international associations or the right to collective defence; a reunified Germany would not be required to join NATO, but if it did, the allies were willing to make reciprocal security assurance guarantees with the East; in the interim, the allies supported Bonn's claim to Alleinvertretungsrecht and insisted that under no conditions was the existence of NATO negotiable.

In addition, the Berlin Declaration endorsed Adenauer's Junktim; here, the final two points of the Declaration are significant:

> 11. The reunification of Germany, accompanied by the conclusion of European security arrangements, would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

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[43] See the account in Grewe, op.cit., pp.290-92.

[44] For the full text, see RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.97-99.

> Conversely, if a beginning could be made towards effective measures of partial disarmament, this would contribute to the settlement of outstanding major political problems such as the reunification of Germany. Initial steps in the field of disarmament should lead to a comprehensive disarmament, which presupposes a prior solution to the problem of German reunification. The Western Powers do not intend to enter into any agreement on disarmament which would prejudice the reunification of Germany.
>
> 12. Any measures for disarmament applicable to Europe must have the consent of the European nations concerned and take into account the link between European security and German reunification.

Clearly, Bonn enjoyed a veto over any military détente in Europe that threatened to formalise the division of Germany. As for the Junktim, reunification was a precondition to comprehensive disarmament, but partial disarmament measures could also contribute to reunification.

This last element reflected American influence in the drafting process, since it excluded unspecified partial disarmament measures from the Junktim, as long as they did not apply to Germany and the German position in Europe or otherwise affect reunification. To Eisenhower, this included measures such as his "Open Skies" proposal and related measures to preclude surprise attack, plus measures to stop production of nuclear weapons and their spread to non-nuclear nations. In April 1957, Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Disarmament, Harold Stassen, made informal proposals to the Soviet delegation at the London Disarmament Conference, without prior allied consultation, to halt the production of fissionable material under international supervision. Macmillan was furious, since Stassen's proposed cut-off date of 1959 did not provide the UK adequate time to establish its weapons stockpile. For the British, who had not then exploded their first thermonuclear device and who had just received promises of greater nuclear cooperation with the US after the Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting at Bermuda the month before, this surprise detailed proposal - however "informal" - was a shock. Dulles arrived in London in June to make his apologies and take over control of the disarmament negotiations.[45]

When Macmillan went to Bonn in May, a week before the British thermonuclear test on Christmas Island, his focus was therefore on the acquisition of a British deterrent: the certainty of strategic nuclear retaliation was required.[46] The same emphasis found its way into the joint communiqué.[47] From Adenauer's point of view, it seemed a propitious opportunity since he had, in a way, a British ally in his battle against premature and uncoordinated partial disarmament measures. Even though Dulles replaced Stassen, that did not end a US desire for some move in this area, as Adenauer discovered when he travelled to Washington in late May.

Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles were willing to push Bonn on disarmament without respecting Adenauer's Junktim. The issue, however, was whether or not certain kinds of partial measures were include this Washington meeting essentially established the wording on point 11 of the Berlin Declaration.[48] In one long session with Adenauer and von Brentano, recorded by Grewe, Dulles argued that it was difficult to establish any inspection zones in Europe because of the risk to Germany: perhaps Antarctica would be a good place to start. With respect to nuclear weapons, Dulles advocated a moratorium on weapons development and production, while a test ban would have to wait for an inspection and control system. Significantly, Dulles suggested that non-nuclear powers should renounce the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons, the beginning of the long, tumultuous route to the NPT in the next decade. Adenauer and Brentano resisted any of these "first steps" without wider conditions relating to other political issues; it would result in a loss of confidence, in which the election in September could not be won. Dulles, in turn, argued these were "minimal steps", which were possible because of US atomic superiority. In the end, Adenauer received what he wanted: a good communiqué and an assurance that nothing would be done to disrupt his election prospects.[49] The Berlin Declaration confirmed this result.

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[45] See Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp.402-03; Harold Macmillan, Vol.IV: Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p.300; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, pp.281-92; Grewe, op.cit., p.297; Washington Post and Times Herald, 14 April 1957. Eisenhower had approved the informal "talking papers"; see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp.472ff.

[46] Macmillan's speech on 7 May 1957, cited in Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp.294-95.

[47] For the communiqué of 9 May 1957, see RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.386-87.

[48] For the communiqué of 28 May 1957, see RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.390-92.

In many respects, the Berlin Declaration symbolised a high point in the US-FRG consensus, personified in the Dulles-Adenauer relationship. Reflecting on Dulles' death two years later, Adenauer wrote:[50]

> Dulles and I were agreed on one key principle: no concessions without counter-concessions. We were accused of being stubborn and unmoving, and the whole world wrote that we should be more flexible...
>
> I am of the understanding that, if after careful reflection, one recognises a goal and a means that is correct, one can then naturally try to alter the means somewhat if the adversary makes things difficult. But in the final analysis, one must be firm and undissuaded in his goal and direction.

The US-FRG relationship had been formed and shaped by the Cold War, in which the politics of strength played a central role in the Western strategy. The US had assumed a "temporary" commitment to the active defence of Western Europe, with the requirement of a firmly integrated Western alliance including a rearmed West Germany. West Germany had joined in that venture willingly, although not without intense debate, in the belief that, through that alliance, German national interests could find expression and fulfilment.

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[49] [illegible] [illegible], pp.[illegible].

[50] A. [illegible], [illegible], p.[illegible].

There were, of course, divergent perspectives, largely overshadowed by the commitment to the primary ground rule: the need to preserve the alliance. To the extent that each ally required a certain amount of flexibility to pursue its individual interests, the imperative of alliance solidarity encroached. At the same time, the need for alliance solidarity gave each ally some room for manoeuvre because each could expect some cooperation and exact some leverage in the name of keeping the alliance together. This is evident in Bonn's possession of a veto and Adenauer's trip to Moscow, as well as in the British and American ability to alter their defence policies with Bonn's reluctant support.[51] Moreover, despite - or because of - Bonn's basic dependency on the alliance, this leverage applied particularly to Bonn. Hence, von Brentano warned during his March 1958 visit to Washington:[52]

> A Germany defenceless and powerless because of an enforced neutrality, released from self-imposed and freely undertaken commitments, would become a pawn in world politics... In order to be able to exist and to work, such a Germany would have to seek friends, since it must perish in isolation... Germany could exist only if it were to adopt expediency and a political principle...
>
> No less great would be the danger presented by a neutral Germany which, left to itself, would have to be prepared to meet any possible threat. Her... situation would compel Germany to build up armaments far in excess of her capacity... Within a short time, this would lead such a neutral Germany to the verge of collapse and compel her either to

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[51] For instance, in Bonn's concession on troop support costs in June 1957 in the middle of the disengagement debate. See RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.393-94.

[52] In a speech to the National Press Club, cited in Congressional Record, 8 March 1957. See the supportive commentary in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 March 1957.

> capitulate to one side or the other, or to make use of her power.

This echoed Eden's report after the 1954 Berlin Conference. Here the allies were agreed: the "German Problem" remained; there could be no security with a neutral Germany, armed or disarmed, for in such circumstances the desire to avoid isolation would be replaced by the presumption of that isolation.

Within these restrictive ground rules, there remained the need to demonstrate movement, both in the direction of reunification and in the direction of partial disarmament measures and the stabilisation of the Cold War military confrontation. In early 1957, Eisenhower and Dulles believed that Western strength was perhaps sufficient to induce Soviet concessions on measures relating to nuclear stockpiles. Similarly, the Berlin Declaration reiterated the 1955 offer of a Treaty of Assurance to the USSR. Bonn applied its own pressure to Moscow. In response to a Soviet threat that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG would make West Germany the first target in case of war, Adenauer and von Brentano replied that the FRG would not reject atomic weapons, warning that, if the London Disarmament Conference failed, the FRG "must consider what to do with 'modern weapons'".[53] In a long memorandum delivered to Moscow on 23 May, Bonn rejected Soviet demands for decoupling German reunification and European security, holding out the prospect of greater trade if reunification were agreed to.[54] Yet the Soviet response to the Berlin Declaration belied the premise of negotiating from a position of strength.[55] Moscow rejected the assertion that a divided Germany was the main cause of international tension and replied that disarmament and European security should not be delayed; as for Germany, that was a question for the Germans. Of greater significance, Moscow boasted of its own strength, retorting that it did not need any assurances from the West.

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[53] Baltimore Sun, 28 April and 25 May 1957, and New York Times, 30 April and 28 May 1957.

[54] See RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.81-92.

[55] Ibid., pp.99-105.

In short, this period ended with two policies of strength confronting each other across the East-West divide in a continuing deadlock. In September 1957, the CDU/CSU won an absolute majority in the Bundestag elections; Adenauer was freed from a need to rely on increasingly recalcitrant and divided coalition partners.[56] In October, the USSR provided evidence of its claim of a successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test with the launch of Sputnik. Suddenly the Western position did not appear so secure. In November 1958, Khrushchev attempted to breach the deadlock in the East-West conflict by delivering an ultimatum on Berlin. The Cold War which throughout the 1950s had been fought in peripheral conflicts and with the exchange of polemic, suddenly returned to Europe in a that threatened to escalate into a catastrophic war. While the basic ground rules remained, including the Junktim, the West - both in and out of Germany - searched for opportunities to manoeuvre within those ground rules. It is that to which this thesis now turns.

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[56] The SPD increased its share of the vote as well to 31.8%, while the FDP dropped to 7.7%, thus continuing the trends of the 1953 elections.

PART 3

CATALYST AND MOVEMENT:

THE BERLIN CRISIS AND COMPETING DÉTENTE STRATEGIES, 1958-1968

> The present partition of Europe has been held to be less dangerous than any other solution. Why? Because if we try to change it, we have to restore fluidity to the European situation... The present situation in Europe is abnormal, or absurd. But it is a clearcut one... If something happens on the other side of the Iron Curtain... nothing happens on this side. So a clear partition of Europe is considered, rightly or wrongly, to be less dangerous than any other arrangement.
>
> Raymond Aron, 1958[1]

On the eve of the Berlin Crisis, in the wake of Sputnik, and in the midst of an intense public debate over the disengagement of military forces from Central Europe, this conclusion could not be officially endorsed by Western governments but nonetheless increasingly dominated policy decisions. Since the death of Stalin i 1953, there had developed in important segments of European American public and elite opinion the sense that a détente between East and West - a general relaxation of tensions between the antagonists of the Cold War - was possible. This reflected more a hope that one could be attained rather than a detached observation that one existed. Improvement in the atmosphere of the Cold War, with the "Spirit of Geneva" and later in the "Spirit of Camp David", oscillated with periods of crisis. With the exception of the Berlin Crisis beginning in late 1958 these crises were remarkable in two significant respects: they took place in what was increasingly called the "Third World" in which the issue of European security was not directly involved; or they were crises within the opposing alliances, most notably in East Berlin in 1953 and in Suez and Hungary in 1956. The notion of détente in the 1950s represented the belief that changed conditions afforded an opportunity for a negotiated settlement to at least some of the issues of the Cold War.

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[1] Quoted in George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p.253.

This perception of the potential for détente had grown out of the confluence of four factors. First, the acquisition of thermonuclear weapons by both sides, plus the increasing reliance on those weapons systems by each alliance, provided a sense of common vulnerability. The Soviet Sputnik launch on 4 October 1957 provided added impetus to the consideration of means to stabilise the superpower strategic relationship through partial methods of arms control distinct from disarmament. Second, the consolidation of the alliance structure in the West, primarily through *its successful* economic recovery and through the integration of the FRG into that framework, partly fulfilled the requirements of "strength" previously established at the beginning of the decade for engaging in negotiations with the USSR. Third, there was an opportunity for détente growing out of the emergence of certain issues on which agreement might be possible. Some viewed the stability of the status quo of a divided Europe as a reasonable basis from which to proceed to regulating the adversary relationship; others observed that the passing of bipolarity in the international system invalidated a zero-sum framework and provided a common motivation for superpower collaboration to manage the evolution of that system. Finally, détente began to enter the political vocabulary in the recognition that this adversary relationship had a certain permanence; the apparent alternatives - war, confrontation and crisis in the Cold War, and a long term process of establishing a position of strength from which to exact concessions from the Soviet

Union - seemed, respectively, either totally unacceptable, dangerous and uncontrollable, or simply unattainable.

While there was a potential for détente, it remained a question of national and alliance politics as to whether such a strategy should be pursued and, if so, under what conditions and to what end. The basic ground rules persisted: the strength and cohesion of the alliance must not be sacrificed in the process; and the issues of security and German reunification had to be resolved together. Therein lay a basic dilemma for the alliance. These four arguments for détente implicitly prescribed an adversary relationship built on a recognition of the status quo, particularly in Europe, in which the dominant actors were the superpowers. Its central element was the management of tension to avoid direct military confrontation, while the adversary competition went on by non-military means.[2] Yet in the climate of the Cold War in the 1950s, a formal recognition of the status quo was equivalent to a Soviet gain, if for no other reason than it seemed to undermine what the FRG viewed as legitimate grounds for its wil membership in the alliance.

A primary feature of the period 1958-1962 was not the development of a Western détente strategy but Western response to Soviet challenge, significantly but not by any means exclusively in Europe. In the wake of Sputnik, Khrushchev seemed to act as if only the West were vulnerable, and there were many in the West who responded to the Berlin Crisis as if he were correct. Apart from the very real possibility that it might lead to a war which neither East nor West wanted, the direct threat of the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis was this: in responding to Khrushchev's actions, the West's options were to defend the status quo or to attempt to negotiate a resolution of the crisis by offering what amounted to concessions, at least in the eyes of the West Germans. Previously, the West had been able to consolidate its position free from any Soviet ability to deter that consolidation. The Soviet Union had also consolidated its position in Eastern Europe, free from Western interference, both in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956. The Berlin Crisis, particularly in conjunction with Sputnik, demonstrated the reality of mutual deterrence; at least in Europe, military power was not a sufficient instrument of compellance. This was probably true even before Sputnik, but then the attention in the West had been directed to its own consolidation. The Berlin Crisis made this fact evident; with it came the recognition that the status quo, if it were to be changed at all, had to be altered by other means. These "other means" were expressed in the wake of the Berlin Crisis by competing visions of détente within the alliance.

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[2] This is not unlike Khrushchev's definition of "peaceful coexistence". See Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence", Foreign Affairs (Vol.38 No.1, October 1959), pp.1-18.

Before discussing the sources and pressures of these competing visions of détente in the 1960s and their effects on US-FRG relations, it is necessary to examine the events which precede and shape them. The Berlin Crisis provided the stage, but it should not be viewed separately from the evolution of Western thinking on alliance defence which, although it had separate roots, was itself shaped by the Berlin Crisis. Significantly, both the diplomatic response to the Berlin Crisis and the military response to an altered nuclear relationship had divisive effects in the Western alliance. To a considerable extent, actions which were divisive in one realm were countered by actions in another in the hope of shoring up that alliance. The discussion which follows is not a detailed history of either the

Berlin Crisis or of the developments in the Western defence debate. Its focus is on the response, particularly in the US and the FRG, to events which threatened, in different ways, vital interests, and on how that alliance relationship managed the beginning of a redefinition of vital interests which were later to find expression in various conceptions of East-West détente.

CHAPTER 9

Sputnik Diplomacy and Western Vulnerability

The Soviet *Sputnik* and claim to a successful ICBM test in late 1957 coincided with a debate in the United States over the Eisenhower Administration's emphasis on massive retaliation and the West's ability to deter or fight limited war. As we have seen, the reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO had evolved as a response to the failure to achieve the Lisbon force goals of 1952 and the presumed economies to be attained by the availability of both thermonuclear weapons and battlefield tactical atomic and nuclear weapons. The hoped-for military integration of Western Europe, sufficient to allow a withdrawal of American forces which had never been intended as an indefinite commitment, had not transpired; proposals for disengagement, although perhaps appealing to those who sought t effect that withdrawal and achieve a Soviet withdrawal from Ea Europe as a bonus, could not be turned into reality largely because of the implications for West Germany's position in NATO and Europe as a whole. Significantly, in the wake of both Suez and Hungary, public opinion in the FRG registered a significant decline in those who would welcome news of a US withdrawal, an opinion which would be further strengthened by the Berlin Crisis, as the following West German poll data demonstrate:[3]

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[3] "Would you welcome or regret reading news of a withdrawal of US troops?" Public opinion surveys by Institut für Demoskopie, cited in Peter H. Merkl, *German Foreign Policies, West and East: On the Threshold of a New European Era* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 1974), p.24.

	1956	January 1957	December 1957	1962
Welcome news of withdrawal	51%	33%	34%	12%
Regret news of withdrawal	22%	34%	34%	59%
Do not know	27%	33%	32%	29%

Notably, there was little discernible effect occasioned by the Sputnik launch, because Western Europe was already vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack.

Before Sputnik, the US had recognised the problem of assuring the allies that the nuclear deterrent was operative. In July 1957, Dulles admitted:[4]

> We do not ourselves want to be in a position where our allies are wholly dependent upon us... Therefore, we are studying ways whereby through perhaps a NATO stockpile of weapons and various arrangements of that sort, there can be assurances to our allies that... they will not be in a position of supplicants, as far as we are concerned, for the use of atomic weapons.

It was a vague proposition, subject to strong Congressional resistance to the prospect of sharing information on atomic energy. The West Germans, once they had adapted themselves to NATO's nuclear strategy, began to exact considerable pressure in a similar direction, using the same "policy of strength" arguments in the nuclear domain that had previously applied in the conventional domain. The most outspoken advocate of this position was Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss:[5]

> In all negotiations about reunification, risks and chances must be weighed against each other. The risks will diminish, the chances will improve, the more Germany herself has to throw into the scales... A policy of strength in the age of the hydrogen bomb means... that one's own freedom of decision cannot be influenced by pressure from hostile or unfriendly quarters... Germany must become so indispensable to her Western friends, and so respectable to her potential adversary, that both will value her presence in the negotiations.

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[4] Press conference, 16 July 1957, in New York Times, 17 July 1957. Emphasis added.

[5] Franz-Josef Strauss, "Sicherheit und Wiedervereinigung", Aussenpolitik (Vol 8 March 1957) pp 140-47 [illegible]

For Bonn, nuclear disengagement, such as that envisaged by proposals for a "nuclear free zone", was no more acceptable than conventional disengagement. Making Bonn the essential core of any Western defence agreement would ensure that no decision would be taken over the Germans' heads which discriminated against Germany.

In retrospect, Sputnik symbolised an evolving mutual vulnerability in the superpower nuclear relationship which invalidated the "politics of strength" as a means of compelling an advantageous resolution of the Cold War. In the long run, this mutual vulnerability afforded a foundation for superpower agreement to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their own strategic arsenals, but these developments had to wait for greater stability in that relationship. It led some to hope that Soviet resistance to disarmament and arms control arrangements, with appropriate inspection provisions, could be possible. Hence, Walt Rostow, consultant to the Eisenhower Administration and later a key foreign policy advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, wrote in early 1958:[6]

> Some Russians may have even begun to define an alternative: namely, to exploit the transient primacy of the Soviet Union and the United States to create a system of armaments control so solid and secure that it would guarantee a world of reasonable and orderly politics by the time the new nations come into maturity.

While Rostow was not explicitly urging a superpower nuclear "condominium", his statement derived from the same presumption: nuclear weapons were bound to proliferate to the detriment of general international stability; moroever, a "stand-off arms race" in the superpower nuclear realm would give allies and other powers "a bargaining position disproportionate to their industrial capacity and military potential".[7]

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[6] Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp.429-30. Emphasis added.

The more immediate effect of a prospective Soviet ICBM capability was a basic instability in the nuclear relationship. While the vulnerability of Western Europe was not directly affected by a Soviet ICBM capability, Sputnik nonetheless altered the basis of the Western alliance in two ways. First, the credibility of the US strategic deterrent was in doubt. One Bonn newspaper thus noted after the second Sputnik launch:[8]

> No one can seriously fear any longer that the United States will take any reckless military steps in the Cold War. Instead, it is a justifiable question whether the Americans, in their susceptibility to Soviet missile attacks, will be ready to continue threatening American atomic reprisals, which have so far been the means of averting direct Russian attacks on Berlin and elsewhere.

The effect of this perception was to create strong arguments for national control of nuclear weapons, independent of the US strategic arsenal. This was most notable in France, especially after de Gaulle became President of the Fifth Republic in June 1958. It also confirmed British desires to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. In West Germany, the effect was more subtle. While Bonn never advocated its own nuclear deterrent or suggested that it might repudiate its unilateral 1954 renunciation of atomic weapons, the pressure for arrangements that guaranteed the continuing operation of the nuclear deterrent and its application to "forward defence" increased substantially.

This alteration of the alliance foundation was essentially political in its effect. It was fundamentally destabilising because it created a chronic "crisis of confidence" that required constant allied assurance and heightened allied sensitivity to practically every nuance of policy affecting alliance security. On the military level as well, the basis of the alliance had changed, bringing with it a commensurate destabilisation of the adversary military relationship. The immediate military measures taken to counter a projected Soviet ICBM capability entailed an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, both for tactical and strategic purposes. At least until the US could mount a suitable deterrent based on a survivable second strike retaliatory capability, it sought to base in Europe a dispersed nuclear force capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union. In general, these weapons were highly vulnerable and inadequately controlled.

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[7] Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p.412. This was Rostow's definition of a "diffusion of power".

[8] General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 13 November 1957. Emphasis added.

Within the US, the launch of Sputnik led almost immediately to charges of a "missile gap", with Democratic Senators Stuart Symington and Henry Jackson claiming on 5 October that the Eisenhower programme of economy in the defence budget had caused the US to fall behind. Eisenhower attempted to calm the public's "mass hysteria" by arguing that the US retained a strategic retaliatory capability and would continue to develop modern delivery systems.[9] On 7 November, the "Gaither Committee" projected an American strategic vulnerability based on an anticipated Soviet ICBM force of 100 missiles with megaton warheads by 1959. It urged, among other things, attention to a survivable retaliatory capability and increased forces for limited war.[10] The Rockefeller reports of 1957 and 1958 urged similar measures, based on private studies begun after Nelson Rockefeller had resigned in 1956 as Special Assistant to the President because of his dissent from the Administration's defence policy.

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[9] See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp.206 and 211. Harold Macmillan noted in his diary that the effect of Sputnik in the US was like that of Pearl Harbor; the US mood only took on a "better temper" after the successful launch of Explorer I on 31 January 1958. See Macmillan, Volume IV: Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp.320 and 409.

Eisenhower was unwilling to make the substantial increase in the defence budget advocated by both the Gaither and Rockefeller reports. In fact, the budget submitted in 1958 reflected only a 2% net increase over the previous year, a decline in real terms.[11] In the strategic arena, this was understandable, since the Atlas ICBM and the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) were still in the research and development stage; but even there, the increases were largely initiated by Congress rather than by the White House. Similarly, Eisenhower rejected both a conventional force build-up and a massive investment in civil defence, as proposed by the Gaither and Rockefeller reports. The short term response focused on the dispersal of the US nuclear retaliatory capability. At the December 1957 NATO summit conference, Dulles offered to station Thor and Jupiter IRBMs under US control on allied territory. Only the UK agreed, having already made such an arrangement at the Bermuda summit the previous May; Italy and Turkey subsequently agreed in 1959. The French refused, and de Gaulle subsequently ordered the removal from French soil of all nuclear weapons not under French control (including weapons to be delivered by tactical aircraft). Adenauer, plagued by domestic opposition to the planned introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the Bundeswehr, claimed that the Bundeswehr's mission was only "tactical" and asked that Bonn not be explicitly offered any strategic missiles.[12]

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[10] See Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp.219ff.; Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson* (New York: Columbia University, 1968), pp.115-23; and Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp.149-51.

[11] *New York Times*, 5 July 1958.

In the volatile political atmosphere of the disengagement debates, this NATO decision to allow bilateral negotiations to station IRBMs in Europe included an offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate on disarmament. The Soviet delegation had walked out of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee negotiations on 4 November 1957, and the Western position remained one of demanding effective inspection and control. Any negotiations relating to Europe had to take into account the German Junktim as expressed in the Berlin Declaration of July 1957. Nevertheless, there was increased pressure to find a means of breaking the deadlock in negotiations on disarmament, especially in light of the increasingly unstable military relationship. Hence, the Second Rockefeller Report urged:[13]

> We must face the fact that a meaningful reduction of armaments must be preceded by a reduction in tensions and a settlement of outstanding issues that have divided the world since World War II. At the same time, concrete proposals to limit such wars as might be forced on us should be introduced into negotiations on reductions in force.

While one could anticipate that disarmament could only occur in the context of a general détente and a settlement of political issues, such as Germany, one could also distinguish between disarmament and arms control and pursue the latter independent of any progress in settling the other issues of the Cold War.

As before, attempts to shore up the deterrent had the effect of hardening the division of Europe. Moreover, any notion of stabilising the adversary military relationship had the effect of increasing tensions among the principal members of the alliance. From the official West German point of view, any considerations of limiting a war in Europe or controlling nuclear war in any fashion merely decreased the risks incurred by Moscow in an attack on Western Europe: deterrence was based on the presumption that war was no longer controllable and would inevitably escalate to a global nuclear exchange. Thus, as John Kennedy later discovered when he sought to reinforce the deterrent by increasing conventional forces capable of fighting a limited war and by placing greater controls over the employment of nuclear weapons, the effect was to cast further doubt on the reliability of the strategic deterrent. Yet Eisenhower, who eschewed that conventional emphasis largely for economic reasons, was compelled to bolster the strategic deterrent in the short run by dispersal and a concomitant decentralisation of control. The effect here was to hinder any willingness of the US to "go to the brink". Given these two perspectives, the demand for an alternative foundation to a "position of strength" increased in the wake of Sputnik and gained currency during the Berlin Crisis. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Alled Commander, Europe (SACEUR), went beyond Administration policy by advocating the establishment of a NATO nuclear force under SACEUR control.[14] Yet the doctrine of a "graduated deterrent", with an emphasis on diffused nuclear control sharing arrangements both in strategic and tactical weaponry, failed to resolve the dilemma. Any hope for negotiations on arms control rested on the condition of US control over nuclear weapons and the shared desire of the US, UK and USSR to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons: to the extent that control rested in US authority, however, the credibility of the US will to retaliate remained suspect.

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[12] See Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University, 1975), pp.130-31.

[13] Cited in Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, pp.370ff. Emphasis added.

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[14] See the discussion in Kelleher, op.cit., pp.128-30, and Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), pp.160-63. For Norstad's presentation to NATO of 8 October 1957, see Karl Bauer, Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik, 1947-1967: Dokumente und Kommentare (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1968), pp.36ff.

Ultimately, the interim measures to counter the perceived "deterrence gap" after Sputnik placed the West in an unenviable security position. Faced with a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin, Eisenhower declared in a press conference that he would not fight a ground war in Europe over Belin; yet, when questioned if he would therefore use nuclear weapons, he retorted that he doubted one could free anything with nuclear weapons: nuclear war was "self-defeating".[15] He was correct in avoiding the brink, because the NATO force structure was such that any conflict would almost surely have resulted in either surrender or nuclear war. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, in inspecting nuclear control arrangements in 1960, found, the words of one observer:[16]

> ...Fighter aircraft with nuclear bombs sitting on the edge of runways with German pilots inside the cockpits and starter plugs inserted. The embodiment of control was an American officer somewhere in the vicinity with a revolver.

Similarly, the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in Europe were vulnerable, unsuited for limited war, subject to complicated control procedures, and only added to what Albert Wohlstetter termed the "massive retaliation psychosis".[17] Improved command and control arrangements, the deployment of submarine-launched Polaris and silo-based Titan and Minuteman missiles, and the segregation of tactical nuclear weapons from front line conventional forces while increasing those conventional forces - these measures had to await the 1960s. Deployment of Thor and Jupiter was halted after 1959; in December 1960, Secretary of State Herter offered the allies a NATO Multilateral Force (MLF), based on mixed crews on Polaris submarines under SACEUR, with the possibility of later transfer of the warheads to NATO custody.

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[15] See New York Times, 12 March 1959. Acting Secretary of State Herter noted on 21 April that he could not conceive of the President initiating a nuclear war unless the US was itself threatened with devastation. Quoted in Dean Acheson, "The Practice of Partnership", Foreign Affairs (Vol.41 No.2, January 1963), pp.252-53.

[16] Discussed in John D. Steinbruner's case study of the MLF, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University, 1974), p.182.

These developments in the defence policy arena are significant in two respects. First, they indicate the military dilemma faced by the Eisenhower Administration and NATO in general in responding to Khrushchev's threats over Berlin, a dilemma that affected the diplomacy of the Western position and placed great strains on the alliance itself. In the long term, they shaped US attitudes about deterrence and arms control. As suggested earlier, there had already begun to develop a distinction between arms control and disarmament, with an increasing belief that the former both could and should be pursued independent of the political issues of the Cold War. To a large extent, Eisenhower himself had given evidence of this distinction in his pursuit of "partial disarmament measures" based on inspection procedures. Yet Eisenhower's approach seemed based in a belief that the existence of a nuclear retaliatory capability provided an automatic deterrent. Thus, as early as August 1956, the Secretary of the Air Force noted:[18]

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[17] See the critique in Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror", Foreign Affairs (Vol.37 No.2, January 1959), pp.211-34.

> Neither side can hope by a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery of atomic weapons to escape the catastrophe of such a war. Beyond a certain point, this prospect is not the result of relative strength of the two opposed forces. It is the absolute power in the hands of each, and the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction.

Contained within this early statement is the essential logic of mutual assured destruction developed in the 1960s.

The difference between this 1956 view and the arms control concepts of subsequent years is that, first, the invulnerability of that power could not always be assumed and, second, the absolute power had still to be sufficient to penetrate defences and fulfil one's military objectives. Moreover, these objectives were increasingly viewed not in terms of a minimum capability to destroy Soviet cities (a "finite deterrent") but in terms of a capability against Soviet military targets. As the Gaither Committee pointed out, and Wohlstetter and many others after him, one's strategic deterrent [illegible] not automatic: the vulnerability of one's weapons systems, coupled with the threat to destroy the adversary's cities while accepting the destruction of one's own, in fact undermined the deterrent and threatened to precipitate the very war one hoped to avoid. What was required was a stable deterrent, based on an invulnerable second strike capability which eliminated the temptation to strike first.

These ideas began to develop outside of the Eisenhower Administration with an urgency that derived from the tensions of the Berlin Crisis and Khrushchev's generally bellicose "Sputnik diplomacy". Despite the aura of intellectual simplicity that these ideas conveyed, they failed to resolve the problem of providing an extended deterrent to the alliance, much less cope with the lingering political desire in the US not to see American forces indefinitely committed to the defence of Europe. These issues were illustrated, for example, in an arms control seminar in the summer of 1960. In considering a hypothetical US-Soviet agreement to limit each to 200 missiles, Morton Halperin acknowledged that it would cause serious problems within the alliance:[19]

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[18] Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University, 1961), p.101. Emphasis added.

> The European members of NATO have become increasingly aware of the possibility that the American strategic deterrent will not prevent a limited attack in Europe... The United States might have to follow up this agreement by stationing larger forces on the European continent and substantially improving NATO's capacity to fight limited nuclear and conventional wars. The question would have to be faced as to whether this activity would destroy the Russian-American confidence necessary to maintain the arms control agreement.

Furthermore, the threat of nuclear proliferation was viewed as an inherent danger in such an agreement; a test ban agreement and an agreement on non-proliferation were thus prerequisites to any US-Soviet agreement setting ceilings on offensive missiles.[20]

These propositions developed largely as a response to the circumstances that existed between 1958 and 1960, and we shall return to them later in this discussion. Their significance lies not only as expressions of an arms control philosophy that dominated US notions of détente in the 1960s, but also as an indicator of how US and West German thinking about the nature of the strategic relationship began to diverge in the midst of crisis. In many respects, the prospect of change is the greatest threat to an alliance. More than anything else, the Junktim of 1957 was an attempt to preclude unilateral change in an ally's approach to the adversary relationship. But the perception of vulnerability following Sputnik, and the persistent Soviet demands for a summit to settle outstanding political issue, created a crisis atmosphere with which the West was not well equipped to deal. Moreover, any attempt to change that security relationship to a more acceptable and safer foundation became subject to charges of unilateral concessions to Soviet demands.

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[19] Morton Halperin, "Implications for Limited War", in American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), Summer Study on Arms Control, 1960: Collected Papers (Boston, 1961), pp.158ff. I am indebted to Mark Olsen, formerly of Keble College, Oxford, for bringing this source to my attention.

[20] See the discussions by Arthur Barber, Jay Orear, Dr Bernard T. Feld and Donald Brennan, in AAAS, op.cit., pp.160-61, 183 and 359.

In this sense, it is useful to recall that the Berlin Crisis erupted in November 1958 in the context of a continuing Soviet effort to entice the West into an agreement on disengagement which, at a minimum, would result in the recognition of the GDR and prevent the FRG from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the wake of Sputnik, there were significant elements of Western public opinion that demanded another summit to ease the increasing tension, a pressure reflected in the December 1957 NATO communiqué. The Soviet Union, which provided official pressure for a summit, refused to participate in a conference "at which the German question might be broached", while warning the West Germans directly of the adverse consequences of nuclear armament or accepting US missiles on German soil.[21] On 8 January 1958, Bulganin addressed a letter to 83 countries, advocating a wide ranging summit, with a nine point agenda which did not include German reunification.[22]

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[21] See Gromyko's speech to the UN and Bulganin's letter to Adenauer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 October 1957, and New York Times, 12 December 1957.

[22] RIIA, Documents, 1957, pp.51-62.

Public pressure for negotiations with the USSR were strongest Britain and the FRG. Prime Minister Macmillan complained of an "orgy of defeatism" in the British press:[23]

> I am said to have lost touch with public opinion in England, because I have not already set out for Moscow to see Khrushchev. All this is pure Chamberlainism. It is raining umbrellas.

Nonetheless, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower suggesting a joint proposal for European security based on a demilitarised zone such as that previously suggested in the Eden Plan of 1955 or the 1957 Rapacki Plan. Eisenhower did not appear supportive; moreover, Macmillan was given to believe that pressure for such a move would have an adverse effect in the US Congress, whose sympathy for Britain was necessary because of pending legislation to amend the McMahon Act to allow a greater sharing of information on nuclear energy and weapons technology. The US response to Bulganin, on 12 January, accepted a summit in principle, provided there was adequate preparation and evidence that agreement was possible: progress at the Foreign Minister level was a precondition in any case.[24]

Eisenhower was willing to negotiate on questions of partial disarmament measures, especially testing and control of nuclear stockpiles, but the prerequisite remained adequate inspection and control arrangements. True to the Berlin Declaration, topics such as European security or regional arms control arrangements evoked the West German veto. Adenauer's position was not as stable as his absolute majority suggested, hence his request that Bonn not be offered Thor or Jupiter missiles. Adenauer was careful not to renounce these publicly but to couch the official position in terms of accepting whatever weapons the NATO Council deemed necessary for Western defence.[25] In essence, Bonn clung to the notion that NATO was first a political alliance and secondly a military alliance: the allies, and the US, UK and France in particular, had an obligation to fulfil certain German national interests. In order to be able to remind the allies of this obligation, Bonn had to maintain its own obligations in the alliance.[26]

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[23] See Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, p.341, for this diary entry of 21 December 1957.

[24] See *ibid.*, pp.461-65. Macmillan and Bulganin had been engaged in a bilateral exchange of letters for several months in which Macmillan supported Eisenhower's position. See RIIA, *Documents, 1957*, pp.2-66, and *Documents, 1958*, pp.1-6.

Bonn's fear, as we saw earlier, was that pressures to negotiate with the USSR in conditions other than clear Western advantage, would lead to a resolution of the "German Problem" based on the status quo of a divided Germany. Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier demanded that reunification be included in any summit agenda, warning that while European security could not be debated "without mentioning Germany", it could be debated "without mentioning German reunification".[27] Proposals for a nuclear free zone in Europe coincided with a vociferous foreign policy debate in the FRG on arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. Both the SPD and the FDP charged the Government with having ignored past "lost opportunities", such as the March 1952 Soviet proposal, and demanded that the FRG take a disarmament initiative by accepting the Rapacki Plan as a "basis for negotiations".[28] The lament over "lost opportunities" was indicative of the overall frustration of the opposition position. It could neither block Government policy nor offer any real alternative except the unattainable goal of Four Power guarantees for a reunited Germany. Neutralisation of Germany, an arms control agreement which discriminated against Germany, and a disengagement of the US security guarantee were all unacceptable prices for reunification.

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[25] See Adenauer's comments after the December 1957 NATO Ministerial, quoted in New York Herald Tribune, 20 December 1957. Also the 25 March 1958 Bundestag resolution, in Bulletin, 1 April 1958.

[26] See the Bundestag resolution of 1 October 1958, in Auswärtiges Amt, Die Bemühungen der deutschen Regierung und ihrer Verbündeten um die Einheit Deutschlands, 1955-1966 (Bonn, April 1966), pp.282-83.

[27] See Bulletin, 18 February 1958.

Adenauer's response to those pressures was to focus on the panacea of general controlled disarmament. From his point of view, it was the only position that allowed him to endorse East-West talks while avoiding negotiations on regional security issues that could either fail with detrimental political effects or succeed in recognising the status quo. In effect, this appeared to evolve into a temporary reversal of the 1957 Berlin Junktim. Thus, the 25 May Bundestag resolution on nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr noted that the FRG must be "equipped with the most modern weapons" to fulfil NATO obligations "until a general disarmament agreement is reached". Moreover, it endorsed general controlled disarmament as a means of relaxing tensions to permit reunification.[29] When Adenauer and Macmillan met in April 1958, they likewise agreed that controlled disarmament "would do more than anything else to facilitate progress on other subjects of dispute...".[30] After the May NATO Ministerial in

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[28] For excerpts from speeches by Erich Ollenhauer, Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler, Gustav Heinemann, Erich Mende, Reinhold Maier and Thomas Dehler in the Bundestag, see Bulletin, 4 February 1958.

[29] See Bulletin, 1 April 1958; also New York Times, 26 March 1958.

[30] Bulletin, 19 April 1958.

Copenhagen, which did not make Germany a necessary agenda item for a future summit, Bonn's Press Chief Felix von Eckardt explained:[31]

> The Federal Government believes that the German Problem, i.e. the question of reunification, would *automatically* become a subject of discussion at a summit conference dealing with disarmament and political relaxation - *even if the German question were not formally on the agenda*.

And in June, after von Brentano met with Eisenhower and Dulles in Washington, their communiqué expressed the belief that the German issue could not be "isolated or pushed aside":[32]

> We agreed that determination of the agenda must not be permitted to include the *negative stipulation of excluding the German question*, but that the agenda must permit the treatment of all political problems.

In short, despite Bonn's veto, Adenauer could not afford to block East-West negotiations but instead exercised his influence to preserve the West German position by directing the prospective negotiations to issues upon which agreement was not expected.[33]

Adenauer's position was helped by the initiation of techni exchanges among the nuclear powers on testing in May 1958. Moreover Bulganin had resigned in March, and Khrushchev, supreme in the Kremlin, began to give evidence of his concern about the increasing independence of the PRC and the French over questions of nuclear control.[34] On 31 March, the USSR ceased nuclear testing, and Eisenhower followed with a one year moratorium on 31 August. By the summer, the *Kampf der Atomtod* in the FRG had largely subsided, and the East-West exchange of notes on a summit had ended. Adenauer, who had welcomed *Sputnik* "almost as a gift from Heaven, for otherwise the free world would have sunk even further into its twilight sleep",[35] had survived the pressures for conventional and nuclear disengagement that dominated the search for a détente in this period free of East-West crises in Europe.

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[31] *Bulletin*, 13 May 1958. Emphasis added.

[32] *Bulletin*, 24 June 1958. Emphasis added.

[33] See, for example, Adenauer's comments to Macmillan in London in April 1958, in Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, p.485.

[34] See Khrushchev's letter to Macmillan and Eisenhower on 4 April 1958, in RIIA, *Documents, 1958*, pp.8-10. The beginning of a serious rift in Sino-Soviet relations can be marked from this period, in which nuclear control issues played a significant role. In May, Mao announced his Great Leap Forward, later viewed as a first step toward self-reliance.

In an interview in May 1958, Adenauer noted that German reunification would be a "long drawn out process that cannot be brought about until there is a general relaxation of tensions in the world and controlled disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons".[36] Reunification remained a Four Power responsibility; Adenauer differed from his opposition in that he discounted any intra-German efforts to facilitate reunification. Adenauer indicated to Moscow that he was willing to forgo reunification for the time being by agreeing to an "Austrian solution", but one which only applied to East Germany.[37] Likewise, despite pressure to open diplomatic relations with Poland in 1958, Adenauer refused to recognise the Oder-Neisse line or to violate the Hallstein Doctrine in that case. The key issue was East Germany: on virtually every issue, progress toward any kind of détente entailed recognition of the Pankow regime. That was unacceptable in the view of virtually all of the political elements in the FRG. It was on this point that Khrushchev launched his next challenge in Berlin.

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[35] Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1955-1959* (Stuttgart: Deutsche, 1967), p.319.

[36] *New York Times*, 21 May 1958.

[37] See Richard Löwenthal, "Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik", in Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *Die zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine Bilanz* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1979), pp.641-43. Also Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1955-1959*, pp.376-80.

CHAPTER 10

The Consensus Weakens: The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960

As it evolved after 1962, the pursuit of a limited East-West détente was possible because it did not entail direct negotiation on the intractably linked issues of German reunification and European security but focused on measures to stabilise the strategic military relationship. It was a détente based on the status quo without expressly recognising that status quo. A broader, European-based, alliance détente strategy could not be pursued until the Brandt Ostpolitik after 1969 opened up negotiations that accepted that status quo as a basis for ultimately altering it. With the Berlin Crisis, however, Khrushchev demanded negotiations on Berlin under the pressure of a six month ultimatum, by which time he threatened to terminate Four Power control over Berlin and turn all responsibility for Berlin and access thereto over to the GDR, unless the West agreed to end [illegible] occupation and make West Berlin a "free city".[1] The Western response, beyond a protest that the USSR could not unilaterally abrogate its responsibilities in Berlin, was to propose that negotiations be broadened to include the entire "German Problem", including reunification. Khrushchev, in turn, refused to discuss reunification, arguing that that was a matter for the Germans themselves. At the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, 11 May - 4 August 1959, which included the Four Powers plus delegations from East and West Germany in the same conference hall,[2] Western proposals to defuse the conflict and register some progress towards German reunification were rejected; the West, meanwhile, had succeeded in removing the ultimatum and reaffirming the legality of its presence in West Berlin. Still, the potential for Soviet manipulation of tensions over Berlin remained, as Khrushchev demonstrated when the Berlin Crisis entered a second phase after Kennedy became President.

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[1] The ultimatum was in a 27 November note to the US, UK and France; see RIIA, Documents, 1958, pp.146-164. On 10 November, in a speech in Moscow, Khrushchev had threatened to turn over to the GDR functions exercised by Soviet agencies. This followed an effort beginning on 5 September to initiate negotiations on a peace treaty, beginning with a joint FRG-GDR commission, pp.137-46.

One analyst has aptly summarised the essence of the Western response to this first phase of the Berlin Crisis as follows: "The original menace had forced a sortie from the status quo, but the West had achieved a victorious retreat."[3] As long as the crisis persisted, the pressures to make concessions on Germany and Berlin increased; as long as reunification remained non-negotiable, the best that could be hoped for was a successful defence of the status quo. With regard to the legal position of Berlin, the status quo had to be defended, at least insofar as it affected allied rights in and access to West Berlin. This was true from both the allied and West German points of view, since a weakening of Four Power control implied also a weakened Four Power obligation to German reunification. Yet the short term defence of the status quo in Berlin implied, particularly outside Germany, the acceptance of the division of Germany in the long term. Moreover, any efforts to develop a negotiating position which gained Soviet acceptance of the status quo in Berlin entailed concessions on the broader German question. Thus, the real danger, as far as West

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[2] This itself was a source of considerable debate. In the end, each German delegation had a separate table. The FRG delegation in the hall was headed by Wilhelm Grewe, so Foreign Minister von Brentano would not be in the same room as the East Germans. Grewe, Rückblenden, 1976-1951 (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), p.400.

[3] Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin, 1945-1962 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), p.21f.

German interests were concerned, lay in the protracted nature of the crisis, with the concomitant allied wrangling over acceptable negotiating positions.

The inclination to negotiate over Berlin rested largely in Britain and, to a lesser extent, the US. De Gaulle maintained throughout the crisis that Khrushchev was unwilling to risk war over Berlin and would not take steps to jeopardise Western rights if the West remained firm. In this de Gaulle supported Adenauer, and both began to develop the close ties that were to lead to charges of a new Franco-German "axis" in opposition to what de Gaulle continued to refer to as the "Anglo-Saxons".[4] This evolving constellation had its effect on Macmillan, who sent this note to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd the day after Khrushchev's 27 November 1958 ultimatum:[5]

> The Berlin issue is, in fact, an ultimatum with six months to run. We shall not be able to avoid negotiation...
>
> Tests and Surprise Attack. These negotiations seem likely to drag on more or less indefinitely. If we can get American consent to abandon the link altogether we may make some advances from the propaganda point of view...
>
> European Free Trade... It is clear that the Germans have really sold out to the French on every count...
>
> We must think of all these problems together, for that is what the British people will do...

Indeed, Macmillan faced a General Election in October 1959 in a political climate sympathetic to disengagement, disarmament and greater trade with the USSR, while generally unsympathetic to the prospect of German reunification and certainly unwilling to go to war over the "legalities" of Berlin.[6]

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[4] See de Gaulle's first press conference of 25 March 1959, in New York Herald Tribune, 26 March 1959.

[5] Macmillan, Volume V, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp.47-48. Emphasis added.

Against this background, Macmillan went to Moscow in February 1959, not, as he assured Adenauer, to negotiate on his own, but "to discover something of what is in the minds of the Soviet leaders":[7]

> If our public opinion is to be kept resolute... then we must demonstrate our readiness to talk to the Russians and convey the reasonableness of our approach to them.

Macmillan was apparently successful in that Khrushchev's note of 2 March to the US, UK and France seemed to accept Western demands for a Foreign Ministers' Conference at least as a prelude to a summit meeting, which in turn was interpreted as having superseded the six months ultimatum. This was certainly the construction placed on it by Macmillan who subsequently visited Paris, Bonn and Washington to push for a Foreign Ministers' Conference as "a preliminary and not a substitute for a summit".[8]

This, however, was further than Eisenhower was willing to go. Neither he nor Dulles were anxious for a summit meeting without the prospect of substantive agreement. Both preferred to use Khrushchev's desire for a summit as a lever to induce Soviet retreat from its challenge in Berlin. As Eisenhower told Macmillan:[9]

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[6] See Macmillan's letter to Eisenhower of 23 June 1969, Pointing the Way, pp.73ff.

[7] Macmillan's message to Adenauer, 2 February 1959, in Macmillan, Volume IV: Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp.585-86. See pp.592-622 for details of the trip, which included a public attack on the West and Adenauer in particular by Khrushchev while Macmillan visited outside Moscow. Adenauer criticised the trip as an "election stunt". See Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche, 1967), p.467. For Eisenhower's belief that Macmillan was "somewhat firmer" after the trip, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace (London: Heinemann, 1966), p.353.

[8] See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp.623-36.

[9] Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.402.

> If I surrendered on this point I would no longer have any influence with Khrushchev, who would, therefore, consider me a "pushover". Indeed, I would myself interpret such an agreement as an exhibition of weakness.

Thus, when the formal proposal of a Foreign Ministers' Conference was made to the Soviet Union on 26 March, it came in the form of three non-identical notes. With regard to a subsequent summit, the US said it would be "ready... if developments... justify"; the UK noted more simply that it would be "glad... to attend"; the French "would be disposed" to a summit if the situation "permits envisagement of genuine progress".[10]

The difficulty in reaching allied agreement on the issue of a summit conference was an indication of the underlying problem that plagued the alliance: the inability to decide on what they were specifically to negotiate. The March proposal for a Foreign Ministers' Conference was sent the day after Dulles' death. Macmillan's reported comment to an American in London is telling:[11]

> Very difficult negotiations lie ahead of us in the next few years. *It is going to be necessary for the West to give some ground.* Every inch we give will look like a concession. If we had [Dulles] with us, everyone would know it was not. No one would be alarmed.

All allies agreed that a unilateral renunciation of Soviet responsibilities in Berlin was unacceptable, that allied rights in Berlin and access thereto would be defended (how was a different issue), and that what was necessary was a solution to the broader question of German unification rather than an isolated agreement on

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[10] See the editorial in the *Washington Evening Star*, 27 March 1959.

[11] Quoted in Robert Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, *Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), p.240. Emphasis added.

Berlin under pressure of a Soviet ultimatum.[12] The immediate Western problem was to devise a contingency plan in the event of a blockade or if allied traffic to Berlin were met with East German rather than Soviet officials. Here Dulles had intimated, in a press conference on 26 November 1958, a form of flexibility then being suggested by officials in both the US State Department and the British Foreign Office: "We might, yet," he said, deal with East German officials as "agents" of the USSR, thereby defusing the crisis while avoiding legal recognition of the East German regime and its right to control allied traffic.[13]

Dulles subsequently assured the new West German ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Grewe, that this did not represent a new flexibility in the US position. In fact, there was considerable precedent for such a step, not only in the control of routine intra-German traffic but also in relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and Communist China. Both in a December NSC meeting and a later January joint State-Defense Department meeting, Eisenhower rejected the "agent theory" because it would "simply start us down a slippery slope towards East German control of everything".[14] The contingency plan adopted at the January meeting included a compromise whereby East German officials could inspect passes but not be allowed to stamp them.

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[12] This was the essence of the NATO position taken at the 14 December 1958 Paris conference. See *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975), pp.123-24.

[13] For the text of the press conference, see *New York Times*, 27 November 1958. Note that the issue did not involve civilian traffic but official allied traffic to Berlin.

[14] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp.337-40.

Ultimately, the "agent theory" was never tested or even officially offered to the USSR, which probably would have rejected it; moreover, it was accepted by the West German government during a lull in the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, partly to preempt other allied concessions:[15]

> The West has made it quite plain that it must refuse "back door recognition" by putting its signatures to a document signed also by a government not elected by popular suffrage... If on the other hand, it should be decided to accept the "agents theory"... no political principle would be involved... The point is that in case of disputes at the demarcation line, the ultimate decision must remain with the Soviet authorities.

The significance of this question lay in its broader effects, on governments and populations alike. In the search for ways out of the Berlin impasse, the press was filled with editorial and political commentary on a variety of schemes to resolve the crisis, all of which had a divisive effect.

The common element of these public proposals was a recognit that the West had to regain the initiative. Lippmann wrote of the need to accept the "facts of life" in Germany:[16]

> There are now two Germanies and two Berlins, and only over a long period of time and in the climate of national freedom after the foreign troops have departed, can the two Germanies become integrated again.

Accordingly, the only way out of the legal impasse was to propose negotiations between the two Germanies. Significantly, the argument for recognition of East Germany was not in order to bring about an immediate reunification of Germany but was based, first, on a recognition that the two Germanies had grown so far apart that it would take generations to integrate them again, and, second, on a belief that partition was not acceptable to the German people:[17]

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[15] Bulletin, 9 June 1959. Emphasis added.

[16] See Lippmann's columns in the New York Herald Tribune, 4 December 1958, and the Washington Post and Times Herald, 16 and 18 December 1958.

> ...some day and somehow the West Germans will come to terms with Eastern Germany and the Soviet Union in order to reunite their country... If we could bring the two German states into a legal relationship with each other, there would be a chance that the movement toward German unity, which is certain to grow, would be open and visible rather than clandestine and conspiratorial.

To act upon these "realities", however, was to impose a solution on the West Germans before the West Germans were prepared to accept it. In retrospect, it anticipated the slow evolution of opinion in the FRG, especially after the Berlin Wall, for ways to "overcome" the division of Germany through contacts between the two Germanies, but it was premature. When, on 10 August 1960, the West German philosopher Karl Jasper proposed in a television interview that the FRG should stop focusing on institutional German unity but look for ways of improving the quality of life in East Germany, the suggestion was rejected by all three principal political parties.[18]

Lippmann was not by any means alone in posing alternatives to a "hold firm and wait" policy. Senate Deputy Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright both suggested forms of disengagement or "relocation of forces" as a possible quid pro quo over Soviet acceptance of a stable situation in Berlin, based either on continued Four Power occupation or, like Lippmann, on UN control of the city. Similarly, former French Premier Mendes-France proposed graduated zones of controlled disarmament, supporting Macmillan's private encouragement to

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[17] See Lippmann's four-part series, "The Two Germanies and Berlin", in the New York Herald Tribune, 6-9 April 1959. Here, 9 April; emphasis added.

[18] See J.K. Sowden, The German Question, 1945-1973: Continuity in Change (London: Bradford University, 1975), p.196.

Eisenhower to consider the earlier Eden and Rapacki proposals.[19] George Kennan developed further his proposals on disengagement, suggesting that the prospect of twelve West German divisions (when the Bundeswehr reached full strength) plus future American ICBM and SLBM developments allowed both allied conventional disengagement from West Germany and consideration of the Rapacki Plan, in exchange for a Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe.[20]

Kennan is worth examining here because of the apparent shift in his position from the decade before. In responding to Acheson's earlier critique of the Reith Lectures,[21] he suggested that containment and disengagement had always been linked by implication, because Western strength had been designed to facilitate compromise, "not the crushing of Soviet power by the force of our actions... but compromise on terms more favorable to ourselves than the conditions of that day would have permitted".[22] In 1959, it was, ironically, Kennan who voiced the same warning that Lippmann had made to him twelve years earlier:[23]

> The rosy prospects which Mr. Acheson and others discern at the end of the present road of Western policy seem to rest in general on the possibility for an extensive breakdown of Soviet power... The probability of any such development is surely far too slight to warrant its entering seriously into the calculations of Western policy.

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[19] See New York Times, 5 January, 17 March and 3 April 1959.

[20] See George F. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited", Foreign Affairs (Vol.37 No.2, January 1959), pp.187-210. Also Kennan's testimony before Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament, reprinted in New York Times, 5 February 1959.

[21] See Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement", Foreign Affairs (Vol.36 No.3, April 1958), pp.371-82.

[22] Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited", p.207.

[23] Ibid., pp.207-08.

The conclusion that Kennan drew, therefore, was an argument for a strategy of détente, not based on an Achesonian "policy of strength" essentially unchanged since the drafting of NSC 68, but one based on:[24]

> ...utmost liberality, scope, and flexibility, involving a real readiness to compromise where compromise is permissible and to accept the lesser risks for the sake of avoiding the major risks.

Included in those "major risks", moreover, was the potential that West Germany could *theoretically* trade its membership in NATO and its more exclusive association with "little Europe" (meaning continental Western Europe) for unification and a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany.[25] Kennan hastened to add that this might even be constructive, but it would nonetheless be a profound shock to a Western community committed to the consolidation of Western strength as a means of dealing with the Soviet Union.

To the West Germans, these debates in the West were distinctly disturbing. On 18 March 1959, the SPD approved its own *Deutschlandplan*, "Military Détente and Security in Europe", incorporating many of the proposals for conventional and nuclear disengagement in Europe with the requirement for German reunification through free elections, although these elections were not to be the first step in what was to be a phased process.[26] Fritz Erler and Carlo Schmid travelled to Moscow to meet with Khrushchev and returned empty-handed:[27]

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[24] Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited", p.210.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp.203-05.

[26] For the text of the plan, published on 27 March, see Bauer, *op.cit.*, pp.176-77. Bonn rejected the plan immediately.

[27] Erler and Schmid's report to the Bundestag, in *Bulletin*, 24 March 1959.

> Reunification, we were told, is a matter that concerns the Germans - that is, the two "German States" - and by no means a matter of free elections; we were asked to understand that there is just now no probability of such elections and that the Federal Government and the "Government" of the "German Democratic Republic" would have to agree on what further steps are to be taken for achieving reunification.

In short, Moscow would not countenance any form of reunification, only a "confederation" of the two German states in which the GDR would receive legal recognition. Recognition of this by the SPD effectively put an end to whatever viability disengagement had possessed as a potential negotiating position for the West. Within the SPD, Willy Brandt, mayor of Berlin, became the dominant figure; accordingly, there was a dramatic shift in SPD policy, evident in the decisions of the 13-15 November 1959 Bad Godesberg conference but which had been building for several years: "the SPD advocates not only the defence of a free democratic order but also declares its positive attitude towards national defence as such".[28] Seven months later, SPD Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner declared in the Bundestag, "the policy of European alliances and NATO are the foundations and framework reunification policies".[29] Thus began an era, born of the Berlin crisis, of ostensible bipartisanship in West German foreign policy, in which the SPD often appeared more committed to the Atlantic Alliance than did certain elements of the CDU.

The shift in the SPD was, on the one hand, a product of a longer process of change within the party and the emergence of people like Brandt, Wehner and Helmut Schmidt who felt that past opposition to national defence in an alliance context was both unrealistic and a political liability. It was undoubtedly influenced by the Western response to the Berlin Crisis and Adenauer's growing inflexibility, which threatened to leave West Germany diplomatically isolated. Dulles, in a press conference on 13 January 1959, made the technically correct observation that free elections were "not the only method of reunifying Germany". Ollenhauer subsequently noted that US policy appeared to be changing, despite Adenauer's anxious claims to the contrary.[30] After Dulles' last trip to Western Europe and before Macmillan's foray to Moscow, Brandt travelled to the US and pleaded for allied unity in the face of crisis and in the defence of Berlin.

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[28] Bulletin, 17 November 1959. See also William E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (London: Saxon House, 1974), pp.141ff.

[29] Bulletin, 5 July 1960. Wehner further noted that the SPD's Deutschlandplan had been "outdated by developments".

There was a subtle difference between Brandt's firmness over the defence of Berlin and Adenauer and de Gaulle's intransigence in the face of imminent East-West negotiations. In Brandt's speech at the sesquicentennial of Abraham Lincoln's birth, he noted:[31]

> I am therefore aware of the fact that neither an isolated nor a sudden solution is possible and that we must hope for *gradual changes*, for step-by-step solutions are the *result of persistent negotiations*. In this sense, I am by all means in favour of flexibility and against making ourselves prisoners of rigid formulas. But... essential principles must remain unchanged.

It remained unclear, in the face of Khrushchev's Berlin challenge, how one registered this flexibility yet maintained essential principles. Equally significant, Brandt's reception in the US was especially positive, beginning a process of enhancing the image of the SPD. This effect was particularly pronounced after Kennedy's election in November 1960. More immediately, Brandt's statements reflected a growing search for flexibility in dealing with the "German Problem" that did not jeopardise "essential principles", did not involve a decoupling of the FRG from the NATO alliance structure, and, most of all, did not lead to German isolation by demanding incredible threats of war over legal technicalities.

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[30] See *New York Times*, 14 and 15 January 1959, and *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 15 January 1959.

[31] See Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen mit Kennedy* (Munich: Kindler, 1964), p.39.

In this respect, Brandt's position was compatible with a growing bipartisan consensus in the US that recognised that firmness required credibility. Particularly in the Democratic Party, sentiment had been growing for an increase in conventional forces capable of making a firm stand in Berlin defensible. Paul Nitze, the primary author of NSC 68 and, in 1959, an advisor to Senator John Kennedy, articulated in public what State Department officials were saying in private in allied four power working level discussions:[32]

> If the provocation is, as it appears to the world as being, merely technical, or legalistic, we would hardly be justified in adopting forceful and highly dangerous courses of action. If the provocation is an acute and not merely a technical observation to Western military traffic moving to Berlin, more serious measures would be justified.
>
> ...I am inclined to agree with Senator Mansfield that talks between East and West Germany do not need to involve recognition. I would like to see what such talks would come up with.

Privately, Dulles urged a similar flexibility on Adenauer, suggesting a "de facto association" with East Germany through which Western influence could be felt.[33] Nonetheless, the US could only nudge in private.

This discussion has so far emphasised the perspectives of the Western actors who began working group deliberations on 5 February in the attempt to find a common negotiating position that would take the immediate pressure off Berlin and broaden the negotiations to include the wider issues of Germany and European security. These perspectives are arguably more significant than the result of the negotiations, because the diplomatic interaction between East and West throughout the Berlin Crisis bore no substantive fruit: the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference adjourned in what was described as "amicable intransigence"; Khrushchev's pressures for a summit, coupled with his apparent unwillingness to carry through his threats, succeeded only in creating Western resolve so that he felt it more useful to exploit the U-2 incident and abort that summit in May 1960.

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[32] In a speech in Milwaukee, 21 February 1959, reproduced in the Congressional Record, 26 March 1959. For virtually an identical formulation, see Macmillan's letter to Eisenhower of 23 June 1959, in Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.73.

[33] Drummond and Coblentz, op.cit., pp.215ff.

The terms of reference for the working group were to develop a position that demonstrated a Western willingness to negotiate, not least to meet public pressure to do so, with the recognition that the USSR was unlikely to accept what was offered.[34] The *Junktim* had to be maintained; there was, however, a consensus among the British, Americans, and even among the West Germans at the working level that the position should do more than simply reiterate a demand for reunification. How much flexibility remained a question where the French sided consistently with Adenauer and von Brentano. De Gaulle had previously objected to the American offer to negotiate on "Germany in all its aspects" at a Foreign Ministers' Conference, advocating instead an explicit reference to German reunification.[35] As he told Macmillan in March, reunification could only be achieved through a war which neither Britain nor France were willing to fight, "but the

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[34] Grewe, *op.cit.*, pp.395 and 401. See also Dulles' comments to Hans Joachim von Merkatz, a member of Adenauer's cabinet, in December 1958, in Drummond and Coblentz, *op.cit.*, pp.206-07, confirmed in private interview with Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand, who functioned as *rapporteur* in these deliberations.

[35] See *New York Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1959

'idea' of reunification should be kept alive in order to give some comfort to the German people".[36] Thus French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville accepted positions which were designed to regulate access to Berlin under Four Power control but rejected a draft peace treaty proposed by the US on 27 February.[37]

The Herter Plan proposed at Geneva on 14 May was designed to do virtually everything but recognise the GDR. Reunification was to be a phased process, linked with regional arms control measures, and preceded by an interim solution on Berlin which envisaged UN-supervised free elections to unite the city under Four Power control. An electoral law and draft constitution for a united Germany were to be drawn up by a mixed commission of West and East Germans (in a ratio of 25:10, with a 75% majority needed for any decision), rather than by the Four Powers, although a time limit was added to ensure that this did not lapse into a de facto confederation arrangement.[38] The plan emanated from the State Department, but had apparently benefitted from the unofficial work of some in Bonn's Foreign Office. Von Brentano and Adenauer were both reluctant to accept the plan, Adenauer especially so, although Grewe questions whether Adenauer had actually read the proposal before complaining about lack of consultation.[39]

Adenauer feared that a willingness to make any concessions at all would lead only to more unilateral concessions. Thus, he was even more disturbed by the 16 June Western "position paper" which reflected a willingness to reduce Western garrisons in Berlin "as soon as the situation permitted", assented to East German personnel exercising control functions in access to Berlin as long as the USSR guaranteed that access, agreed to a nuclear free zone in Berlin, and accepted curbs on propaganda activities in Berlin that included reference to a guarantee of "fundamental rights and liberties" of all Berliners. Bonn then drew the line:[40]

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[36] Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p.637.

[37] Grewe, op.cit., p.398.

[38] For the full four-phase, 32-point plan, see RIIA, Documents, 1959, pp.34-39; also the Congressional Record of 15 May 1959.

[39] See Grewe, op.cit., pp.396-401.

> With these concessions the West had reached the limits of what seemed feasible short of trespassing upon West Berlin's fundamental democratic rights.

Although Bonn insisted this was an indivisible package, Moscow endeavoured to negotiate on them in piecemeal fashion, focusing on the mixed German commission on a parity basis and measures regulating the status of Berlin. Before the conference re-convened to no avail on 13 July, Bonn declared hopefully:[41]

> Before the interval, the conference had no doubt come precariously close to treating the Berlin problem in isolation; now, however, the problem's close relations to all other issues will be re-established.

In this, there was solid bipartisan support in the FRG, since Brandt, who had accepted the emphasis on increased intra-German contacts, had been especially vocal in warning against an interim solution on Berlin that left Berlin's future status under Four Power control in doubt.

The final session of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference was anti-climactic. Herter proposed a permanent East-West conference on Germany while Khrushchev declared, on 17 July, that the Elbe River was an "inviolable and sacred" ideological boundary.[42] Attention turned to Khrushchev's visit to the US in September. According to Eisenhower, he had extended a qualified invitation to Khrushchev during the Geneva recess, based on "at the very least an assurance that Western rights would be maintained in Berlin until changed by Four Power agreement"; however, the invitation was received without qualification.[43] At Adenauer's request, Eisenhower included a short visit to Bonn as the first step in what was originally to be consultations in London and Paris prior to Khrushchev's visit. Eisenhower took the occasion to encourage Adenauer to consider improved intra-German contacts, but was "disappointed".[44]

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[40] Bulletin, 23 June 1959.

[41] Bulletin, 14 July 1959.

Adenauer sought Eisenhower's visit as a mark of reassurance that Bonn was not as isolated diplomatically within the alliance as many observers were saying at the time. Indeed, Bonn's statement on the visit implies both a warning to this effect and an air of protesting too much:[45]

> It does not take a visit from President Eisenhower to allay any possible fears that the US Government might be prepared to purchase a release of international tension by political jobbery to the disadvantage of their allies and above all to the detriment of the Federal Republic.

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[42] See *Bulletin*, 4 August 1959. This remark provided Adenauer's explicit reason for rejecting Foreign Office proposals of a non-aggression treaty with Poland and Czechoslovakia as a means of easing tension and regaining initiative. On the split in the Foreign Office, see *New York Times*, 8 September 1959 and *Baltimore Sun*, 21 October 1959. Also Grewe, *op.cit.*, p.400, and Arnulf Baring, *Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer, 1949-1964* (Munich: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974), pp.252-53.

[43] See Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp.405ff.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp.414 and 418.

[45] *Bulletin*, 11 August 1959. Virtually every FRG statement talked of the "complete harmony" of US and FRG interests and views.

Not only was Adenauer concerned about diplomatic isolation over Berlin; he was also worried about de Gaulle's moves to remove French forces, specifically the Mediterranean fleet, from the NATO integrated command structure, and, more generally, to block the broader integration of NATO defences (including nuclear integration).[46] In this, his feelings were shared across the political spectrum, although the conclusions were not always the same. Adenauer increased his efforts to build ties with de Gaulle to keep de Gaulle in the alliance, just as de Gaulle sought to increase the links to Bonn as a means of keeping the FRG from seeking alternative arrangements with the East.[47] The SPD, however, had altered its view of the Western alliance in part because a broader Atlantic integration based on a US nuclear guarantee was preferable to reliance on de Gaulle (and a European nuclear deterrent).

These differing views on how to preserve the integration of the West dominated the West German debate in the 1960s, but their roots are evident here. Their common element was the need to maintain the alliance: there was no "Eastern option", although there were many in the West who began to resurrect such fears. The more immediate response was to define a position for the forthcoming meeting at Camp David and, subsequently, for the Four Power summit that was supposed to follow in May 1960 after Khrushchev agreed to remove the time limit ultimatum on Berlin.[48] In essence, Adenauer's position was to avoid discussion on either the question of Berlin or even of Germany, to talk about the latter only raised the threat of the Herter package being disentangled. Thus, Bonn's press spokesman announced in October:[49]

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[46] See New York Herald Tribune, 26 March 1959, New York Times, 21 August and 30 November 1959, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, editorial, 2 April 1959.

[47] See de Gaulle's comment to Macmillan during the December 1959 "Western Summit", in Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.110.

[48] For Khrushchev's statement after his return from Camp David, see the Baltimore Sun, 30 September 1959.

> Adenauer believes that the question of disarmament should rank first among the topics to be discussed at all East-West conferences... The Soviets will insist on talking about Berlin as well, and that such talks cannot be refused.

A week prior, however, Adenauer had also declared that the FRG would not accept any disarmament controls that did not apply to all of Europe.[50] While the SPD still hoped to see a German initiative on nuclear disarmament,[51] Adenauer was still manipulating the Junktim to restrict the area of East-West negotiation.

Under the circumstances, Adenauer's persistence in blocking negotiations on Germany and Berlin and his general fear of a détente were not incompatible with the political tenor at the time. The general perception was that the West was not strong enough to eme from any serious East-West negotiations with anything resemblin favourable ouctome.[52] After the "Western Summit" in December 1959, in which Adenauer refused any German participation in the forthcoming East-West summit, Die Welt remarked:[53]

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[49] Bulletin, 27 October 1959, emphasis added. See also Bonn's statement after Eisenhower's visit, Welt am Sonntag, 30 August 1959, and the Government declaration in the 5 November 1959 and 10 February 1960 Bundestag foreign policy debates in Bulletin, 10 November 1959 and 16 February 1960. See also von Brentano's letter to Adenauer, 30 October 1959, in Baring, op.cit., p.283.

[50] On 13 October to the Foreign Press Association, in Bulletin, 20 October 1959, and Baltimore Sun, 14 October 1959.

[51] See Ollenhauer's radio speech of 12 May 1960, in Bulletin, 17 May 1960.

[52] See, for example, the February 1960 public opinion polls cited in Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p.616, footnote 16.

> What some Western statesmen have often indicated in the past - namely that the endeavour to achieve a relaxation of tensions requires years of discussion with the Soviets - has now become official Western policy.

In January and February 1960, Adenauer and von Brentano reiterated their view that the Herter Plan of May 1959 (not the subsequent "position paper") was the proper position from which future negotiations were to start.[54] Likewise Brandt, in the US again in May, argued that, since there could be no isolated Berlin solution, no agreement was better than a bad one.[55] Eisenhower, who, according to Macmillan, had indicated that a Berlin settlement might be possible in exchange for a guarantee of Germany's frontiers, could not make such a proposal.[56] After Adenauer's visit to Washington in March 1960, the US seemed resigned to a summit without prospect of result, but for which it had neither any great need nor desire. If Berlin were to be discussed, it would only be on the basis of "interim arrangements to reduce tensions", but German reunification and a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe were necessary to liquidate the anomalies left from World War II.[57] While Eisenhower and Macmillan still hoped to reach an agreement on nuclear testing, there was considerable Congressional opposition to such an accord; indeed, many in the US were urging a resumption of testing, a pressure which subsequently grew as Khrushchev became increasingly bellicose in his polemic.

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[53] Die Welt, 22 December 1959.

[54] Adenauer's speech in Berlin of 11 January and von Brentano's speech in the Bundestag on 10 February, in Bulletin, 12 January and 16 February 1960. See Grewe, op.cit., pp.434-36, for Working Group deliberations on the same premises.

[55] On "Meet the Press", 15 May 1960; see also New York Herald Tribune, 13 December 1959.

[56] Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.191.

[57] See Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon's speeches, in Department of State Bulletin, 25 April and 9 May. Regarding this increasing firmness of US policy, see Windsor, City on Leave, pp.216-17.

The Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference was the last formal Four Power meeting to consider the issue of German reunification. It had produced no result, despite the continual prognoses that the West would have to yield on this contentious issue. One could argue that Khrushchev had bluffed because he did not possess the strategic military capability with which he was credited. Likewise, one could argue that the inherent instability of the strategic relationship - the belief that any conflict could not be contained - was in itself a deterrent. Whatever the case, Khrushchev advised Pankow on his return from Paris that a separate peace treaty was not appropriate at that time; it would be "necessary to preserve the existing situation" until another summit with a new American President.[58]

In late 1960, both Bonn and Washington found themse increasingly concerned not with the details of East-West diplomacy but with the need to regain an acceptable "position of strength" with which to cope with the continued challenge of the adversary relationship. As before, they sought to strengthen the alliance, sorely strained by the protracted deliberations that were a consequence of the first phase of the Berlin Crisis. As before, they focused on the elements of allied military strength. In late October, Adenauer endorsed Norstad's proposal of a NATO nuclear force on the grounds that, as long as Khrushchev was confident of nuclear superiority, no détente was possible:[59]

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[58] See RIIA, *Documents, 1960*, pp.37-38.

> The precondition both for nuclear disarmament and for a solution to the political problems of Europe is a nuclear balance of power between East and West.

Within a month, the first US Polaris submarine became operational; two months later, Herter proposed a multilateral NATO force in an attempt to meet both the West German need for a NATO nuclear guarantee and France's objection to reliance on an exclusively American nuclear guarantee. Yet the growing bipartisan consensus in the US for a substantial defence investment was directed less at the problem of alliance nuclear defence but at the alliance's inability to fight limited war without recourse to nuclear weapons. With the election of John Kennedy in November 1960, this common US-West German focus on a renewal of allied military strength brought to light differences in Bonn and Washington about not only the nature of that strength but also the uses to which it should be put.

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[59] Quoted in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 November 1960.

CHAPTER 11

Kennedy, Adenauer and Berlin

The years 1961 and 1962 were in many respects the worst years in US-FRG relations. In part, the problems rested with the personalities of the two leaders. John F. Kennedy and Konrad Adenauer were products of different generations: one was beginning a period of preeminence at the pinnacle of political power; the other was presiding over the end of his political tenure. Both respected each other, but each was aware that he was not received with total enthusiasm: Kennedy had earlier written that "the age of Adenauer is over"; he also knew of Adenauer's clear preference for a Nixon victory in the 1960 Presidential election.[1]

There were, of course, genuine substantive differences, arising not just from personalities but from the agenda that the US-FRG alliance faced. Here one might include the emergence of burden sharing as a significant issue in NATO, spurred by the United States' $4.3 billion balance of payments deficit in 1960.[2] While burden sharing does not play a direct role in this analysis, it symbolises a broader issue: increasing demands by the US that West Germany play a larger role in the affairs of the alliance, not only with respect to the modalities of Western defence but also with respect to facilitating a resolution of the seemingly intractable conflict between East and

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[1] See John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (Vol.36 No.1, October 1957), p. 49. Also, Felix von Eckardt, Ein unordentliches Leben: Lebenserinnerungen (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1967), pp. 624-26. Generally, Walter Stützle, Kennedy und Adenauer in der Berlin-krise, 1961-1962 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft, 1973).

[2] New York Times, 24 November 1960.

West, especially as it related to German interests. There was, of course, an inherent dilemma in this position, since a call for West German initiatives also brought with it a possibility that those initiatives might not always find favour elsewhere in the alliance. That has since become an endemic problem in the alliance, because the transition from a direct dependency to independence implies also the risks of yielding control.

Particularly for Adenauer, this demand for independent initiatives was not welcome. His vision for the Federal Republic was of a nation submerged in an integrated Europe, whose core was France and Germany. As he told Brandt, whose SPD favoured a broader integration of Europe including Britain, a European structure including France, Britain and the FRG could lead to the isolation of the Federal Republic within that framework.[3] Yet France was led by de Gaulle, who did not envisage the same Europe as either Adenauer or Brandt: for de Gaulle, a Europe of the Six meant "one cock and five chickens", while a Europe which included Britain meant "two cocks... which is not as agreeable".[4] A Gaullist Europe meant that the FRG remained a "chicken", equally isolated and suppressed.

Adenauer retained the vision that dominated policy in the 1950s in effecting the entanglement of the Federal Republic, together with Western Europe and the United States, in an alliance that served two purposes: the restoration of the FRG and the continuing commitment of the allies both to the defence of the FRG and to the reunification of Germany. It was, as we have seen, a largely defensive vision, defensive not only in a security sense but also as a defence against what Adenauer himself mistrusted in the Germans - an inclination to seek reunification at the expense of that Western alliance and a propensity to assert German national interests for their own sake. This had been a major factor in endorsing German rearmament in an alliance framework, in pursuing that integration irrespective of any alleged "lost opportunities" for a solution to a divided Germany, and in avoiding any negotiations which looked to lead to a disengagement in Europe either in the nuclear or conventional force structure of the opposing alliances. It had been based on the premise, as Brandt noted critically, that "West European integration and rearmament supposedly would add up to German reunification".[5] It was this premise which was demonstrably false in the context of the Berlin Crisis.

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[3] Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), p. 58.

[4] Harold Macmillan, Volume VI: At the End of the Day, 1961-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 365, recording a comment of the French Minister of Agriculture to Christopher Soames.

Adenauer understood this. He had long accepted the fact that reunification was not possible under existing circumstances, but he likewise resisted any alternative framework. The Politik der Stärke was predicated on a fear of German neutralism; he persisted in wa[illegible] the allies of that consequence if the West should ever demonstrate weakness in the face of Soviet challenge.[6] At the same time, Western vulnerability had led him to distrust the West's willingness to respond to such challenges. Thus, his apparent intransigence in the face of prospective East-West negotiations did not extend to a desire to raise the stakes in a crisis. In September 1960, when the East Germans had temporarily restricted civilian traffic to Berlin,

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[5] Willy Brandt, "The Means Short of War", Foreign Affairs (Vol.39 No.2, January 1961), pp. 196-207, here p. 200.

[6] Note Adenauer's letter to Kennedy after the Wall, in Baltimore Sun, 30 August 1961. That de Gaulle saw things in the same light, see his comment to Khrushchev in March 1961, cited in Maurice Schumann, "France and Germany", Foreign Affairs (Vol.41 No.1, October 1962), p. 71.

Adenauer called off the traditional opening meeting of the Bundestag in Berlin, cancelled plans to locate the headquarters of a West German radio station in West Berlin, and urged no economic sanctions against East Germany.[7] A year later, after the raising of the Berlin Wall, Adenauer waited nine days before visiting West Berlin, arguing that to have visited earlier might have precipitated riots on the other side.[8]

It was, therefore, the prospect of reunification that formed the basis of Adenauer's thinking about the political future of Germany and Germany's role in Europe. His constant reminders to the allies of their obligations with respect to Germany stemmed from a conviction that the alliance itself symbolised that prospect. Anything that seemed to weaken the alliance also generated the perception that that prospect was false, that the West's promises were without substance. Adenauer reiterated this argument in November 1959 in the Federal Government's declaration in the Bundestag:[9]

> If Germany should... ever weaken the alliance, we might have to face the fact that our alliance partners would in turn renounce their common policy with us. It is even possible that they... might attempt to settle their relationship with the Soviet Union without us or even against us.

Privately, a West German official told an American journalist a month before:[10]

> We can never get enough assurances from our allies - and particularly from the US. Reassurances, though they seem hard and lasting at the time, are used up very fast here.

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[7] See New York Times, 21 July, 21 September and 26 October 1960; Washington Post, 23 July 1960; New York Herald Tribune, 7 August 1960; Baltimore Sun, 13 September 1960. On these points Brandt had objected, not without sympathy from many in the State Department.

[8] Willy Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy (Munich: Kindler, 1964), pp. 92-93.

[9] Bulletin, 10 November 1959.

[10] New York Times, 20 October 1959.

These were expressions of what one observer had aptly characterised as *Anpassung*: not just simple dependence, but a predisposition to adapt and conform to the dictates of the alliance.[11]

Ultimately, Adenauer's insistence that a settlement of the German question was exclusively a Four Power responsibility created the vulnerability that he hoped to avoid. As Britain and the US - and later France - began to probe the possibility of changing the ground rules of the East-West relationship, Adenauer felt undermined. As in the early 1950s, the conventional wisdom that Bonn had no other options related more to Adenauer's understandable and justifiable prescription, but it did not necessarily apply in reality. There were others who did perceive options, and these included both the new American Administration and the West German political opposition. Indeed, it was the coincidence of these two sources of pressure that heightened Adenauer's anxiety. There was, first, the inevitable process of defining policy within the Kennedy Administration, in which the very prospect of policy review brought an aura of change and it the uncertainty whether the conclusions would come out the same. Moreover, given the election cycles in the two countries, this process coincided with an election campaign in the FRG in which Brandt, as the SPD candidate for Chancellor, was often compared to Kennedy and was in fact more compatible with Kennedy than was Adenauer.

The position of the SPD is important here, not because the SPD enjoyed any considerable influence in Bonn either in early 1961 or after the September 1961 elections,[12] but because of the influence Brandt had on Kennedy, even if it was only to offer an alternative German view that had become more respectable in American eyes. The US-FRG consensus in the 1950s had largely been a function of the Dulles-Adenauer relationship, in which Dulles shared many of Adenauer's concerns about German neutralism and vulnerability. For many of the same reasons as Adenauer, Dulles had been a stalwart supporter of German reunification only as a product of Western strength and endurance. The SPD had gained little or no hearing with Dulles because its position seemed, to Dulles, neutralist and therefore injurious to the process of consolidating Western strength.

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[11] Josef Joffe, "Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Politics of Dependence, 1961-1968", in William C. Cromwell *et al.*, *Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership: National Perspectives* (Bruges: College of Europe, 1969), pp. 323 ff.

Yet the SPD had dramatically altered its views on the alliance and the value of Western integration, although the latter was interpreted more broadly. Of particular significance, the SPD had endorsed West German participation in NATO for its own sake and not based on the assumption that NATO was the exclusive political instrument of eventual German reunification:[13]

> The world thus will have to accustom itself to continue seeking a balance of forces under conditions that mean neither peace nor war in the traditional sense of the terms. This assumes protecting what each side possesses at the moment. The effort to develop new rules of the "game" is based very largely on a policy of seeking to maintain the military status quo... In other words, the established military status quo is the point of departure for overcoming immobility.

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[12] Elections on 17 September 1961 saw a rise in both the SPD (from 31.8 to 36.3%) and FDP (from 7.7 to 12.7%) and a decrease in the CDU/CSU (from 50.2 to 45.3%). It took until 7 November for Adenauer to form a coalition with the FDP, whose foreign policy views corresponded more with those of the SPD: part of the price for Adenauer's continuing Chancellorship was the replacement of von Brentano with Gerhard Schröder as Foreign Minister.

[13] Brandt, "The Means Short of War", pp. 196-97.

Brandt's argument, published as Kennedy took office, affirmed three positions that were compatible with Adenauer's policy but were also subtle in their differences. First, it supported without reservation the alliance and friendship with the US and the FRG's position in the Western community: the FRG could not alter that position, nor would it be "a wanderer between two worlds". Second, progress towards the imperative of German reunification was indeed a function of the strength of the Western alliance; moreover, if the task of maintaining the military balance necessitated the integration of nuclear weapons into the Bundeswehr, then this military obligation should be accepted. Third, a solution to the problems of Berlin and Germany should not be pursued in isolation to the broader issues of East-West relations; to break the Junktim in this way would be to reduce Germany "to mere historical objects".

The differences, however, are significant in light of the later development of Brandt's Ostpolitik and the SPD's view of the US-FRG alliance. First, Brandt's acceptance of the FRG's Western association was not a prescribed entanglement to negate neutralist tendencies but an acknowledgement of the reality of shared democratic values and mutual security needs. That also meant that Bonn should be an "independent partner" rather than a "dependable follower".[14] In a similar vein, Carlo Schmid remarked at the Second American-German Conference in February 1961:[15]

> Friendship requires frankness... the friend has a right to know when we believe that his ideas endanger us and our common cause, for the danger threatening us threatens him

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[14] Brandt's press conference in Washington, cited in Washington Post, 14 March 1961.

[15] Second American-German Conf rence, East-West Tensions II. The Present Status - Future Developments (American Council on Germany and Atlantic-Brücke, 1961), pp. 21-22.

> *too*... We Germans may have foregone too much of our chances to develop an initiative of our own. *We have seen ourselves smaller than we actually are*, and we have not always realised that we, although having stumbled down from the pedestal of a great power, yet have *become big enough again so as not to let the others, the great powers, alone decide what kind of policy the free West must pursue*.

This conviction that shared obligations in the alliance brought with it the right to assert ones's own needs was the basis of Brandt's candour and even strident criticism of Kennedy's position on Berlin and, later, Brandt's and Helmut Schmidt's criticisms of American policy in the 1970s and 1980s.

This conviction relates, in turn, to Brandt's affirmation of the relationship between the strength of the alliance and German reunification. If the FRG persisted in making the alliance the instrument of reunification, Brandt felt, then reunification would not be achieved: "...we must always try to improve our situation in Germany, and we cannot expect our allies to be more German than the Germans themselves."[16] While Bonn should not negotiate "behind the back" of the allies, Four Power responsibility for Berlin and Germany should not be the excuse for refusing to negotiate at all or for contributing positively to allied deliberations on those questions. Brandt wanted West German initiatives; without them, he felt the allies would either impose their own solution or ignore the issue altogether.

While Brandt accepted the necessity of the *Junktim*, it was, as we saw earlier, one designed to expand the possibilities of agreement rather than to restrict them. He envisaged no precise sequence between disarmament and reunification, but he argued they should nonetheless be integrated. A military balance of power was an essential prerequisite to negotiations; while he accepted that nuclear weapons might be necessary in the FRG, they were expendable in the broader interests of détente, provided the FRG had some influence over alliance nuclear strategy.[17] Brandt proposed no specific package, nor was he willing to commit himself to a recognition of the Oder-Neisse line or to any recognition of East Germany: out of power, with a quarter of the West German population consisting of refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe, the SPD could not endorse suggestions posed by others outside Germany which the West German electorate still found blatantly unacceptable.[18] But the essence of what Brandt later referred to as a Friedensordnung ("peace order") was already evident, albeit vague: a military détente, born of a stable balance of power, was the precondition for a political détente that included progress on "overcoming" the division of Germany. The alliance was necessary because it provided security (valued more than reunification), security which allowed the FRG to take initiatives in the East, not out of a fear of isolation but with a strong negotiating posi which derived from its solid position in the alliance. This attitude, used by Brandt to criticise Adenauer for not cooperating with Kennedy's "Strategy of Peace", was likewise turned on the US years later for not extending a bilateral superpower military détente to the problems of European security and Germany.[19]

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[16] Brandt's speech of 14 February 1962, in Boris Meissner, ed., *Die Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation)* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 27-28.

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[17] See Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy, pp. 216-18, regarding Brandt's discussion with Kennedy and McNamara on the MLF and Partial Test Ban Treaty, June-November 1963. The SPD was also sympathetic to Kennedy's focus on conventional defence and a de-emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. See the SPD's declaration of 28 April 1961, in Bulletin, 9 May 1961, and Helmut Schmidt, Defence or Retaliation: A German Contribution to the Consideration of NATO's Strategic Problem (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962).

[18] See H.G. Alexander, "Germany Before the Elections", Political Science Quarterly (April-June 1961), pp. 168-81. Not until December 1966, when Brandt was Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, did he go so far as to "recognise Poland's longing for a territory with secure borders"; the SPD party platform adopted in March 1968 included a call "to respect and recognise" the Oder-Neisse Line until a peace treaty. Meissner, op.cit., pp. 163-64 and 245-46.

In 1961, these visions were more distinct in the abstract than in the realm of practical politics. The immediate problem was the maintenance of a defensible position in and on Berlin. Brandt's call in June for a Four Power conference to discuss a German peace treaty was not out of any expectation of success but was designed to buy time and to avert a crisis in Berlin that seemed, after the Vienna meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, inevitable.[20] On Berlin, Brandt held a hard line; he feared that the West was defining its interests in Berlin too narrowly, specifically focusing on West Berlin, as suggested in the "three essentials" formulated at the May 1961 NATO Ministerial in Oslo: Allied military presence in, free access to, and "viability" for West Berlin.[21] The West's relatively quiet acceptance of the Berlin Wall reinforced Brandt's view "that Moscow and Washington subscribed to a sort of tacit agreement on the non-violation of European spheres of influence".[22]

Brandt feared that a Western defence of the status quo would result in a "status quo minus": the apparent surrender of Four Power control for all of Berlin and the possibility that negotiations would lead to an acceptance of Four Power rather than Three Power control of West Berlin. Adenauer's fear was somewhat different: that Western attempts to negotiate at all on Berlin would inevitably lead to negotiations on Germany and European security, in which he feared Western concessions. Here, Adenauer's fears were perhaps more justified than Brandt's. Kennedy had been explicit in the election campaign that he felt Berlin was worth a war in its defence; after the Wall he admitted that Berlin was militarily indefensible but noted that the presence of American troops there was "our hostage" to US intent.[23] In fact, a large measure of Kennedy's later popularity in the FRG and West Berlin stemmed from the fact that the crisis was directed in areas in which he was prepared to demonstrate his determination, namely official Western access to and freedom of allied movement within the city.[24] But Kennedy also believed that the situation in Berlin was a cause rather than the result of East-West tensions. On the other hand, Bonn had, in justifying its focus on general disarmament as the first priority of East-West negotiation reversed its earlier contention that the division of Germany and Berlin constituted the central cause of tension in Europe.[25]

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[19] This criticism was common in the Grand Coalition and a source of US-FRG tensions after 1969, but also evident in Brandt's memorandum to Rusk in August 1964 regarding economic relations between East and West Europe. Meissner, op.cit., pp. 85-90.

[20] Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy, pp. 59-60.

[21] A colleague of Brandt's termed it "almost an invitation" to the Soviets to do what they wanted in East Berlin. Ibid., p. 59.

[22] Brandt, People and Politics, p. 79.

It was indicative of the existing political climate in the FRG, therefore, that the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy was heralded in the West German press as both a harbinger of necessary and beneficial change and as an affirmation that US policy would remain the same.[26] The ensuing interaction between Bonn and Washington consisted, from Washington, of hints of change coupled with assurances of fidelity, and, from Bonn, of assertions that nothing in reality *could* change. In March 1961, Averill Harriman visited Bonn as Kennedy's personal representative to prepare for Adenauer's April visit to Washington. Simultaneously, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, when asked at a press conference whether the US would remain in Berlin forever, replied "forever is a long time".[27] The next day the State Department affirmed what Harriman had told Adenauer: "we are no longer bound by past proposals with respect to any future negotiations with the Soviet Union on Berlin".[28] That same day, however, Adenauer held his own press conference:[29]

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[23] See Washington Post, 2 August 1959, and New York Times, 31 August 1961.

[24] By sending a 1500-man battle group along the Autobahn to West Berlin within a week of the Wall, and, in October, by the face-off of tanks at "Checkpoint Charlie" to assert allied rights of transit; in the latter case, the fact that Soviet tanks were used both to match US forces and to ensure that no war developed from any mishandling of the situation by the GDR, was a symbolic demonstration that the alleged GDR sovereignty in East Berlin remained subject to Soviet control. Wilhelm Cornides, the influential editor of Europa Archiv and a persistent critic of Kennedy throughout 1961 notes that Kennedy was actually harder on the question of access than were Eisenhower and Herter. See his "Präsident Kennedys Engagement in Berlin", Europa Archiv (Vol.18 No.12, 25 June 1968), pp. 427-44.

[25] Note von Brentano's speech in the Bundestag, 30 June 1960, in Bulletin, 5 July 1960.

> I do not fear that this examination will lead to an essential change in the position of the US with regard to us, because this position rests on the level of fact, *of political and geographic "givens" that remain the same*, regardless of which administration now leads the United States.

Bonn's emphasis of the external realities of Germany's position in Europe remained a persistent theme throughout the following decade as the US sought to stabilise the East-West strategic relationship around a divided Germany while minimising the US investment in Europe.

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[26] Newspapers sympathetic to the SPD tended to endorse the prospect of change (see the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 19 July 1960, and the *Neue Rhein Zeitung*, 21 and 31 January 1961), while those sympathetic to the CDU tended to emphasise continuity (see the *Kölnische Rundschau*, 19 July and 2 August 1960, and 31 January 1961).

[27] *New York Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1961.

[28] *New York Herald Tribune*, 11 March 1961.

[29] Cited in Stützle, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

Kennedy ultimately accepted those realities because he had to, although he would have preferred to deal with a government more flexible in its approach to the questions of European security. Clearly, Kennedy did not view German reunification as a workable negotiating objective. As he told Finland's President Kekonnen in October 1961:[30]

> ...Let the Soviet Union keep Germany divided on its present basis and not try to persuade us to associate ourselves legally with that division and thus weaken our ties to West Germany and their ties to Western Europe.

While this is often cited to stress Kennedy's *conclusion*, it seems clear that this was not incompatible with the views prevailing in the FRG at the time: Adenauer and Brandt both accepted that reunification would not result from Four Power agreement under existing circumstances, although they drew different conclusions from that fact. What is more important is Kennedy's *reason*, especially as de Gaulle sought to pose an alternative "Grand Design" for the We Germans' consideration. In this, Kennedy was probably not in disagreement with his erstwhile White House consultant, Henry Kissinger:[31]

> If the West understands its interests, it must advocate German unification... The West may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but it cannot agree to it. The division of Germany may be unavoidable but the cohesion of the West and the future of the North Atlantic Community depends on our ability to demonstrate what makes it so. Any other course will in the end bring on what we should fear the most: a militant dissatisfied power in the center of the Continent...

This was essentially the same position articulated in the State Department in 1946; from it derived Bonn's veto, however unpalatable that was to the new Administration.

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[30] Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 399.

[31] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 144.

Bonn's anxiety and Washington's frustration were interrelated: Kennedy had to adjust his impulse to negotiate to the reality that there was no negotiable solution acceptable to all actors; Bonn likewise began to realise that its successful defence of the Junktim constituted, in effect, an admission that the Politik der Stärke was not an evident route to reunification. After his June meeting with Khrushchev, in which Khrushchev brought Berlin back to centre stage,[32] Kennedy combined both a clear decisiveness in maintaining the Western position in Berlin, with military means if necessary, with signals of a readiness to negotiate without defining his negotiating position.[33] What Kennedy sought in such negotiations was Soviet accession, at an acceptable price, to a binding agreement on access and a stabilisation of the city's future; in effect an improvement of the status quo:[34]

> Perhaps there is room in which both sides - East and West - could make an agreement which respected both our two positions in that part of Europe and even make a more peaceful life in Berlin... I do not agree with those who hold that discussions already are a concession.

The essential question - what kind of specific negotiating package was acceptable - remained. As with the deliberations in the late 1950s, this was a source of considerable alliance tension, exacerbated by public comments by columnists and politicians which were received in the FRG with anxious credence. As long as the Kennedy Administration could not agree on a negotiating package, all options seemed open.

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[32] On the Vienna meeting, see Schlesinger, op.cit., pp. 358-74. For the text of Khrushchev's 4 June aide-mémoire which threatened a separate peace treaty with the GDR by 31 December and reiterated earlier demands, see RIIA, Documents, 1961, pp. 277-81. For the argument that Kennedy went to Vienna expecting the meeting to centre on Third World issues, see Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 225 ff.

[33] See particularly Kennedy's 25 July 1961 radio and television address, RIIA, Documents, 1961, pp. 332-39.

[34] Kennedy's interview in Harper's, 9 December 1959. Similarly, his and Rusk's continuous emphasis in public statements throughout June and July 1961 that the status quo was "reasonable", "tolerable", "satisfactory" and "peaceful".

Bonn's fear that the US might be willing to agree to a de facto recognition of the GDR, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, or a general European security arrangement that entailed a disengagement of US military and political guarantees, derived from its perception that Kennedy did not start from the same premises as Bonn or his predecessors. An early indication of this was Kennedy's "State of the Union" message on 30 January 1961. It included no explicit reference to Berlin, but was instead a conscious reply to Khrushchev's speech of 6 January in which the Soviet Premier noted the obsolescence of "world wars" and "local wars" while endorsing "wars of national liberation".[35] To Kennedy, the Soviet threat existed primarily in the Third World: Berlin remained a potential source of instability, but Southeast Asia and Latin America held his immediate attention. The primary task was to stabilise the adversary confrontation in Europe while taking steps to ensure that war did not result from miscalculation. From this foundation one could deal more effectively with crises in the Third World, with less fear that war might result in the central stalemate in Europe. From these premises emerged Kennedy's approach to Berlin and his emphasis on the stabilising features of his defence programme and the arms control measures it was meant to serve.

In this respect, Kennedy's policies were more compatible with Democrats such as Adlai Stevenson, Harriman, Fulbright and Humphrey than with Acheson, who advocated a harder line on Berlin and whose influence waned after the Berlin Wall crisis in late 1961. The spectrum among his advisors was wide; although that was part of Kennedy's decision-making style, it also contributed to the naggingly slow process of creating any viable negotiating package or contingency plans. At one extreme was Acheson, who believed Khrushchev's threats on Berlin represented the spearhead of a global challenge that had to be confronted, with force if necessary, and without any concessions: it was a recipe for total stand-off decided by the parameters of strength which were not clearly to the West's advantage.[36] On the other extreme were those like Harriman who emphasised Khrushchev's tenuous position and wanted to make recognition of Lippmann's "realities" an inducement to broader cooperation in the strategic relationship. As Harriman noted, off the record, in June 1961:[37]

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[35] For these speeches, see RIIA, Documents, 1961, pp. 3-8 and 259-72. Regarding Kennedy's view of Khrushchev's speech, see Schlesinger, op.cit., pp. 302-04. For a predictably critical West German response, see Die Welt, 31 January 1961.

> A sit-tight in Berlin is ridiculous. We've got to wake up to the fact that Khrushchev is on a long limb and we've got to help him get off it. It's about time we stopped letting Adenauer pull us by the nose and Chiang [Kai-shek] pull us by the ear. I see nothing wrong at all in exchanging recognition of the GDR for new guarantees on our right of access.

Kennedy shared many of the frustrations over the inconvenience of allies, but he needed them as well. Kennedy's "policy of strength" required allied contributions to distribute the costs of allied defence, even if this did not extend to a greater distribution of latitude in alliance decision-making.

In this sense, Kennedy also shared the premises of his predecessors once removed. In concert with Acheson and Nitze, he disliked a reliance on nuclear weapons because that reliance

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[36] For the details of the Berlin contingency planning and Acheson's position in the Administration, see Schlesinger, *op.cit.*, pp. 380-94.

[37] See Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 266.

"necessarily causes us to hesitate on the brink and leaves the initiative in the hands of our enemies".[38] This applied both to Europe and the Third World. Insofar as he wanted both the US and the allies to increase conventional forces in Europe, it was the obverse of disengagement. Indeed, Kennedy rejected the disengagement premise of the late 1950s that the thermonuclear age made foreign troops on German soil unnecessary and therefore subject to negotiation. But as these views related to the FRG, Bonn was not so convinced. On the one hand, Kennedy urged an acceleration in bringing the Bundeswehr up to its full strength of twelve division; in 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara even probed the possibility that the Bundeswehr be allowed to expand to 750,000 men to displace two US divisions in the FRG, but he received no sympathy in NATO.[39] More significant was the desire shared by Kennedy and McNamara to minimise the role of tactical nuclear weapons. As McNamara told the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations in April 1961, "the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts should not be forced on us simply because we have no other means to cope with them".[40]

To Strauss and others in Bonn's military establishment, this was an apparent retreat from the requirements of forward defence and a prelude to three unwelcome possibilities: first, a disengagement of the US nuclear guarantee; second, acceptance of proposals for a nuclear-free Germany; and, third, the eventual disengagement of American conventional forces.[41] In fact, the prospect of a denuclearisation of NATO led Strauss to greet Herter's December 1960 MLF proposal by urging a NATO decision before any future Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting.[42] Kennedy's emphasis on strenghthening the US nuclear deterrent, through an invulnerable second strike capability, was associated with a desire to exploit the resulting stability in the US-Soviet strategic relationship by an agreement on certain arms control measures, including a test ban and limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To Strauss, that translated into a willingness to limit the diffusion of nuclear control at Bonn's expense.

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[38] See Kennedy's collection of speeches, 1958-1960, in The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), here p. 184.

[39] See Strauss' interview with Adalbert Weinstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 August 1962; also the report in the Baltimore Sun, 11 August 1962, and New York Times, 18 December 1962.

[40] Quoted in William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 59-60. For a more forceful statement of McNamara's desire to be able to defend without crossing the nuclear threshold, see his February 1963 testimony to the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, quoted in Rostow, Diffusion of Power, p. 174.

Kennedy was not sympathetic to the idea of an MLF under joint control or even to a quasi-independent NATO nuclear force. His particular concern was the possibility of automatic, uncontrolled escalation, which, for Strauss, constituted the essence of the deterrent. In reviewing B.H. Liddell Hart's *Deterrent or Defence*, Kennedy had noted:[43]

> ...the bulk of the job of deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities must continue to be with the United States... The *instabilities* that might result from this diffusion of nuclear weapons are *equally* dangerous to Russian and American interests.

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[41] See Franz-Josef Strauss, "Verteidigung zu stärken, um zu verhandeln", *Aussenpolitik* (Vol.12, February 1961), pp. 79 ff. Also his interview with Weinstein, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 May 1961. See also the remarks by Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger, reported in *New York Times*, 4 March 1961.

[42] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 December 1960.

[43] In *Saturday Review of Literature*, 30 September 1960, cited in Stützle, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

Kennedy shared Macmillan's dislike for France's *force de frappe* but was unwilling to grant France any control over the US deterrent: not only did it violate his own views on the prerequisites of a stable nuclear balance; it would also, as he told Macmillan, make it impossible to refuse any similar West German requests.[44]

Hence, when Kennedy appeared to endorse the MLF in March 1961, it was because the *offer* of an MLF was politically useful as an inducement to strengthening conventional forces. Addressing the Canadian Parliament in March 1961, Kennedy suggested:[45]

> ...the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne missile force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, *once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved*.

Moreover, by placing the additional caveat, "subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use", Kennedy effectively ruled out any US bilateral arrangements; it was unlikely that Britain France and the FRG - much less the US Congress - would agree on those guidelines.

There was a third indication that Kennedy's perspectives clashed with West German official policy. He had been an advocate, after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, of providing moral and economic support to the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe which were:[46]

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[44] See Harold Macmillan, *Volume V, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961* (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 350-55, for Macmillan's speech in the US on 7 April 1961 and Kennedy's 5 May letter to Macmillan.

[45] See Kaufmann, *op.cit.*, p. 107. For greater detail on this debate, see Catherine M. Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University, 1975), chapters 6-7, and Dieter Mahncke, *Nukleare Mitwirkung: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Atlantischen Allianz, 1954-1970* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), pp. 85-110.

[46] Kennedy' speech to the Overseas Press Club, 6 May 1960, quoted in Stützle, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30. Emphasis added.

> ...the Achilles heel of the Soviet empire, the tender spot within its coat of armor, the potential source of an inflammation that could spread infectious independence throughout its system, accomplishing from within what the West could never accomplish from without.

This particularly applied to Poland, with which the US increased its trade in 1957 on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis. Kennedy did not then or later explicitly and publicly propose recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, but the logic was there: as long as the FRG claimed the "Eastern territories", it tended "to create gravitational pulls in Poland toward Russia".

Kennedy thus gave some impetus to thinking within the US and within the State Department that the growing polycentrism in the bipolar structure could be exploited advantageously by the West:[47]

> It is this sort of situation that American thinking, conditioned to the notion of two world camps, most needs reorientation - to accept partial gains in order to undercut slowly the foundations of the Soviet order.

This thinking had little direct effect on US policy until after Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, although the principal private spokesman of this position, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was already advocating the concept of "peaceful engagement", to which we shall later return.[48] Similar conclusions were being reached outside Adenauer's inner circle in the FRG, but likewise did not begin to find expression until the Berlin Crisis had passed and the new Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, could operate outside the declining shadow of Adenauer.

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[47] Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy", p. 47. See Harold Macmillan, Volume IV, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 492, for a sympathetic refrain.

[48] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc", Foreign Affairs (Vol.39 No.3, April 1961), pp. 430-43, and Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe", Foreign Affairs (Vol.39 No.4, July 1961), pp. 642-54. Anticipating his later arguments in the Johnson Administration, Brzezinski advocated a relaxation of the Hallstein Doctrine and the

The creation of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 had a profound effect on virtually all actors in the debate. Prior to the Wall, Kennedy had pressed for some kind of Four Power negotiations to divert the crisis threatened by Khrushchev in Vienna and which, by all accounts, dominated his attention throughout the summer. There was reportedly considerable pressure within the State Department for a negotiating package that included at least recognition of the Oder-Neisse line in exchange for Soviet access guarantees. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles was the most explicit in a 23 July press conference:[49]

> This government is prepared to negotiate. The eastern boundary of Germany is negotiable, so is the level of forces in Berlin, all of Germany, and Eastern Europe. A non-aggression pact is negotiable. Under certain conditions the denuclearization of the Germans is negotiable.

There was no firm position, however, either in Washington or among the four allies who deliberated first at the working level then at the Foreign Minister level in Paris in early August. Talk of recognising the Oder-Neisse line was reportedly suspended at least until after the West German elections.[50] The Foreign Ministers agreed only on the "three essentials" without elaborating any negotiating steps, and de Gaulle wrote to Kennedy to express his persistent belief that any offer of negotiations in the crisis would be tantamount to a surrender of Berlin.[51]

The Wall was received almost with relief outside West Germany. Senator Fulbright had virtually suggested it in a television interview earlier in August: "I do not understand why the East Germans do not close their border... they have the right to close it."[52] East Germany had been suffering its own crisis as the refugee flow to West Berlin reached a monthly rate of 20-30,000, with over 4000 in the twenty-four hours before the Wall.[53] In retrospect, one can argue that no negotiating package could have been acceptable to the East that did not consolidate the East German regime. Likewise, there could have been no détente as long as the stability of the GDR were threatened; in that respect, Moscow may have equally been a hostage to the government in Pankow much as Washington was to the government in Bonn.[54] In any event, Rusk's statement on 13 August, after checking with Kennedy who remained in Hyannis Port, recorded the fact that it was a violation of Four Power Agreements signed in 1949 but emphasised that the "three essentials" remained unchallenged:[55]

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[49] Quoted by James Reston in the New York Times, 28 July 1961. See also New York Times, 21 and 26 July 1961. Bowles lost his job four months later in a shake-up of the State Department that undercut much of the influence of the Foreign Service in policy formulation.

[50] New York Times, 5 August 1961.

[51] See Schlesinger, op.cit., pp. 393-94.

> Available information indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not at the Allied position in West Berlin or access thereto... It goes without saying that these measures must not affect existing provisions for traffic control or communication routes between West Berlin and West Germany.

The fact remained that the Wall was in East Berlin. Brandt wrote Kennedy a letter of protest over the lack of Western response, but he likewise agreed with Kennedy that to tear the Wall down would have been an unacceptable risk of war.[56] Kennedy responded by reinforcing the Allied garrison with a battle group which travelled along the Autobahn and was met by Vice President Johnson in West Berlin. There was no retaliatory action, and the Western protest was four days in preparation.

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[52] New York Times, 3 August 1961.

[53] See Bulletin, 25 July and 15 August 1961.

[54] See Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin, 1945-1962 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), pp. 221-23.

[55] See US Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 619-20.

[56] See Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy, p. 78. and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 594.

After the Wall, the prospect of negotiations to settle the crisis increased in the public eye. On 21 August, Kennedy wrote to Rusk that he wanted negotiations on Berlin.[57] On 15-16 September, the four Western Foreign Ministers met in Washington, but the French refused Four Power negotiations. Over French and, initially, West German objections Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko held "exploratory talks" at the UN the next week; Gromyko and Kennedy subsequently met on 6 October; Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin continued their talks parallel with discussions in Moscow between Gromyko and US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson; and Kennedy and Khrushchev began an exchange of correspondence that continued until Kennedy's death. The purpose of these talks was to establish "whether a reasonable basis for negotiations with the Soviet Union exists".[58] Ultimately, this became the basis of US-Soviet "bilateralism" in the arms control field, a bilateralism which was criticised in both France and West Germany but which was also the product of French and West German insistence that no negotiations should alter the status quo unless, from Bonn's point of view, they were to lead to German reunification. In effect, this Soviet-American "bilateralism" was, on the one hand, a product of the nuclear agenda in which only Britain was willing to join (the test ban and nonproliferation) and which could be traced to Eisenhower's proposals in 1955. It was also, however, a product of the

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[57] Schlesinger, op.cit., p. 381.

[58] Quoted in Stützle, op.cit., p. 157.

Junktim which had been manipulated by Bonn to emphasise not the primacy of the "German Problem" but the precondition of progress towards disarmament outside European security issues. As we shall see, Bonn subsequently sought to restore the original 1957 Berlin Junktim after the crisis in Berlin subsided.

This increase in diplomatic activity was accompanied by a commensurate increase in private and political commentary prescribing the elements of solution. Walter Lippmann reminded his readers that a future German leadership might seek a deal with Moscow but nevertheless proposed negotiations, "with the recognition of the fact that these are two German states", to place West Berlin in trust as an international city.[59] General Clay, newly appointed as US Military Commandant in Berlin and a symbol of Western resistance in that city, created shocks when his off the record comment - that the US might ultimately have to acknowledge the existence of two German states - was published.[60] Senator Humphrey stated in Rome that the US was giving "friendly consideration" to recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, and in Warsaw that the State Department was likewise considering the Rapacki Plan; Rusk denied at least the latter point.[61]

There were also pressures in the other direction. In a series of television interviews in the US, Ambassador Grewe generated considerable White House displeasure by his warning of "answering maximum pressure... with maximum concessions", as well as the recurrent caution, "There will be no... fundamental change in our foreign policy - provided there is no change in Western policy."[62] The conservative West German Axel Springer press distributed in the US reprints of an article, largely directed against Britain, that warned of the consequences of "betrayal and mortal insult":[63]

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[59] New York Herald Tribune, 12 September 1961.

[60] Washington Post, 25 September 1961.

[61] Baltimore Sun, 29 September and 19 October 1961. Senator Edmund Muskie also returned from Berlin and urged "informal" recognition of the GDR, Washington Star, 2 October 1961. On the lack of coordination in the policy process that contributed to this confusion, see Eleanor Lansing Dulles, One Germany or Two: The Struggle at the Heart of Europe (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1970), pp. 230 ff.

> Far more likely... the Germans would... conclude that the West was both weak and treacherous and that the choice they had made in 1955 was now finally and bitterly proved to be the wrong one. They would curse the day they made it, wish to goodness they had accepted Stalin's offer instead, and pray to heaven that it were repeated.

Beginning with the dubious premise that the West German decision to join NATO was an "act of noble magnanimity... an immense favour" to the West rather than an act of mutual self-interest, this article also distorted West German public opinion.[64] Nonetheless, there were those in the US who warned, "When the present crisis passes it will not be the US but the Soviet Union who will be in a position to offer the unification of Germany."[65]

Actually, despite persistent fears and speculation, Kennedy and Adenauer's positions appeared to converge. More precisely, Kennedy was not willing to undermine Adenauer, while Adenauer's *public* position sounded more accommodating. Addressing the Bundestag on 18 August, Adenauer urged Four Power negotiations "to enable the German problem - and thus the Berlin question - to be solved on the basis of...

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[62] See Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Rückblenden, 1976-1951* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), pp. 499-504, and *Bulletin*, 3 October 1961.

[63] Sebastian Haffner, "Giving the Germans a Sense of Betrayal and Mortal Insult" (reprint from Axel Springer Press, late August 1961).

[64] Actually, FRG confidence in NATO as a defence organisation increased to 73% in November 1961 (after the Checkpoint Charlie incidents), whereas it was only at 52% in December 1958. See Joffe, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

[65] James Reston, in *New York Times*, 6 October 1961.

self-determination".[66] On 16 September, von Brentano endorsed the Rusk-Gromyko talks as a means of demonstrating the West's determination.[67] Yet Adenauer privately wrote to Kennedy that he agreed with de Gaulle's judgement that a negotiating initiative would be seen as a sign of Western weakness.[68] Adenauer's public stance should thus be viewed in the context of, first, the forthcoming FRG elections on 17 September, and, second, his knowledge that de Gaulle would block any Four Power negotiations and thereby relieve Adenauer of that burden.

Macmillan's position had also been affected by events, at least in terms of what he was willing to advocate publicly. He and Kennedy had a close relationship, both sharing a similar outlook on the need for arms control, a stable modus vivendi in Central Europe, and the broader integration of Europe including British membership in the Common Market. During Kennedy's visit to London after his June meeting with Khrushchev, Macmillan tried to impress upon him privately "some of the underlying realities of the Berlin problem", and later urged steps to avoid a crisis when Kennedy called for increased military preparations. Macmillan's lesson from the Wall, by his account, was "to speed up negotiations"; yet Macmillan had also decided to enter into negotiations to join the Common Market and therefore eschewed sending a joint note with the US to Moscow proposing negotiations, so as not to create "an open rupture with the French".[69] Kennedy was thus in the lead position, both in proposing negotiations and in demonstrating the military resolve to convince Khrushchev that the West would not be intimidated into concessions. This involved not only the conventional reinforcements in Berlin, to which Macmillan reluctantly agreed but de Gaulle refused, but also the resumption of underground nuclear testing after Khrushchev detonated three thermonuclear devices in the atmosphere in the first week of September. As Kennedy wrote to Macmillan, "the gravest of our dangers is that we may seem less determined than Khrushchev".[70]

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[66] Bulletin, 22 August 1961; also Adenauer's radio and TV address of 6 September, in Bulletin, 12 September 1961.

[67] Bulletin, 19 September 1961.

[68] On 29 August. See Grewe, op.cit., p. 496.

[69] See Macmillan's diary entries of 11 June and 25 August as well as the general discussion, in Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 356-97.

Nonetheless, Kennedy was committed to arms control and wanted to provide an avenue in that direction. On 25 September, the US submitted proposals to the UN emphasising phased disarmament under international control; agreements to ban testing, the production of fissionable materials and the proliferation of control or manufacturing capability of nuclear weapons; negotiations to limit the production of strategic delivery vehicles; and measures to prevent war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack.[71] The Soviet response, registered the next day, focused on agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, a non-aggression pact between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons including the sharing of those weapons within a "military bloc system", atom-free zones, and reduction of forces on either side of existing demarcation lines.[72] In effect, these two positions were the starting points for subsequent negotiations on arms control throughout the 1960s which simultaneously involved the issues of Germany despite their bilateral quality.

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[70] Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 397.

[71] RIIA, Documents, 1961, pp. 389-95.

[72] Ibid., pp. 395-401.

The US proposal had not injured the West German position with respect to the MLF and, in every other respect, remained in the realm of bilateral disarmament measures that did not involve West Germany, thus remaining faithful to Adenauer's interpretation of the Junktim. Likewise, the Soviet proposals involved the FRG in virtually every respect: neither the US nor the FRG could accept any no-first use agreement, even if not accompanied by a disengagement of foreign troops, since Soviet conventional superiority would theoretically become usable. Similarly, Adenauer and Strauss remained committed to a NATO nuclear force, while other measures were rejected because they would necessarily involve if not the recognition of the GDR, at least its "upgrading" (Aufwertung). Nevertheless, there seemed to be some room between the US and Soviet positions that Kennedy hoped to exploit in reaching an agreement on Berlin without surrendering the "three essentials" or the substantive interests of the West Germans.

Kennedy seemed to be increasingly sensitive to the climate in West Germany that included pressures of its own for movement.[73] On 9 November, Kennedy telephoned Macmillan regarding Adenauer's forthcoming visit to Washington. Macmillan urged pressure on Adenauer to yield on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, de facto recognition of the GDR, political ties between the FRG and West Berlin, and sign a pledge not to produce nuclear weapons. In reply, Kennedy registered his concern that Adenauer would be giving up more than he would receive, especially since it would be a stabilisation of Berlin, not German reunification, that would be the objective of any negotiations.[74] At the same time, a meeting between the West German Ambassador in Moscow, Hans Kroll, and Khrushchev resulted in a Soviet plan that provided for Four Power guarantees of access to West Berlin, to be honoured by the GDR, in exchange for Western "respect" for the GDR. Kroll's initiative was his own, unauthorised from Bonn; Bonn said as much on 14 November and recalled Kroll for consultations on 17 November.[75] Indeed, Adenauer rejected any unilateral West German negotiations with Moscow because it would not only undermine Four Power responsibility for Germany and Berlin but also free the US from having to stay within the negotiation parameters imposed by Bonn.[76]

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[73] See Schlesinger, op.cit., pp. 398-99.

The "Kroll affair" did not represent a strong tendency toward a West German Rapallopolitik. There was no real threat of a West German Alleingang ("go it alone"); indeed, those political elements in the SPD, FDP and CDU which were anxious for movement, including the new Foreign Minister, Schröder, were fundamentally committed to the alliance with the US. Erich Mende, FDP leader, proposed FRG-USSR bilateral talks as a parallel supplement to US-USSR discussions, b Adenauer refused.[77] The Soviet note of 27 December 1961, like the 9 November note, reminded Bonn that its allies were not interested in reunification and talked of "the traditional policy of Germany towards Russia". Bonn responded: "German-Soviet relations can only be normalised if the situation of the German people is normalised."[78] Heinrich Krone, Adenauer's Minister without Portfolio, noted that it would be "inappropriate" for West Germany to take an initiative which would suggest a lack of confidence in allied exploratory talks.[79] For Adenauer, there was value in the bilateral US-Soviet discussions, because they provided a shield against pressures for West German initiatives with the confidence that de Gaulle would block any Four Power agreement at West Germany's expense.

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[74] For the Kennedy and Macmillan exchange before and after the Adenauer visit, see Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 407-08 and 419-28.

[75] See Baltimore Sun, 9 November 1961. Also the discussion in Grewe, op.cit., pp. 516-17, and Stützle, op.cit., pp. 160-71. For the 5-point "Kroll plan", see Arnulf Baring, Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer, 1949-1964 (Munich: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974), p. 469, fn. 114; also pp. 378-80 for von Brentano's fear of US reactions.

[76] See Grewe, op.cit., p. 519.

[77] Washington Post, 27 January 1962.

Kroll's own memoirs suggest that his purpose was to improve bilateral FRG-USSR relations as a hedge against a Western "deal" in the belief that he could make a better one.[80] What the elements of such a deal might have been remains unclear. Of greater importance is the concern it generated in both the US and FRG for ending the "crisis of confidence". Despite their divergent perspectives, Kennedy and Adenauer met on 20-22 November with a recognition of their mutual dependency. Kennedy needed West German cooperation on two counts: not only did progress toward a stabilisation of Berlin require Bonn's consent on the parameters of any subsequent negotiations, but Kennedy's parallel desire to increase both the strength and the flexibility of NATO's defence posture demanded contributions from Bonn most of all. By the same token, Adenauer's domestic political position had been weakened by the election, and his ambassadors in Washington and Moscow seemed to be working at cross-purposes, both of which were disruptive. Moreover, the United States still provided the essential guarantees, both political and military. Ultimately, his only protection, outside de Gaulle, was that which was counselled by the New York Times: "It would be intolerable for the Germans to sit back and say later - as Hitler did - that a Diktat was imposed on them."[81] Both Bonn and Washington were vulnerable to an alliance breach.

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[78] Unlike the 9 November note, which was immediately made public and provoked Kroll's temporary recall, the 27 December note was not published until 10 January 1962 and answered on 21 February. See *Bulletin*, 30 January and 23 February 1962.

[79] *Bulletin*, 6 February 1962. See also Fritz René Allemann, "Rapallo-Mythos und Wirklichkeit", *Der Monat* (14/163, April 1962), pp. 5-12. Kroll was permanently recalled from Moscow in early March, with a critical press. See *Die Welt*, 3 March 1962.

[80] Hans Kroll, *Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschaften* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1967), pp. 474 ff., for his reaction to Thompson-Gromyko meetings on the day Kennedy was inaugurated, and pp. 521 ff. for the November affair. Kroll never enjoyed the role played by his pre-war predecessors in advising the Kremlin. See also Werner Feld, *Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963).

Grewe returned to Bonn on 14 November and outlined the divergent perspectives to Adenauer, the cabinet, and the parliamentary Fraktion leaders on the 17th.[82] The traditional Junktim - that a détente had to include progress toward reunification - was in serious jeopardy. The question was no longer what price the allies would pay for reunification, but what price they, or at least the US and UK, were prepared to pay for a stabilisation of the status quo, or, indeed, a "status quo minus". Adenauer and Brandt had both urged that there be no isolated agreement on Berlin, but agreement only in concert with a solution of the broader German issues; Adenauer restated this on the 16th, warning as well against the "disastrous delay" in the US decision to create a NATO nuclear force. Grewe subsequently argued, and Adenauer agreed, that the weakness of the Junktim required a preemptive move: to exclude the broader German issues from the agenda and agree on a narrower agreement on access to Berlin, in which the "three essentials" would be operative. In return for this West German

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[81] New York Times, 17 November 1961.

[82] See Grewe, op.cit., pp. 513-20.

"concession", issues relating to European security such as recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and atom-free zones, would also be removed from the agenda; a new "essential" - protection of the constitutionally prescribed relationship between Berlin and the FRG - would also be added. Moreover, Bonn would be willing to extend non-aggression declarations to the Warsaw Pact, including the GDR, as a substitute for a signed treaty; to agree to surprise attack prevention measures as long as they applied to all of Europe (here de Gaulle was a silent partner); and to apply the "agent theory" in "technical" contacts with the GDR, provided that an access agreement applied also to civilian traffic.

There was an additional "essential" imposed by Adenauer but whose importance is more an indication of the internal dispute between Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schröder. In his 16 November press conference, Adenauer declared that the dismantling of the Berlin Wall was a precondition to any negotiations on Berlin. Two days later, Schröder noted that this was neither an ultimatum nor a condition: negotiations were necessary, but they should not be conducted under pressure.[83] This was likewise not an insurmountable condition: Khrushchev had, at the 22nd CPSU Congress a month before, declared that his June ultimatum of 31 December for a German peace treaty no longer applied.[84] Schröder reiterated this point in Washington when he, in Adenauer's place, gave the traditional address to the National Press Club.[85] Schröder's position is especially important, because his greater flexibility on negotiations regarding Berlin, plus his determination to strengthen US-FRG relations, provided Rusk a more amenable counterpart. In subsequent months, Schröder became an essential and sometimes exclusive contact for Rusk in developing a negotiating package on Berlin. In the same way that Adenauer could move closer to Kennedy because of the protection afforded by de Gaulle, Kennedy could broaden his negotiating latitude by working through Schröder and still be within the bounds of official West German policy.

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[83] Grewe, *op.cit.*, p. 523. Also *New York Times*, 17 and 19 November 1961.

[84] On 17 October. See RIIA, *Documents, 1961*, pp. 223-25.

[85] *Bulletin*, 28 November 1961. Adenauer was reportedly ill.

The second Kennedy-Adenauer meeting reflected only superficial agreement. They were "in accord on the basic elements which will permit a peaceful resolution of this crisis through negotiation"; they would consider "reasonable" Soviet demands, but negotiate only through "positions of strength".[86] The Junktim between regional security arrangements and reunification remained intact by the exclusion of both issues from an interim Berlin access agreement that would be pursued independently. The essential guarantees, including the link between the FRG and Berlin, also remained intact. The security issues were similarly skirted under the rubric of negotiating through strength, as neither side committed themselves to the other's strategic outlook. Kennedy maintained that the issue of a NATO nuclear force was not his decision but one for NATO as a whole; Adenauer, in turn, reaffirmed his decision to increase the conscription period of the Bundeswehr from twelve to eighteen months, justified not as an endorsement of "flexible response" but on the grounds of training efficiency.[87] Paradoxically, despite the doctrinal differences between Bonn and Washington, the practical result of this mutual accommodation in the crisis was Bonn's agreement to raise its troop strength from 350,000 to 500,000 men and Washington's agreement to a substantial increase in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

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[86] Bulletin, 28 November 1961, plus the commentary in New York Times, 24 November 1961.

Three days after Adenauer's departure, Kennedy tried to elaborate the parameters of a negotiating position in an interview with Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexsei Adzhubei, editor of Izvestia. He made three essential points. First, while recognising that Moscow held a veto over German reunification and could sign any treaty it wanted with the East Germans, he made clear that any such treaty should recognise the rights of all allies in Berlin. Second, he pointed out that the integration of the FRG in NATO was, as before, a source of security against Germany as well as for Germany:[88]

> Now if this situation changed, if Germany developed an atomic capability of its own, if it developed missiles or a strong national army that threatened war, then I would understand your concern, and I would share it... If it changed, then it would seem to me appropriate for the United States and the Soviet Union and others to consider the situation at that time.

Third, he suggested an "International Access Authority" as a means of stabilising the isolated problem of military and civilian access to Berlin.

Four days later, Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard delivered the Government's foreign policy statement to the new Bundestag. He endorsed Kennedy's "three essentials" and posited three "non-negotiables":[89]

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[87] See Baltimore Sun, 2 December 1961, and the discussion in James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1966), pp. 75-[illegible], and Uwe Nerlich, "Die nuklearen Dilemmas der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Europa Archiv (Vol.20 No.17, 10 September 1965), p. 641.

[88] Department of State, Current Documents, 1961, pp. 668-70. See also Kennedy's news conference of 29 November, New York Times, 30 November 1961.

> 1. The security of the Federal Republic.
>
> 2. The maintenance of the existing political, legal and economic ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic, including free access for the civilian population.
>
> 3. The upholding of the common policy with regard to Germany, that is to say, reunification, non-recognition of the Soviet Zone regime, and settlement of the frontier questions in a peace treaty with an all-German government.

Erhard also reiterated Bonn's basic position on the Hallstein Doctrine, the link between European security and German reunification, non-discrimination against the FRG in surprise attack measures and NATO force structure, the importance of general and controlled disarmament, and the need for a plan to construct a NATO atomic force.

While Kennedy's and Erhard's statements appeared to be in conflict, they were not mutually exclusive unless one wanted to interpret them that way. In subsequent months, both Washington and Bonn further refined their public positions. In late February, Attorney General Robert Kennedy joined the steady stream of American luminaries to West Berlin and acknowledged a fourth "essential": Bonn's demand for continued ties between the FRG and Berlin.[90] On 1[illegible] March, before the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference convened, Rusk and Schröder met. Among other things, Schröder assured Rusk that the FRG had no desire for its own nuclear weapons, but repeated that there should be no disarmament arrangement based on Germany's partition.[91] A month later, Strauss posited Bonn's own

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[89] Bulletin, 5 December 1961.

[90] Bulletin, 27 February 1962.

[91] Bulletin, 13 March 1962. For the Rusk-Schröder communiqué, see Heinrich Siegler, Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit, Volume II, 1960-1963 (Bonn: Siegler, 1964), p. 174.

"three essentials" with respect to nuclear sharing in the alliance: "Information, guarantees, and a certain amount of co-determination."[92]

It is against this background that one should assess the subsequent crisis in US-FRG relations that resulted from the US proposal, leaked to the press, of a negotiating package designed to break the stalemate in both the Berlin negotiations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference.[93] Its key point was the creation of an International Access Authority (IAA), composed of five representatives each from East and West - the four powers with responsibility for Berlin, plus Poland and Czechoslovakia for parity, and the FRG, GDR, West Berlin and East Berlin - and three neutrals, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. In addition, the two Germanies would renounce nuclear weapons; NATO and the Warsaw Pact would exchange renunication of force declarations; and a technical commission of representatives from East and West Germany plus a standing Four Power Conference of Foreign Ministers would be established to pursue negotiations. This package was delivered on 9 April to Grewe in Washington and conveyed to Bonn by the 12th with an American request for an answer within forty-eight hours. Rusk, who had failed to reach any agreement with Gromyko by 27 March was due to meet Dobrynin on 16 April.

Gromyko had earlier rejected the concept of an IAA when Thompson raised it in January, notably for the exact opposite reason that Adenauer and von Brentano disliked it: Moscow saw it for what it was, an affirmation of Four Power control (since it would operate on behalf of the Four Powers whose legal responsibilities remained unchanged), hence a limitation on the claim of East Germany's sovereignty; Adenauer, on the other hand, rejected it as a concession of East German sovereignty and was quite possibly the source of the leak. As for the arms control provisions, they were designed to counter Soviet demands at Geneva for a nuclear free zone and a renunciation of force treaty between the members of the two opposing alliances, thereby gaining recognition of the GDR and an arms control arrangement discriminating against the FRG. The renunciation of nuclear weapons would be a reiteration of Bonn's 1954 pledge, except that it would be directed to the East rather than simply to NATO. As for the other provisions, Adenauer had already agreed to "technical" intra-German contacts and had himself called for a Foreign Ministers' Conference, although de Gaulle had the week before confirmed to him that France would not agree to such a conference.[94]

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[92] *Bulletin*, 10 April 1962.

[93] First in *Die Welt* and *Der Tagesspiegel*, 14 April. Subsequently, *New York Times*, 14 April 1962.

At the emergency meeting in Bonn on 12 April, including Adenauer, von Brentano (then CDU Fraktion leader), Krone, Schröder, Foreign Office State Secretary Karl Carstens, Mende (FDP) and Ollenhauer (SPD), only Adenauer, von Brentano and Krone denounced the package as a "sell out". The real issue - hence the probable motivation for the leak - was the division within Bonn rather than any real incompatability in the US-FRG positions. Schröder maintained that the FRG had been informed all along, that the IAA concept had been approved in the Ambassadorial Steering Group, and that he and Rusk had discussed it in their meeting in March.[95] Neither he nor Rusk were confident that Moscow would accept the package; indeed, the publicity surrounding it certainly gave Khrushchev ample opportunity to exploit it if he were at all favourably disposed. It nonetheless provided the foundation of an acceptable proposal that, like the Herter Plan of 1959, went as far as possible in meeting Soviet demands while preserving the essential interests of Bonn and Washington. Bonn's press spokesman, Felix von Eckardt, tried to play down the crisis; Carstens attempted to salvage the package by suggesting modifications, largely in terms of making Four Power control of the inner-German commission more explicit.

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[94] Adenauer to the CDU Fraktion after his meeting with de Gaulle on 15 February. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 and 23 February 1962.

Rusk's attempt to gain a breakthrough on both Berlin and arms control by linking them together was aborted by the press leak and the emotions that flared in Bonn and Washington. Washington registered vehement protests to Grewe and Schröder. At a press conference on 7 May, Adenauer announced Grewe's recall, decried the IAA as "unworkable", and declared he did not have "the least hope" that existing negotiations would yield any result, despite the NATO decision a few days before to continue exploratory talks.[96] Two days later, Kennedy expressed his pique at Adenauer and de Gaulle, complaining "some countries do not play as active a role as we have been willing to do in attempting to work out a settlement". Noting that nothing would be done without Bonn's approval, Kennedy emphasised what McNamara had urged at the NATO Conference in Athens the week

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[95] See his interview in Kölnische Rundschau, 30 April 1962, also his statements in the German language Bulletin of 25 April and 3 May 1962. For detailed discussion of this crisis and the German participants' positions, see Grewe, op.cit., pp. 548-63, and Stützle, op.cit., pp. 207-17. Grewe had not been informed of the total package beforehand, so the Rusk-Schröder contact may have been an exclusive one.

[96] Washington Post, 8 May 1962.

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

before: that the allies needed to increase their military manpower and defence budgets to allow the West "to speak with vigor now... and establish an environment for effective negotiations".[97]

In effect, the specific issue of Berlin and, with it, the broader questions of German reunification, suddenly died as an active agenda item for Western diplomacy. Rusk did not propose any package to Moscow at subsequent meetings with Dobrynin. Whereas Rusk had hoped, and Bonn later urged, that Berlin and arms control might be linked in an agreement that provided the basis for a détente - defined in terms of a stabilisation of the status quo - Washington's attention was increasingly directed at the fulfilment of its defence modernisation and expansion programme with corollary emphasis on burden sharing in the alliance. Such was the basis of Kennedy's "Declaration of Interdependence" on 4 July 1962.[98] Four Power diplomacy on Berlin and Germany was suspended until 1969 as the US conception of détente emphasised arms control, without any link to a resolution of the division of Berlin, Germany or Europe. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Khrushchev himself removed Berlin from the agenda.[99] Both Bonn and Washington endeavoured to repair their relationship, a relationship sorely strained by the unsuccessful attempts by both East and West to improve upon the legacy of World War II, but difficult to repair because of the disparate prescriptions for coping with that legacy.

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[97] Washington Post and New York Times, 10 May 1962.

[98] See Walt Rostow's comments on his meeting with Kennedy on 2 July from which came the draft of that speech, in Rostow, Diffusion of Power, pp. 235-36.

[99] Khrushchev declared in East Berlin, on 6 January 1963, that the Wall had eliminated the need for a separate peace treaty. RIIA, Documents, 1963, pp. 132-44.

CHAPTER 12

Arms Control in the 1960s: The Dilemmas of Détente and Disengagement

The virtually simultaneous termination of the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises generated renewed hopes for a détente between East and West. As in the 1950s, it remained a question as to whether and how a Western détente strategy might be pursued. The four factors identified earlier, whose confluence had led some to advocate such a strategy in the 1950s, were perhaps more strongly established. Both alliance systems still relied on nuclear weapons; the experiences of Berlin and Cuba, plus the independent development of nuclear weapons by France and China, heightened the sense of vulnerability to nuclear war and, with it, of mutual interest among the superpowers for stabilising at least to some extent their strategic relationship.[1] While this sense of mutual vulnerability provided an incentive to arms control negotiations, there also existed a degree of military strength - at least in the US - that allowed one to negotiate without fear of being intimidated into making concessions. The US enjoyed - and recognised - a clear superiority in invulnerable strategic delivery systems over the Soviet Union; moreover, the expansion of conventional forces both in the US and Europe, plus a substantial increase in tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe under improved control procedures, coupled with a dramatically decreased estimate of Soviet forces in Eastern

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[1] See, for example, Khrushchev's indirect warning to Peking in his 12 December 1962 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet: "this 'paper tiger' has atomic teeth... and it must not be treated lightly". RIIA, Documents, 1962, p. 257. France's first thermonuclear test occurred in April 1960; China's in October 1964.

Europe, suggested a better balance of military power in Central Europe than before.[2]

In the late 1950s, the existing combination of strength and vulnerability had led some to suggest that there was an opportunity for a détente through the mechanism of disengagement in Central Europe. This had been rejected because both the strategic and political parameters for negotiations were acceptable neither to Bonn nor Washington. In fact, that opportunity did not flow from the strength and vulnerabilities existing at the time: the vulnerability to thermonuclear weapons in an unstable strategic relationship would not have been removed by a disengagement that was dependent upon mutual nuclear deterrence; likewise, Western strength, provided by the successful consolidation of the FRG into NATO, would have been weakened by a disengagement that placed the burden of forward defence on indigenous West German forces that were not yet deployed and had no tangible guarantee of the continued existence of the US nuclear deterrent. After 1962, however, the combination of strength and vulnerability was of a different sort: the strategic relationship allowed arms control to be pursued outside a zero-sum game context:[3]

> It is wrong... that any US gain in security necessarily implies a concomitant Soviet loss... Indeed, it may be that the one distinguishing characteristic of all "arms control" measures... is that of a design to achieve mutual improvement of security.

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[2] For a summary of US force developments between 1961 and 1963 and the revised estimate of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, see William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 67-78 and 120-21.

[3] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control James T. McNaughton, in an address before the International Arms Control Association, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 19 December 1962. This can be regarded as a response to Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet the week before. New York Times, 20 December 1963.

Moreover, once they were agreed on measures to decrease the chance of war by accident or miscalculation,[4] the superpowers were less vulnerable to each other and more vulnerable to the fragmentation of their respective alliances. In the arms control arena, this placed the issue of nuclear proliferation, to which a test ban was a prelude, at centre stage.[5]

Finally, as with the 1950s, détente gained currency as a political concept because the alternatives were unacceptable. The difference in the early 1960s is significant. In the 1950s, détente was viewed as an alternative to war, crisis and confrontation in order to establish a stable situation in Europe. Détente had thus been conceived as an inherently Europe-centred strategy, dominated by issues of European security. This had been the impetus for the original *Junktim*, to ensure that no such strategy was pursued on the basis of a divided Germany. When negotiations threatened to involve concessions relating to recognition of the GDR, boundaries, or limited schemes for a military détente across the European divide, Adenauer advanced the precondition of disarmament, and with it a general political détente, to remove European security issues from the negotiating agenda. After 1962, however, Central Europe no longer provided the locus of East-West conflict, but not because of a negotiated agreement to regulate it: vindicating de Gaulle's prediction, Moscow had unilaterally removed its challenge in the face of Western intransigence; moreover, the Wall *did* allow a stabilisation of Ulbricht's regime, posing new dilemmas for Bonn's *Deutschlandpolitik*. The *Politik der Stärke* had succeeded only in deterring an alteration of the *status quo* to the disadvantage of the West but not in compelling a settlement in terms of reunification.

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[4] Such as the "Hot Line" Agreement of 20 June 1963. See ACDA, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington, 1980), pp. 28-33; also pp. 113-19 for its 30 September 1971 modernisation.

[5] See Kennedy's speech, 10 June 1963, at American University, in RIIA, *Documents, 1963*, pp. 14-19.

The implications of these factors, however, remained much as before. To the extent that a Western détente strategy was plausible, it was one based, first, on an acknowledgement of the *status quo* as an enduring - and to some even desirable - feature of the international system. Second, and important in an alliance context, such a détente strategy required the maintenance of a bipolar structure for its successful execution, a point rejected by de Gaulle but perhaps indirectly vindicated by developments after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the US view, this was the essential link between the pursuit of arms control on the one hand and the debate over alliance nuclear sharing on the other, leading McNamara to declare bluntly: "Limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."[6] Kennedy and McNamara wanted to avoid a precedent that induced the FRG into believing that it, too, needed an independent nuclear force.[7] Political reluctance, both in and out of the FRG, for a German nuclear force derived from three reasons, beyond the obvious historical ones: because of the Soviet reaction, it would terminate any arms control prospects and might even be a precipitant to war; in the context of US strategic doctrine, it would be destabilising and violate the requirement for central (i.e. US) control; moreover, it would be a drain on resources that the US wanted to see directed toward meeting Bonn's conventional force goals.

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[6] McNamara's speech, 16 June 1962, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in RIIA, *Documents, 1962*, pp. 369-76. He subsequently qualified his remarks to exclude Britain from that judgement, by virtue of Britain's integration in the NATO force structure.

[7] See Kennedy's 17 December 1962 radio-television interview, in *New York Times*, 18 December 1962. Kennedy met the next day with Macmillan at Nassau. See their joint statement, and RIIA, *Documents, 1962*, pp. 482-84.

While it would not be incorrect to view the early arms control efforts after 1962, the evolution of Bonn's _Ostpolitik_ at least in its relations with Eastern Europe, and the general broadening of East-West contacts in the 1960s as indicative of a Western détente strategy, it would be an exaggeration to consider that the objectives of the policies pursued by Bonn and Washington were fundamentally different from those pursued before Berlin and Cuba. In the public eye, détente was an alternative to the confrontation of the Cold War. Kennedy's "Strategy of Peace" speech in June 1963, in which he announced the beginning of test ban negotiations in Moscow, partly reflected this sentiment when he distinguished between total peace and a "more practical, attainable peace" and urged Americans to re-examine their attitudes toward the Soviet Union: "No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue."[8] But this conception presumed US military strength, allowing a defence of vital interests while avoiding "those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war". It was a strategy of conflict avoidance, on the assumption that military force was not a usable instrument of conflict resolution.

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[8] See note 5, _supra_.

This was not, however, a declaration that the Cold War - or the basic adversary conflict - was at an end. When asked the year before whether the American purpose was détente or victory, Rusk had noted:[9]

> I cannot answer in terms of, say, one year. Freedom is fundamental. Communist dogma is not likely to change. Total victory is possible over the processes of time, but not climactic total victory. That is just not in the cards by a military act. *Détente is not inconsistent*. The question is how to manage the situation with respect to specifics. There are elements in Soviet society that have been able to elbow out areas of freedom.

Indeed, détente was also viewed as an offensive strategy for dealing with that adversary relationship. As the Soviet Union seemed to turn inward to focus on what one analyst described as "communism in one empire",[10] the possibilities for exploiting centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe as a way of revising the *status quo* gained greater attention in the West. This posed a dilemma for both superpowers: in an adversary relationship characterised by a mutual desire to avoid direct confrontation, how did one exploit the diffusion of power in the adversary's alliance while maintaining the solidarity of one's own? We shall return to this in the next chapter as it relates to East-West trade and the development of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*.

Neither was arms control a panacea. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTB), initialled in Moscow on 25 July 1963 by Britain, the US and the USSR, and generally heralded as a cornerstone of détente, is more significant for the narrowness of its application. Kennedy, Rusk and McNamara were at pains to emphasise that it did not represent any real changes in the nature of East-West relations. In his 26 July television address, Kennedy denied that Moscow had made or had been asked to make any concessions:[11]

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[9] In a background press briefing in March 1962, quoted in Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 215. Emphasis added.

[10] See Richard Löwenthal, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and the West: The Soviet Aspect", in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1964), p. 67.

> The treaty is not a milennium. It will not resolve all conflicts or cause the Communists to forego their ambition, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step... toward peace.

Rusk was more blunt when he submitted the treaty to the Senate on 12 August: "This treaty does not rest on the element of trust. The Soviet Union does not trust the United States. We do not trust the Soviet Union. But that is not the point."[12] To counter conservative criticism, McNamara assured the Senators the next day that the "principal direct military effect of the treaty" was the "prolongation of our technical superiority".[13]

In short, what was beginning to be called a détente by outside commentators reflected Washington's view that the security interests of both superpowers were intertwined. What Marshall Shulman was already calling a "limited adversary relationship" was in fact containment at the strategic level, in which the principal medium was not military confrontation but a US attempt to educate both the Soviet Union and the NATO alliance on the prerequisites of a stable military balance. McNamara's emphasis on counterforce as the foundation of the new US strategic doctrine was publicly articulated to give "the opponent an incentive to refrain from hitting our cities".[14] As for the PTB, it did not include underground testing and thereby avoided the contentious issues of inspection, verification and control.

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[11] Quoted in Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University, 1968), p. 279.

[12] US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed Services, and Senate Members, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, p. 5.

[13] Ibid., p. 105.

Nevertheless, the PTB marked the beginning of a new phase in East-West relations. Rostow spoke of the third major effort "to establish whether or not it is possible for the Soviet Union and the West to live together on this planet under conditions of tolerable stability and low tension.[15] In this he reflected Washington's emphasis on crisis-avoidance. Brandt used the occasion to urge similar movement on the German issues:[16]

> Nobody can foretell whether or not the Moscow test ban agreement is the beginning of a new relationship between East and West... There should be a will for more such "beginnings"...

Schröder was more cautious as he interjected Bonn's central qualification to any détente strategy:[17]

> We are now in a phase that is generally being called a phase of relaxation. Whether or not this phase really deserves the name is yet to be seen... In our view relaxation is not synonymous with freezing the *status quo* but means the possibility of trying to get ahead in the German question.

The central question was where this process might lead. In large measure, this was to be determined by the West Germans themselves: the evolution of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* in the 1960s was essentially a reaction to the perceived movement of its allies towards a détente that circumvented the issue of German reunification.

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[14] See note 6, *supra*. Also the discussion in Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (New York: Praeger, 2nd ed., 1965), p. xvi.

[15] See Walt W. Rostow, "The Third Round", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.42 No.1, October 1963), pp. 1-10.

[16] Brandt at the SPD Convention in Hamburg, quoted in *Bulletin*, 3 September 1963.

[17] Schröder's television interview of 16 August, in *Bulletin*, 20 August 1963. For wary endorsements of the PTB, while questioning whether West German concessions would ultimately be required, see editorials in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 18 August 1963.

While Bonn sought its own way out of the immobilism of the 1950s, it was important to avoid a détente which altered the strategic framework in which Bonn could operate. Viewed from Bonn, the combination of a US desire to reach a strategic accommodation with the USSR, the persistent calls for increased NATO European conventional force levels, the constant pressure for decreasing the US economic burden in NATO, Washington's increasing obsession with Southeast Asia, and the apparent willingness to live with a divided Germany - all added up to a danger of disengagement. McNamara's advocacy of strategic centralisation plus Kennedy's articulation of a "Grand Design" based on a partnership between the US and united Europe (including the UK) could also be interpreted as a veiled retreat to the "division of labour" notion advanced by Admiral Radford in the 1950s. Nor was this entirely unjustified, particularly if one took Kennedy's retort to de Gaulle's 14 January 1963 press conference as an imminent possibility:[18]

> The day may come when Europe will not need the United States and its guarantee. I don't think that day has come yet, and we would welcome that. We have no desire to stay in Europe except to participate in the defense of Europe. Once Europe is secure and feels secure, then the United States has 400,000 troops there, and we would, of course, want to bring them home.

From Bonn's point of view, the FRG had to ensure that the US did not one day declare that its vision of a superpower détente had made such a withdrawal possible. As the 1960s wore on, and pressures for troop withdrawals were [illegible], those who advocated a more intensive détente strategy, the association between détente and disengagement took on greater poignance.

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[18] *New York Times*, 15 January 1963. De Gaulle had vetoed British entry into the Common Market and rejected the offer of US Polaris missiles in a NATO MLF, agreed by Kennedy and Macmillan at Nassau. For de Gaulle's press conference, see RIIA, *Documents, 1962*, pp. 487-500.

The parallel concerns of Bonn and Washington - one focused on the revision of the *status quo* to fulfil its national goals, the other on its stabilisation - are often viewed as contradictory. Nonetheless, it does not follow that Washington and Bonn worked at cross purposes. The distinction between détente as a vehicle for revising the *status quo* and one for maintaining it applied perhaps more to French and British views than to US and West German prescriptions. De Gaulle's advocacy of a broad political détente constituted a rejection of American "hegemony" and a desire to create a European solution to Europe's problems.[19] Its implications for Germany, whose reunification would be possible only after the unification of Europe, were most poignantly spelled out by Raymond Aron:[20]

> It would appear now that, after the intermission of the Fourth Republic and the Cold War, it is again a question of establishing peace and equilibrium in Europe thanks to an agreement among the states of Continental Europe, and in particular between the Soviet Union and France. A reunified Germany would have an honourable place in this Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but not the same place as the victors [of the Second World War].

Britain, on the other hand, had, since the 1950s, registered its willingness to create a *modus vivendi* in Central Europe that provided the potential for greater East-West interaction (particularly trade) and to recognise the "realities" of a divided Germany and establish a military détente on that basis.

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[19] See, for example, de Gaulle's press conference of 23 July 1964 and 4 February 1965; more generally, de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal, 1958-1962* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 172-80 and 199-217. Significantly, de Gaulle did not equate arms control with any détente. Also Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974).

[20] In *Le Figaro*, 12 November 1966. By this point, de Gaulle had travelled to Moscow and announced France's withdrawal from the NATO

This Anglo-French dichotomy is undoubtedly oversimplified; in fact, both shared an early willingness to recognise the Oder-Neisse line, deny Bonn access to nuclear weapons, and accept the existence of a divided Germany. More to the point, Bonn and Washington straddled both views. Bonn obviously retained revisionist aspirations for the reunification of Germany, if possible within its prewar boundaries. Yet Bonn did not accept the fundamental revision envisaged by de Gaulle: the elimination of the US as the primary guarantor of European security. As Schröder noted hopefully during the PTB negotiations, the US would protect West German interests because they were also US interests:[21]

> The United States cannot desert Europe, since Europe is indispensable to them. Or it would be better to say as long as Europe is indispensable to them, as long as Europe does not resign itself, as long as Europe wishes for an alliance with the United States and the presence of American troops on this side of the Atlantic... It is this that our political task consists: we must remain as indispensable for the USA as they are for us...

Significantly, elite and public opinion surveys in the early 1960s showed a clear distinction between French and German views on the nature of the international system, with the French emphasising incipient multipolarity and the West Germans stressing the continuity of a bipolar world dominated by the two superpowers. The instrument of alliances and reliance on the US were, for the West Germans, clearly preferable to a more diffuse system.[22]

By the same token, Washington, while in concert with Britain on the priority for a stable *modus vivendi* in Central Europe, was more insistent on the need to preserve Bonn's vital interests - less out of a shared stake in the fulfilment of those interests than out of a need to sustain Bonn's stake in the alliance. Thus, while it is true that Bonn and Washington sought to improve the status quo in different respects, the central feature of this constellation during the 1960s was their desire to secure their mutual ties. On particular issues, Bonn and Washington would differ with respect to the pace and scope of a détente strategy, at times urging each other to make greater efforts at accommodating Soviet demands, at other times urging greater caution in the steps the other was contemplating or believed to be contemplating. The fundamental issue, however, was the preservation of the alliance because of the unique stakes each had within it. The net result, by the end of the decade, was that both Bonn and Washington felt pressure by the other allies to take greater initiatives in the development of a coordinated alliance détente strategy, not only for the benefits of such a strategy, but also for the sake of the alliance itself.

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[21] In a speech to the Iron and Steel Association, 28 June 1963, in Bulletin, 9 July 1963.

[22] Karl W. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 21-24 and 27-28.

This primacy of the alliance - the essential ground rule from the outset - also accounts for the acute sensitivity in Bonn and Washington over what the other was thought to be doing. Washington's efforts were largely focused in the field of arms control and security; Bonn's were directed at the improvement of social and economic interaction between East and West. As such, they were largely independent of each other. With Bonn's failure to resurrect Four Power negotiations on Germany and Berlin as a direct vehicle for obtaining reunification,[23] Bonn could only defer to Washington: the US, besides being the principal guarantor of West German security, was also the principal bargainer on behalf of West German interests. This was especially so since the improvement in the atmosphere of East-West relations did not extend to the specific relations between Bonn and Moscow (and ultimately the rest of the Warsaw Pact). Washington, on the other hand, could only hope that Bonn's unilateral efforts to improve its relations with the East were sufficient to foster a resolution of the issues of European security. Excessive pressures in Bonn for concessions in its vital interests would be counterproductive if it induced a rejuvenated Schaukelpolitik.[24]

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[23] See the 12 October 1962 Bundestag resolution, calling on the allies to seek with the USSR "a permanent conference for solving the German question", in Bulletin, 16 October 1962.

Squaring the interests of the alliance and the specific interests of Bonn and Washington in this period was more easily accomplished in political rhetoric than in actual policy. The issues related not only to security and arms control but also to the growing interaction between East and West that accompanied the perception of a superpower military détente. The latter will be addressed in the next chapter to illustrate the political motivations that animated the developments after 1968. The key issue in the early 1960s remained the relationship between arms control, European security, military strategy in NATO, and the unsolved problem of a divided Germany. Previously, when the East-West agenda was dominated by the issues of Four Power responsibility for Germany and Berlin, the four allied powers coordinated closely, each maintaining a virtual veto in determining allied policy. In the 1960s, that direct control over the process dissipated as East-West discussions avoided the very issues that had provided each ally a veto. This was to facilitate progress at other levels and indeed bore its first fruit with the PTB.

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[24] For indications of Johnson's own views on this count, see Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 28 ff., and Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 392.

Agreement on a partial test ban was possible because it stood alone, despite efforts from a variety of sources to link it to other issues. Macmillan had expressed to Kennedy his hope that Khrushchev could be enticed into a comprehensive test ban by coupling it with a "non-dissemination" agreement on control of nuclear weapons, to him "the real key to the German Problem". He urged it again when Khrushchev suggested linking the PTB with a non-aggression treaty between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[25] While there was little sympathy for a non-aggression treaty which entailed the recognition of the GDR, some supporters of the PTB in the US privately urged that Bonn renounce any nuclear control arrangements, recognise the Oder-Neisse line, and relax the Hallstein Doctrine as a means of facilitating the PTB negotiations.[26]

In rejecting any linkage with the PTB, Kennedy supported Bonn's *Junktim*: no specifically European security arrangements without progress on reunification. He accepted reference to a non-aggression treaty in the final Moscow communiqué, but not in the treaty itself.[27] Other measures posed by Moscow and enjoying sympathy in London, such as an exchange of observation posts across existing demarcation lines, were left to languish in the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). By the same token, Kennedy was not willing to allow Bonn to hinder the PTB by imposing unrealistic conditions. Rusk stopped in Bonn to assure Adenauer and Schröder that any exchange of non-aggression declarations would be linked to guarantees of West Berlin's security and that East German accession to the PTB would not constitute recognition of the GDR.[28] The latter point was Adenauer's major objection to the treaty, as he felt he had not been adequately consulted on the accession arrangements.[29] Reflecting as well an internal debate between Adenauer and Schröder, Bonn's signature of the treaty was deferred until 18 August. This was not without some US pressure, as Bonn's accession to the PTB was viewed by some as a necessary prerequisite to Senate ratification.[30]

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[25] See Harold Macmillan, *Volume VI: At the End of the Day, 1961-1963* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 456-64 for his 16 March 1963 message to Kennedy. Also pp. 480-82.

[26] See, for example, the *Washington Post*, 11 June 1963, editorial.

[27] See RIIA, *Documents, 1963*, p. 170. Kennedy had earlier stated in a press conference that he did not rule out a non-aggression treaty but preferred a separate forum, *Washington Post*, 25 June 1963.

In the aftermath of Berlin, Cuba, and the alliance shocks of the Anglo-American meeting in Nassau and the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, there was little sentiment, especially in Congress, for agreements with Moscow based on West German concessions. Disarmament negotiations stagnated at this point. Khrushchev's proposal to link the PTB with military détente measures in Central Europe were expanded as the ENDC reconvened in early 1964. President Johnson proposed, on 21 January, a "verifiable freeze on strategi launchers" plus a non-proliferation treaty in which nuclear weapons "should not be transferred to the national control of other states".[31] The Soviet counterproposal, on 4 February, reverted to the original notion (to which the PTB was an exception) that such bilateral measures should not be isolated but joined with other agreements, including a ban on nuclear weapons on foreign territory and a phased reduction in all other forces as the first step toward the reduction of ICBMs.[32] Washington ruled out a non-aggression pact because there was no "basis for agreement" and negotiations on troop withdrawals because of "unresolved political problems". This was not simply a deferral to Bonn's persistent demand that "the more important the military détente measures, the stronger must the German question be brought into play".[33] It also reflected Washington's desire to preserve "the present rough balance".[34] That balance was asymmetrical, both by design and by default. Conventional force imbalances nothwithstanding, the US enjoyed a superiority in intercontinental delivery systems, while the USSR enjoyed a superiority in what have since become known as "Eurostrategic" systems: Soviet MRBMs directed at European targets without any commensurate European-based threat to the Soviet Union. The persistent problem with that "balance of imbalances" was - and is - the need to assure the alliance that the US deterrent extended to the forward defence of Europe, for it was this that de Gaulle had long since called into question.

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[28] On the Berlin security and access precondition for a non-aggression declaration, see Baltimore Sun, 20-21 July and New York Times, 11 August 1963.

[29] In fact, the Political Counselor at the US Embassy in Bonn, Martin Hillenbrand, had provided daily briefings since three days before the negotiations began and presented the accession clauses three days before the treaty was initialled. New York Times, 25 July and Baltimore Sun, 5 August 1963. Confirmed in personal interview with Ambassador Hillenbrand.

[30] See New York Herald Tribune, 12 August 1963. Bonn signed the treaty on 18 August; see Bulletin, 20 August 1963. On Bonn's final ratification (unanimous) and deposit of instruments (only in Washington and London because of Moscow's rejection of a Berlin clause), see Bulletin, 9 June and 8 December 1964. The US Senate ratified it on 24 September 1963.

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[31] See Heinrich Siegler, Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit, Vol.III, 1964-1965 (Bonn: Siegler, 1966), pp. 6-7. Emphasis added.

[32] Ibid., pp. 18-19. Similarly, Poland reiterated its proposal for a nuclear free zone in Europe on 26 February; see p. 26. Given US ICBM/SLBM superiority, Moscow was hardly enthusiastic about a freeze on strategic (i.e. intercontinental) delivery systems.

[33] See Schröder's radio interview, 6 October 1963, in Boris Meissner, ed., Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation) (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 57-62.

[34] See the speeches at the ENDC by the head of the US delegation and ACDA Director, William C. Foster, 11 February and 10 September 1964, in Siegler, op.cit., Vol.III, pp. 21-23 and 108-10.

The primary manifestation of this problem was the debate over the MLF, a proposal shelved by Kennedy in 1961 but restored in late 1962 to serve simultaneously a multitude of purposes: to provide a medium for greater NATO integration; to serve as an alternative to independent nuclear deterrents, especially France's; to provide Bonn with a sense of participation in alliance nuclear affairs; to preempt any presumed desire in West Germany for a "Gaullist" nuclear position; and to advance the prospects of a non-proliferation agreement with Moscow. The importance of the last point was indicated at the 30 May 1962 Ambassadorial Steering meeting in Washington after the abortive Berlin proposal: Washington's "draft principles" included provision for "non-nuclear states to renounce possession or control of atomic weapons and acquisition of information, equipment and materials for their construction".[35] But it was also clear that the prospect of any West German control over nuclear weapons under any kind of alliance sharing arrangement was vociferously opposed by Moscow. Soviet speeches were vehement in their charges of West German revanchism; Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin told Foster in July 1964 that if the US would abandon the MLF, Moscow would sign a non-proliferation treaty the next morning.[36]

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[35] Cited in Wilhelm G. Grewe, Rückblenden, 1976-1951 (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), p. 564. See also Rostow, Diffusion of Power, pp. 243-46, for a discussion of Washington's anti-de Gaulle motivations. Rostow was then head of the State Department's Policy Planning Council.

Kennedy's resort to the MLF was an unfortunate choice in dealing with the complex - and essentially political - issues that faced the alliance. Kissinger had urged that the US support a "modest" French nuclear force in the interests of the alliance, but Kennedy disavowed any association with his advisor's views.[37] Kissinger's subsequent criticisms of the MLF centered on the point that it prematurely and unnecessarily raised West German nuclear ambitions.[38] The underlying problem with the MLF was that it could conceivably fulfil the objectives placed upon it only in the abstract; as a military hardware solution, however, the closer one got to specifying its characteristics, the more it exacerbated all the problems it was designed to solve. When considered in the context of the Nassau agreement with Macmillan, it could be viewed as an integration of existing NATO nuclear forces without any nuclear power surrendering its own control - more like the British concept of a multinational force which could conceivably accommodate French demands - or it could be viewed as an allied nuclear force including the participation of non-nuclear powers. It was the latter that the West Germans desired because the former too much resembled a tripartite nuclear "directorate" that highlighted Bonn's secondary status in the alliance. The latter, however, was unacceptable to both Paris and London. Moreover, to the extent that one actually extended physical control to Bonn, it was unlikely to meet Congressional or even Executive approval in Washington.[39]

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[36] Oral History Interview, William C. Foster, John F. Kennedy Library, Harvard University, p. 38. This did not necessarily hold true. Foster's deputy Adrian Fisher testified in June 1966 that the "European clause" which provided for a potential MLF was not the real obstacle to Soviet agreement on an NPT: US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: United States Policy Toward Europe (and Related Matters), 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1966, pp. 217-59. Moscow was equally hostile to the Franco-German treaty because it unjustifiably feared Franco-German nuclear cooperation.

[37] See Henry A. Kissinger, "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense", Foreign Affairs (Vol.40 No.4, July 1962), pp. 515-41. See also Roberts, op.cit., pp. 213-14.

[38] Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), pp. 142-44.

Kennedy viewed the MLF primarily as an instrument to bind Bonn to an Atlanticist concept of NATO integration. Its acceptance by Bonn reflected a comparable West German desire to bind the US to NATO. No one in Bonn disputed Adenauer's admonition that "we must under no circumstances release the United States from the defensive alliance".[40] It was generally accepted, as Schröder warned at Athens, that a principal objective of the renewed Soviet emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" was to split the FRG from NATO and effect a withdrawal of US forces from Europe.[41] As for the Gaullist suggestion of a European "Third Force", "emancipated" from the US, Schröder called it "short-sighted".[42] Even Strauss rejected such a European Third Force if it meant "an isolated Fortress America".[43] Thus, when Under Secretary of State George Ball met with Adenauer on 14 January 1963 to offer the MLF - a meeting which was interrupted by Adenauer's aide to give him the transcript of de Gaulle's press conference - Adenauer accepted the MLF forthwith.[44] In the next week, Kennedy wrote to Adenauer to confirm his desire to move on the MLF "with utmost vigor", and Rusk stated Washington's willingness to proceed even without France.[45]

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[39] See the statement by Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in Washington Post, 16 November 1965.

[40] Adenauer's interview in Die Welt, 17 May 1962.

[41] Bulletin, 8 May 1962.

[42] Bulletin, 12 June 1962.

[43] Bulletin, 26 June 1962.

In effect the revitalisation of the MLF created a political symbol - beyond any military merit it may or may not have possessed - of the continuing cohesion of the alliance, the US commitment to Europe, and the broader integration of the FRG in the alliance. But the ensuing debate, flavoured by a "France vs. US" choice for West Germany, was fundamentally disruptive. Adenauer's acceptance had been one of principle; increasingly he, with Strauss, von Brentano, Gerstenmaier and von Guttenberg (CSU) urged a European nuclear force (still integrated in NATO) to keep from alienating France.[46] That this group became labelled "Gaullists" was unfortunate, since it added to the perception outside Germany that they were anti-American. More accurately, they retained the original vision of a West Germany securely embedded, on an equal basis, in an integrated Western Europe

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[44] Personal interview with Ambassador Grewe, who was present at the meeting.

[45] Rostow, op.cit., p. 247, and New York Times, 23 January 1963. See also Dieter Mahncke, Nukleare Mitwirkung: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Atlantischen Allianz, 1954-1970 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), pp. 133 ff.

[46] See Franz-Josef Strauss, The Grand Design (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), and Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Wenn der Westen will (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1964). Surveys in the FRG in 1963-1965 showed only 6% in favour of a European nuclear force independent of NATO and 80% opposed. The MLF was not enthusiastically received either: 34% in the FRG favoured and 34% opposed it. See Deutsch, op.cit., pp. 58 ff.

- not exactly the same vision as de Gaulle's.[47] While the American nuclear guarantee remained vital, Franco-German rapprochement was no less so, since the prospect of France alienated from the Western alliance, pursuing "traditional" relations with Moscow, would destroy any chances of reunification and threaten the FRG.[48]

The majority view in Bonn was not so much a rejection of the "Gaullist" position but a recognition that de Gaulle's vision was no more likely to lead to the kind of integrated Europe that Bonn wanted. More important, it might lead to the withdrawal of the US. Thus, Erhard, Schröder, and the new Defence Minister, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, supported FDP and SPD proposals to attach a preamble to the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 22 January 1963 that articulated their support for the US commitment to Europe, collective defence in NATO, European unification including the UK, and the elimination of trade barriers between the EEC, US and UK.[49] However relieved Washington may have been by this support from Bonn, it again indicated Bonn's dependence on the US for the fulfilment of its foreign policy goals, a dependence that placed commensurate reponsibilities on Washington that complicated Washington's own inclinations. The alienation of France was virtually complete and undoubtedly contributed to de Gaulle's unilateral efforts to reach a political détente with Moscow. Moreover, the MLF was the embodiment of Bonn's preference for an Atlanticist "Grand Design" and the symbol of its fidelity to the US. Once offered as a symbol of integration, its abandonment - like the withdrawal of US troops despite a demonstration of rapid transatlantic airlift capability - was a symbol of disengagement.[50]

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[47] See the discussion based on elite surveys, May-October 1964, in Lewis J. Edinger, "Patterns of German Elite Opinions", Part II of Deutsch, Edinger et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Scribners, 1967), pp. 180-83.

[48] See Adenauer's speech in defence of the Franco-German Treaty, 25 April 1965, in Bulletin, 7 May 1963.

[49] For the Franco-German Treaty, see RIIA, Documents, 1962, pp. 435-38. For the preamble, approved by the Bundestag, 16 May 1963, with four dissenting and four abstaining votes, see RIIA, Documents, 1963, pp. 54-55. For the Bundestag debates, see Bulletin, 5, 12 February; 7, 21 May 1963. Also F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (London: Oxford University, 2nd ed., 1968), pp. 310-18. Paris dubbed the preamble as "alien" to French foreign policy.

Bonn's position was not essentially different from that which it had held in the 1950s, although it became increasingly difficult to maintain. The original _Junktim_ remained as in 1957, with the restored assumption that the division of Germany was the cause of tension, the removal of which was the central condition for détente:[51]

> We say "yes" to détente, with corresponding steps to remove the causes of tension... We say "no" to anything which could strengthen the _status quo_. We say "yes" to worldwide, controlled disarmament. We say "no" to disarmament measures which are limited only to Germany or diminish Western strength. We say "yes" to a coupling of steps toward disarmament with steps toward the right of self-determination... We must make it perfectly clear that the Federal Republic of Germany is no opponent of efforts toward détente.

Yet in an atmosphere of apparent détente, it was not enough to accept assurances that the West would "undertake no move that could lead to a cementing of the present partition of Europe".[52] The pressures for movement both in and out of the FRG demanded more than Schröder's - or Kissinger's - consolation that at least Moscow would be the clear cause of failure. As long as Moscow blocked reunification, the belief grew that it was Moscow with which Bonn had to deal. Fearing this, Adenauer wrote to Khrushchev in mid-1962 proposing a ten-year "political truce" on the German question, after which a plebiscite could be held, providing that East Germany had been allowed "greater freedom than exists now".[53]

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[50] For "Atlanticist" warnings, see Kurt Birrenbach, _The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership_ (New York: Praeger, 1963); Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Détente through Firmness", _Foreign Affairs_ (Vol.42 No.2, January 1964), pp. 184-94; and Theo Sommer, "For an Atlantic Future", _Foreign Affairs_ (Vol.43 No.1, October 1964), pp. 112-25. For an early indication of Bonn's sensitivity to the prospect of troop withdrawals, even of those deployed during the Berlin Crisis, see _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_ editorials, 21 October and 1 November 1963. Kennedy had to intervene personally to assure Bonn and stop the withdrawals; see _Baltimore Sun_, 21 October; _New York Times_, 22 October; and _New York Herald Tribune_, 3 November 1963.

[51] 14 September 1963 radio speech by Rainer Barzel (CDU), Minister for All-German Questions, in Meissner, ed., _op.cit._, pp. 55-56.

Bonn's justified reluctance to pursue an Alleingang with Moscow as Khrushchev had proposed meant that any progress on reunification remained the obligation of the Four Powers. Bonn took every opportunity to remind them of that obligation. When Rusk was on his way to Moscow to sign the PTB, Schröder proposed allied discussions on Four-Power investiture of an all-German commission to consider German reunification, essentially based on the 1959 Herter and 1962 Rusk packages. He raised the issue at the UN in September, but received only "assurances that both Britain and the United States share their ally's view that Germany's partition is one of the causes of East-West tension".[54] Notably, France did not subscribe to that view. Before the NATO Ministerial in the Hague in May 1964, Schröder again proposed a diplomatic overture to Moscow on reunification, but the communiqué only noted that "any possibility should be grasped" to effect reunification:[55]

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[52] Averill Harriman in New Yor.: Times Magazine, 25 August 1963, cited in Bulletin, 27 August 1963. Also the essence of the first Johnson-Erhard communiqué, New York Times, 30 December 1963.

[53] Adenauer announced this unanswered offer on 3 October 1963. See the text in Meissner, ed., op.cit., p. 57.

[54] Joint communiqué from Schröder, Rusk and Lord Home, 27 September 1963, in Bulletin, 1 October 1963.

> The Ministers will again consider the different possibilities and consult with their governments. The discussions were taken up again in the Ambassadorial Group.

In December, when Schröder proposed that the allies approach Moscow on "procedures" for a Four Power Conference on Germany, there was not even a non-committal communiqué.[56]

Part of the problem was French unwillingness to accommodate Bonn at a time when Bonn was clinging to the US and the MLF and de Gaulle was emphasising the "natural affinity" between France and Russia.[57] In May 1965, Paris would not consent to an explicit endorsement of German reunification in the allied "Germany Declaration"; the declaration referred neither to Bonn's claim that Germany's border should be considered only after a peace treaty was signed with a reunified Germany, nor to Bonn's claim of Alleinvertretungsrecht.[58] French opposition notwithstanding, neither the US nor Britain were anxious to engage in Four Power negotiations on Germany and Berlin unless there was prospect for agreement. Moreover, given the Soviet attitude, any immediate prospect for agreement depended on Bonn's willingness to make concessions. Thus, when Johnson and Erhard had their first meeting in Texas in December 1963, each proposed that the other take the initiative.[59] French dissension, however, provided an impasse equal to that of Moscow's. By 1965, the call for Four Power negotiations had become a matter of ritual, while bilateral US-Soviet "exploratory talks" continued. Relations between Bonn and Washington focused on the contentious issues of alliance defence and burden sharing.

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[55] Auswärtiges Amt, Die Bemühungen der deutschen Regierung und ihrer Verbündeten um die Einheit Deutschlands, 1955-1966 (Bonn, April 1966), p. 483.

[56] For Schröder's speech and Erhard's reminder of the allies' obligations, see Bulletin, 22 December 1964. On the antagonism between Schröder and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, see Josef Joffe, "Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Politics of Dependence, 1961-1968", in William C. Cromwell et al., Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership: National Perspectives (Bruges: College of Europe, 1969), p. 341.

[57] De Gaulle's phrase in a farewell speech to the retiring Soviet Ambassador to Paris; see Willis, op.cit., pp. 334-35.

[58] For the Tripartite Germany Declaration of 12 May 1965, see Auswärtiges Amt, op.cit., p. 533. Compare with the 26 June 1964 declaration, following the USSR-GDR Friendship Treaty and Erhard's decision to meet with Khrushchev, which was much stronger and explicit in endorsing all of Bonn's claims, pp. 495-96. Also the discussion in Charles R. Planck, The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy, 1955-1966 (Washington: Studies in International Affairs No.4, Johns Hopkins University, 1967), pp. 48-54.

The deadlock on a Four Power approach to reunification, while not surprising to Bonn, generated anxiety about the West German position because of simultaneous US troop withdrawals and declining enthusiasm for the MLF. An earlier attempt to withdraw troops in 1963 had been vetoed by Kennedy because of the vociferous West German reaction at a time when Bonn was deliberating on the PTB.[60] Yet those plans were only deferred; McNamara announced on 10 April 1964 the withdrawal of 7500 troops deployed during the Berlin crisis, a decision justified by Johnson as "routine".[61] Partly out of inertia and partly to placate Bonn, the MLF retained its priority: at their second meeting in June, Johnson and Erhard agreed that an MLF accord would be signed "by the end of the year".[62] Erhard had the day before announced that he had agreed to meet Khrushchev in early 1965; it seems likely that he felt an MLF agreement would provide him with a better "position of strength".

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[59] Washington Post, 3 January 1964 and New York Times, 5 January 1964.

[60] See Oral History Interview, Roswell L. Gilpatrick, John F. Kennedy Library, Harvard University, pp. 83-84, plus the press reports cited in note 50, supra.

[61] Johnson's interview in the West German weekly, Quick, 3 May 1964, in Siegler, op.cit., Vol.III, pp. 54-55.

By October 1964, however, the setting had changed. Within the space of one week, Brezhnev and Kosygin replaced Khrushchev, Peking detonated its first atomic advice, Harold Wilson formed a Labour government in Britain, and Erhard announced that he would join the US alone in an MLF. The last element was out of step, leading to French threats of non-cooperation in the Common Market. Wilson was opposed to the MLF as a "fatal provocation" to any détente.[63] His proposal of an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) when he met with Johnson in early December was designed to scuttle the MLF. Johnson, meanwhile, was reassessing the MLF in light not only of domestic political opposition (in ACDA, the Pentagon and key Democratic Senators) but also of allied opposition, including an assessment from the Ambassador to Bonn, George C. McGhee, of West German ambivalence.[64] The result was a non-decision, whose net effect was a slow death-by-neglect for the MLF, eventually to be superseded by permanent FRG membership in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) as a means of providing an "appropriate share in nuclear defence".[65]

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[62] New York Times, 12 June 1964.

[63] See Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 41-49.

[64] See Geyelin, op.cit., pp. 164-74.

[65] This phrase, from the December 1965 Johnson-Erhard communiqué, remained the agreed formulation: Washington Post, 23 December 1965. The McNamara "Select Committee" proposed in May 1965 became permanent in December 1966. See Mahncke, op.cit., pp. 211-28 and Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University, 1975), chapters 9 and 10.

In essence, the nuclear sharing problem reverted to the "three essentials" listed by Strauss in April 1962: information, security guarantees, and a "certain amount of co-determination". The National Security Council decision after the Wilson meeting, leaked to the press by Johnson, was only that the US would not press for an early MLF agreement but would examine ways of resolving allied interests with the need for a US veto and the interests of non-proliferation.[66] Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick's November 1964 arms control study commission recommended that the MLF be sacrificed in the interests of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), but that step was deferred - along with the publication of the commission's findings - until 1966.[67] There were three reasons for this. First, Johnson was primarily concerned about the effect in Bonn and on the alliance in general, in light both of a perceived Gaullist alternative and continued Soviet attacks on Bonn. In fact there was a broad spectrum of opinion in the FRG on the MLF throughout 1965, although Bonn still officially urged some "physical form" of integrated nuclear defence.[68] The other two reasons were even more compelling for Johnson. At least until late 1965, with growing problems in Southeast Asia, Congressional opinion was generally pessimistic about any détente with Moscow; Johnson was not a politician who fought battles he did not think he could win. Thus, Congressional opposition to nuclear sharing did not necessarily translate into enthusiasm for disarmament measures affecting alliance interests. Finally, Moscow's position in Geneva denied non-nuclear states "the right to participate in the ownership, control, or use of nuclear weapons", a formula that jeopardised existing two-key systems and perhaps alliance consultative mechanisms such as the NPG.[69]

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[66] New York Times, 13 December 1964; also Rostow, op.cit., p. 393.

[67] New York Times, 1 July 1966. See Mahncke, op.cit., pp. 214 ff. Its conclusion was reprinted in the Washington Post, 17 July 1965, but Rusk denied it represented US policy.

[68] See Theo Sommer, "The Objectives of Germany", in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 39-54, for a summary analysis.

Despite the growing consensus that the MLF was defunct, it became clear that Bonn's position on an NPT was not solely determined by a desire for a "hardware" solution to alliance nuclear sharing. In the context of the German Junktim, any disarmament or arms control measures directly affecting German interests remained subject to progress toward fulfilling German national goals. Like Adenauer, Schröder believed in "no concessions without counter-concessions":[70]

> If [German security will be satisfied] through the form of a Multilateral Atlantic Deterrent Force or a similar solution, Germany could renounce vis-à-vis her allies the acquisition of her own nuclear weapons. Should the Soviet Union be prepared... to agree to essential and irrevocable steps toward German reunification, the security question would change. The accession of an all-Germany to a worldwide agreement would be possible.

This, however, was an application of the Junktim that Washington was not prepared to make. Reunification was an unacceptable negotiating objective. Moreover, the image of Bonn threatening, even indirectly, the eventual acquisition of its own nuclear weapons made many even in the FRG uncomfortable.[71]

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[69] Lyndon B. Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 477-78; Rostow, op.cit., pp. 377-99; and Geyelin, op.cit., p. 151.

[70] Interview by Schröder in Düsseldorfer Nachrichten, 9 July 1965, in Siegler, op.cit., Vol.III, pp. 246-47. Emphasis added. Similarly, the statements by Heinrich Krone, Chairman of the Federal Defence Council, in Bulletin, 27 July 1965 and 25 January 1966.

Washington was prepared to preserve Bonn's strategic interests in the form of nuclear consultation arrangements in the alliance and continued, in its 17 August 1965 draft NPT, to provide for an eventual MLF/ANF by prohibiting the transfer of control only to "states" and not increasing the total number of nuclear powers.[72] This overrode a previous British draft which prohibited the transfer of control, even indirectly, to nations or "groups of nations".[73] Moreover, despite the Soviet draft treaty of 24 September 1965 which was directed against the MLF but still threatened existing joint control arrangements, the US continued to argue that an alliance nuclear sharing solution would actually constitute greater control over proliferation and be in Moscow's interests.[74] Washington was also willing to support a more restricted version of the Junktim: no European security arrangements linked to disarmament without progress on reunification. Moscow's advocacy of a European security conference and a corresponding resolution on liquidating foreign bases, was countered by a repeat of Johnson's January 1964 proposals, involving only bilateral strategic issues.[75]

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[71] See, for example, Die Zeit, 5 November 1965, which warned that insistence on the MLF would only impair the basis for "overcoming" Germany's division. Also the discussion in W.B. Bader, "Nuclear Weapons Sharing and 'The German Problem'", Foreign Affairs (Vol.44 No.4, July 1966), pp. 693-700.

[72] New York Times, 18 August 1965.

[73] Baltimore Sun, 27 July 1965.

[74] On the Soviet draft and accompanying memorandum, see ACDA, op.cit., p. 84. US delegate Adrian Fisher's comments in Geneva in March 1966 echoed the argument of Zbigniew Brzezinski in "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence", Foreign Affairs (Vol.43 No.1, October 1964), pp. 126-34.

A non-proliferation agreement clearly took greater priority than progress on reunification, and the MLF was not to be retained as a bargaining lever for that purpose. Comments by Senators Robert F. Kennedy and Frank Church, Foster, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Gilpatrick, reflected a general consensus on that point.[76] On 24 September 1966, Rusk and Gromyko met at the UN and agreed on a formula for prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons or their control; the essential wording of Articles I and II of the NPT was agreed by 5 December and briefed by Rusk to the NATO allies a week later. In effect, it ruled out any multilateral co-ownership scheme, but it did not, in the unchallenged US interpretation, "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members".[77]

This agreement on the operative principles of non-proliferation - numerous other aspects remained to be worked out before the treaty was signed on 1 July 1968 - occurred against a backdrop of growing US involvement in Southeast Asia, de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure, and deepening economic difficulties in the US, UK and the FRG which placed Bonn in a difficult position. Five weeks after de Gaulle's announcement that France would withdraw by 1 July 1966, McNamara announced the "temporary withdrawal" of 15,000 troops from the FRG, a decision which Bonn discovered through the press.[78] A month later, von Hassel advised McNamara of Bonn's budget difficulties and its inability to meet fully its pledge to offset US troop costs by military purchases by 31 December; McNamara threatened to reduce US forces in proportion to the offset deficit.[79] Amidst reports of further withdrawals, Mansfield introduced his first Senate resolution calling for "substantial reductions" in US forces in Europe, citing a reduced Soviet threat to Central Europe.[80] Britain similarly hoped to withdraw 14,000 troops unless Bonn increased offset payments.

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[75] For the US and Soviet ENDC resolutions of 1 June 1964, see Siegler, op.cit., Vol.III, pp. 206-08 and 210-12.

[76] Kennedy's 23 June 1965 speech in the Senate, in Siegler, op.cit., Vol.III, pp. 232-36; Frank Church, "US Policy and the 'New Europe'", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.43 No.4, July 1965), pp. 587-601; McNamara before the Senate Government Operations Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 21 June 1966, in Henry M. Jackson, ed., *The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 259 ff.; Bundy, former National Security Advisor to Johnson, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *United States Policy Toward Europe*, 20 June 1966, p. 10.

[77] See ACDA, op.cit., pp. 84-85; for these interpretations, pp. 90-94; also Johnson, op.cit., pp. 477-79. Rostow, op.cit., p. 394, notes that Gromyko was clear on this interpretation in September, but written assurances to Bonn were not conveyed by Washington until 29 March 1967. This was in lieu of a "Europe clause" in the NPT itself. See Patrick William Murphy, *The Response of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Challenge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1974), pp. 155, 398.

By April 1967, the offset problem had found an interim solution in tripartite Anglo-American-German negotiations that allowed for some troop reductions plus Bonn's assistance in maintaining the strength of the dollar.[81] Its broader significance, however, was that Bonn had been forced to yield in the face of allied demands, without gaining any direct allied support for its own national goals while the allies pursued policies that at least potentially jeopardised what Bonn saw as its vital interests. The offset problem was more than just symbolic of the demands placed on Bonn to further allied interests in pursuit of détente. As Rostow noted:[82]

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[78] Washington Post, 13 April 1966.

[79] Washington Post, 17 May 1966; New York Times, 6 June 1966. For critical replies, see Die Welt, 14 June 1966 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 June 1966.

[80] On the perspectives of what he called the "potential isolationist coalition" in the Senate, see Rostow, op.cit., p. 396. For Senate Resolution 49, supported by 44 Senators, plus amendments, see US Senate, Combined Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: United States Troops in Europe, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, pp. 1-4.

[81] For details, see Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Combined Subcommittee, United States Troops in Europe, pp. 78 ff., plus Rusk's 3 May 1967 testimony, pp. 63 ff. For its effect on force levels, see Horst Mendershausen, Troop Stationing in Germany: Value and Cost (RAND Memorandum RM-5881-PR, December 1968).

> There was a less well understood corollary to this linkage of security and monetary policy in the alliance... German support for the dollar was tied implicitly to American steadfastness as a NATO ally in much the same way as German support for the NPT.

In June 1966, de Gaulle travelled to Moscow to advocate a political détente. He was disappointed in that Moscow seemed more concerned with collective security arrangements which de Gaulle believed should be the end rather than the beginning of a détente relationship.[83] Despite de Gaulle's continued support for reunification, it was clear that such a prospect could only be the product of détente rather than its condition. Likewise, Johnson's "bridge-building" speech of 7 October 1966 was viewed as an endorsement of that view, amidst press and public commentaries urging that he articulate that point clearly.[84]

The view that détente should precede reunification was not, as we shall see, new or even alien to West German thinking both in and out of the government. But that is less relevant than the fact that it struck a raw nerve in the FRG, where, as Kissinger warned, the "psychological margin" was considerably less than the economic one.[85] Rusk had earlier echoed Kennedy's retort to de Gaulle:[86]

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[82] Rostow, op.cit., p. 397.

[83] See a French official's comments, New York Times, 26 June 1966.

[84] New York Times, 8 October 1966. See also New York Times, 22 June 1966, and Frank Church, op.cit.

[85] See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Policy Toward Europe, 27 June 1966, pp. 160-61.

[86] Television interview, 3 January 1965, in Department of State

> Now, if some of these political questions such as Germany and Berlin can be settled *or can be made clear that they are not going to be made the subject of a crisis*, and there can be some easing off of the military confrontation of the two power groups, then perhaps this matter [of troop reductions] can be reviewed.

Actually, Rusk's comments were in reference to a Soviet suggestion of *mutual* troop reductions. But by 1966, it increasingly looked like those reductions were to occur regardless of any East-West agreement. Instead of a formula for *mutual* disengagement, détente seemed to imply unilateral disengagement.

The events of 1966 represented a *perceived* dead end in the West German approach to its foreign affairs. Having survived the traumas of the early 1960s, Bonn had tilted toward the US as the alliance seemed to fragment, only to find that it had still not resolved the dilemma of its position and could not look to Washington to do so. More to the point, the allies - including Washington - *looked to Bonn to solve* its own problems, albeit within limits. Equally important, an increasing consensus within the FRG believed likewise. The FDP had long urged greater West German initiatives in the face of allied unwillingness to press for Four Power negotiations on Germany:[87]

> The travels of Chancellor Erhard to France, the United States and England make good sense, but they do not and cannot serve the aim of German unity.

Brandt likewise believed: "Nothing will move if the Germans themselves don't move."[88] The FDP's withdrawal from the coalition on 27 October 1966, leading to Erhard's demise, was ostensibly precipitated by irreconcilable budgetary pressures. More broadly, it reflected a deeper Angst within West Germany, to which the rise of the neo-Nazi NDP gave evidence even if it did not represent the direction Bonn would take.[89]

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[87] Bundestag Vice President Thomas Dehler on 18 January 1964, in Meissner, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 75. Similarly FDP leader Erich Mende's commentary in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 January 1965.

[88] Quoted in *New York Times*, 30 April 1966. This included not only concessions on boundaries - see the SPD declaration cited in *Baltimore Sun*, 17 May 1966 - but also SPD willingness to scrap the MLF in favour of an NPT. See Brandt in *Washington Post*, 17 July 1965, and Helmut Schmidt's 17 February 1966 interview with the Associated Press, in Karl Bauer, *Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik, 1947-1967: Dokumente und Kommentare* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1968), p. 54.

At the end of 1966, there was a growing consensus that the potential for a real détente existed, but there was also concern that the process was in danger of destroying the alliance. These two views provided the impetus for alliance deliberations which led to the Harmel Report of December 1967. Moreover, the FRG was generally viewed as an impediment to détente. Bonn's past Ostpolitik had served past purposes but served them no longer. The CDU recognised "the magnitude of the tasks ahead of us" but likewise was not sanguine about Bonn's "capacity to cope with them, which is not limitless".[90] The Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD was a transition - necessary if also painful - to the SPD-FDP coalition after 1969. It succeeded in probing those limits, in the process shaping the parameters of both European and superpower détentes that followed. With the FRG's political divisions incorporated in the same government, Bonn tried to reconcile those divisions, reverse its negative image, and ensure that any détente fulfilled German interests, even if those interests had to be redefined.

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[89] The NDP gained 8 seats in Hesse and 15 seats in Bavaria in 1966 Land elections. See Bulletin, 8 November and 6 December 1966. Also Stuart Drummond, "West Germany: Land Elections, the NPD, and the Grand Coalition", The World Today (Vol.XXIII, September1967), pp. 385-95.

[90] Schröder to the CDU Party Congress at Bochum, in Bulletin, 31 May 1966.

CHAPTER 13

"Peaceful Engagement" and the Evolving Ostpolitik

To a large extent, 1966 represented a more significant milestone in the development of Western détente strategy than did 1969. The political basis for the "era of negotiations" after 1969 was largely inherited, including, significantly, the willingness of the USSR to engage in those negotiations on terms acceptable to the West. The definition of what terms would be acceptable in Bonn and Washington had evolved slowly. As this discussion will suggest, that evolution occurred within the context of a changing alliance and was largely dictated by the need to preserve that alliance.

Bonn's persistent demands for a Four Power Conference on Germany had been to no avail. Yet, in early 1966, the Erhard government continued to assert that the division of Germany was a cause of East-West tension, the resolution of which was a Four Power - not a German - responsibility; any steps toward détente had to incorporate progress toward German reunification and at least avoid discriminating against German national interests. In a major White Paper detailing the West's efforts to achieve reunification, the Foreign Office noted:[1]

> The reunification of Germany has not been reached. Many have asserted that German policy up to now has failed and that a whole new policy is required. This judgement is false. The policy up to now has not yet led to a result. But the way the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies have chosen is the right way. It must be continued...

Success, however, could only be posited in negative terms: Moscow had not succeeded in communising all of Germany, separating Berlin from the FRG, gaining recognition of East Germany, or splitting Bonn from its allies.

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[1] Auswärtiges Amt, Die Bemühungen der deutschen Regierung und ihren Verbündeten um die Einheit Deutschlands, 1955-1966 (Bonn, April 1966), pp. 5-6.

If the primary obstacle to reunification remained Moscow, the prescription for dealing with that obstacle was at issue. A stalemate on reunification was more palatable in the 1950s when the object of Bonn's policy was to secure its position in the West with corresponding Western obligations to pursue reunification as a precondition to détente. It was not acceptable when Western integration had clearly stalled in the face of raison d'état and indeed gave evidence of fragmentation; the allies no longer viewed the division of Germany as a cause of tension but a lingering symptom. The "classical concept" of reunification through free elections under Four Power agreement, as Grewe advised the cabinet in late 1965, had been "suitable as an instrument of diplomatic and propagandistic battle *against the Soviet policy on Germany*"; regardless whether it had ever had a chance of practical success, it was no longer a realistic concept because its maintenance required, at a minimum, the continued rhetorical support of the allies. Moreover, to the extent that Bonn pressed for reunification, it not only hampered any alliance détente strategy but also isolated Bonn within the alliance.[2]

Much of the debate in the 1960s revolved around the seemingly esoteric argument regarding the relationship between détente and reunification. Reunification remained a zero-sum-game issue. Yet, unlike the decade before, the allies were unwilling to defer arms control or increasing interaction with the East in the name of reunification. Those who urged measures toward East-West détente generally did so with the argument that détente was a necessary precondition to any format for German unity. But if détente were to be a precursor to reunification, then it could create expectations in the FRG that might go unfulfilled. Détente was also a means of stabilising the status quo and as such was not demonstrably a sufficient precondition to reunification: if détente could be achieved without German reunification, that would demonstrate that the division of Germany was not a cause of tension. It was not clear how or why reunification would then be any more acceptable, negotiable, or even necessary.

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[2] See Wilhelm G. Grewe, Rückblenden 1976-1951 (Berlin: Propyläen, 1979), pp. 244 ff. (footnote 13). For a similar analysis, but a different conclusion, see Karl Kaiser's three part "Die Deutsche Frage - Rekapituliert", in Frankfurter Hefte: Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik (Vol.20 No.11, November 1965; Vol.20 No.12, December 1965; Vol.21 No.1, January 1966), pp. 752-62, 861-70 and 40-56 respectively.

A potential resolution of this dilemma was the theory of "small steps": limited measures designed to improve the atmosphere of East-West relations. In January 1958, both the SPD and FDP had proposed legislation to establish diplomatic relations with Poland; in November 1959, the SPD similarly urged "diplomatic relations at the earliest possible date" with all East European states. Not until May 1961 did the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs agree to a resolution, adopted unanimously in the Bundestag on 14 June, that requested the Government:[3]

> ...to pursue, together with its allies, a policy vis-à-vis the East that has as its goal the re-establishment of a free and united Germany... To this end the Federal Government should avail itself of every opportunity that offers for achieving a normalisation of the relations between the Federal Republic and the East European States, without abandoning vital interests...

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[3] Emphasis added. For this resolution, the SPD and FDP motions, and the accompanying report of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Wenzel Jaksch (rapporteur), Germany and Eastern Europe: Two Documents of the Third German Bundestag, 1961 (Bonn: Atlantic-Forum, 1962).

This was less a mandate than a compromise formulation. The Hallstein Doctrine and non-recognition of the GDR remained intact. Not until the Grand Coalition did the Hallstein Doctrine become modified to allow diplomatic recognition of East European states, by which time Poland had made recognition of the Oder-Neisse line a precondition to diplomatic relations, a condition which the CDU/CSU found unacceptable.[4]

While the Berlin Crisis had contributed to Adenauer's ability to resist SPD and FDP pressures, its termination intensified advocacy for a new Ostpolitik. Even before the Berlin Wall, the Committee had pointed out the weakness of Bonn's position:[5]

> It is impossible for us to regard Eastern Europe as a political and historical no-man's-land, while it plays a substantial role in our Allies' assessment of world politics...
>
> Exchange relations between Germany and the East European countries should at least keep step with the development of the relations between America and Russia.

Implicitly, the Committee recognised that détente in the form of a normalisation of relations with Eastern Europe could contribute to reunification, as argued by Britain and the US.

Just as the allies pursued arms control measures that circumvented the intractable issues of European security, Bonn pursued a cautious policy, under Foreign Minister Schröder, to circumvent East German and Soviet opposition to reunification. Since diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe remained barred by a self-imposed restriction, the Politik der Bewegung ("Policy of Movement") aimed at improving economic and cultural relations to overcome the perception of a revanchist Germany:[6]

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[4] The Hallstein Doctrine was modified in connection with the Geburtsfehler ("birthmark" or "congenital defect") theory, allowing recognition of states which, by virtue of Soviet domination, had no choice but to recognise the GDR. It was suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith in "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe", Foreign Affairs (Vol.39 No.4, July 1961), p. 646, and urged by FDP leader Mende in 1965; see Die Zeit, 2 July 1965 for a review of the FRG debate.

[5] Jaksch, op.cit., pp. 19 and 21. Emphasis added.

> Certainly, all of this can only be a beginning... We Germans live in the middle of Europe, and our divided people suffer under the East-West division more than other European peoples. It is thus our task, despite all opposition on the other side, to build bridges and to overcome, as much as possible, the division of Europe.

It was also responsive to external pressures, in that it sought to do more than simply oppose Soviet demands for a recognition of the status quo:[7]

> Détente only makes sense for us if it leads to a positive change in the status quo... A change in the status quo cannot be achieved only by standing still. We must see whether we can find a hole in the Soviet position that we can widen.

With improved relations with Eastern Europe, and accompanying economic benefits, Schröder hoped to generate pressure on Moscow to alter its rigid support for the GDR, by making the GDR more a liability than an asset to the East in much the same way as some feared an intransigent FRG might become a liability to the West.

On an operational level, this policy led to the establishment of trade missions in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 1963 and 1964. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia were complicated by issues involving the validity of the 1938 Munich Pact and claims resulting from that legal nexus.[8] Significantly, those trade agreements included a "Berlin Clause", recognising Bonn's right to represent West Berlin in matters of trade, a point which Moscow refused to accept in concurrent FRG-USSR trade negotiations. The policy depended on and to some extent exploited a growing national independence within Eastern Europe:[9]

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[6] See Schröder's speech, "Deutschland, Europe, und die freie Welt", at the CDU Party Congress, Dortmund, 4 June 1962, in Boris Meissner, ed., Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation) (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 33-34.

[7] Schröder's interview with Deutschlandfunk, 6 October 1963, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 57-62.

> The emergence of national characteristics is nothing new... What is new is that the governments are beginning to incorporate these characteristics and interests in their deliberations... even if these interests deviate from, or possibly clash with, those of the Soviet Union. Gradually, their relations to each other, to the Soviet Union and to the countries of the West are assuming new and more appropriate forms.

The policy also excluded the GDR which, Schröder asserted, was too dependent on the Soviet Union to base a policy on "national interest".

Schröder did not, however, publicly endorse the view that greater interaction with Eastern Europe could be a lever against Soviet control:[10]

> The development I have been describing in Eastern Europe is often referred to as a process of disintegration. I consider this term inappropriate. Changes need not lead to disintegration and relaxation need not lead to a break... The danger for Western policy today lies not so much in the fact that we might overlook but rather that we might overrate the changes in Eastern Europe and their significance.

Yet others, out of Government, did adopt such a view, extending the logic by urging a comparable policy with the GDR. While Schröder hoped to take advantage of incipient polycentrism in Eastern Europe, others, like Egon Bahr, advocated greater interaction with the GDR to effect that change rather than to wait for it.[11] Wandel durch Annäherung - "change through coming together" - reflected the SPD's emphasis on dealing directly with the problem of German unity, not in the sense of direct recognition or negotiations on reunification, but to "overcome" the division of Germany and cultivate the presumed sense of national interest that the Ulbricht regime denied.

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[8] For greater detail on these developments, see William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Rebulic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1978), chapter 3, and Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management of Détente (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), chapters 3-6.

[9] Gerhard Schröder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe", Foreign Affairs (Vol.44 No.1, October 1965), p. 16.

[10] Schröder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe", p. 17. Emphasis added.

More so than Schröder's Politik der Bewegung, the notion of Wandel durch Annäherung accepted the implications of a "policy of small steps" toward reunification. Not only did reunification require a general détente between East and West; it also demanded one at the intra-German level:[12]

> We Germans cannot solve the German and Berlin questions alone. Nor can they be solved solely through the support of the Western Powers... Such a solution is conceivable only when the German will to put together again the partitioned nation is able at the right moment to join forces with a change in the constellation of interests among the world's great powers.

Bahr and Brandt argued that such a concept was compatible with U desires.[13] This was true in that Kennedy, various influential Senators, and even General Clay had urged, like Eisenhower and Dulles before, de facto cooperation with East Germany as a means of easing the Berlin crisis. It was also true in that a growing body of opinion in the US began to view greater East-West interaction as a means of undermining Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

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[11] See Bahr's speech to the Protestant Academy at Tutzing, 15 July 1963, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 45-48. Bahr was Brandt's press secretary.

[12] Brandt's speech to the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland, in Bulletin, 3 December 1963.

[13] Besides Bahr's speech (note 11, supra), see Willy Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy (Munich: Kindler, 1964), pp. 221-22.

The arguments behind Wandel durch Annäherung were more fully articulated by Peter Bender. Like Bahr, he departed from the premise that reunification was excluded for the foreseeable future. He agreed with Schröder that Eastern Europe was most amenable to internal change:[14]

> Ostpolitik is above all indirect politics; its goal is to facilitate the changing atmosphere in the eastern countries. Then any improvement in the standard of living and with it the atmosphere is automatically a step on the way... toward national freedom.

It was a long term prospect, the pace of which would be determined by the process of social modernisation, in which growing consumerism and technological development would bring about a loosening of the rigid legacies of Stalinism. Bender's central and more controversial argument was that the exclusion of the GDR from this policy, to isolate it from the benefits of détente, only consolidated the Ulbricht regime and impeded developments in Eastern Europe. Instead, Bender argued, one could only improve the human condition in the GDR in concert with the regime, not against it:[15]

> One must recognise the status quo, because the result can be ameliorated only in such a way. Détente is the only possibility for Germany to assume the political offensive. Only a limited stablisation of the GDR can bring the superiority of the Federal Republic into play.

This was the precursor of the "two states in one nation" concept which became official policy in the Brandt coalition.

In suggesting that this was in full accord with US views on the "German Problem", however, Bender may have underestimated lingering fears in the West. Washington did indeed urge Bonn to reassess its Ostpolitik, but explicit pressures to deal with the GDR on a de facto basis declined as the issue of Berlin slipped off the agenda. More basically, Washington retreated as a direct actor in the search for a solution to the "German Problem" and was concerned first with restoring damaged relations with Bonn and holding the alliance together in the contentious debates on strategy.[16] There was no urgent challenge to Western interests in Germany and Berlin, and the experience of the spring 1962 negotiating package suggested the need for a more passive profile. As McGeorge Bundy testified after he left the White House:[17]

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[14] Peter Bender, Offensive Entspannung: Möglichkeit für Deutschland (Cologne: Kiepenhauer und Witsch, 1964), p. 59. A historian and frequent commentator on East-West questions, Bender was on the editorial staff of Westdeutscher Rundfunk (Cologne).

[15] Ibid., p.124, emphasis added. For his arguments on liberalisation in the GDR and the development of a technocratic "counter-elite", see pp. 61-108.

> Further possibilities are more for German than American decision... I believe that it would be helpful if German opinion could come to support a clear statement on the record of what we all know off the record: that when there is a peace settlement it will be built, among other things, on the present boundaries between Germany and Poland... [It is] important to encourage the Federal Republic and demonstrate confidence in them, but we cannot push them or write a settlement over their heads.

Significantly, emphasis on the Oder-Neisse line reflected two elements in Washington's view, neither of which related directly to Bonn's pursuit of reunification: the importance of Eastern Europe and the challenge of de Gaulle.

Despite the association of many in the CDU/CSU with "Gaullism", de Gaulle's détente initiatives beginning in 1964 had more appeal in the SPD and FDP than amongst those who consistently urged the integration of West Germany in a united Europe and no unilateral concessions to the USSR.[18] Thus, while the SPD rejected the notion that Europe should free itself from its association with the US, the SPD was not unsympathetic to de Gaulle's demand that a reunified Germany would have to accept present boundaries and restrictions on armament. More fundamentally, the SPD accepted de Gaulle's logic that a stable bipolar world offered an opportunity for - and indeed required - movement in Europe:[19]

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[16] See, for example, Walt Rostow's 18 September 1963 speech, "The Role of Germany and the Evolution of World Politics", reproduced in Bulletin, 1 October 1963.

[17] US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: United States Policy Toward Europe (and Related Matters), 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1966, pp. 9 and 34. Bundy's 20 June testimony was as a private citizen; Rostow replaced him as White House National Security Advisor in February 1965.

> If France can use the balance of the superpowers to find movement, then why should it be her alone?...
>
> Movement is not good by itself alone. This is of course true... Motionlessness by itself is not a good thing. Especially not when a hard frozen ice cover breaks up and ice flows start moving.

Nor was this altogether unwelcome in the US. Bundy reminded a sympathetic Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the final object of policy in Europe is not strength, but settlement":[20]

> In that time we have some dull but necessary work to do in keeping our alliance in business... The right motto for the rest of us is to let the movers alone while they do their work.

Washington's underlying concern was preservation of the alliance.

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[18] See Die Welt, 29 April 1965, for a conservative editorial critical of de Gaulle. For a later CDU criticism of Brandt's Ostpolitik as "left-wing German Gaullism", see Walther Leisler Kiep, Good-bye Amerika, Was Dann? (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1972), pp. 142-43.

[19] Brandt's speeches in New York, 15 May 1964, and Bonn, June 1964, in Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 43-45. On the significance of France's détente policy as a precedent for Ostpolitik, see also Karl Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition: Bonn between East and West (London: Oxford University, 1968).

[20] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Policy Toward Europe, p. 7. The tone of these hearings was more understanding to de Gaulle, in contrast to concurrent hearings of Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, which reflected greater hostility to de Gaulle, suspicion of Ostpolitik, and insistence on total alliance unity. Cf. Henry M. Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings (New York: Praeger, 1967),

Because de Gaulle had "broken the ice" in urging a revision of the European status quo, pressures for a more active American policy increased. Brzezinski, who had since 1961 urged a policy of "peaceful engagement" did so with increasing force as a means not only of encouraging polycentrism in Eastern Europe but also to preempt de Gaulle's bid for a dominant position in Europe:[21]

> If the United States and Germany were to move first in recognizing the Oder-Neisse line and attempting political-economic penetration in Eastern Europe, France would be found unprepared and unable to exercise leadership...
>
> The policy of détente implied, however, a Soviet-American partnership based on a mutual interest in the status quo. The moment this impression was created, the dissipation of American leadership began.

In effect, Brzezinski shared the assumption held in varying degrees by de Gaulle, Schröder, Bahr, Brandt and Bender that détente with Eastern Europe - especially in the form of increased social and economic interaction - could promote evolutionary change advantageous to the West. The changes might not be in terms of internal liberalisation, but they could facilitate the resurgence of nationalism. It incorporated some of the axioms of functionalist and convergence theory: economic modernisation eroded the influence of ideology, viewed here as an artificial suppressant of the "renewed vitality of nation-states".[22]

Even if one accepted the desirability of reinforcing nationalism in Eastern Europe as a means of diminishing Soviet control, it was quite another thing to extend that argument to Germany. Adenauer's decisive legacy was the rehabilitation of a defeated and truncated West Germany and a sublimation of German national aspirations in a broader framework of West European integration. Opposition within the CDU/CSU to US détente policies after 1962 reflected the fear that a détente based on the status quo would resurrect those nationalist aspirations.[23] In similar terms, Brzezinski urged "peaceful engagement" to undermine de Gaulle's precedent and isolate the GDR in the process: because détente made the continued partition of Germany less tolerable within the FRG, it was necessary for the US to take the lead in pursuing a policy that could offer reunification as a product of European reconciliation. For Brzezinski - like de Gaulle - a European détente was the precondition of reunification; the key was the Soviet-Polish relationship which, he argued, could be loosened only if Bonn recognised the Oder-Neisse line.[24]

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[21] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 109 and 120. Also his "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism", Foreign Affairs (Vol.41 No.3, April 1963), pp. 513-25.

[22] Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, pp. 75 and 120. This did not, however, apply to the GDR, since liberalisation there would induce Soviet counter-repression; see p. 101. For Bender's retort, see "Die Illusion der Isolierung", Der Monat (Vol.17 No.201, June 1965), pp. 26-32.

Especially significant for US-FRG relations after 1969 is the fact that Kissinger shared the fear of resurgent nationalism expressed by Adenauer and others. In contrast to those in Washington who welcomed the advent of "flexible Germans" in Bonn, Kissinger warned, "The German version of flexibility could become indistinguishable from traditional nationalism."[25] Kissinger objected to persistent hints from Washington that Bonn be more flexible because it created expectations that could not be fulfilled, resulting instead in both frustration and isolation:[26]

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[23] See Alfons Dalma, "The Risks of a Détente Policy to Central Europe", in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1964), pp. 93-124. Dalma was a close associate of Franz-Josef Strauss.

[24] Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, pp. 5 ff. and 26.

[25] Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 215.

> It is dangerous to encourage the Federal Republic into solitary efforts on the subject of reunification... The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position towards East Germany... is likely to be an illusion...
>
> My concern is that the Germans not try to tackle the unification issue as a purely national problem but in a framework larger than Germany itself... My worry is that Germany may by itself try to be a bridge between East and West.

Similarly, Kissinger disagreed with the theory that reunification could result from détente: more likely, he argued, détente made reunification unnecessary.[27]

Kissinger's prescription was to defer the contentious issue of reunification altogether; he preferred Adenauer's solution of a moratorium on the question - during which time the GDR would be neutral, demilitarised and independent - followed by a supervised plebiscite. He argued that Germany should accept the Oder-Neisse line and remain a non-nuclear state; he disagreed both that the US should push Bonn in this direction prematurely and that Bonn should lead in the process. In effect, his was similar to de Gaulle's position, with whom he also sympathised on matters of alliance integration: reunification required a decline in the importance of both ideology and national frontiers. In the meantime, claims - for reunification in the short term, on borders, and relating to nuclear matters - that complicated the development of ties between Western and Eastern Europe were best suspended, although the US should continue to support them in principle.

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[26] Testimony of 27 June 1966, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Policy Toward Europe, pp. 143 and 179.

[27] Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 211.

The argument between Kissinger and Brzezinski highlighted a dilemma of US policy: to restrain a process that it could not lead or to lead a process it could not control. Either way, there were bound to be strains in the alliance. Moreover, the issue was complicated by the fact that the debate occurred less on an operational policy level but invoked competing "Grand Designs" for the future of Europe. Reunification was, after all, only a long term prospect; the debate on it involved theoretical visions, often more divisive than the short term increments of policy that flowed from them. It had long been a prevailing view in the US that German reunification would come about, if at all, because the demonstrated benefits of Western democracy and prosperity would be an attractive force in the East:[28]

> The reunification of the German people... can best be achieved if you build a structure of unity in the West which acts as a very powerful magnet in which the German people can ultimately be incorporated... I think that Western Germany can belong to a system of Western unity, and that as détente proceeds and conditions are created for the German people to express themselves, there can ultimately be the adhesion of the East German peoples to some kind of system of Western unity.

Ball shared the conviction of previous Administrations that the primary task of Western policy was the unification of Western Europe: to replace the "tinder-box" of nation-states; to submerge the "German Problem"; and to allow a more self-reliant Europe to contribute to its own defence in a broader Atlantic framework.

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[28] Testimony of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 13 July 1966, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Policy Toward Europe, pp. 340-41. Similarly, J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Necessary Partnership", Foreign Affairs (Vol.44 No.3, April 1966), pp. 417-33. See also Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure (London: Bodley Head, 1968), especially pp. 162-68.

Yet this notion also incorporated demands on West Germany, not only to be more patient with respect to reunification, but also to bear more of the burden of the alliance and not only the alliance:[29]

> This [Atlantic Partnership] entails increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.

Moreover, de Gaulle had already demonstrated the futility of such a vision, while the insistence on unity fell increasingly on Bonn as a test of loyalty - witness the MLF. To Kissinger, this only threatened to create a "latent nihilism" in Germany. Yet Kissinger and Brzezinski, while accepting both the resilience of nationalism as a fact of world politics and the logic of a "magnet theory" for eventual German reunification, did not accompany Bender down the path to Wandel durch Annäherung.[30] Indeed, Bender's argument for intra-German interaction was to create the opportunity for the "magnet theory" to work. As Kissinger himself argued later in advocating "positive linkage" with respect to trade with the USSR, one could not manipulate levers unless one first created them.

Conflicts over Grand Designs nothwithstanding, the creation of those levers was a difficult undertaking. Since World War II the US had been a restrictive influence on East-West trade, largely because Washington placed a broader interpretation than the allies on what constituted "strategic goods" subject to embargo.[31] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 required that aid recipients also accept trade restrictions; the 1949 Export Control Act led to the creation of a US master embargo list, plus joint allied embargo lists established by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). Truman was only able to mute this legislative restriction in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951 (the "Battle Act"), gaining limited Executive discretion in continuing aid to countries that traded in goods included on the US list but not on the COCOM list. By the mid-1950s, however, Western Europe began to reduce embargo lists to cover only military hardware and certain advanced technology items, as the termination of Marshall Aid removed much of the leverage that Washington had previously enjoyed.[32]

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[29] US Ambassador to Bonn, George C. McGhee, 10 July 1964, in Department of State Bulletin (DOSB), 3 August 1964.

[30] Both Brzezinski and Kissinger's views, along with a variety of West German views, are incorporated in Theo Sommer, ed., Denken an Deutschland: Zum Problem der Wiedervereinigung - Ansichten und Einsichten (Hamburg: Nannen, 1966). For Sommer's criticism, see p. 15.

Despite Washington's relaxation of trade restrictions with Poland after 1956,[33] the discrepancy between US and Western European trade policies continued. In August 1957, Senator John Kennedy proposed an amendment to the Battle Act "to promote peaceful change behind the Iron Curtain wherever this would help wear the so-called captive nations away from their Kremlin masters".[34] This amendment was defeated; during the Kennedy Administration Congress even temporarily suspended Poland and Yugoslavia's Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status. US embargo lists remained substantially unchanged until 1966; in 1972, unilateral US controls still existed over 600 items, although by June 1974 the US list exceeded COCOM's by only 65 items.[35]

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[31] This legislative history is drawn from Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist-Wiksell, 1968); Connie M. Friesen, The Political Economy of East-West Trade (New York: Praeger, 1976); and Jozef Wilczynski, The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade (New York: Praeger, 1969).

[32] Up through 1954, the value of US economic and military assistance to Western Europe exceeded Western Europe's total trade turnover with the USSR and Eastern Europe. See the figures in Adler-Karlsson, op.cit., p. 46.

[33] Almost 75% of US trade with Communist countries, 1957-1963, was with Poland. See the annual reports, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries. Poland had been granted MFN status and a 10 year, $20 million credit in 1956; Yugoslavia MFN status in 1951.

[34] Quoted in Adler-Karlsson, op.cit., p. 105.

By and large, Bonn's trade policies remained in line with that of the US, not only because of Bonn's uniquely dependent position but also because of the politics involved in dealing with the East:[36]

> We are not of the opinion that we must conduct a political policy for the sale of business... These markets are political markets. The relations in the first instance are political. How we shape our relations is a political and not an economic question.

In 1952, the allies had removed special restrictions that applied to Bonn's trade with the East; West German commercial organisations *subsequently formed the* Ostausschuss ("Eastern Committee") to coordinate trade arrangements in the absence of formal diplomatic or consular machinery. While generally anxious for greater trade relations with Eastern Europe, business groups also supported Adenauer and harboured few illusions about any return to traditional levels of trade between Germany and the East. Limitations were inherent in the differing economic structures and the lack of suitable exports from the East.[37]

Within these constraints, trade developed with little political content, except in the case of trade with the USSR where Bonn employed economic levers for the repatriation of German nationals in the late

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[35] US Department of Commerce figures, in Friesen, op.cit., p. 22.

[36] Von Brentano to the Bundestag, 6 December 1956; quoted in Gerard Braunthal, The Federation of German Industry in Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1965), p. 308.

[37] See, for example, the Ostausschuss 1960 testimony to the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs, in Jaksch, op.cit., pp. 22-27.

1950s and, in 1960, to gain a symbolic Soviet compromise on a "Berlin Clause".[38] That relationship was disrupted in late 1962 by the embargo of West German sale of large diameter steel pipes to the USSR.[39] In October 1962, three West German firms signed a contract to supply the USSR with $28 million worth of 40-inch steel pipe. A month later, the NATO Council adopted a resolution recommending that members neither deliver nor contract to deliver steel pipe in excess of 19 inches to the Soviet bloc. US pressure for the embargo stemmed in particular from the fear, on strategic grounds, that Soviet dumping of oil below world prices would generate Western dependency on Soviet oil; more broadly, trade denial remained an indiscriminate instrument of US policy in the Cold War. There was little threat that such a specific dependency would develop; the embargo only delayed the Soviet pipeline to Eastern Europe in any case. The West German interest, on the other hand, centered more on the potential export of steel than on the import of oil, the latter providing a substitute for credits or less desirable import commodities. This was not a COCOM restriction because Britain would have vetoed such an embargo and indeed proceeded, along with Sweden and Japan, to sell large diameter pipes after the West German deal was cancelled. The US, however, insisted that Bonn comply with the NATO resolution, not only with respect to future contracts but also by breaking the contracts just signed. On this latter point, Adenauer was opposed not only by the FDP and SDP but also by some members of the CDU. To avoid defeat of the Government's embargo order, the CDU walked out of the Bundestag on 19 March 1963 to remove a quorum before a vote was taken.

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[38] See New York Herald Tribune, 15 and 29 December 1960. The "Berlin Clause" was implict rather than explicit in the trade treaty.

[39] For the most complete discussion of the steel pipe embargo, see Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), pp. 98-124.

This incident is significant here in two respects. First, it demonstrated Bonn's vulnerability to the US at a time when Bonn - after the Kroll affair and the Franco-German treaty - was anxious to demonstrate its political reliability:[40]

> It is no more than a matter of political loyalty to fulfil the justified requests of other alliance members - not least the United States - if at the same time the Germans are repeatedly asking the alliance partners to guarantee the security of the German people and the freedom of Berlin...

It had an adverse effect, however, on relations with Moscow which refused to negotiate a new trade agreement with Bonn in 1964. In the aftermath of the embargo, Moscow turned to other countries which were willing to offer long term credits (more than 5 years) that neither Washington nor Bonn would accept. As a result FRG trade with the USSR declined in the 1960s, sharpening the distinction between its trade with the USSR and with Eastern Europe. Moreover, trade with Eastern Europe was hampered by the credit competition that began in 1963, thus threatening to undermine the political basis for the Politik der Bewegung.[41]

Bonn urged repeatedly, beginning in July 1963, for a common NATO position on East-West trade, but only the US and FRG supported a five year limit on credit. Indeed, part of Brzezinski's argument for a policy of "peaceful engagement" was to preclude US and FRG isolation in growing East-West trade relations.[42] To that end, he proposed a new "Marshall Plan" for Eastern Europe, a suggestion that Brandt had also made to Rusk in August 1964:[43]

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[40] CDU Fraktion leader von Brentano, in Bulletin, 26 March 1963, echoed by Adenauer, Erhard and Schröder.

[41] Belgium extended 10 year credit terms to Hungary in late 1963; France 7 year terms to the USSR in October 1964; Britain up to 15 years to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1964. See Wilczynski, op.cit., pp. 230 ff.

> It is in the Western interest to support the independence of the East European nations and not to make it difficult for them to use their room for maneuver... What is possible between the US and USSR should also be possible between Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

Any concerted Western policy for economic interaction with the East required Washington's support and participation; Bonn could certainly not take a leading position and was under pressure from the US to maintain its restrictive credit policies. The US approach to East-West trade was largely determined by Congressionally-imposed restrictions which, with the growing conflict in Southeast Asia, became more difficult to overcome.

The Kennedy Administration was, as we have seen, sympathetic to the easing of trade restrictions for political purposes. On 9 October 1963, he announced that the US would sell 500 million tons of grain to the USSR following poor Soviet grain harvests and a Canadian sale of twice that magnitude. In the wake of the steel pipe embargo, Adenauer attempted to impose his own objection to the sale. In a farewell speech in Munich, Adenauer suggested that grain sales to the East should be examined within NATO, warning that "whoever relaxes tensions today can rebuild tensions tomorrow".[44] After Kennedy's announcement, Adenauer expressed his disappointment that "no responsible politician" made removal of the Berlin Wall a condition of grain sales.[45] Adenauer's objection was more the exception in the FRG; Kennedy's decision was generally welcomed as evidence of a less restrictive US trade policy. Erhard subsequently authorised West German grain sales as well.

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[42] Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 70. In 1965, Bonn allowed credits up to five years with authority to "match" competing offers for up to eight years; see Bulletin, 15 August 1967.

[43] Brandt's memorandum to Rusk, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 85-90; Brzezinski in Die Zeit, 26 March 1965.

[44] New York Times, 6 October 1963.

Significant Congressional opposition continued to block the US grain sale when Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963. The grain deal involved short term (6 months) credit; a proposed amendment to the 1964 Foreign Assistance Act would have denied authority for the Exim (Export-Import) Bank to guarantee the loan. Defeat of that amendment and final approval of the sale in mid-1964 required President Johnson's personal intervention in an early test of Executive prerogative in foreign policy.[46] More significantly, the deal generated an overdue debate on East-West trade which found the Johnson Administration combining arguments of apolitical commercialism, liberation rhetoric of the Cold War, and notions of détente and bridge-building. In a major policy speech in February 1964, Rusk justified the grain sale with recourse to the first argument:[47]

> ...Our current sales of wheat to the Soviet Union involved no change in basic policy. And from a traditional Yankee trading viewpoint, we are not unhappy about swapping surplus foodstuffs for gold and hard currency which help to balance our international payments.

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[45] Washington Post, 10 October 1963.

[46] See Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University, 1968), pp. 310-13.

[47] "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently", 25 February 1964, DOSB, 16 March 1964; also his speech in Cincinnati three days after the grain deal announcement, in New York Times, 13 October 1963.

At the same time, he also articulated the Administration's endorsement of Schröder's Politik der Bewegung:[48]

> We have always considered it unnatural... for the diverse peoples of Eastern Europe... to be submerged in a monolithic bloc. We have wanted these peoples, while living in friendship with the Russians and other neighbors, to develop in accordance with their own national aspirations and genius... The Communist world is no longer a single flock of sheep following blindly behind one leader... Our policy is to do what we can to encourage evolution in the Communist world toward national independence and open societies.

Three months later, Johnson put his own mark on Kennedy's policy, promising "to build bridges... of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid" to Eastern Europe.[49]

There was a significant body of opinion in the US that urged a broad-based détente "package" of trade, arms control and assurances to the East in a European security arrangement, with implicit FRG concessions. Reflecting a more benign view of Soviet intentions, Senator Fulbright declared in 1964:[50]

> The character of the Cold War has, for the present, at least, been profoundly altered: by the drawing back of the Soviet Union from extremely aggressive policies; by the implicit repudiation by both sides of a policy of "total victory"; and by the establishment of an American strategic superiority which the Soviet Union appears to have tacitly accepted because it has been accompanied by assurances that it will be exercised by the United States with responsibility and restraint.

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[48] Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently". The US also signed a commercial licensing agreement with Rumania in 1964; MFN status had been restored to Poland and Yugoslavia but not extended to Rumania. See Economist, 13 June 1964 and Andrej Korbonski, "US Policy in East Europe", Current History (Vol.48, No.283, March 1965).

[49] On 23 May 1964 in Lexington, Virginia at the dedication of the Marshall Library, DOSB, 15 June 1964.

[50] "Old Myths and New Realities". See Wall Street Journal, 7 April 1964. For a summary of FRG reaction, see New York Times, 11 April 1964. There was little coverage in the FRG, and Schröder dissented from Fulbright's assessment. For a more sceptical view, see Charles Burton Marshall, "Détente: Effects on the Alliance", in Wolfers, ed., op.cit., pp. 17-54.

Yet détente did not enjoy a broad political consensus. On a practical level, Johnson could only advise Erhard to understand Soviet fears.[51] His political challenge in the 1964 Presidential elections came from the conservative wing of the Republican Party, a compelling argument against any initiatives before 1965.[52] By that time, impending elections in the FRG, in which Washington did not rule out an SPD victory, argued against any direct pressures on Bonn for concessions.[53]

The US argument for "indirection" in seeking evolutionary changes in the existing political relationships[54] appeared largely as an attempt to satisfy a variety of political pressures, both for and against détente, both in the FRG and in the US as well as among other allies. Actions sometimes contradicted words. When Brandt, as Mayor of Berlin, successfully arranged for Christmas passes for West Berliners to visit across the Berlin Wall in 1963 - resulting in 1.2 million visits - Washington joined the Erhard Government in cautioning that independent actions by West Berlin might vindicate the East's assertion that West Berlin was a separate political entity.[55] Brandt correctly noted that the agreement was coordinated with the three allies and Bonn; the reality was that no one wanted to stop the move - most welcomed it in principle - but the political climate also suggested caution. The GDR rejected new guidelines for a passes agreement for Easter and Whitsun, although further negotiations resulted in similar pass agreements for 1964/65 and 1965/66.[56] Such was the sensitivity in Bonn over the directions in US policy that the subsequent proposal of a US firm to sell a synthetic fibre plant to the GDR was received as a change of policy in Washington.[57] In attempting to isolate the GDR, Bonn was especially sensitive to any international interaction with the GDR, however minor.

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[51] At their meeting in December 1963 and, more controversially, in Johnson's interview with Quick, 3 May 1964.

[52] See Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 74-88.

[53] Baltimore Sun, 31 December 1964 and 5 January 1965.

[54] Ambassador McGhee's 18 February speech in Bonn at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, New York Times, 19 February 1964.

[55] New York Times, 5 January 1964; Baltimore Sun, 8 January 1964; and Washington Post, 10 January 1964.

Johnson's expressed desire to build bridges to the East remained without policy substance until after the 1964 elections. In Senate hearings on East-West trade on 13 March 1964, Rusk repeated the view that trade had to be used, not as a "blunt instrument" but "flexibly applied... to exert some influence on the evolution of policy and institutions in *this period* of accelerating change in Eastern Europe".[58] Credits, however, had "some of the characteristics of foreign aid" which allowed Communist countries "to avoid or postpone" resource allocation decisions to the detriment of Western capital markets and to Western security.[59] This latter justification took on greater poignance as US involvement in Southeast Asia grew, so that one month after his January 1966 State of the Union message - in which he reiterated the bridge-building theme - Johnson authorised a "blacklist" of Polish (and Western) ships which were reportedly trading with Hanoi. The war also effectively killed any prospects for Johnson's proposed legislation, in May 1966, to liberalise non-strategic trade with the East and his offer, in October, of Exim Bank financing of US exports in conjunction with Italian construction of a Fiat plant in the USSR.[60]

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[56] See Bulletin, 18 February 1964, for Bonn's conditions on further agreements. In general, Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), pp. 96-98.

[57] New York Times, 24 December 1964 and Baltimore Sun, 29 December 1964.

[58] US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: East-West Trade (Part I), 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, pp. 4, 10 and 18.

[59] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings: East-West Trade (Part I), pp. 15-16.

Johnson's unsuccessful efforts in 1965-66 to ease restrictions on East-West trade reflected a dliemma that continued into the 1970s: although trade was justified as an integral part of a broader dêtente strategy, it was also justified in terms of Cold War rhetoric that not only undermined any dêtente atmosphere but was also used to defeat those trade measures. The difficulty with trade is that it is not an instrument subject to precise control and is therefore not especially amenable to manipulation, although its political acceptability often requires that this feature be attributed to it. A State Department spokesman in late 1965 promoted trade as a "vehicle for creating a dêtente" and then asserted:[61]

> Trade which can be encouraged when the time and circumstances are right can also be withdrawn when circumstances change... We are in full control.

Johnson's Blue Ribbon panel on East-West trade, the Miller Committee, urged trade "as a tactical tool... for pursuing our national objectives".[62] It employed many of the arguments advanced by

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[60] Adler-Karlsson, op.cit., pp. 103-04; also Geyelin, op.cit., pp. 283-89. In 1968, the Exim Bank was prohibited from extending credit guarantees to any country which assisted a nation in armed conlfict with the US; see Wilczynski, op.cit., pp. 231 ff.

[61] Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 21 October 1965, in Dallas; cited in Brown, op.cit., p. 321. Similarly, Mose L. Harvey East-West Trade and US Policy (New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1966), pp. 152 and 168.

[62] See Report to the President of the Special Committee on US Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union (The White House, 29 April 1965), here p. 3. The Committee, under J. Irwin Miller, was created on 7 February 1965.

Brzezinski and Rusk for using trade as an inducement, recognising that denial of trade only reinforced autarky. While it advocated broader use of MFN status with the East and an embargo policy more in line with the allies, it also argued that long term credits were dangerous.

To the extent that there was a US policy on East-West trade by 1966, it did not correlate with the political objectives ascribed to it. Any "bridge building" designed to facilitate internal transformation in Eastern Europe was constrained by the fact that substantial trade required credits that Washington was unwilling to offer. The USSR, which was less susceptible to such penetration, was the only Eastern country in a position to support a significant trade expansion. Kennan's conclusion - that trade would not produce any political concessions from the East, but that the denial of trade had "an adverse effect on the behavior of Communist countries"[63] - was an abrogation of the political motives for trade that were needed to justify it to a sceptical Congress. This was a particularly unsuitable argument in the prevailing political climate because it suggested acknowledgement of "spheres of interest" as a way of living with the East:[64]

> The West [should]... demonstrate to the East that they have nothing to fear... [and] show itself reconciled to the existence of these regimes without accepting responsibility for them.

Particularly in the latter respect, this advice was heeded most of all by the SPD. As we saw in chapter 2, this also resembled the view held by Kissinger after 1969, a view which Brzezinski criticised both in the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.

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[63] Kennan's testimony, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: East-West Trade (Part II), 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 148.

[64] See George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy", Foreign Affairs (Vol.42 No.2, January 1964), pp. 171-85. For a sympathetic view, see J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 208 ff.

Johnson's oft-cited "bridge-building" speech of 7 October 1966 was less a declaration of new US policy than a culmination of his largely unsuccessful efforts to make policy conform to rhetoric.[65] The CDU complained, and many authors have since observed, that it reflected a reversal of the traditional Junktim, an official statement that reunification would only follow and not precede East-West détente.[66] Johnson did note in October 1966 that "[European] unity can provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears". So also had de Gaulle and Brzezinski; in fact, Brzezinski had joined the State Department Policy Planning Council in 1966 and helped draft part of the speech. But Johnson had implied the same thing in his "bridge-building" speech of May 1964: "It is also our belief that wise and skillful development of relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed the day when Germany will be united."[67] While Johnson was more explicit in 1966, it is not clear that it constituted any dramatic policy shift.

Actually, Johnson's subsequent policy initiatives were directed more at the USSR than at Eastern Europe, suggesting that Brzezinski -

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[65] Speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers, "Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task", DOSB, 24 October 1966. See also Lyndon B. Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives in the Presidency, 1963-1969 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 470-79.

[66] New York Times 11 and 18 October 1966; Washington Post, 16 October 1966. See Wilhelm G. Grewe, Spiel der Kräfte in der Weltpolitik: Theorie und Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1970), p. 317; Griffith, Ostpolitik, pp. 135 ff.; Josef Joffe, "Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Politics of Dependence, 1961-1968", in William C. Cromwell et al., Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership: National Perspectives (Bruges: College of Europe, 1968), pp. 435 ff.

[67] See note 49, supra.

who had argued for a distinction between the two - did not enjoy as much influence as some believed.[68] The removal of 400 items from the US embargo list - including large diameter steel pipe - affected trade with Moscow as much as with Eastern Europe. The US eased restrictions on travel to Eastern Europe; it also established commercial air service between Moscow and New York. Gromyko had indicated his acceptance of existing NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, thus opening the way to serious NPT negotiations. In reply to signals from Moscow and with domestic pressures for unilateral troop withdrawals, Johnson, Rusk and McNamara talked of the need for "gradual and balanced revision of force levels on both sides". In January 1967, Johnson wrote to Kosygin to urge progress on arms control and received a reply in February indicating Moscow's willingness to discuss limitations on strategic delivery *systems*. This early sign of possible SALT negotiations, which Johnson pushed in his meeting with Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, on 23 and 25 June 1967, was overshadowed first by the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and later by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.[69] But it is clear that, along with a persistent desire to improve relations with Eastern Europe, Johnson's attention turned increasingly toward Moscow, both out of a desire to pursue arms control for its own sake and partly out of a hope that

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[68] This impression was corroborated by personal interviews in 1981 with some State Department officials who had worked on East-West policy at the time.

[69] On the Johnson-Kosygin exchange, see Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 479-80; on Glassboro, pp. 480-85.

Moscow could influence Hanoi to agree to an acceptable settlement in Vietnam.[70]

Regardless whether Johnson's "bridge-building" speech of October 1966 reflected a change in policy, the CDU demonstrated more sensitivity to this speech than they had either to Johnson's May 1964 speech or to other efforts to nudge Bonn toward initiatives on the "German Problem". The Johnson-Erhard communiqué of barely a week before had prescribed "looking steadily for ways to overcome the rigidities of the past".[71] Undoubtedly, de Gaulle's June 1966 visit to Moscow had contributed to a fear that West German immobilism would result in isolation. As Bohlen, then US Ambassador to France, wired Washington after de Gaulle's withdrawal from the integrated NATO command stucture:[72]

> ...there is a high degree of probability that the Germans, becoming discouraged and frustrated with the Western allies, will at some point in the future be tempted to take the previously followed route of a deal with the Soviets. There can be little doubt that Moscow will drop de Gaulle instantly if this prospect developed...

Actually, de Gaulle's mission to Moscow yielded few results; his vision of a European political détente did not match Moscow's emphasis on collective security, and de Gaulle did not publicly undermine Bonn's position on reunification or non-recognition of the GDR. Upon his return, bilateral negotiations between Bonn and Paris resulted in the continued presence of French troops in the FRG; in December, de Gaulle announced that France would remain in NATO when the alliance was renewed in 1969.[73]

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[70] Britain shared this belief, perhaps even more than the US. On the unsuccessful attempt to find a basis for negotiations during the Tet 1967 ceasefire, cf. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 345-66, and Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 252-57.

[71] For the communiqué from the 26-27 September meeting, see Bulletin, 4 October 1966.

[72] Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), pp. 508-08. For similar fears, see New York Times, 16 June 1966.

In Bonn, the Erhard coalition crumbled under the weight of policy dilemmas it could not resolve. Its 1966 White Book on reunification was largely viewed as an apology for immobilism. Erhard's "Peace Note" of 25 March 1966[74] had been designed to counter Bonn's declining image - not only in the East - which was largely a product of its insistence on a material share in alliance nuclear affairs. In fact, it reflected no change in policy; while it was welcomed in official Western statements, it was also greeted with considerable disappointment as a reiteration of old claims, no doubt contributing to Johnson's pressure for "removing the rigidities of the past". The "Peace Note" appeared to have stemmed from a major policy reassessment in late 1965 by Erhard's cabinet, based on the view that the Politik der Bewegung had not succeeded in producing any foreseeable change in the European political constellation that could lead toward reunification. In November, Schröder asked Grewe, then Bonn's Ambassador to NATO, to write an "exposé" for that cabinet discussion. That report, in which Grewe examined the demise of the "classical concept" mentioned earlier, reflected both an acknowledgement of

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[73] See Christian Science Monitor, 25 July 1966, and Washington Post, 18 December 1966.

[74] See Bulletin, 29 March 1966, for the text of this note, sent to all countries with which Bonn had diplomatic relations and to Eastern Europe. For commentary and critical Eastern reaction, see Keesings', Germany and Eastern Europe since 1945: From the Potsdam Agreement to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik (London: Keesings' Research Report No.8, 1973), pp. 198-206. Also, Washington Post, 27 March 1966.

Bonn's predicament and an unwillingness to alter the basic course of policy:[75]

> The continuation of the Cold War... helps us little... The "détente" as such helps us just as little. It has first and above all the fatal tendency of accepting the status quo as a basis of a balance between East and West.

Grewe dismissed military détente measures as being "connected with negative results for the German Question"; he likewise dismissed Bender's argument for consolidating the GDR as a means of inducing its transformation and criticised Brzezinski and de Gaulle because they demanded "concessions in advance" which were "harmful and unsuitable".

Grewe stressed that "the key to reunification lies in Moscow", but all parties recognised that such negotiations were inconceivable. Indeed, this same conclusion provided the basis for the SPD's criticism of Schröder's Politik der Bewegung which not only had failed to have any effect but was also tainted by the "liberation" rhetoric with which it was associated:[76]

> For a solution of the German Question we must preserve the trust of the West but win the confidence of the East. The effective key lies obviously with Moscow... [It] cannot be done behind the backs of the allies... [It] cannot profit from tension between the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The SPD's central criticism, however, was that a refusal to consider certain concessions in advance would not succeed in restraining a détente process that was viewed as inevitable but would result instead in a process that excluded and isolated the FRG and hardened the German division even more. Only through concessions in less important issues - "We don't have anymore what lies between the Oder and Neisse, or between us and there"[77] - could the FRG hope to sustain its international position and have any hope of ultimately securing a reunified German state.

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[75] See Grewe, Rückblenden, pp. 744-50 for the report (here p. 747). In a personal interview in October 1981, Grewe noted that he never received any feedback on the report or on the actual cabinet discussion; nevertheless, his recommendations are largely reflected in the subsequent Peace Note and White Paper and are therefore presumably indicative of the cabinet's point of view.

[76] SPD Fraktion leader Fritz Erler in the Bundestag, 29 November 1965, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., p. 117.

The Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD, formed on 1 December 1966,[78] was unsuccessful in extricating Bonn from its predicament. Its primary significance was domestic: in including the SPD in the Government for the first time since the Weimar Republic, in allowing an opposition FDP to formulate its own views more clearly, and in providing a more gradual transition to the post-1969 Ostpolitik than might have occurred had an SPD-FDP coalition replaced Erhard in 1966. As a result, the post-1969 Ostpolitik was not a policy reversal without a fully developed public base of support but a continuation of an evolving process for which public opinion was not only reasonably well prepared but in some ways anticipating policy. There were costs to such a coalition, both in an uncertain foreign policy and in domestic turmoil: expectations for great change were not fulfilled, and the lack of a significant parliamentary opposition temporarily fuelled the growth of an alienated and radical minority.[79]

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[77] Brandt at the SPD Party Conference in Dortmund, 1 June 1966, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 131-32; see also Schmidt's 3 June speech at the Conference, pp. 132-33.

[78] Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) was Chancellor; Brandt was Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. The cabinet included Strauss (Finance), Schröder (Defence) and Wehner (All-German Affairs), in all 8 CDU, 3 CSU and 9 SPD. In the elections in September 1965, both the CDU/CSU and SPD shares had increased (47.6% and 39.3% respectively), while the FDP declined to 9.5% of the vote.

[79] Compare, for example, the optimism in Theo Sommer's "Bonn Changes Course", Foreign Affairs (Vol.45 No.3, April 1967), pp. 477-91, and his more frustrated and cynical tone in Die Zeit, 28 March and 27 June 1969. By the end of April 1968, the neo-Nazi NPD had won seats in six out of eleven Land elections with a range of 5.8-9.8% of the vote; it did not, however, succeed in winning any seats in the September 1969 federal election.

The Grand Coalition modified the existing Ostpolitik in two essential respects. The first was the partial dismantling of the Hallstein Doctrine, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania in January 1967 and, one year later, with Yugoslavia.[80] The second was Bonn's attempt to establish a "regulated coexistence" (geregeltes Nebeneinander) with the GDR. This fell short of recognising the GDR as a German state - the essential element of the post-1969 Ostpolitik - but it established a willingness on Bonn's part to deal on a de facto basis with East Germany while stressing that recognition in international law was impossible because it was not a foreign country in relation to the FRG. These two elements allowed Bonn to go beyond previous policy and to consider exchanges of declarations renouncing the use or threat of force with not only the USSR and Eastern Europe but also the GDR. It also allowed the exchange of correspondence between Kiesinger and Willi Stoph, Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, in 1967.[81]

Nonetheless, on two central claims of the Adenauer era - that Bonn was the sole representative of German interests (Alleinvertretungsrecht), and that the Oder-Neisse line was only a provisional boundary between Germany and Poland pending a final peace treaty - the Grand Coalition did not alter the official position as much as it muted it. Here one should distinguish between Kiesinger and Brandt. Kiesinger recognised, as had the Protestant Evangelical Church in October 1965, that Poland had a right to secure borders. He unilaterally included the claim of Alleinvertretungsrecht in announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania; yet, he did not stress that claim in the hope that a dialogue with the GDR could develop outside irreconcilable issues.[82] Brandt, however, wrote in 1968 of "our arrogant claim to speak for all of Germany" and argued that *if* Bonn could *not* legitimately speak for the whole German nation, then the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line was not something Bonn *could* recognise:[83]

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[80] See Bulletin, 14 February 1967 and 6 February 1968 for the communiqués. The Geburtsfehler theory did not really apply to Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia did not recognise the GDR until 1957.

[81] For the exchange, see Bulletin, 20 June, 19 September and 3 October 1967; also Keesings', op.cit., pp. 209-20. The principal initial policy statements were Kiesinger's Government Declaration to the Bundestag, 13 December 1966 (Bulletin, 20 December 1966) and Brandt's speech to the Council of Europe on 24 January 1967 (Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 176-78).

> We do not feel legitimated to anticipate decisions of a future all-German Government and the settlement in a peace treaty, but we can respect and recognise the Oder-Neisse line until such a peace settlement is concluded.

Writing as Foreign Minister, not just as SPD Chairman, Brandt declared that the FRG had no territorial demands.

The shape of the post-1969 Ostpolitik was more evident in the FDP position, unhampered by the demands of government. In effect, the FDP was the first to distinguish between détente and reunification as two worthwhile goals while recognising that a direct causal relationship might not exist. A March 1967 FDP "Working Paper" noted:[84]

> On German territory two German states have grown up... [The GDR's] continuing existence is not in the interest of the East alone; the reunification of Germany... would lead to a total disruption of the balance of power in Europe.

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[82] See Kiesinger's comments before the Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, 23 June 1967, cited in Cromwell, op.cit., p. 157.

[83] See Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, pp. 112-29, and his "German Policy Toward the East", Foreign Affairs (Vol.46 No.4, April 1968), pp. 476-86. FDP chairman Walter Scheel made the same argument in a 14 December 1968 interview with Weserkurier; see Meissner, ed., op.cit., p. 328.

[84] Published in Der Stern, 3 March 1967; see Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 191-93.

That was further than the FDP wanted to go officially, but its "Action Programme" one month later incorporated the notions of geregeltes Nebeneinander and Wandel durch Annäherung as a way of achieving a "feeling of solidarity amongst the Germans".[85] In a 15-point Bundestag resolution on 25 September 1968, which side-stepped recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the validity of the 1938 Munich Pact, all three parties endorsed the pursuit of a "European Peace Order" in concert with the allies, while the FDP registered its own version on point 6: while the Government endorsed the Alleinvertretungsrecht and rejected "recognition of the other part of Germany as a foreign country or as a second sovereign state of the German nation", the FDP declared only that the FRG "does not legally recognise the other part of Germany as a foreign country".[86]

The Grand Coalition's attempt to submerge without altogether abandoning those claims that hindered any improvement in its relations with the East had a threefold effect. In the Third World, it became increasingly difficult to justify the continuation of the Hallstein Doctrine and required enormous diplomatic efforts to ensure that Bonn's internal shift did not lead to large scale international recognition of the GDR. Brandt was successful in averting such a flood, but the issue created an additional pressure on Bonn to eliminate the doctrine altogether to preclude, as Brandt often pointed out, the GDR from determining "where the FRG has to pull down its flag". Bonn's decision to pursue détente "without preconditions" found support amongst the allies who were generally predisposed to normalise East-West relations - in arms control and trade particularly - on their own merits without linkage to any political concessions by the East. But Bonn's call for a removal of preconditions applied also to the East which was unwilling to remove its preconditions and rebuffed Bonn's policy with an increase in hostile rhetoric.[87]

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[85] See Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 199-201. Also FDP chairman Mende's speech at the Party Conference in Hannover, 3 April 1967, pp. 198-99. Similarly his successor's (Walter Scheel) speech at the FDP Convention in Freiburg, 31 January 1968, pp. 241-42.

[86] The texts of the Bundestag resolution and the FDP dissenting version are in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 290-92. In his interview with Weserkurier (see note 83, supra), Scheel also proposed a General Treaty of Relations between the two German governments.

Relations between the FRG and East Germany actually deteriorated during the Grand Coalition. In 1966, Ulbricht had attempted to entice a divided SPD into abandoning Brandt's programme then subsequently aborted the proposed SPD-SED "exchange of speakers" when it was apparent that it would bring him no advantage. In December, Ulbricht refused any "holiday passes" agreement that had become routine in the previous two years. In reply to Kiesinger's 16 point proposal in April 1967 for practical FRG-GDR contacts, the GDR adopted an "all-or-nothing" stance, demanding that Bonn recognise the Oder-Neisse line and the border between the two German states, the status of West Berlin as an independent political unity, and the invalidity ab initio of the Munich Pact, and also renounce atomic weapons on German territory.[88]

At the same time, the GDR was securing its own position within the Warsaw Pact, signing a series of Mutual Friendship Treaties with its allies in 1967. With support from Moscow, which hoped to discourage others from following Rumania's example in establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn, the GDR effectively blocked any possibility of Bonn's succeeding in its new Ostpolitik. This was clear in the April 1967 Karlovy Vary meeting of Communist parties, which included the GDR's demands plus the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as the conditions for a European Security Conference in which neither the US nor Canada would participate. To raise Bonn's anxieties even further, Moscow suggested, beginning in August 1967, that it retained the right of intervention in the FRG in accordance with the "enemy state clauses" (Articles 53 and 107) of the UN Charter, alleging that a resurgence of fascism, militarism and revanchism in the FRG constituted a threat to peace.[89]

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[87] See Brandt, "Entspannungspolitik mit langem Atem", Aussenpolitik (Vol.18, August 1967), pp. 452 ff. On Moscow's hostile response, see Gerhard Wettig, "Moskau und die grosse Koalition in Bonn: Die sowjetische Echo auf die Bildung der grossen Koalition", Aus Politik- und Zeitgeschichte (B10/68, 6 March 1968). On Washington's general approach, see Die Welt, 6 January 1967.

[88] For Kiesinger's programme and Stoph's demands, see Bulletin, 18 April and 19 September 1967. On the SPD-SED relationship in 1966, see David Childs, "SPD at Dortmund: Ulbricht Sets the Pace", The World Today (Vol.XXII, July 1966), pp. 285-93; and Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 110-13.

Clearly Moscow was worried about the effects of détente on its own alliance, especially Czechoslovakia with which Bonn agreed to exchange trade representatives in August 1967. In the middle of the "Prague spring", Brzezinski noted:[90]

> The purpose of recreating an East-West relationship was not to normalise relations between the two sides so that a peaceful settlement could then be contrived, but rather to effect over a long period of secular change such a transformation in the outlook of the communist element and our own that a settlement could arise as a consequence instead of a precondition.

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[89] For further details on the Warsaw Pact reaction to the Grand Coalition, see Griffith, Ostpolitik, pp. 141-60; Windsor, op.cit., chapters 5 and 6; and Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries (London: Oxford University, 1971), chapters 3 and 4. For the Karlovy Vary Declaration and the similar declaration of the July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, see Survival (Vol.IX, No.7, July 1967 and Vol.VIII, No.9, September 1966, respectively).

[90] Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, Summary Report of a European-American Conference: European Perspectives and the German Problem (June 1968), p. 7.

This was a far cry from Moscow's view of "peaceful coexistence". Despite Bonn's protestations that it did not seek to estrange Eastern Europe from the USSR, it was implicit in the concept of Wandel durch Annäherung and the desire in both the US and France to exploit the polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 constituted Moscow's reply.

The crisis in the execution of the Grand Coalition's Ostpolitik coincided with a greater consensus within the alliance on the requirements for détente. To some extent, the problems within the alliance were simplified by de Gaulle's withdrawal from the integrated command structure. France had been the principal opponent to the doctrine of flexible response. France's withdrawal facilitated the formal adoption of that doctrine (MC 14/3) on 9 May 1967 in two respects: not only was France's veto eliminated, but the official removal of French forces from the NATO command also meant that NATO could not officially adopt a doctrine that relied on conventional defence. Moreover, the US had continued to increase the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe to a level of over 6000 warheads, while McNamara stressed after 1964 the need for an improvement in NATO's infrastructure rather than an increase in troops. In fact, adoption of flexible response followed less than a week after the US, UK and FRG agreed to an offset package that allowed for allied troop withdrawals and unit rotations, to which Bonn replied with temporary reductions of its own. Hence, the doctrine was a compromise on two counts. It reflected a West German willingness to accept fewer allied troops, to make the US commitment "less expensive, more mutually acceptable, and thus more permanent";[91] it also provided for a nuclear threshold high enough to satisfy those who disliked an excessive reliance on nuclear weapons but low enough to convey a continued link to the US strategic guarantee. The "real deterrent", noted the US Ambassador to NATO, "is uncertainty".[92]

France's withdrawal also allowed the permanent establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group which effectively replaced the MLF as a response to Bonn's nuclear sharing demands and coincided with US-USSR agreement on a draft NPT (minus Article III on inspection). When Bonn was presented with that draft in December 1966 and the US draft, including Article III, in January 1967, conservative protest was vehement: Kiesinger warned of "atomic complicity"; Adenauer called the NPT "Morgenthau Plan squared"; and Strauss referred to a "new Versailles of cosmic dimensions".[93] By March, the US had taken pains to improve its consultation with Bonn on the NPT and to provide essential guarantees on both the "Europe clause" and security. The prevalent belief, expressed by Schmidt, was that the FRG[94]

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[91] See Wilhelm Cornides, "The Power Balance and Germany", Survey (No.58, January 1966), pp. 151-161, 172 (here p. 159). Cornides emphasised the importance of tactical nuclear weapons. On the Grand Coalition's defence policy reappraisal, see Horst Menderhausen, "West Germany's Defense Policies", Current History (May 1968), pp. 268-74, 307. On McNamara's deemphasis on numbers of troops, see his 21 June 1966 testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee, in Jackson, ed., op.cit., p. 259.

[92] Harlan Cleveland, "The Real Deterrent", Survival (Vol. IX, No.12, December 1967). Reflecting the persistent FRG desire to keep the threshold "very low", see Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense", Foreign Affairs (Vol.43, No.2, January 1965), pp. 205-16. In general, see Timothy W. Stanley, "NATO's Strategic Doctrine", Survival (Vol. XI, No.11, November 1969), pp. 342-43.

[93] Le Monde, 1 March 1967; Der Spiegel, 20 and 27 February 1967. Also Grewe's opposition in "Über den Einfluss der Kernwaffen auf die Politik", Europa Archiv (Vol.22 No.3, 10 February 1967). For a mixed appraisal, see Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 February 1967.

> ...must not... be maneuvered into a position in which she can be made to appear responsible for a failure in the non-proliferation negotiations, and put thereby into psychological isolation.

Bonn subsequently focused on the details of the NPT in a way that was in concert with other non-nuclear states, using the treaty as an instrument to further détente by emphasising the obligations of the nuclear weapons states.

Bonn's policy on the NPT was articulated in a memorandum to the ENDC participants on 7 April 1967.[95] Its provisions were both technical and political. Bonn urged non-discrimination in developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses and adequate controls against its diversion to military uses. Here Bonn was successful in gaining British and American agreement to submit civil nuclear facilities to international control and in preserving EURATOM controls in separate negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By January 1968, with identical US and Soviet drafts on the table but against the backdrop of Soviet threats of intervention under the "enemy state clauses", Bonn stressed the need for explicit guarantees against nuclear blackmail and for concrete assurances by the superpowers to negotiate "in good faith" toward disarmament. Two successive drafts followed, based on Bonn's objections registered on 6 March, before the treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968.[96]

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[94] Helmut Schmidt, "Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: A German View", in James F. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman, Jr., eds., Arms Control for the Late Sixties (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 57.

[95] For the text, see Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen: Dokumentation zur deutschen Haltung und über den deutschen Beitrag (Bonn, December 1969), pp. 11-14.

The internal debate in Bonn remained in muted form; yet, with UN, British and American guarantees, it appeared that Bonn might soon accede to the treaty. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, placed the "enemy state clause" threats in a more ominous light, significantly undermining public support for the treaty. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States in Geneva on 3 September, Brandt emphasised the obligations of the superpowers to détente and successfully urged a resolution on the general renunciation of force. In the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, it became clear that Moscow wanted to repair its position and was interested in détente, provided it did not lead to the disintegration of its alliance. In April 1969, reflecting the divisiveness of the NPT in an election year, the Grand Coalition suspended any decision on the treaty.[97] Bonn signed the treaty on 28 November. Ten days later, Bonn and Moscow began negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement.

The Grand Coalition had begun by endorsing détente in principle as long as it incorporated the issue of reunification:[98]

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[96] For Bonn's memorandum of 6 March, see Presse- und Informationsamt, Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen, pp. 23-27. For the final NPT text, see US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, 1980), pp. 90-94.

[97] Brandt's speech in Geneva, in Bulletin, 10 September 1968. See, in general, Patrick William Murphy, The Response of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Challenge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1974). The US Senate also deferred ratification hearings until 1969 (New York Times, 19 November 1968), advising ratification hearings on 13 March 1969; Nixon signed the ratification bill on 24 November 1969.

[98] Kiesinger's speech in Bonn on 27 January 1967, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., p. 178.

> No simplified formula "first reunification, then détente" or "first détente, then reunification"! Both belong together, and both must in each stage of the process of European détente be considered and acted upon.

Washington supported that formulation: "no détente in Europe without German reunification, and no German reunification without détente".[99] As Bonn found itself threatened by Soviet hostility and Washington was increasingly immobilised by the seemingly interminable conflict in Southeast Asia, both tended to view détente in different ways as threats to the alliance upon which each depended. Washington had pursued arms control as a part of détente free from the entanglement of other political issues, particularly those of European security, while pressuring Bonn for concessions on its interests. Bonn had sought to effect a change in the operative forces of East European politics, not as dramatically as de Gaulle suggested but certainly more than Washington was able. Both processes had been mutually independent as attempts to circumvent, for different reasons, the contentious issue of German reunification.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had a profound effect on the entire political landscape. First, it demonstrated the limits to any Western policy designed as "liberation" in disguise. Certainly, if there was no direct path to German reunification through Four Power negotiations, there was also no indirect path through any conceivable transformation of Eastern Europe regardless of whether the GDR was a target of such efforts. For Bonn, it meant a return to a direct approach, in turn requiring a redefinition of reunification altogether if either reunification or détente were to be attained. That reality meant a return, both for Bonn and Washington, to a conception of linkage as a vehicle for both expanding and controlling détente.

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[99] Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, on 25 November 1966, DOSB, 2 January 1967.

Second, the Soviet invasion, plus the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship, provided new incentives for Moscow to respond to that reality, affording, in turn, the opportunities for linkage in Western détente strategy. Both Bonn and Washington had urged and endorsed the formulation of détente and defence as complementary functions of NATO as expressed in the Harmel Report of December 1967. Not until after Czechoslovakia did that concept have any substance. It is to the implementation of that concept in the ensuing "era of negotiations" that this thesis now turns.

PART IV

LINKAGE POLITICS IN THE "ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS", 1969-1973

> ...[O]ne of the reasons why Germany's Western allies as a whole were so happy with the *Ostpolitik* was because they saw it as a very long term process, putting off any dramatic change in the German situation to an almost indefinite date and thus avoiding for all of them the difficulty of being asked to stand up and be counted on whether they would support German reunification if it were obtainable.
>
> Kenneth Younger, 1970.[1]

The principal result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was the establishment of conditions conducive to the successful pursuit of a détente strategy by the West. The essential Western ground rule - "that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the alliance"[2] - was mirrored in the Soviet view. While dampening many expectations that détente could facilitate the disintegration of the Soviet-East European relationship, the Czech tragedy also created the *opportunity* for détente in the form of Soviet willingness to negotiate both on arms control and a *modus vivendi* in Europe. Having asserted its dominant position in Eastern Europe, Moscow had made it clear to both East and West that a détente which sought to undermine that position was not acceptable, but that a détente which recognised the Soviet Union as a superpower and a principal European actor was not only tolerable but beneficial.[3] The growing Sino-Soviet rivalry, erupting into armed conflict along the Ussuri River in March 1969, contributed to the Soviet impulse for détente with the West.

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[1] Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, *Summary Report of the Third European-American Conference: Cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe, Interests - Obstacles - Possibilities* (Bonn, June 1970), p. 8.

[2] NATO Communiqué, Brussels, 15-16 November 1968, in NATO Information Service, *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974* (Brussels, 1975), p. 213.

[3] For a detailed discussion, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), pp. 386-426.

In both the US and the FRG, the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not thwart the developing consensus for détente, although it did interject more caution. Fundamentally, détente was viewed as useful for both domestic and alliance reasons. In the US, Presidential candidates Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey both stressed the impending "era of negotiations" and the need for "bridge building", noting that the Soviet Union could contribute to terminating the war in Southeast Asia on terms acceptable to the US.[4] In the FRG, Kiesinger, Brandt and Scheel emphasised the importance of reassuring Moscow that the USSR had both rights _and_ responsibilities in the construction of a European _Friedensordnung_ ("Peace Order"), while Schmidt noted that the balance of power in Europe had remained basically unchanged.[5]

A key factor in motivating both the US and the FRG towards détente after 1968 was the necessity of maintaining alliance cohesion: alliance cohesion was thus not only a _limit to_ but also an _impetus for_ the pursuit of a Western détente strategy. As Kissinger later reflected:[6]

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[4] See the election campaign analysis, _Washington Post_, 6 September 1968.

[5] See Chancellor Kiesinger's speeches to the Bundestag on 25 September and 16 October in _Bulletin_, 1 and 22 October 1968, renewing the offer of negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement; Willy Brandt, "Plädoyer für die Vernunft: Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach dem 21. August", _Der Monat_ (Vol.20 No.245, February 1969), pp. 20-26; FDP leader Walter Scheel's speech in the Bundestag, 25 September 1968, in Boris Meissner, ed., _Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation)_ (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 293-97; and Helmut Schmidt's 7 October 1968 interview in _Frankfurter Rundschau_. See also Peter Bender's argument for restraint in Eastern Europe, in "Entspannung oder Sicherheit", _Der Monat_ (Vol. 20 No.242, November 1968), pp. 5-8, and, in general, Wolfgang Wagner, "Europäische Politik nach der tschechoslowakischen Krise", _Europa Archiv_ (Vol.13 No.18, 25 September 1968), pp. 651-58.

> In previous decades, American rigidity had become a target for leftist criticism in Europe... forcing Europe's leaders to shift to a détente line, purporting to act as a "bridge" between East and West. The stark fact was that if America was intransigent, we *risked being isolated within the Alliance and pushing Europe toward neutralism*... [W]e came to the conclusion that we could best *hold the alliance together by accepting the principle of détente* by establishing clear criteria to determine its course.

The mechanism of control was "linkage", elaborated at the beginning of the Nixon Administration in an attempt to tie SALT to the "settlement of outstanding political issues".[7] From Washington's point of view, this strategy was designed to capitalise on Moscow's willingness to negotiate, not on the expectation that there had been any fundamental transformation in the nature of Soviet policy or the regime itself, but on the recognition that there was little satisfactory alternative for maintaining international stability, alliance solidarity and domestic legitimacy:[8]

> No period of coexistence with the Soviet system has proved permanent... The quest for peaceful coexistence clearly has its perils; *it did not follow that a crusading policy of confrontation would prove more successful*. The former might sap our vigilance; the latter would risk our national cohesion and our alliances... We would not accept that the American people could maintain their vigilance only by a strident militarism that conceded to our adversaries a monopoly on the global yearning for peace, and that would gradually maneouver the US Government into isolation.

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[6] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 403. Emphasis added.

[7] Recall the discussion in Chapter 2. Gromyko had offered a "serious exchange of views" on SALT in his UN speech in October; see *New York Times*, 4 October 1968.

[8] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 1256-57. Similarly, see his 24 August 1970 background briefing at San Clemente, emphasising the role of China and Moscow's tactical interest in détente, in Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era* (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), p. 31.

Détente was containment by other means: as an alternative strategy to confrontation, it was assessed according to its relative utility in pursuing objectives which themselves had not fundamentally changed. Its intellectual companion was the "Nixon Doctrine": through greater self-reliance on the part of allies, the US could in turn limit its resource investment to allow a "balanced and realistic American role... over the long pull".[9] In this latter respect it was reminiscent of the philosophy that dominated the preceding Republican Administration in which Nixon had been Vice President.

Similarly, the Grand Coalition in Bonn, presuming the advent of a bilateral superpower détente, endeavoured to ensure that such a détente did not isolate the Federal Republic. Even before Nixon's election, Brandt had warned - with a view both to Paris and Washington - against a "patchwork" of bilateral steps that "are not linked to the prospect of a European solution".[10] Indeed, Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Kissinger, dissented from the Kennedy-Johnson views that mutual superpower interest in arms control was worth pursuing in isolation. This was not, however, out of deference to any German Junktim, but was based on the assumption that SALT was desired more by the USSR than by the US and could therefore be exploited as a lever to gain Soviet cooperation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the domestic pressures for SALT forced Kissinger to abandon that link altogether; in any case Berlin and Germany were not initially viewed by Washington as sufficiently negotiable for inclusion in the early linkage framework.[11]

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[9] The Nixon or "Guam Doctrine" was announced 3 November 1969. See Nixon's First Foreign Policy Report to the Congress, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace (The White House, 18 February 1970), pp. 4-5. On this general theme, see Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (London: Bodley Head, 1973).

[10] Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 90.

In Bonn, this not only suggested further efforts to ensure that European issues were included in any superpower détente, but, to Brandt particularly, also required that the FRG establish the necessary political foundation for it:[12]

> We Germans must hope that the two super-powers will discuss important security questions, for example, the matter of intercontinental weapons. And we must be *ready to play a constructive role*, so that such a Russo-American dialogue will include the unsettled Central European and German questions and will not concentrate only on trouble spots in *other* parts of the world.

Nixon had indicated, in his 27 February 1969 speech at the Siemens factory outside Berlin, his willingness to negotiate on improving access to Berlin. His visit to the FRG coincided with an incipient Berlin crisis in which the GDR was harrassing traffic to West Berlin to deter Bonn from holding its 5 March Bundesversammlung in Berlin to elect a Federal President. Despite allied circumspection and Soviet protests, all West German political parties were determined to proceed with this ceremonial act. Nixon's visit lent his prestige to the position in the ritual reiteration of US determination to defend the "essentials" of Berlin. Significantly, however, Nixon's references to Berlin negotiations reportedly resulted from Bonn's urging; Kiesinger had pressed for the inclusion of Berlin in a SALT linkage package, although Nixon refused to commit himself to an agenda.[13]

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[11] On the Administration's early attempt to apply linkage to SALT, see Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 132-38, including Nixon's 4 February 1969 policy letter to the State and Defense Departments and CIA, pp. 135-36. See also Honoré M. Catudel, Jr., *The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: A New Era in East-West Politics* (Berlin: Berlin, 1978), p. 54. On Llewellyn Thompson's dissenting end-of-tour report as US Ambassador to Moscow, arguing that Moscow would not pay for SALT with political concessions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, see *New York Times*, 17 February 1969.

[12] Brandt to the Bundestag, 19 March 1969, in *Bulletin*, 25 March 1969. Emphasis added. Cf. his Gustav Pollack Lectures at Harvard in October 1962, *The Ordeal of Coexistence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1963), discussed in Chapter 2.

By the time Brandt was elected Chancellor on 21 October 1969, the "era of negotiations" had begun.[14] Negotiations on SALT were set to begin in Helsinki on 17 November. Responding to Gromyko's offer on 10 July for "an exchange of opinions on how to prevent complications in West Berlin", the US, UK and France sent identical notes to Moscow on 6-7 August suggesting negotiations on access plus FRG-GDR negotiation within a Four Power framework. After further exchanges reflecting a basic disagreement on their purpose and scope, negotiations began on 26 March 1970, without agenda.[15] In November 1969, Bonn proposed to both Moscow and Warsaw the initiation of negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement and, in the latter, to normalise relations. Discussions with Moscow began on 8 December, and with Warsaw in February 1970. By the end of 1970, Bonn had signed agreements with both Moscow (12 August) and Warsaw (6 December), while the Berlin and SALT negotiations remained stalemated. A satisfactory agreement on Berlin, meanwhile, had become the condition for West German ratification of the Ostverträge plus the prerequisite for intra-German transit and traffic agreements and the *Grundlagenvertrag*. NATO required, moreover, that the Berlin and German questions be settled before a multilateral Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which would include participation by the US and NATO and be held parallel with Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks.[16]

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[13] For the speech, see New York Times, 28 February 1969. On the Nixon-Kiesinger talks, see New York Times and Die Welt, 27 February 1969; also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 96-100, and Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), p. 194.

[14] In the 28 September 1969 elections, both the CDU/CSU and the FDP declined to 46.1% and 5.8% of the vote, while the SPD gained 42.7%. The coalition of Brandt (Chancellor) and Scheel (Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister) enjoyed only a 254-242 majority in the Bundestag.

[15] See Catudel's detailed account on the preliminaries, op.cit., pp. 53ff. In an interview with Catudel on 13 August 1969, Dean Rusk expressed doubts whether the negotiations would serve any useful purpose, a pessimism that existed within the Administration as well; ibid., p. 60. Moscow insisted that the talks only applied to West Berlin, the West to "Greater Berlin".

In examining the US-FRG interaction in this complex network of negotiations, three points stand out. While Bonn and Washington each endeavoured to link the other's negotiating agenda to multilateral issues that took its - and alliance - interests into account, the fact remained that bilateral negotiations were necessary before the multilateral process could proceed. While SALT may have been viewed initially as a lever for settling other issues, it soon acquired a value of its own as the principal American interest in détente. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* likewise entailed bilateral negotiations with the East, particularly Moscow: a multilateral European security conference was inconceivable to the FRG until the intra-German relationship acquired a regulated framework. Furthermore, these bilateral negotiations involved issues in which Bonn and Washington were mutually suspicious. Nixon and Kissinger were wary of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, while Bonn feared the strategic and political implications of superpower agreements that might jeopardise the deterrent foundations of the alliance. Finally, Bonn and Washington also relied on each other for the successful pursuit of their respective efforts. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was ultimately founded on - and sought to gain Soviet endorsement of - Four Power rights on Berlin and Germany as a whole; without Four Power agreement on Berlin, Bonn's policy lacked both substance and political acceptability. Likewise, Washington's efforts at arms control ultimately relied on the leverage provided by Bonn's Ostpolitik.

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[16] See the NATO Declaration from Brussels, 4-5 December 1969, in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974*, pp. 229-32.

This final part of the thesis examines these two aspects of the "era of negotiations" - the implementation of Ostpolitik and the pursuit of arms control - in the light of the ironies suggested above. In essence, Bonn and Washington pursued complementary aims in distinct negotiations in which neither could exercise any significant control over the other; rather, each had to trust a process of which it was suspicious but on which it was nonetheless dependent. By 1973, the "era of negotiations" had reached a plateau after a period of spectacular success in regulating the East-West relationship. By the end of 1974, some of the limits of détente had become apparent, while the alliance - with Gerald Ford, Helmut Schmidt, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Harold Wilson having replaced Richard Nixon, Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou and Edward Heath as the leaders of its principal members - focused on the internal distributive issues of trade, energy and finance. In the interim, however, the alliance had changed, perhaps more so than the adversary relationship. The most significant change involved the role of the Federal Republic of Germany: still an "economic giant", no longer a "political dwarf", it had succeeded, as Brandt more than once noted, in "recognising itself". This was a direct result of its Ostpolitik, to which we now turn.

Chapter 14

Adapting to "Realities": The Implementation of Ostpolitik

During the Berlin Crisis in the late 1950s, Walter Lippmann had urged publicly - and successive American Administrations privately - that Bonn should recognise the "realities" of a divided Germany. By 1969, the political pressures within NATO for détente were broad and substantial, stemming from desires for greater East-West trade, arms control, and more acceptable defence commitments. The question was therefore less one of whether but one of how a détente strategy would be pursued - bilaterally or multilaterally, with or without alliance coordination, including or excluding the resilient issues associated with the postwar divsion of Germany. In many respects, Brandt's Ostpolitik reflected considerable continuity from previous positions of the Grand Coalition: its central reference point was the assertion of Four Power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole, legally precluding any direct West German neogtiation with either East Berlin or Moscow on German reunification; its procedural format entailed the negotiation of renunciation of force agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that incorporated the GDR; its direct aim, besides the general improvement of relations with the East, was to facilitate practical interaction between the two parts of Germany and stabilise the situation in and around Berlin. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the GDR's harrassment of traffic to West Berlin in mid-1968 and early 1969 reinforced these features.

The Brandt-Scheel coalition departed from its predecessors in defining what were and were not vital interests for the Federal Republic. The demand for a reunified German state as a precondition to or an integral part of détente; denial of the GDR as a state; maintenance of the Hallstein Doctrine; the claim to Alleinvertretungsrecht; refusal to accept the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's Western boundary; unwillingness to declare the Munich pact invalid; delay on signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - all were viewed as counterproductive to the FRG's international position. By exploiting the Soviet and East European - indeed also the Western - desire for détente, and by conceding these points, Bonn hoped to secure certain aims which not only had escaped his predecessors but had become increasingly remote since the Berlin Wall:[17]

> The building of the Wall in 1961 brought us face to face with the painful reality of Germany's division... The Federal Republic's foreign policy could only make some progress if it contributed to the global détente of the world powers and to détente in Europe. The whole world was requiring of the Germans: "You should not obstruct the improvement of relations between Western and Eastern Europe; you must finally put your house in order"...

Recognising "that reunification in the original sense is no longer possible", Brandt accepted the reality of "two German states in one German nation" while eschewing recognition of the GDR under international law.[18] With this formula, Brandt in effect accomplished what Adenauer and Kissinger had, for different reasons, urged earlier: a "political truce" on the question of reunification, suspending those issues in which agreement was impossible.

Yet in 1969, pressures for West German initiatives no longer emanated from Washington, except on the NPT. Consistent with his earlier warnings about such initiatives, Kissinger advised Nixon on the new regime in Bonn:[19]

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[17] Scheel to the Bundestag, 13 August 1971, quoted in J.K. Sowden, The German Question 1945-1973: Continuity in Change (London: Bradford University, 1975), p. 257.

[18] See Brandt's interview in Welt am Sonntag, 1 February 1970. For his 28 October 1969 Government Declaration, see Bulletin, 4 November 1969.

> There can be no doubt about their basic Western orientation. But their problem is to control a process which, if it results in failure, could jeopardize their political lives and, if it succeeds, could create a momentum that may shake Germany's domestic stability and unhinge its international position.

Kissinger had noted years earlier that Bonn did not enjoy the "bargaining tools" to conduct an Ostpolitik on a purely national basis: the humanitarian levers held by the East outweighed any political levers held by the FRG. Fearing a resurgence of German nationalism in any case, Kissinger wanted to "make certain that the West cannot be blamed for the possible consequences".[20] While recognising the "inevitability" of Brandt's policy, the US lent official but unenthusiastic support to it, ostensibly refraining from any direct involvement on its methods while attempting to keep it tied to the broader alliance negotiating agenda.

In reality, Ostpolitik was less a purely national effort than it perhaps appeared. Long before the prospect of actual treaties with the East, and any official linkage between Berlin and those treaties, Berlin was the central issue. Five days before Brandt's election as Chancellor, Klaus Schütz, Mayor of Berlin, met with Pyotr Abrassimov, the Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin. Abrassimov stressed the "realities" of West Berlin: while there could be economic links between the FRG and West Berlin, West Berlin was an "independent political entity". Moscow could assist in securing access to West Berlin, providing that there were no "provocations" by a demonstration of Bonn's political presence. Moscow was ready to deal on a renunciation of force, based on West German acceptance of the NPT and recognition of the GDR. Schütz's reply characterised the vital point upon which *Ostpolitik* was based and which took it out of the realm of purely "national" policy: "Berlin, its existence, its ties to the Federal Republic of Germany and its territorial integrity, and the responsibility of the Three Powers were also realities in Europe and had to be recognised by the Soviet Union and its allies."[21]

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[19] Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 408-09.

[20] Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), pp. 213-15. Cf. White House Years, pp. 410-23.

Any *modus vivendi* with Eastern Europe first required an agreement with Moscow on issues within the legal competence of the FRG plus a quadripartite Berlin agreement. The net effect of these agreements was to clarify Moscow's position as a victorious power in Germany before Bonn could begin substantive negotiations with the GDR, as well as to give Moscow an incentive to pressure the GDR into accepting the "two states in the German nation" formula. After an "exchange of views" between Gromyko and Bonn's Ambassador to Moscow, Helmut Allardt, Egon Bahr, State Secretary in the Chancellor's Office, assumed the role of principal negotiator on 30 January 1970. Gromyko's direct and intensive involvement in the talks had been both surprising and problematic: Allardt was of insufficient stature; Scheel could not go because of the time involved; moreover, the allies evidenced some misgivings about Bonn's ability to deal with Gromyko.

The first Bahr-Gromyko meeting reflected the different approaches of both sides. Gromyko reiterated the standard demands relating to border recognition, nuclear weapons, Berlin and legal recognition of the GDR. Brandt had accepted the linkage between renunciation of force and the border issues, but with a significant legal distinction: the treaty should not be a border treaty but a renunciation of force agreement that accepted the "territorial integrity" of states. A treaty that included Bonn's legal "recognition" of the Oder-Neisse line or the border between East and West Germany would appear to anticipate a final peace treaty: such borders could only be "respected", Bahr argued, within the context of a renunciation of force agreement. Any legal recognition of those borders, like the legal recognition of the GDR, would contradict Four Power control and violate the West German *Grundgesetz*. In the interest of both eventual German reunification and European integration, the possibility of peaceful modification of national borders had to be left open.

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[21] See Arnulf Baring, *Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel* (Stuttgart: Deutsche, 1982), p. 250. Baring's work is based on the diaries and papers of Scheel and Egon Bahr, among several others; portions of Brandt's diaries that were read out to him; and internal government papers. The discussion of Bonn's negotiations on the Moscow treaty is drawn principally from this source.

Gromyko also wanted to negotiate directly on Berlin, but Bahr declined: it was not within Bonn's competence, it would anger the allies, and it would free all Four Powers from their responsibilities in Berlin. Nonetheless, "détente without a qualitative improvement in the situation in and around Berlin was inconceivable".[22] The "link" between a Berlin agreement and the rest of *Ostpolitik* was thus evident in this first meeting. Later, on 12 May, Bahr presented Gromyko a message from Brandt:[23]

> The Federal Government considers that a renunciation of force agreement, a contractual regulation of the relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic and a satisfactory arrangement of the situation in and around Berlin *constitute a whole*... In this way, *reference to Berlin in the agreement itself can be avoided*.

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[22] Baring, *Machtwechsel*, pp. 272-76 on the first Bahr-Gromyko meeting.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 322; emphasis added. Brandt had made the same point in his speech to the National Press Club in Washington on 10 April; see *New York Times*, 11 April 1970.

Both Government and Opposition endorsed this linkage; within the coalition, Scheel, who conducted formal negotiations in Moscow after 28 July, pressed it more strongly than Brandt. Wanting to avoid a "political straight-jacket", however, Brandt stressed that it was not a "legal *Junktim*". Nonetheless, Scheel announced that Bonn would sign the treaty but that it would not enter into force until a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin had been achieved. This was consistent with the 7 June cabinet agreement on guidelines for the final negotiations in Moscow.[24]

In his consultations with the allies in July, Scheel discovered that they were concerned most of all with Berlin and the preservation of allied rights. The previous month, the contents of the "Bahr Paper" - actually the "Bahr-Gromyko Paper" which Bahr had brought back from Moscow on 22 May - had been leaked to the press. The first four points anticipated the draft of the Moscow Treaty, while points 5-10 constituted a "declaration of intentions" with respect to the broader *Ostpolitik*, including prospective UN membership for the two German states; the improvement of economic, scientific, technological and cultural relations with Moscow; and endorsement of a Conference on European Security.[25] With Scheel on 17 July, US Secretary of State William Rogers expressed his fears that the German position was ill-considered; furthermore, Rogers was amazed at the "excessively discreet, hidden, and indirect handling of the Berlin Problem". As Scheel later recorded:[26]

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[24] For the cabinet guidelines, see Keesing's Research Report No.8, *Germany and Eastern Europe since 1945: From the Potsdam Agreement to Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik"* (New York: Scribners', 1973), p. 266. For Brandt's qualification, see his interview in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 July 1970; also his *People and Politics*, pp. 387-88. Scheel's announcement was also 8 July.

[25] See Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik: Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969-1979. Bericht und Dokumentation* (Bonn, February 1980), pp. 157-58.

> It was evident that our efforts to confirm Four Power rights were sceptically received, although held to be essential. [I explained] that it was problematic and otherwise difficult, although it might not be impossible, to claim these rights in the treaty text itself. Reference in a letter of interpretation seemed to [me] to hold the best prospects. Rogers replied that it was important to his government that the USSR be persuaded as much as possible to confirm the existence of these rights, regardless of the form or the place.

The issue was whether explicit Soviet acceptance of Four Power rights and responsibilities over Berlin and Germany as a whole would have to be achieved in the bilateral FRG-USSR negotiations or be left up to the allies in the Berlin negotiations.

Washington had little justification in fearing that Bonn would jeopardise the rights of the Western allies; indeed, it was precisely Bonn's insistence on Soviet recognition of these same rights as well as its own responsibilities in a Four Power framework that created the problem in FRG-USSR negotiations and ultimately required the allies to play a key role in Bonn's Ostpolitik. Preservation of the "reality" of Four Power control constituted not only the limits to Ostpolitik but also Bahr's safety net. The Soviet demands that Bonn found unacceptable and therefore non-negotiable - essentially those that had dominated Moscow's challenge in the Berlin crisis a decade earlier - all involved Four Power rights: recognition of borders, of the GDR in international law, and of West Berlin as an "independent political entity". Bahr pointed out to Gromyko in January that any such recognition would also affect Soviet rights in Germany, to which Gromyko reportedly registered his amazement. This argument apparently had some effect: subsequently Moscow altered its formulation of Soviet troops "temporarily stationed in the GDR" to one of "Soviet troops in Germany", thus emphasising an original Soviet right to be in Germany rather than a right based on mutual agreement with a sovereign state that could (theoretically) be withdrawn.[27]

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[26] Quoted in Baring, Machtwechsel, p. 321.

This argument also placed the Berlin and intra-German negotiations in a new light. Once the quadripartite negotiations began in March 1970, Moscow no longer raised the Berlin issue with Bahr, although Moscow continued to press its position, to little avail, with the allies. On 22 January 1970, Brandt proposed to Willi Stoph, Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, negotiations on an exchange of renunciation of force declarations "without preconditions", a proposal that Kiesinger had previously made in 1967. While Brandt offered a different formula for those relations - "two states which are not foreign to each other" - this was no more acceptable to East Berlin than Kiesinger's previous attempt to talk about practical human and commercial issues while agreeing to disagree on legalities. While the subsequent meetings between Brandt and Stoph in Erfurt (in the GDR on 12 March 1970) and Kassel (in the FRG on 21 May 1970) were spectacular in their historic symbolism and tumultuous in their effect on the attending crowds, they were substantively sterile. Stoph demanded recognition in international law and rejected the application of Four Power rights to all of Berlin; Brandt refused the former and stressed the latter.[28] Further intra-German exchanges did not resume until October 1970, leading ultimately to the December 1971 Transit Agreements (which formed part of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin), the May 1972 Traffic Treaty, and, finally, the Grundlagenvertrag of December 1972.

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[27] Baring, Machtwechsel, pp. 275-78.

[28] For details of the Erfurt and Kassel meetings, see Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 366-86.

Significantly, the intra-German aspect of Brandt's Ostpolitik could only follow the reaffirmation of Four Power control and the application of leverage on the GDR by Moscow to accept Bonn's formula, essentially that laid out by Brandt in his Twenty Points at Kassel.[29] Prior to the Erfurt and Kassel meetings, the GDR had claimed a right of co-determination in the Moscow negotiations and offered to Bonn bilateral negotiations on Berlin access, in an attempt to keep legal recognition of the GDR as a central negotiating point; Gromyko rebuffed him during his 24-27 February visit to East Berlin.[30] Thus, while Brandt's visit to Erfurt generated some anxiety among those who feared the psychological volatility of the reunification issue, Brandt remained distinctly cool to any direct interaction with the GDR in defining the intra-German relationship. As he noted a week before signing the Warsaw Treaty:[31]

> When the Four Powers reach agreement on [Berlin access] - I emphasise, not until then - the German Federal Government will be prepared to talk with the GDR on a supplementary agreement that, by definition, would be within the competence of the German authorities... None of this is simple; nothing must happen in a hurry.

Membership of the two German states in the UN (in September 1973) and their participation "on an equal footing" in CSCE - the ultimate "upgrading" of the GDR - could only occur at the end of the process, a point on which Nixon and Brandt were in agreement.

Bonn's emphasis on a multilateral détente process that reinforced Four Power control also determined its position on CSCE. Since 1954, Moscow had advocated a European Security Conference to ratify the postwar division of Europe and to facilitate the disengagement of the US from Western Europe, a theme that was persistent in Warsaw Pact pronouncements after 1965. In reply, NATO proposed negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, largely due to US and West German pressures to counter Senator Mansfield's resolution for a unilateral "substantial withdrawal" of US forces from Europe.[32] From the beginning, the inclusion of the US and Canada in such a forum was a sine qua non of Western participation, a condition which Moscow accepted in an unusual press conference in January 1970 and confirmed in the June 1970 Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest.[33]

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[29] For the text of the Twenty Points, see Bulletin, 26 May 1970.

[30] Baring, Machtwechsel, p. 278.

[31] To the Foreign Press Association on 1 December, in Bulletin, 8 December 1970. Also Brandt, People and Politics, p. 301, and his comment in the Washington Post, 9 July 1970.

The US position on CSCE - aptly characterised by one observer as "elastic scepticism"[34] - envisaged the conference as a prize to be given to Moscow after it had passed the "tests of sincerity" on détente which Rogers listed at the Brussels NATO meeting in December 1969: "constructive responses" to Brandt's Ostpolitik, improvement in the Berlin situation, and a "positive response" to NATO's MBFR proposals. Above all, such a conference should not entail Western ratification of or acquiescence in the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited

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[32] For general discussions, see Marshall D. Shulman, "A European Security Conference", Survival (Vol.XI No.12, December 1969), pp. 373-81, and Günter Joetze, "Der KSZE-Prozess in geschichtlicher Perspektive", in Peter Coulmas, ed., Element des Wandels in der westlichen Welt: Jahrbuch für Ost-West Fragen, 1979 (Cologne: Markus, 1979), pp. 273-84. The May 1968 NATO "Signal from Reykjavik" was largely drafted by Brandt: see NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1979, pp. 209-10, and Brandt, People and Politics, p. 188.

[33] See New York Times, 14 January 1970. For the 22 June 1970 Budapest Memorandum of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, see Survival (Vol. XII No.9, Sepember 1970). The memorandum also acknowledged the possibility of negotiations on a reduction of foreign (not indigenous) troops in Europe, but in a separate forum.

[34] See Helga Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik zwischen Sicherheitsbefriedigung und Friedenssicherung: Zur Aussenpolitik der BRD, 1955-1973 (Düsseldorf, Beutelsmann, 1974), p. 302.

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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sovereignty" as applied to Eastern Europe.[35] Here Bonn agreed, with a view toward Moscow's persistent claims of the right of intervention under the UN "enemy state" clauses. Washington had been unsuccessful in including an explicit reference to the Brezhnev doctrine in the December 1969 NATO communiqué; it was opposed by France, Britain, Canada, Denmark and Norway, but not the FRG.[36]

Initially, Bonn and Washington played comparable roles in restraining allied interest in CSCE. Indeed, much of the time pressure that Brandt felt in pursuing his *Ostpolitik* was based on a desire to resolve the intra-German relationship before such a conference while not trying the patience of its allies, particularly France and the Benelux countries, who valued the project. After the December 1969 NATO Conference, Brandt noted:[37]

> The European Security Conference makes no sense if the existing relations between both Germanies were not to change somewhat to the benefit of individuals and in the interests of peace. Such a conference should not be dominated by... the "German quarrel".

A CSCE agreement should not ratify the *status quo* if one meant by that the permanent division of Germany; however, Bonn *did* view CSCE as an instrument for recognising the *status quo* in quite a different sense. During the April 1970 visit to Washington, Brandt attempted to point out to Nixon and Kissinger the special significance that CSCE could have: by acceding to Western demands, voiced most loudly by Bonn and Washington, that any conference on European security should include the US and Canada, Moscow would have effectively overruled its previous goal of detaching the US from Europe by tacitly accepting the legitimacy of that American presence independent of any Four Power rights that derived from victory over Germany in 1945 or of rights that "reposed solely on the North Atlantic Pact". To Kissinger, "the implication that Soviet approval was needed to legitimize our role in Europe [was] dangerous".[38]

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[35] Discussed in Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970s* (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 35-36.

[36] *Washington Post*, 1 December 1969. Moscow admitted, during the spring 1972 *Ostverträge* ratification debates, that this claim had been "superseded" by the Moscow Treaty.

[37] Brandt's interview with Deutschlandfunk, 7 December 1969, in Meissner, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 399-401.

While Brandt's argument was not well received in Washington, it nevertheless reflects a significant aspect of his Ostpolitik. Any future European Friedensordnung could only be secured on the basis of a collective security arrangement that involved the guarantee of both superpowers. In this respect, it recalled the SPD argument in the mid-1950s in the midst of the disengagement debate. A neutral reunified Germany could never be fashioned out of the existing international system unless - as Fox had argued in 1944 - the superpowers were mutually agreed to commit themselves to maintaining and enforcing the peace. That option no longer existed, except as a theoretical possibility, because of the fundamentally adversary nature of the East-West relationship and the implausibility of a reunified German state. Moreover, the SPD had long since committed itself to the North Atlantic Alliance, not, as we saw earlier, as an instrument of reunification, but as a necessary element of West German security.

On an operational level, therefore, Brandt viewed the CSCE as an instrument for facilitating both Soviet acceptance of the US as a principal guarantor of European security and American acceptance of the USSR as a principal actor in Europe. The former was important because of the pressure for troop withdrawal and the threat of neo-isolationism in the disillusionment and demoralisation accompanying the war in Southeast Asia. The latter was desirable as a lever on Moscow for cooperation in Ostpolitik, and, more particularly, in persuading Moscow to accept responsibilities as a "legitimate" power in Europe. Consistent with the thrust of Bonn's argument in the Moscow treaty negotiations, Moscow could only gain Western acceptance of the rights that derived from its geopolitical position if it also accepted its associated responsibilities and the commensurate rights and responsibilities of other powers. By persuading Moscow to acknowledge the Four Power "realities" in Germany and Berlin, one could then move on to broader issues of European security and cooperation based on a distinct set of "realities" that did not derive, thirty-five years after the war, from the notion of a defeated Germany. Ostpolitik was not to anticipate a peace treaty; it rendered one irrelevant as long as its essential elements could be secured.

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[38] Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 424-25; also Brandt, People and Politics, p. 289.

These essential elements were incorporated in the Western proposal for a CSCE agenda, ultimately the three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975: issues of European security, increased economic cooperation, and the "free movement of peoples, ideas, and information".[39] The third element recalled the earlier notions of Wandel durch Annäherung and "peaceful engagement", although the rhetoric of undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe had become muted in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, it provided the central element of the Western refusal to allow CSCE to represent a ratification of the division of Europe:[40]

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[39] See the NATO communiqué from the Rome Ministerial, 26-27 May 1970, in NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974, p. 236.

[40] Kissinger, in the 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, in Survival (Vol. XVIII No.5, September/October 1976), pp. 194-203.

> We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognise no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony.

To Bonn, Basket III related most of all to the issue of intra-German relations. It was subordinate, however, to the broader requirement for establishing a stable European framework: "In small matters as in large, *Wandel durch Annäherung* requires stability if it is to be successful."[41] Bahr went on to stress, as did every other principal West German politician in both Government and Opposition, that such stability relied ultimately on the credibility of the US strategic deterrent, a direct function of the tangible presence of US troops in Europe.

On two points, Bonn found itself at odds with Washington with respect to CSCE. The first relates to a dilemma of linkage. Having tied participation in CSCE in part to success in *Ostpolitik*, Brandt became an increasingly vocal advocate of CSCE after the Moscow Treaty, both in fulfilment of point 10 of the "Bahr Paper" and as a constant reminder to Moscow of the benefits to be achieved by further cooperation on Berlin. Washington, on the other hand, never accepted the proposition that CSCE might entail Soviet legitimisation of the US in Europe; neither was Washington keen on legitimising the Soviet role in Europe, while Kissinger professed an inability to understand why Moscow would want a conference that would "loosen their hold on the satellite orbit".[42] Nonetheless, having accepted that linkage, Washington was ultimately committed to the project; its reluctance was further increased by parallel Western European efforts to coordinate on a common policy for the conference. Coinciding with severe economic, commercial and monetary shocks to trans-Atlantic relations beginning in 1971, this attempt to strengthen Western European integration threatened to lend a further element of antagonism to the US-West European relationship.[43]

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[41] Egon Bahr, "German *Ostpolitik* and Superpower Relations", 11 July 1973 speech to the Protestant Academy at Tutzing, in *Survival* (Vol. XV No.6, November/December 1973), pp. 296-300.

[42] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 966.

Bonn and Washington also disagreed on the relationship between CSCE and MBFR. While Brandt had long valued a conference on European security as a vehicle for contributing to détente in Europe, its central substantive element was "militarily balanced, phased reduction of armed forces on both sides" for which Western troop withdrawals in 1968 constituted "advance concessions".[44] To Bonn, MBFR was thus a precondition to CSCE. While the Nixon Doctrine was "an effort to withstand the present wave of neo-isolationism as embodied in such moves as the Mansfield Resolution",[45] a substantial revision of the US military presence in Europe seemed inevitable. Indeed, the Nixon Administration's repeated assurances during 1970 that no troops would be withdrawn unilaterally before July 1971 only increased the expectation of such withdrawal after that point. It was important, therefore, to stabilise the US presence in Europe, even if, as Wilhelm Cornides had argued in 1966, that meant a lower force level. In any case, as Helmut Schmidt repeatedly declared, a stable balance of power was the necessary condition for the pursuit of détente:[46]

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[43] See Brandt's article, "Europe's New Self-Awareness", in New York Times, 29 April 1973, a response to Kissinger' speech of 23 April 1973, "A New Atlantic Charter", announcing 1973 as the "Year of the Europe" in US policy. Both reprinted in Survival (Vol. XV No.4, July/August 1963), pp. 188-94. For a summary analysis of these issues, see Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany, 1945-1973: A Study in Alliance Politics (London: Oxford University, 1974), pp. 200-08, 233-38.

[44] Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, p. 191.

[45] Kissinger, in a February 1970 interview with Henry Brandon, cited in Brandon, op.cit., p. 81.

> Here it is important that we view the question of mutual force reductions not only in a narrow military perspective, but that we see it as a political task. If it succeeds, the Americans will be able to leave Western Europe without losing it, and this under circumstances that would make it improbable that they would have to return later to head off a threatening danger. The withdrawal of US troops should not be seen as a retreat, but instead as a contribution to cooperation and de-escalation of confrontation in Europe.

While Western critics of *Ostpolitik* later accused Bonn of "self-Finlandisation", Bonn viewed its *Ostpolitik* as both inevitable and a necessary part of stabilising the Western deterrent. It risked fuelling neo-isolationist arguments in the US, while it required that US commitment to avoid "Finlandisation": such an undue vulnerability to Soviet political pressure would not, therefore, be something that Bonn would *do* to itself, but would be a condition *created by* an American withdrawal.[47]

Thus, a key element of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was to evade the threatening connection between détente and disengagement by ensuring that détente institutionalise American engagement as much as it recognised the necessity of political cooperation with Moscow in any future European *Friedensordnung*. While Kissinger attributed the appeal of CSCE amongst the continental allies as a search for "alternatives" for European security as American leadership became questioned,[48] and others, like Walter Hahn, interpreted Bahr's vision of a future European collective security system replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact as "dangerous" to the US role in Europe,[49] Bonn's policy was in fact designed to strengthen and stabilise the US role in Europe. American latitude might be restricted, particularly in retaining the option for withdrawal; its relationship might be more difficult because of Europe's, and especially Bonn's, new self-awareness as an "independent partner"; but the American commitment was vital, regardless of whether it was a period of Cold War or détente.

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[46] Schmidt, in an 8 April 1970 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, quoted in Martin Saeter, *The Federal Republic, Europe, and the World: Perspectives on West German Foreign Policy* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), p. 55. In general, see Schmidt, *The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Superpowers* (London: William Kimber, 1971; first published 1969).

[47] For strong arguments along this line, see Dieter Mahncke, "Erhaltung der Sicherheit", in *Das Ende des Provisoriums*, pp. 37-51, and Dieter Dettke, "Politische Interessen fremder Mächte", in *Der Zwang zur Partnerschaft*, pp. 17-33, volumes I and III respectively of Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, *Aussenpolitische Perspektiven des westdeutschen Staates* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1971, 1972).

When NATO decided in May 1970 on its criteria for MBFR, Scheel was unsuccessful in persuading the allies to adopt a "no CSCE without MBFR" formula, while the Warsaw Pact's June 1970 reply made it clear that there would be no MBFR without CSCE.[50] Ultimately, the allies agreed on "parallel but separate" negotiations, a compromise between Bonn's persistent call for direct linkage and both Soviet and French opposition to MBFR and advocacy of CSCE.[51] Significantly, Washington's opposition to this linkage rested on Nixon's dislike for CSCE and his fears, expressed to Brandt, that support for such a project would increase pressures in Congress for troop withdrawals.[52] While Washington exploited the prospect of MBFR in resisting Congressional pressure, Kissinger feared that Moscow could then kill both MBFR and CSCE if Brezhnev eventually concluded that CSCE was neither necessary nor useful in gaining Western acceptance of the *status quo*: *Ostpolitik* provided the former quite apart from CSCE, while the provisions of Basket III could prove counterproductive to Moscow's original intentions. Bonn, on the other hand, wanted a link between the two, not only to persuade Moscow to negotiate on mutual troop reductions, but also to persuade Washington to support CSCE. By linking the two, Moscow could not get a CSCE without MBFR, while Washington could not kill CSCE without also undermining its position in the troop withdrawal debate: unilateral American reductions or bilateral superpower negotiations on troop levels in Europe that circumvented the alliance were equally detrimental to Bonn's position.

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[48] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 413.

[49] See Walter F. Hahn, "West Germany's *Ostpolitik*: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr", *Orbis* (Vol.16 No.4, Winter 1973), pp. 859-80. This article, based on an interview with Bahr, was written "as a loud warning bell" for the US and NATO. For Bonn's official disclaimer, see Morgan, *op.cit.*, pp. 242-43.

[50] See NATO's Declaration on MBFR, attached to the 26-27 May Rome communiqué, *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974*, pp. 237-38, and the Budapest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact, 22 June 1970 (see note 33, *supra*) compared in Hans-Georg Wieck, "Politische und militarische Probleme ausgewogener Truppenreduzieren in Europa", *Europa Archiv* (Vol.25, No.22, 25 November 1970), pp. 807-14; also Haftendorn, *Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik*, pp. 257-59.

In the light of Bonn's overall approach to *Ostpolitik*, therefore, it is ironic - yet understandable - that its largely conservative critics, both in the domestic opposition and among the allies, feared that the policy would ultimately create a "drift" toward the East. Kissinger in particular feared the possible long-term effects if the FRG became disillusioned by the practical limits of Ostpolitik and questioned Bonn's basic international orientation:[53]

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[51] France, under President Pompidou, advocated CSCE as a way of keeping Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, which he feared, in a multilateral framework; see Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 414, 421-23; Marc Ullmann, "Security Aspects in French Foreign Policy", *Survival* (Vol. XV No.6, November/December 1973), pp. 262-67; and Gerhard Kiersch, "Frankreichs Reaktion auf die westdeutsche Ostpolitik", in Egbert Jahn and Volker Rittberger, eds., *Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Triebkräfte, Widerstände, Konsequenzen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1974), pp. 181-206. For much the same reason, Pompidou acceded to British membership in the EEC, effective on 1 January 1973, with strong support from Brandt. France opposed MBFR, however, because of the prospect of bloc-to-bloc negotiations; see Walter Schütze, "Frankreich und das Problem einer ausgewogenen Truppenverminderung in Ost und West", *Europa Archiv* (Vol.25, No.13, 10 July 1970), pp. 469-78.

[52] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 966.

> As long as he is negotiating with the Eastern countries over the issues that are currently on the table - recognition of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse, various possible arrangements for Berlin - Brandt should not have any serious difficulty in maintaining his basic pro-Western policy... But assuming Brandt achieves a degree of normalization, he or his successor may discover before long that the hoped-for benefits fail to develop... Having already invested in their Eastern policy, the Germans may at this point see themselves facing agonizing choices.

While Kissinger stressed that Washington should avoid any responsibility for Bonn's negotiating position, he equally emphasised the need to gain control over the process, afforded by the American veto in the Four Power Berlin negotiations. Yet, one could not exercise such control without assuming some responsibility for the entire process; indeed, Bonn's persistent pressure for parallel negotiations on Berlin anticipated and required Washington's active role in the successful execution of Ostpolitik, precisely what Kissinger seemed to resist as much as relish:[54]

> Brandt wanted to speed up the Berlin negotiations so that we could use them for leverage and, if necessary, shift the onus for any failure of his Ostpolitik to us. Conversely, we favored a more leisurely pace, lest we be asked to pay for progress in the inter-German negotiations in the coin of Four Power rights in Berlin.

After the signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1970, Bahr visited Washington to urge greater emphasis on the Berlin negotiations. Kissinger pointed out to Nixon the "danger... that we were being set up as the fall guy should the intricate set of negotiations collapse".[55]

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[53] Kissinger's 16 February 1970 memorandum to Nixon, quoted in White House Years, p. 530.

[54] Ibid., p. 532.

This conclusion was probably unavoidable given the nature of the linkage. Standing alone, the Moscow Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty that followed entailed unilateral concessions from Bonn without any tangible benefits in return. Yet, they were never intended to stand alone; indeed, it is difficult to imagine what realistic concessions Moscow could offer *Bonn* beyond allowing Bonn to preserve the legal framework in which the FRG defined its national position. The treaty was, as Bahr envisaged, a renunciation of force agreement that "respected" the Oder-Neisse and intra-German borders while guaranteeing "territorial integrity" and the "inviolability" of frontiers. In formal negotiations with Gromyko in late July and early August, Scheel wanted to remove explicit reference to these frontiers, but Gromyko was adamant: "We change no word, no comma" [in the earlier formulation of the Bahr-Gromyko paper].[56] Scheel wanted Gromyko to endorse in writing Bonn's interpretation of the treaty as not affecting the desire for eventual German unity; Gromyko agreed only to acknowledge by receipt but without comment Bonn's "Letter on German Unity" and accepted Scheel's reference in the preamble to Adenauer's similar letter to Bulganin in 1955; moreover, Scheel's "Letter of German Unity" was transmitted with the treaty to the USSR Supreme Soviet as part of Moscow's ratification proceedings, thus meeting a requirement of the CDU/CSU in Bonn's ratification process.[57] While

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[55] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 533.

[56] This summary drawn from Baring, *Machtwechsel*, pp. 332-49.

[57] For Soviet Ambassador Valentin Falin's direct consultative participation in the drafting of the CDU/CSU-SPD-FDP "Joint Resolution" on *Ostpolitik* between 28 April and 10 May 1972, see [illegible]'s, *op. cit.*, pp. [illegible]-93.

Moscow never actually renounced its claims under the "enemy state" clauses of the UN Charter, Gromyko did accept Scheel's insertion in the treaty that disputes would be resolved "exclusively" by peaceful means.

Scheel was less successful in gaining explicit Soviet endorsement of Four Power rights and responsibilities relating to Germany and Berlin and of the Berlin Junktim. In the latter, Gromyko refused to accept Scheel's letter stating that the treaty could not enter into force until "a satisfactory settlement in and around Berlin... is accomplished". Nonetheless, that link remained, even if it were "political" rather than "juridical". On the former, the treaty merely acknowledged that it did not affect existing treaties and agreements. On 7 August - since the issue of Four Power rights was not properly a part of the treaty itself - Bonn sent notes to Washington, Paris and London affirming that the treaty did not affect Four Power rights and responsibilities; Gromyko, however, would only allow a statement that the "question" of those rights was not affected by the treaty. It thus remained for the quadripartite negotiations to deal with the differing interpretations of those rights and the scope of their application.

A significant feature of the entire process was the rapid success of the Moscow negotiations within ten months of Brandt's election as Chancellor, thus creating unanticipated pressures on the allies for a serious effort in the Berlin negotiations. In his first Government Declaration on 28 October 1969, Brandt asked the allies to pursue negotiations on Berlin; when Rogers visited Bonn in December, Brandt urged a direct linkage between those talks and his own Ostpolitik, while Rogers expressed his concern that Ostpolitik was getting ahead of Washington's own efforts.[58] Kissinger, on the other hand, preferred to phase the negotiations to avoid direct negotiating trade-offs between the two sessions, in turn setting the Berlin and SALT negotiations in tandem to apply added leverage to Moscow in the SALT process. Rather than a vehicle desired by Moscow sufficient to induce Soviet concessions on Southeast Asia and the Middle East, SALT had become, by late 1970, an object rather than a source of leverage: the Berlin negotiations would provide pressure on Moscow to accept the US demand for an agreement on both defensive and offensive strategic systems, while Moscow preferred an isolated ABM agreement.[59] The benefits that the USSR desired from the Moscow and Warsaw treaties thus provided a principal lever not only for Berlin but also for SALT.

US leverage required delay on Berlin, particularly as Moscow began to display greater enthusiasm for the quadripartite negotiations after Bahr registered his intransigence on direct negotiations on issues involving Four Power rights. The US dilemma - how to assume control without associated responsibility - thus became more acute:[60]

> On the one hand, we could bring about an improvement of access to Berlin and move Ostpolitik into a multilateral framework only if we were prepared to sustain a prolonged deadlock; this would bring home to the Soviets that they needed a Berlin agreement more than we did... On the other hand... a prolonged stalemate offering no hope of solution could damage US-German relations severely. We could become

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[58] Washington Post, 2 December 1969. Rogers also carried a letter from Nixon to Brandt, conveying general support for Bonn's efforts to "contribute to the cohesion and strength of our Western community while seeking, at the same time, to reduce long standing causes of tension in Europe". See Washington Star, 7 December 1969.

[59] See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 530-31, 798-99, 823-24. Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand, then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, confirmed to me in a personal interview that, until the Bahr mission to Moscow produced surprising agreement, neither the State Department nor the White House believed a satisfactory Berlin agreement was negotiable.

[60] Ibid., p. 800. Emphasis added.

> the whipping boy, accused by Brandt of blocking his policies, and charged by his opponents with having let him get too far out front.

Bonn, however, had already declared its willingness to limit federal activity in Berlin in exchange for Soviet acceptance of ties between the FRG and West Berlin and guarantees of access. The symbolic performance of federal constitutional functions in West Berlin had been necessary to confirm the "psychological feeling of belonging" on the part of the West Berliners; once those ties were accepted, the "demonstrative" - but not total - political presence could be surrendered.[61] Moreover, Brandt was convinced that Moscow wanted to reach agreement on Berlin before the March 1971 24th CPSU Congress; Moscow had in fact insisted that the 4 November communiqué from the quadripartite negotiations note that there had been progress, referring to agreement that the Four would seek an "umbrella accord" while the Germans worked out the details on access and transit.[62] Thus, in December, Brandt authorised intra-German negotiations on traffic provisions under the Four Power "umbrella" and urged, in a letter to the three allies, that the Berlin negotiations go into "continuous conference".[63]

The quadripartite negotiations, meanwhile, had gone into another long recess while Kissinger activated his own "backchannel" with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on Berlin, SALT, and the prospect of a US-USSR summit.[64] While Brandt pushed for progress on Berlin, Kissinger stalled, precipitating a particularly acrimonious series of press "leaks" suggesting that Washington did not, after all, support Ostpolitik; the issue was magnified further in Bonn as the Opposition pressed its attack on Brandt while those sympathetic to Brandt insisted it was all a campaign generated by the Axel Springer press.[65] After an unannounced visit to Washington, Brandt's State Secretary, Horst Ehmke, reported "complete agreement on substance and tactics" and conveyed Kissinger's official approval.[66] Nonetheless, former New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, General Lucius Clay, John J. McCloy and Dean Acheson had been invited to the White House, after which Acheson criticised Brandt's "mad rush to Moscow" and his willingness to "settle for too little" in West Berlin.[67] The underlying issue was not, however, one of pace or timing or internal tactics relating to broader linkage schemes. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung pointed out:[68]

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[61] See Washington Post, 5 August 1970 and Baring, Machtwechsel, pp. 328-29.

[62] See Catudel, op.cit., p. 129.

[63] See New York Times, 18 December 1970, and Washington Post, 24 December 1970.

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[64] Nixon and Gromyko/had discussed a summit meeting on 22 October; Nixon wanted an early announcement, but Moscow stalled as the internal politics of the Brezhnev-Kosygin relationship had yet to be settled. Clearly, Moscow linked a summit to a Berlin settlement which it feared Washington did not want. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 794-95, 833-34.

[65] See New York Times and Washington Post, 20 and 22 December 1970. Compare also Rheinische Post, Frankfurter Rundschau, Die Welt, 22 December 1970, and Neue Rhein Zeitung, 23 December 1970.

[66] Washington Post, 22 December 1970, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 December 1970.

[67] Washington Post, 9 and 10 December 1970. Note also the subsequent exchange by former Under Secretary of State George Ball (New York Times, 29 December 1970 and 5 January 1971) and former US Ambassador to the UN and Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg (New York Times, 5 and 12 January 1971). Cf. George W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World (London: Bodley Head, 1976), pp. 110-11; Ball's argument was much the same as Kissinger's with regard to possible further German disillusionment and a "traditional fascination" with the East.

[68] Editorial of 23 December 1970.

> The Brandt Government after all does what virtually all US Administrations since Kennedy have recommended... It is true that we inform our Western partners in detail. But this *Ostpolitik* is made by us instead of by the Americans. When confronted with possible consequences beyond its control, a world power cannot but worry... Acheson, Clay and McCloy have said what Nixon, Rogers and Kissinger cannot say...

Ironically, there was an interesting compatability between Kissinger and Bahr in this respect: Bahr informed; Kissinger responded and attempted to manipulate; Bahr did not seek Washington's advice or approval; Nixon and Kissinger wanted no responsibility for the outcome.[69]

Nonetheless, there were signs that this disruptive polemic in the US and West German press had generated anxieties over the prospects of *Ostpolitik* which by this time rested on Four Power negotiations. Brandt's stated unwillingness to place himself in a "political straight-jacket" on the Berlin *Junktim* stemmed from his concerns about allied willingness to seek an agreement on Berlin. On the eve of Brandt's signature of the Warsaw Treaty, Bonn's press spokesman, Conrad Ahlers, made the technically correct statement that there was "no juridical connection" between ratification of the Warsaw Treaty and a Berlin settlement, leading to considerable speculation that Brandt might submit the treaty to the Bundestag for ratification immediately.[70] Scheel had already assured the allies that the Warsaw Treaty would be submitted on the same grounds as the Moscow Treaty; to Brandt, it was a moot point because he anticipated a Berlin accord by

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[69] Cf. Kissinger's description of his relationship with Bahr, *White House Years*, pp. 410-12. For an excellent discussion, see Günther Schmid, "Henry Kissinger und die deutsche Ostpolitik: Kritische Anmerkungen zum ost- und deutschlandpolitischen Teil der Kissinger-Memoiren", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (B8/80, 23 February 1980), pp. 12-15.

[70] See, particularly, *Washington Post*, 7 December 1970, and *Die Welt*, 5 January 1971.

February 1971. With some US pressure and in the context of open speculation on allied mistrust of Ostpolitik, Bonn issued a "clarification" on 5 January 1971, noting agreement with the allies on the criteria for a "satisfactory" settlement on Berlin and stating that neither the Warsaw nor the Moscow Treaties would be submitted for ratification prior to such agreement.[71]

Moscow continued to pressure Bonn to abandon the Junktim, since ratification of the Ostverträge was the principal lever, with the exception of CSCE, for Soviet agreement on Berlin. Indicative of this pressure, and Bonn's response, was a conversation between Falin and Bahr during the ride to the airport after the signing of the Moscow Treaty.[72] Falin raised the subject of Berlin; Bahr reminded him that the Moscow Treaty would not be ratified without a Berlin settlement. Falin asked whether Bonn had considered that Washington, London and Paris had become "referees" with respect to the Moscow Treaty: the Three needed only to scuttle the Berlin negotiations to kill the Moscow Treaty, and there were many who disapproved of it. Bahr acknowledged Falin's point, but could not agree on two grounds: "We cannot do otherwise. And we also do not want to do otherwise." The Junktim was based in part on the domestic political requirements for ratification, but it was based on more than that: "If it does not apply to Berlin, then the attempt at cooperation between us is destroyed. Berlin is the innermost substance of our relations." Moreover, Bahr added, the FRG was such an important ally of the three Western powers that its clear desire for an improved Berlin situation could not be swept aside.

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[71] Bulletin, 12 January 1971.

[72] Baring, Machtwechsel, pp. 331-32. Brandt and Kosygin, Scheel and Gromyko were in separate cars; this account is presumably from Bahr's records.

The difficulty in the Berlin negotiations was not that the West wanted more than Bonn; the West needed it less and Bonn wanted it faster. In some respects, Bonn even wanted more. While US Ambassador Kenneth Rush talked of "improvements in the condition of access to the city, and in circulation within the city", Bonn talked of "unhindered access"; Rush talked of "acceptance by the Soviets of ties" between the FRG and West Berlin, Bonn talked of "close ties".[73] Rush cautioned, "We do not underestimate the urgency of relaxing tensions, but we do not confuse urging with haste." Brandt agreed:[74]

> ...that there must be no pressure of time... All the same the work should proceed with the necessary speed, so that these negotiations, whenever their progress warrants it, can assume greater intensity...

In fact, while urging that speed, Brandt added an additional criterion for a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin: "There will be no Berlin settlement unless it guarantees the right of free assembly as much as unhampered access". In the eventual agreement the allies enumerated the official constitutional functions that Bonn could not perform in West Berlin; as such, they were exceptions to a broader right of assembly that allowed political but extra-constitutional functions to be performed. In abandoning an earlier hope that West Berlin might become a Land of the FRG, Brandt pressed all the more for "ties... the close solidarity" and the political presence that reflected those ties.[75]

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[73] Compare Rush's statement in Bulletin, 27 October 1970, and the 5 January 1971 statement by Rüdiger von Wechmar, a Government spokesman, in Bulletin, 12 January 1971. Rush was also the US negotiator on the Berlin accord.

[74] See Brandt's Report on the State of the Nation, 28 January 1971, in Bulletin, 2 February 1971.

[75] Ibid. See also Brandt's statement to the Bundestag on 9 June 1971, in Bulletin, 15 June 1971.

The Quadripartite Agreement, signed on 3 September 1971, was a masterpiece of legal ambiguity. Moscow conceded four of the five general principles listed by Kissinger to Dobrynin before the Soviet Party Congress. First, the agreement noted that "the ties" between West Berlin and the FRG "will be maintained and developed", implying that they had always existed although West Berlin "continue[d] not to be a constituent part of the FRG or governed by it". Second, the agreement included a Soviet statement of "unimpeded" access for civilian traffic to West Berlin. Third, Moscow stated that "communications" between West and East Berlin and between West Berlin and the GDR "will be improved", including travel *from* West Berlin. Fourth, West Berlin was to be represented abroad by the FRG, based on Soviet acknowledgement of Western Three Power responsibility in that area. The Agreement only implied recognition of Four Power rights and responsibilities for *all* of Berlin (rather than West Berlin, as Moscow desired): it referred to "Berlin" only in the context of the "Western sectors of Berlin", to which its detailed provisions applied; "Berlin" does not appear in the title; the preamble refers to the "relevant area" and "without prejudice to their legal positions".[76] There is also no official German text because of differing FRG and GDR formulations of access and ties.

Ironically, one of the strongest bases for inferring that the Quadripartite Agreement applies to *all* of Berlin rather than simply West Berlin is the provision by which the Western Three authorise the

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[76] See Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 823-33, for his discussion of the Berlin negotiations, including these general principles, the 5 February Western draft treaty, and the 26 March Soviet draft treaty. Also Catudal, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-78 and the Foreword by Rush, pp. 13-22; also Hillenbrand's review of Catudal in *Orbis* (Vol. XXII, No.3, Fall 1978), pp. 755-58. For an early official explication of the agreement, see Rush's comments in *Department of State Bulletin*, 1 November 1971.

USSR to establish a consulate in West Berlin. Yet this was a final Western concession made at the beginning of August in return for FRG representation of West Berlin abroad: Kissinger's fifth general principle had been to treat this issue outside the Quadripartite Agreement. Virtually all other points had been settled in June, while Kissinger stalled so that the first round could take place in the shadow of the 15 July announcement that he had been and Nixon would go to Peking.[77] This position is also one of the few substantive points on which US-FRG approaches to the Berlin negotiations differed. On 23 April 1971, Bahr pressed acceptance of a Soviet consulate in West Berlin during a meeting with Kissinger and others, urging it both as a concession to gain Moscow's acceptance of Bonn's presence and as a demonstration that Moscow did not enjoy original rights in West Berlin. Washington rejected the suggestion at the time, reportedly claiming that it would support Moscow's contention that West Berlin was an independent political entity; however, Kissinger discounts this argument by pointing out that Moscow had consulates in several West German cities.[78]

The need for this eleventh hour Western concession may suggest that the "China card" was less effective as a specific lever on Moscow than is sometimes claimed. Available evidence relating to the Berlin negotiations suggests that the only Western desiderata outstanding before the 15 July announcement of Kissinger's return from Peking and Nixon's impending May 1972 visit was the issue of Bonn's foreign representation. Given Kissinger's style, rejection of Bahr's suggestion in April may have been based on the expectation that it might not be necessary. Certainly the CDU claimed it was not. Nevertheless, it apparently was. The announcement that heralded a "triangular strategy" for Washington did not disrupt the Berlin negotiations, but neither did it have any direct substantive impact. It undoubtedly made the May 1972 Moscow summit more desirable in Brezhnev's eyes, since Nixon had been eager for one but Moscow had in turn linked a summit to a Berlin agreement.[79] Securing that summit - plus perhaps the SALT I agreements and the US-Soviet agreement on Basic Principles - became entangled with Bonn's ratification of the Ostverträge.

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[77] See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 830, and Catudel, op.cit., p. 178. The NSC Study Memorandum recommending this trade-off (NSSM 136) was dated 30 July; see Wilfred L. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and US-European Relations: Patterns of Policy-Making", World Politics (Vol.28, No.1, October 1975), p. 26.

[78] See Catudel, op.cit., pp. 163-66, and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 830; also New York Times, 2 August 1971. While Kissinger discussed at some length his meeting with Bahr during a conference in Vermont on 24-25 April, in which Bahr had the "ingenious suggestion" of dropping legal justifications and focusing instead on practical reponsibilities (p. 828), he makes no reference to the 23 April meeting or to Bahr's suggestion or to any Western genesis of the proposal. Given the significance of the point and Kissinger's reported reaction to Bahr's suggestion, the omission is conspicuous.

In his 1972 State of the World message to Congress, Nixon pointed out a central feature of Washington's view of détente:[80]

> Some of our allies were pursuing détente in bilateral contacts with the East, but it was clear that most bilateral questions were part of a wider web of European security issues. The Soviet Union could not be given the opportunity to offer selective détente, smoothing relations with some Western nations but not others... Western cohesion must be the bedrock of our pursuit of détente.

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[79] See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 833-38, for a discussion of the preliminaries to agreement on the summit. The formal invitation from Moscow was on 10 August, after the re-opening of the formal Berlin negotiations and the backchannel settlement on all outstanding points.

[80] United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace (The White House, 9 February 1972), p. 51. Emphasis added.

The "era of negotiations" had opened with Washington believing that it should take advantage of the opportunities for détente but most of all ensure that the alliance did not proceed without the US. Yet, within two years, the Moscow Treaty had "changed the character and the significance of the Berlin negotiations among the Four Powers".[81] Fundamentally, it made a Berlin agreement not only obtainable on its own but also capable of facilitating SALT and securing a summit meeting for which Nixon was particularly anxious. Yet, by spring 1972, Soviet-American détente remained tenuous. Kissinger wrote to Bahr on 8 April:[82]

> ...warning him that we were reassessing our entire Soviet policy. Two military offensives [the Indo-Pakistani War and a concerted North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam] against American interests made possible by Soviet arms within the space of six months was too much. We doubted the value of a policy of détente under the circumstances. Bahr, with the ratification of Brandt's Eastern treaties hanging in the balance, was certain to convey these sentiments to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. And Moscow would be reminded that we were not without means of pressure.

Five days before, Kissinger had warned Dobrynin that the US would have to respond to the Vietnamese offensive, "certain to present Moscow with difficult choices before the summit". Moreover, he would not intervene in Bonn's ratification debate to support Brandt, a request by Dobrynin which Kissinger was reluctant to honour anyway.[83]

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[81] See Nixon's 4th State of the World report, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace (The White House, 3 May 1973), p. 30. Compare with the characterisation of the Berlin negotiations in his first report, A New Strategy for Peace, 18 February 1970, p. 24.

[82] Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1117. Emphasis added.

[83] Ibid., p. 1114. At Brandt's 28-29 December 1971 meeting with Nixon, Nixon declined to give official public endorsement of the treaties, retaining a position of "benevolent neutrality". See the account in Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 301-02.

Washington responded to the spring 1972 North Vietnamese offensive by mining Haiphong harbour, announced on 8 May. Up to that point, SALT had not been linked to any particular Soviet concessions in Southeast Asia, although Nixon apparently wanted to threaten cancellation of the summit to obtain Soviet cooperation in Vietnam. Kissinger, on the other hand, did not want the US to assume the burden of cancellation or make the summit and a "virtually settled SALT agreement... hostage to Vietnam".[84] On 9 May, Kissinger told Dobrynin of the CDU's decision to allow ratification of the Ostverträge, further suggesting the operative link between Ostpolitik and the summit (and SALT).[85] SALT was thus linked not to Soviet concessions in Vietnam but to Soviet acquiescence in what was, to Washington, a necessary move in its continuing efforts to pressure Hanoi: it functioned not as a compellant but as a deterrent link to Soviet behaviour. On 11 May, Moscow registered a moderate denunciation of US policy in Vietnam, while the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister called on Nixon at the White House. After a week's postponement of the final vote, the Bundestag ratified the Ostverträge on 17 May. Five days later, Nixon arrived in Moscow to sign SALT I, a Declaration of Principles, and a host of economic and exchange agreements.

It is not yet possible to detail the precise influence that Washington brought to bear to ensure the success of Ostpolitik. Clearly, the ratification of the Ostverträge - for which Nixon had always declined either to express support or opposition - played a key role in achieving the Moscow summit. Equally, Washington could not count on Brandt's success. Having started with a slim majority in the

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[84] Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1154-55, 1162.

[85] Ibid., pp. 1191-92.

Bundestag, the SPD-FDP coalition had deteriorated since 1969. Periodic defections to the Opposition plus coalition losses in *Land* elections after 1969 deprived Brandt of that majority in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Rainer Barzel, the interim CDU leader, called for a constructive vote of no confidence to depose Brandt on 27 April, only to be defeated by two votes which came from the CDU. On the final ratification vote in the Bundestag, the CDU abstained, giving Brandt a 248-0 approval, one vote short of an absolute majority.[86] Certainly, the presumed effect of *Ostpolitik* on Washington played an important part in the internal debate. Former Foreign and Defence Minister Gerhard Schröder argued that *Ostpolitik* would exacerbate US isolationist tendencies, increase Moscow's influence on Western Europe, and free the West from its responsibility for German reunification.[87] Scheel, on the other hand, turned Schröder's first - and most compelling - argument around:[88]

> We Germans, who have so much to thank for the *friendship* and the *engagement* of the United States for our military security, should not make the President's mission [to Moscow] more difficult or indeed place it in jeopardy. How would this visit to Moscow end well if it had to take place in the shadow of a refusal of the treaties in the German Bundestag? There are, in the lives of nations, even the

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[86] See Roger Morgan, "Political Prospects in Bonn", *The World Today* (Vol. XXVIII, August 1972), pp. 351-59. On the CDU's opposition to *Ostpolitik*, see Geoffrey Pridham, "The *Ostpolitik* and the Opposition in West Germany", in Roger Tilford, ed., *The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1975), pp. 45-58; and Christian Hacke, "Die ost- und deutschlandpolitische Argumentation der CDU/CSU seit 1973", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (B34/75, 23 August 1973).

[87] See Schröder, "'Nein' zu den Ostverträgen", in *Die Zeit*, 4 February 1972. For a sympathetic refrain from the conservative wing of the Republican Party in the US, see Senator Barry Goldwater's remarks in the *Congressional Record*, 19 April 1972.

[88] To the Bundestag, 17 May 1972, cited in Manfred Knapp, "Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ostpolitik der BRD und den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen", in Jahn and Rittberger, eds., *op.cit.*, p. 170.

> great and mighty, moments when the faith and gratitude of an alliance partner plays a role, and this we should never forget.

Indeed, Moscow had, since October 1971, reversed the Berlin *Junktim*, making ratification of the *Ostverträge* the condition for implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement.[89] Thus, failure to ratify the treaty would not only have jeopardised the summit; it would have unravelled an entire process that had centered - with Bonn's pressure - on a Berlin agreement which was certainly more advantageous to the West than anyone in 1969 - or 1958 or 1962 - had anticipated.

In light of the polarisation of West German politics, it was perhaps sufficient that no *direct* pressure be brought to bear - as Kissinger claims - on the internal ratification process, that Washington maintain "benevolent neutrality" and refuse to assure the CDU that a rejection of the *Ostverträge* would be welcomed by the Nixon Administration. This is Brandt's view, noting that Barzel had returned from a visit to Washington in late 1971 without any specific encouragement from Kissinger.[90] Similarly, when Brandt thanked Nixon, in their December 1971 meeting, for NATO's support of *Ostpolitik*, "Nixon frostily corrected him, saying that the alliance did not *object* to the policy".[91] Ultimately, the CDU abstained because it did not want the responsibility for destroying a process in which the alliance had substantially invested; thus, Scheel's argument, and the timing of the summit, were key elements in Brandt's success. As the 19 November 1972 West German federal elections demonstrated, the Opposition had little domestic political grounds for rejecting Brandt's

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[89] *Washington Star*, [illegible] October 1971. The Final Protocol implementing the Quadripartite Agreement was signed on 3 June 1972.

[90] See Brandt, *People and Politics*, p. [illegible].

[91] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 965.

Ostpolitik.[92] Nevertheless, part of the trauma in West German politics that led many observers to recall the turmoil of the Weimar Republic, must be attributed to Washington's manipulation of linkage politics in pursuit of its own détente strategy.

In a relationship such as that between the US and the FRG, in which there is considerable interdependence, neither can really abstain from involvement in the other's vital interests: intervention is implicit, tacit, and unavoidable. This particularly applies to alliance security issues, as arms control became a central element of Western détente strategy in the 1970s. As with the formulation of *Ostpolitik*, many of the security dilemmas that have plagued US-FRG relations throughout the postwar period continued to dominate the further pursuit of détente.

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[92] Brandt called for early elections in July 1972 to capitalise on the success of *Ostpolitik*, particularly FRG-GDR agreement on the *Grundlagenvertrag*, initialled on 8 November. The SPD rose to 45.9% and the FDP to 8.4%, while the CDU/CSU declined to 44.8%, giving the coalition 18 additional seats in the Bundestag. Significantly, endorsement of the coalition was principally on foreign policy grounds, as polls showed less confidence in the SPD's ability to manage the economy. See the Allensbach poll data in Werner Kaltefleiter, "Europa und die Nixon - Doktrin: Deutschlands Schlüsselstellung im Bundnis", *Die Politische Meinung* (Vol.18, No.150, September-October 1973), p. 92.

CHAPTER 15

Arms Control and European Security: Enduring Dilemmas Revisited

Arms control is a complement to defence policy much as détente is an instrument of national and alliance security. Throughout the postwar period, arms control - as a practical alternative to disarmament aimed at stabilising the strategic adversary relationship - has received periodic impetus corresponding to concerns about Western vulnerability. Debates over the particular modalities of arms control can thus be correlated with Soviet advances in weapons development or crises which served as reminders of that Western vulnerability: Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb in 1949, the advent of the thermonuclear age in 1953, *Khrushchev's threats during the* Suez crisis, the anticipation of a Soviet ICBM capability after 1957, the brinkmanship of the Berlin and Cuba crises, recognition of strategic parity at the end of the 1960s, and the fear of a theoretical Soviet first strike capability as a result of developments in weapons technology in the 1970s. Likewise, arms control enjoyed increased appeal in the face of a different kind of vulnerability: domestic political pressures for a diminished investment in defence, either because that absolute investment was viewed as excessive or because the strategy which defined that investment suggested an unacceptable vulnerability itself. In this respect arms control may also serve to obviate an unwanted increment of defence investment (as in NATO's 1979 "double decision" on LRTNF modernisation) or to preempt an anticipated unilateral diminution of that investment (as in Bonn's and Washington's emphasis on mutual force reductions in the face of the Mansfield Amendment and its successors).

The dilemmas of arms control and European security revolve around two key issues. The first is the irony that arms control on a strategic nuclear level has responded to the reality of vulnerability by seeking to institutionalise that vulnerability as a condition equally and unavoidably applicable to both superpowers. Thus, Kissinger noted critically in 1979: "Now we have reached that situation so devoutly worked for by the arms control community - we are indeed vulnerable."[1] Kissinger further rejected the premise, inherited from the McNamara era, that the US need only sustain an invulnerable second-strike capability sufficient to inflict a certain level of damage on Soviet society and its administrative- industrial infrastructure to provide the necessary deterrent. The US, Kissinger declared in 1979, had depended on strategic superiority. Indeed, McNamara had asserted in 1965 that Moscow had accepted defeat in the quantitative arms race: "There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic force as large as ours."[2] SALT, however, proceeded from the assumption that the USSR could compete favourably in a quantitative arms race but not necessarily in a qualitative one, reminiscent of the argument with which McNamara justified the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963.[3] "Strategic superiority", as Kissinger once noted with exasperation, had no operational meaning.[4] In essence, the reality - notwithstanding any desirability - of that mutual vulnerability provided the foundation for SALT: "parity" was defined as "the ability [of each superpower] to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first".[5]

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[1] Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years", in Brussels, 1 September 1979; in Survival (Vol. XXI, No.6, November/December 1975), p. 265.

[2] Quoted in Laurence M. Martin, "Military Issues: Strategic Parity and its Implications", in Robert E. Osgood et al., Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973), p. 140. By 1967, the US had completed its ballistic missile build-up to 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs; both remained constant into the 1980s, although profoundly altered in their effect by improved guidance technology and development of Multiple, Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). The USSR, with only 200 ICBMs and 120 SLBMs in 1965, more than doubled the former by 1967 and reached a force level of 1527 ICBMs and 628 SLBMs by 1973. Data from The Military Balance 1972/1973 (London: IISS, 1973).

The ABM Treaty was largely viewed as an endorsement by both superpowers of mutual assured destruction as a stabilising element in this relationship. Moscow's desire for SALT apparently stemmed from its desire to avoid an arms race in the technology-sensitive area of ballistic missile defence in which the US held an advantage and had, despite a contentious internal debate, begun to develop its own system, albeit as a "bargaining chip" for SALT.[6] The Nixon Administration, in turn, insisted that an ABM agreement could only accompany an accord that limited strategic offensive systems.[7] The logic flowed from its premises: one assured mutual vulnerability by denying the capacity for damage limitation, either through ballistic missile defence or through a disarming first strike. The SALT I Interim Agreement, which lasted only five years and established numerical ceilings without regard to "heavy" missiles (potentially capable of destroying hardened ICBM silos) or the evolving technology of multiple warheads, failed to provide that assurance of mutual vulnerability. Concerns over the increased vulnerability of US land-based ICBMs, plus suspicions about Soviet investment in civil defence, suggested that the original premises behind SALT might be ill-founded.

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[3] See Nixon's report to the Congress, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace (The White House, 3 May 1973), p. 201.

[4] See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 18, and the 1973 foreign policy report, Shaping a Durable Peace, p. 194. Similarly, McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano", Foreign Affairs (Vol.48, No.1, October 1969), p. 9.

[5] United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace (The White House, 18 February 1970), p. 2.

[6] See Kissinger's 14 August 1970 background press briefing in New Orleans, cited in David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (London: Robson, 1974), p. 148.

[7] The SALT "breakthrough", announced by Nixon on 20 May 1971 and a precondition for accelerated Berlin negotiations, was Soviet acceptance of that linkage. See Kissinger, White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1979), pp. 810-23, and John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), pp. 214-19.

This debate relates to the second key issue which dominates the relationship between arms control and European security: the distinction between "passive" and "active" (or "extended") deterrence. The ability of the US to deter a Soviet intercontinental nuclear strike is not the central concern of the Western European allies; it is the ability of the US to deter a Soviet attack - nuclear or conventional - against Western Europe. In that respect, the advent of parity was less momentous in Western Europe than in the US: "effective parity" had existed since the 1950s, since neither superpower could deny a catastrophic retaliatory strike if it chose to attack.[8] American acknowledgement of parity had already followed a decade of turmoil in NATO on how to cope with an American nuclear guarantee that was not absolute. France and Britain had their own partial answer in the form of a "finite deterrent" against a Soviet attack against themselves. To them SALT was desirable insofar as it stabilised the strategic relationship. They particularly welcomed the ABM Treaty:

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[8] On this point, see Andrew J. Pierre, "The SALT Agreement and Europe", The World Today (Vol. XXVIII, July 1972), pp. 281-88.

Soviet ballistic missile defences could negate their ability to threaten unacceptable damage despite a relatively small number of delivery systems. The problem of "extended deterrence" thus applies most directly to the FRG, whose signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - without which SALT would have been an infinitely more difficult endeavour - further represented Bonn's dependence on the alliance nuclear guarantee as the foundation for a credible "forward defence". The US interest in SALT was of particular concern, not because parity had affected Bonn's security position, but because the US response to parity might affect Bonn's position.

Bonn was thus ambivalent about SALT from the outset. The Grand Coalition had succeeded in extracting guarantees in the NPT that the superpowers would negotiate "in good faith" on limiting their strategic arsenals, but Bonn also feared the implications of superpower bilateralism. Détente had long been associated with disengagement, suspected because it would remove the security foundation of the FRG and subject it to "the changing tides of European politics". Washington had similarly opposed disengagement because of the implications not only for European security but also for the US global position. Yet there had always been a significant element in American politics that resisted the US commitment to Europe, or at least its associated costs. US force levels in Western Europe had, between 1962 and 1970, declined by more than 25%. Ironically, McNamara, who had set out to replace an emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons with a credible conventional defence capability in Central Europe, ultimately maintained fewer troops in place than had the Eisenhower Administration and oversaw a seven-fold increase in the development of tactical nuclear weapons. With the material and psychological pressures of Vietnam, bilateralism could easily become the pretext for unilateral disengagement. Nixon's task was to balance the domestic pressures for troop withdrawal and the need to maintain force levels, if only to motivate the allies to do more.[10]

The issue remained just as Lippmann had warned Kennan in 1947 and Kennan himself suggested a decade later: the requirements for global containment were excessive in relation to the psychological, if not physical, capacity of the US; it expected "too much, and for too long a time, of the United States, which is not a European power". As one observer noted before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia:[11]

> If America's monopoly was broken, if America's guarantee was weakened thereby, what was needed - in a world that was not willing to let Germany rearm with nuclear weapons, in a continent that could not really develop a nuclear force of its own capable of replacing America's and of matching Russia's - was a German policy so respectful of America's main concerns, and also so vigilant with respect to the Soviet Union, that the US would both feel obligated to keep its mantle of protection over Germany and not be tempted into negotiating a détente at Germany's expense. German docility would be the condition for, and counterpart of, America's entanglement.

That prescription - if not prognosis - was relevant to a German policy that had expected the alliance to fulfil its national interests and had sought, for over a decade, to restrain bilateralism by applying the traditional *Junktim* between détente and reunification. Yet Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was designed to ensure that détente between the superpowers - a precondition for European détente - did not bypass Europe. "Americans no longer have the exclusive initiative in Europe; there is a bitter limit to a superpower's room for manoeuvre."[12] As with the broader aspects of *Ostpolitik*, Bonn's approach to arms control was directed at affirming the US "entanglement", while shedding the legacy that required its "docility".

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[10] See Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand's 18 February testimony, US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Hearings: United States Relations with Europe in the Decade of the 1970s (91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970), pp. 27-55, particularly his response to the Subcommittee Chairman's warning to prepare for inevitable withdrawals and higher offset payment demands, pp. 53-54. George Kennan testified, on 11 March, that he had advocated disarmament only in return for German reunification; any unilateral withdrawal coinciding with Ostpolitik would be "particularly unfortunate"; see pp. 165, 175.

[11] Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", in Hoffmann, ed., Conditions of World Order (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968), pp. 125-26; emphasis added. Cf. an opposite formulation by Curt Gasteyger, Europe in the Seventies, Adelphi Paper No.37 (London: IISS, April 1967), p. 8.

On this point, there was little dispute among the political parties in Bonn. Upon his return from Washington in August 1969, Kiesinger noted:[13]

> [SALT] raises serious questions... about whether the outcome of such talks could not produce a situation that would be worse for the European NATO partners than the present situation... [producing] a less credible deterrent... It could be... that it would reflect a change for Europe, that *Soviet medium range rockets, which are targeted only on Europe, will not be as well covered as before*.

While the traditional *Junktim* between reunification and arms control no longer applied, the connection between superpower arms control and European security issues remained paramount. In many respects, the prospect of SALT generated a debate reminiscent of that of a decade before: the possibility of altering the framework of military confrontation in Europe served as a greater impetus for an assessment of alliance strategy than had an imminent Soviet military threat.[14]

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[12] Theo Sommer, *Die Zeit*, 28 August 1970.

[13] In an interview with Südwestfunk, in Boris Meissner, ed., *Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation)* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 374-76. Similarly, Brandt's 3 September 1968 speech to the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States, in *Bulletin*, 10 September 1968, and Schmidt's interview in *Die Welt*, 16 February 1970.

[14] This point is particularly well argued by Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe* (London: Elek, 1972), pp. 115ff.

Intra-alliance tensions were - and remain - inevitable because of the dilemmas that must be faced in such an assessment.

In every arms control forum, the principal Western criterion was the maintenance and stabilisation of the balance of power. While arms control is often justified by the assertion that the stabilisation of an existing relationship can provide the foundation for subsequent force reductions, no clear picture has yet evolved of how one can alter the framework of military confrontation without undermining the stability upon which the process depends. SALT proceeded on the assumption that such interim stabilisation might ultimately lead to actual reductions, but its negotiability was enhanced by its bilateral nature. From the outset, however, this bilateralism was artificial and confining. Moscow insisted on defining "strategic" weapons according to whether they could target the territory of either superpower. French and British systems notwithstanding, this immediately brought into consideration US forward-based systems (FBS) - principally aircraft stationed in Europe - that could deliver nuclear munitions on Soviet targets. Excluding these systems from the parameters of SALT I required that Bonn abandon its demand that Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems, which had been targeted against Western Europe since the 1950s, also be included.

Bonn's ambivalence over SALT, therefore, derived, on the one hand, from its wariness of an exclusively bilateral process and, on the other hand, from its affirmation of that bilateralism to preserve FBS, viewed as an essential "escalation mechanism" in NATO strategy.[15] Maintaining FBS grew in importance for two reasons. One was the expectation of US troop withdrawals. Despite the concerted efforts by most allies to increase their own investments in NATO's infrastructure and conventional defence - designed both to compensate for anticipated withdrawals and to preclude them by a demonstration of self-help[16] - and repeated assurances by the Nixon Administration that forces would only be withdrawn in the context of mutual force reductions, Western Europe and particularly the FRG required greater certainty that the US nuclear deterrent remained coupled to European defence. The second reason relates to the options that NATO had for reinforcing that link to the US guarantee.

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[15] See Helga Haftendorn, *Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik zwischen Sicherheitsbefriedigung und Friedenssicherung: Zur Aussenpolitik der BRD 1955-1973* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1974), pp. 105-06.

Tactical nuclear weapons had traditionally served the function of providing a credible "forward defence" in the event of a conventional attack which could not be repulsed by existing conventional forces. Yet, the US was reluctant to commit itself to early resort to tactical nuclear weapons despite pressure from Bonn for a declaratory policy to that effect.[17] NATO lacked in 1969 - and by all accounts still lacks - a precise doctrine on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in alliance strategy: Bonn tends to stress their deterrent effect as an assurance of escalation (deterrence by punishment), while Washington emphasises their defensive effects in the context of a possible

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[16] Notably the commitment by ten European members of NATO, with strong FRG support, to a five year, $1 billion, European Defence Improvement Program (EDIP) announced on the eve of the December 1970 NATO Conference and expanded a year later. These coincided with Nixon's December 1970 assurances of no unilateral withdrawals and the December 1971 announcement of the return of 20,000 US troops back to Europe. See New York Times, 5 December 1970; Washington Post, 16 December 1971.

[17] On the deliberations in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in 1968 and 1969, see Baltimore Sun, 12 October 1968, and the Times (London), 2 December 1969. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 218-20, and his critical remarks in his 1979 Brussels speech (note 1, supra). In general, Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma", Orbis (Vol. XIX, No.2, Summer 1975), pp. 461-76.

"limited" war in Europe after a relatively longer conventional engagement (deterrence by denial). As Defence Minister after 1969, Schmidt sought to de-emphasise the role of tactical nuclear weapons, not because he rejected their "coupling" function, but because he recognised that they were more likely to be used later rather than sooner, in a war-fighting context on the territory of both the FRG and the GDR. Forward-based systems, on the other hand, not only provided the escalating function with greater flexibility, but had, for Bonn, the additional advantage of being able to put the Soviet Union at risk while avoiding the inevitability of "tactical" nuclear war on German territory.[18]

This contentious debate was removed from the initial SALT process by the narrow parameters defined in SALT I, yet it continued to dominate deliberations on arms control and weapons development within the alliance. The close relationship between the superpower nuclear dialogue and European security was first highlighted by the controversy over the 1973 Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The treaty text is ineffectual, part of the atmospherics of the period, but its origins are significant.[19] Even before the May 1972 summit, Moscow suggested a US-USSR treaty renouncing the use of nuclear weapons against each other. As a declaration of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, such a treaty would have undermined NATO strategy by reinforcing the usability of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. The treaty did not constitute such a declaration, although the limited consultation in the West - confined to leaders who did not in turn adequately prepare those who were sceptical of superpower bilateralism - contributed to its exaggerated and erroneous public response.

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[18] Schmidt's 1970 Defence White Paper stressed the desirability of "damage limitation" in the consideration of tactical nuclear weapons. Walter Hahn criticised Bonn's declaratory de-emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons as part of a broader policy of appeasing the East; in view of Schmidt's focus on FBS, this is not convincing. Schmidt's argument was consistent with that expressed almost a decade before in Defence or Retaliation: A German Contribution to the Consideration of NATO's Strategic Problem (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1972). See Hahn, Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views (London: SAGE, 1975), pp. 56ff., and "Nuclear Balance in Europe", Foreign Affairs (Vol.50, No.3, April 1972), p. 514.

[19] On the background and development of this treaty, see Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 274-86.

Significantly, the most vocal endorsement of the treaty in Western Europe came from Bahr, who had been involved in the allied consultations on the treaty and who recognised it for what it was, an indirect acknowledgement of NATO's nuclear strategy:[20]

> For once, nuclear weapons must be praised. I do not know whether, without the extreme effectiveness of their deterrence, the world would have been wise enough to steer past the rocks of deep-seeded conflict and differences of interest between East and West without a general upheaval in Europe; the temptation to use conventional weapons might have been too great. To that extent deterrence has worked, and continues to work for today and tomorrow.

To Bahr, the treaty symbolised a superpower _modus vivendi_, the precondition to any "fruitful coexistence" in Europe and an intra-German _rapprochement_: "If the world wishes to achieve détente, we cannot stop it, but the world _can_ stop us: if tensions increase, the two German states cannot form an island of détente."[21]

Negotiations on SALT II proceeded immediately after agreement on SALT I. Despite earlier expectations, SALT II again deferred the knotty issues of Soviet MR/IRBMs and NATO's FBS, further complicated by developments, such as the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and "Backfire" bomber and US cruise missile technology, that blurred the already tenuous distinction between strategic and non-strategic systems. Washington's agreement to exclude "Backfire" and the SS-20 from SALT II ceilings while conceding a three-year protocol limiting the range of cruise missiles provided, to some, further evidence of the limits of a bilateral process which appeared to leave Western Europe more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation while failing to resolve the problem of US vulnerability. "Backfire" and SS-20 remained strategic threats to Western Europe if not to the US. While the three year protocol did not affect actual deployment, since cruise missiles would not yet be operational anyway, it nonetheless appeared as an advance concession for SALT III which was expected finally to deal with systems based in or targeted on Europe.[22] Tensions between Bonn and Washington by the end of the decade thus derived in part from an increasing US scepticism about the utility of arms control, coupled with pressure from Bonn to move beyond the exclusively bilateral SALT framework and encompass European security.

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[20] See Egon Bahr, "German _Ostpolitik_ and Superpower Relations", 11 July 1973 speech at Tutzing, in _Survival_ (Vol. XV, No.6, November/December 1973), pp. 296-300.

[21] _Ibid._, emphasis added. Also, Bahr, "Renunciation of Force and the Alliance", _Aussenpolitik_ (Vol.24 No.3, Autumn 1973), pp. 243-54.

Bonn's primary requirement and expectation for arms control was that it proceed on a broad front, dealing simultaneously with nuclear and conventional weapons, issues of European as well as superpower security; SALT was inadequate in isolation. Not only did Bonn require that SALT eventually include the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe; it also made MBFR a necessary companion to SALT:[23]

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[22] For a useful summary of these issues, see Lothar Ruehl, "The 'Grey Area' Problem", in *The Future of Arms Control: Part I. Beyond Salt II*, Adelphi Paper No.141 (London: IISS, Spring 1978), pp. 25-34. On Bonn's position, see Heinrich Buch, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik bei SALT - Mitspieler oder Zuschauer?", in Helga Haftendorn *et al.*, eds., *Verwaltete Aussenpolitik: Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978), pp. 127-28. Also Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), particularly pp. 185-90.

> Measures for a progressive arms reduction should include conventional as well as atomic potential. A reduction in atomic weapons would leave the eastern side with a greater number of conventional forces... The general balance of forces must be maintained.

American strategic vulnerability - ratified but not created by parity - implied the potential usability of conventional forces in Europe if the Soviet Union could deter the US from the initial use of nuclear weapons upon which NATO doctrine ultimately rested. As SALT continued to exclude systems that posed a threat to Western Europe, and the Warsaw Pact embarked on a significant modernisation programme that emphasised offensive war-fighting capabilities on the conventional level, Bonn stressed not only the military threat that such capabilities created but also the political threat that would arise if the credibility of the American guarantee were undermined.

Bonn's pressure for MBFR included political motivations that went beyond the purely military desire to achieve a conventional military balance. Bonn wanted to avoid an excessive concentration of military power in the FRG that might resurrect Eastern fears, and thus resisted pressures within NATO for force increases to compensate for the expected withdrawal of US troops; indeed, Schmidt's argument against West German increases referred also to West European fears of an expanded Bundeswehr.[24] Secondly, Bonn advocated MBFR as an instrument for reaffirming American engagement and preempting domestic US pressure for withdrawal. MBFR also had a broader political function in relation to the East: it could be an instrument for creating détente. In this respect, MBFR was only partly concerned with the actual reduction of troops; it was also to remove the possibility of surprise attack and create an atmosphere of mutual confidence: exchange of observers on military manoeuvres, notification of troop movements, and similar "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) were perhaps of greater importance than a strict attention to force level agreements that could not be easily verified.[25] To the extent that MBFR remained separate from CSCE in the Western (US) view, it was all the more important to Bonn that CBMs be incorporated as "Basket I" of CSCE.

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[23] Brandt, in an interview with "German International", 31 July 1969, in Meissner, ed., op.cit., pp. 369-7 Similarly Schmidt's speech at NATO, 9 November 1970, in Bulletin, 17 November 1970. This theme also dominated his remarks at the NATO summit on 10 May 1977; see Survival (Vol. XIX, No.4, July/August 1979), pp. 177-78.

[24] New York Times, 21 May 1970, and Schmidt's article in the Washington Post, 2 April 1970.

Bonn's enthusiasm for MBFR was not, however, matched by the other major powers. Moscow had no desire for negotiations aimed at depriving it of its conventional force advantage in Eastern Europe and only agreed to the Western proposals to negotiate (but not necessarily to agree) because of the broader associated benefits of détente. France refused to participate; Britain was ambivalent. Washington doubted that Moscow would negotiate and was not sure it wanted to pay the price (CSCE) that Moscow demanded. Nonetheless, the Nixon Administration exploited the concept in its defence against the Mansfield resolution which, by January 1970, had 51 sponsors.[26] Mansfield was equally sceptical of Soviet willingness to negotiate and continued to press his resolution.

Ironically, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev provided an important catalyst for MBFR by declaring, on 14 May 1971, his willingness to negotiate on mutual troop reductions in Europe. The announcement, moreover, came three days after Mansfield introduced an amendment to the Draft Extension bill which would have required a one-third reduction of US troops in Europe, instead of a non-binding "Sense of the Senate" resolution.[27] The amendment was defeated on 19 May; as if to suggest one motive for Brezhnev's cooperation, Nixon announced the SALT "breakthrough" the next day, although Brandt's ardent advocacy of CSCE and the pressure provided by Ostpolitik and the Berlin-Ostverträge linkage undoubtedly played a role as well. Kissinger noted, "Our willingness to discuss détente had lured Brezhnev into an initiative... that saved our whole European defense structure from Congressional savaging".[28]

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[25] See Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik, pp. 261-63.

[26] New York Times, 26 January and 21 April 1970; Washington Post, 9 April 1970.

A further irony, however, was that Bonn then feared the implications of US over-enthusiasm for MBFR, anticipating that a heightened interest in MBFR and Kissinger's stalling on Berlin would alter the negotiation sequence that envisaged the settlement of Ostpolitik prior to multilateral negotiations such as MBFR and CSCE.[29] This fear was exaggerated, although it hinted at an underlying disagreement between Bonn and Washington as to the negotiating parameters of MBFR. Washington's interest remained almost exclusively in resolving its domestic problems on force levels in Europe; it preferred to negotiate on a withdrawal of US troops from Europe. Since the technical problems involved in MBFR appeared prohibitive to any comprehensive agreement, Washington stressed the criterion of negotiability: as much as possible, negotiating parameters that made agreement more rather than less difficult were to be excluded.[30]

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[27] New York Times, 15 May 1971.

[28] Kissinger, White House Years, p. 949.

[29] See the remarks by Conrad Ahlers, Bonn's press spokesman, in Washington Post, 25 May 1971, and US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's assurances, Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 1971.

Bonn's position, on the other hand, seemed designed to make agreement more difficult on virtually every count. While the simplest negotiating framework would appear to be a small reduction of US and Soviet troops stationed in Germany, Bonn disliked that option on several counts. First, it would leave indigenous forces untouched, while Schmidt repeatedly emphasised that the Bundeswehr must not grow in strength relative to other countries involved.[31] To focus only on US troops further underlined the exclusively bilateral context of arms control. MBFR was, like CSCE, designed to broaden the framework to bring the European states into the process. Moreover, such an exclusive context might even be destabilising if it reinforced doubts about the credibility of the US guarantee.[32] Ultimately, Bonn acceded to the US position, with the assurance that MBFR would include a second phase of reductions that included both stationed and indigenous forces.[33] Nonetheless, the May 1970 NATO criteria incorporating

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[30] See John Yochelson, "MBFR: The Search for an American Approach", Orbis (Vol. XVII, No.1, Spring 1973), pp. 275-82.

[31] For example, Schmidt's interview in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 1971, and his article in Bulletin, 28 September 1971.

[32] This argument is particularly stressed in Christoph Bertram, "The Politics of MBFR", The World Today (Vol. XXIX, January 1973), pp. 1-7; Josef Joffe, "Amerikanische Präsenz und europäische Stabilität: Zur Problematik amerikanischer Truppenabzüge aus Europa", Europa Archiv (Vol.25, No.6, 25 March 1970), pp. 191-204; and Uwe Nerlich, "Westeuropa und die Entwicklung des amerikanisch-sowjetischen Bilateralismus", Europa Archiv (Vol.27, No.20, 25 October 1972), pp. 687-702.

[33] See the statement by Defence Minister Georg Leber, New York Times, 30 July 1973.

Bonn's original position were reportedly accepted by Brezhnev during Brandt's 16-18 September 1971 visit to the Crimea.[34]

Second, this simple negotiating framework suggested a "special regime" that discriminated against Germany by confining the area of reductions to the territory of the FRG and the GDR. Brandt had agreed to the possibility of an exchange of observers within these territorial confines, but, reminiscent of Bonn's objections to the Eden Plans of the 1950s, rejected any framework that highlighted the "special character" of Germany. Ostpolitik was to eliminate any discrimination against Germany that remained a legacy from the war. Such was Brandt's argument for the NPT and the 1972 Convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons: both removed the unique character of Bonn's 1954 renunciation of atomic, biological and chemical weapons.[35] NATO concurred in this requirement; the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia were included in the "guidelines area". Nonetheless, French non-participation was problematic, and the first phase of US reductions would affect the FRG most of all.

Third, Bonn particularly wanted to include tactical weapons in MBFR, although various elements in the FRG had different reasons. The CDU was generally sceptical of MBFR, anticipating that it might stall out of both US and Soviet disinterest after an initial round of troop reductions that left the FRG worse off than before. MBFR was also a useful counter to SALT, which excluded the Soviet MRBM threat to Western Europe. The CDU tended to view the inclusion of tactical weapons as a possible trade-off against Soviet MRBMs, although the acceptability of such a proposition was always questionable. Schmidt, on the other hand, preferred a lessened dependence on tactical nuclear weapons in any event. To the extent that MBFR created a conventional balance, the need for tactical nuclear weapons would decline: their primary function had been to compensate for NATO's inability to provide a forward defence with conventional forces in the event of a conventional attack.[36]

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[34] See Strategic Survey, 1971 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 18, and Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik, p. 265.

[35] Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik, pp. 102-03.

The fundamental problem, however, was that there was no conventional balance in Europe in NATO's view. Hence, MBFR was always a one-sided proposition of inducing Moscow to concede that balance; critics were quick to point out that the political conditions were not conducive to that. In his meeting with Brezhnev, with Ostpolitik still hanging in the balance as much for Moscow as for Bonn, and Bonn still insisting on a "no CSCE without MBFR" Junktim, Brandt extracted a formulation on MBFR that was close, although not identical, to the Western requirement for "balanced" reductions: "Both sides outlined their views on the question of the reduction of troops and armaments in Europe without the incurring of disadvantage by those concerned."[37] It was less of a concession than Bonn claimed: Moscow never accepted the criterion of "balance". Moreover, the criterion that negotiations not work to the military disadvantage of either side effectively undermines the Western goal of creating a more favourable conventional balance. In 1975, after almost three years of deadlocked negotiations, NATO proposed the withdrawal of 1000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft, 36 "Pershing" missiles, and 29,000 US troops, in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of 68,000 ground troops and 1,700 tanks and Soviet acceptance of common force ceilings as the end product.[38] Moscow continued to reject the goal of common ceilings; instead, it proposed equal percentage reductions which, while conceding a greater absolute reduction on its part, nonetheless preserved the original force ratios while retaining the advantage of geographic proximity.

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[36] Haftendorn, Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik, pp. 279-80.

[37] Communiqué from the Oreanda summit, in Bulletin, 21 September 1971, emphasis added. Scheel's statement on 10 September 1971, cited in Dieter Dettke, Allianz im Wandel: Amerikanisch-europäische Sicherheitsbeziehungen im Zeichen des Bilateralismus der Supermächte (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner, 1976), p. 208.

By 1976, both the prospect of and even some of the impetus for conventional arms reductions had waned. It was apparent that Moscow would not accept any formula that retained a conventional balance based on common force ceilings. Moreover, any marginal leverage that NATO had previously enjoyed on MBFR was gone - CSCE had ended, without any of the dramatic results that had been either desired or feared. SALT provided no leverage on Moscow; indeed, it perhaps required some of its own. Ostpolitik had reached a "natural" end with German membership of the UN; it was concentrating, within extremely tight limits, on garnering the practical benefits of a relationship that had not yet, as Brandt had suggested, evolved from nebeneinander (coexistence) to miteinander (cooperation). East-West trade - never a sufficient lever - had completed a phase of acceleration and was confronting its own limits. The driving force behind US interest in MBFR had also gone. The Mansfield Amendment for a 40% reduction in US forces was barely defeated in September 1973 after a substitute amendment by Senators Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn made troop reductions a function of the percent of offset that Nixon could negotiate with

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[38] On NATO's "Option Three" proposal and the Warsaw Pact response, see Strategic Survey, 1976, pp. 112-14. For earlier proposals on both sides, see Robin Ranger, "MBFR: Political or Technical Arms Control?" The World Today (Vol. XXX, October 1974), pp. 411-18.

Bonn. Nine months later, Mansfield's amendment for a smaller reduction was defeated by a larger margin. In June 1975, after the fall of Saigon, Mansfield deferred his proposal altogether as inappropriate.[39] Simultaneously, the latest US-FRG offset agreement expired. Schmidt, as Chancellor, argued that the devaluation of the dollar and a surplus US balance of payments removed any need for further offsets; President Ford's letter requesting a renewed offset agreement remained unanswered.[40]

The mitigation of these domestic determinants of alliance strategy and arms control policy provided temporary relief to an alliance relationship that had suffered under their divisive impact for so many years. Nonetheless, it did not remove the fundamental security dilemmas that had been an impetus for arms control. The ultimate aim of arms control as an instrument of military détente is to translate declarations on the renunciation of force into an objective reality by denying the usability of that military force. This has become increasingly significant as technology obscures the distinction between deterrence and defence, making the capacity to wage war rather than the capability to inflict punishment the condition for a credible deterrent. The central problem for arms control in both the nuclear and conventional domains has been how to accomplish that aim.

Small reductions, or the establishment of ceilings that reflect existing force levels, may simply ratify the existing assymetries that remain within those force levels. This may be a desirable approach to arms control if one enjoys the advantage of that assymetry; it may also be desirable even if one does not: it makes agreements more negotiable, while the process of negotiations serves to institutionalise a dialogue that may itself be beneficial. Even if MBFR produces no agreement or actual force reductions, the continuation of a negotiating forum that institutionalises a multilateral dialogue on the problem of a stable European balance has its merits, both in an East-West and a West-West context. At worst, it is innocuous; at least, it provides the potential for progress by establishing an organisational habit or - particularly significant in the absence of a force reduction agreement - formulating CBMs that preclude surprise attack; at best, it may facilitate a political détente that may render the military confrontation less relevant.

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[39] Phil Williams, "Whatever Happened to the Mansfield Amendment?" Survival (Vol. XVIII No.4, July/August 1976), pp. 146-53.

[40] New York Times, 26 June 1975, and Washington Post, 8 and 10 September 1975.

While such an approach to arms control may have utility - and Bonn's enthusiasm for CBMs and the negotiations in Vienna reflects this belief - such limited agreements may also be counterproductive. To the extent that such agreements also fail to remove any inherent instabilities in the adversary military relationship, they may function as a palliative that obscures the reality of conflict just as aspirin represses the body's warning that a debilitating condition requires attention. Critics of SALT II pointed to an increasing vulnerability of US land-based ICBMs, arguing that an excessive faith in an inadequate SALT process only detracted from necessary force modernisation programmes. But even if SALT *did* provide a satisfactory stabilisation of the superpower relationship, Bonn was sensitive to its relationship to European security:[41]

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[41] Schmidt's speech at the 10 May 1977 NATO summit meeting, in *Survival* (Vol. XIX, No.4, July/August 1977), pp. 177-78.

> [Strategic parity] will make it necessary during the coming years... to reduce the political and military role of strategic nuclear weapons as a normal component of defence and deterrence; the strategic nuclear component will become increasingly regarded as an instrument of last resort, to save the *national* interest and *protect the survival of those who possess these strategic weapons of last restort*.

Schmidt's logic was similar to that which had led the UK and France to reaffirm their national nuclear deterrents. Bonn retains that option only in the context of a European nuclear deterrent, a prospect unlikely in the foreseeable future although one which has received increased consideration as a response to perceived US-Soviet bilateralism.[42]

Schmidt's conclusion, however, was necessarily different from the traditional "Gaullist" response: "...the more we stabilise strategic nuclear parity... the more it becomes necessary to achieve a balance of conventional weapons."[43] As before, SALT required MBFR: SALT "magnifies the disparities between East and West in nuclear... and conventional weapons".[44] A conventional balance was paramount because of the potential usability of superior conventional forces against a defender which was deterred from nuclear retaliation. To the extent that arms control was unlikely to *create* that balance, one had to take unilateral steps to do so (such as the May 1977 NATO commitment to 3% real growth in defence expenditure) and attend to similar imbalances in nuclear systems that existed outside the SALT framework. This was the genesis of the LRTNF modernisation "double decision" of 1979.

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[42] See the discussion in Dettke, *Allianz im Wandel*, pp. 110-20. Also François Duchêne, "A New European Defense Community", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.50, No.1, October 1971), and Christoph Bertram in *Die Zeit*, 20 July 1973. More recently, Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", paper presented to the *Journal of Common Market Studies* Conference, Oxford University, 28-30 March 1982 (mimeo).

[43] At the May 1977 NATO summit; see note 41, *supra*.

[44] Schmidt, "1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", 28 October 1977, in *Survival* (Vol. XX No.1, January/February 1978), pp. 2-10.

Yet there remain two alternatives to an arms control process that focuses on small reductions or the establishment of ceilings in a situation in which no prior balance exists. One is no arms control at all. It may well be that, given the limits of détente in reconciling the resilient political conflict between East and West, military détente is impossible without political détente; moreover, military détente may not lead to political détente as much as it provides a forum for each side to manipulate the process to its own advantage as it seeks to transform military power into political influence. If arms control is an unacceptable or unsuccessful antidote to vulnerability, then - reminiscent of the debate in the 1950s - what remains is to secure a deterrent outside a negotiated framework. To some, that requires the demonstrable capability to wage limited war - be it conventional or nuclear - in Europe as a complement to a strategic nuclear deterrent that has no absolute guarantee. To others, particularly those for whom such a war would be distinctly unlimited, that requires the inevitable engagement of that strategic nuclear deterrent.

This dilemma has not receded. Indeed, it has assumed new relevance precisely because it is irresolvable. It is this dilemma, and the inescapable vulnerability that flows from it, that provides the principal impetus to arms control. To the extent that the alliance attempts to resolve it through particular weapons deployments, that may also undermine the prospects for future arms control. Because the FRG is most sensitive to this dilemma, its desire not to foreclose arms control is accordingly higher:[45]

> Unless we see real progress on MBFR, we shall have to rely on the effectiveness of deterrence... We have to consider

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[45] Schmidt, "1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture".

> whether the "neutron weapon" is of value to the Alliance as an additional element of the deterrence strategy, as a means of preventing war. But we should not limit ourselves to that examination. We should also examine what relevance and weight this weapon has in our efforts to achieve arms control.

The neutron weapon controversy highlighted this dilemma. The desire to limit the collateral damage associated with a nuclear response on German soil conflicted with the desire to ensure the coupling of the US strategic guarantee by avoiding the prospect of a war that could be limited to Europe. Moreover, its effect on the climate for arms control was viewed as deleterious. Comparable dilemmas exist with LRTNF modernisation.[46]

There is an additional approach to arms control that merits attention. Negotiations aimed at substantial rather than nominal force reductions have been advocated both by ardent supporters of total disarmament and by conservative critics of traditional forms of arms control. Proposals for a substantial reduction in strategic offensive systems - suggested by Senator Jackson in 1973 and made to Moscow by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations[47] - have stressed the elimination of any first-strike capability and were directed against Soviet "heavy" ICBM deployments. In a similar vein, a West German study group in the early phases of NATO's MBFR planning rejected the prevailing concept of a 10-30% reduction on both sides on the grounds that it would preserve a Soviet offensive capability while depleting NATO's capacity for forward defence. Instead, it proposed 75%

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[46] See Gregory Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper No.168 (London: IISS, Summer 1981) and Gerhard Wettig, "Das Ringen zwischen Ost und West um Sicherheit: SALT, MBFR, und die Optionen der westlichen Politik", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (B26/79, 30 July 1979).

[47] Jackson's proposal for a one-third reduction, in Washington Star-News, 9 December 1973; on Carter's "Deep Cuts Proposal" of March 1977, see Talbott, op.cit., pp. 58-63. Reagan's START proposal was also for a one-third reduction; see New York Times, 10 May 1982.

reductions on both sides on the premise that such reductions would at least deprive the Warsaw Pact of an offensive capability. The Grand Coalition rejected the proposal: such deep cuts were probably not negotiable with Moscow; further, it required that the bulk of the cuts come first from indigenous forces because of the implications for US engagement.[48]

Proposals for substantial arms reductions must confront the strong probability that they may not be negotiable, thus leading to the conclusion that arms control in any form remains - in the absence of political détente - an inadequate instrument for providing national and alliance security. Yet, neither is it clear that such security can be provided to the satisfaction of all members of the alliance in the absence of arms control. To those - particularly the FRG - who are most sensitive to the dilemmas of alliance security and most vulnerable to any deficiencies in forward defence and extended deterrence, arms control remains an important instrument in coping with the continuing conflict between East and West. It is not clear that the US strategic guarantee has been impaired by SALT; certainly there are those who continue to stress the importance of uncertainty as an element of deterrence.[49] But the central requirement for that deterrent as it applies to the alliance remains as it always has: the coupling of the US guarantee. Given the vulnerability of the FRG to an alliance dependent on nuclear weapons, Bonn generally welcomes proposals for the restoration of a conventional balance made by

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[48] See Martin Müller, "Konzeption und Akteur: Die Entwicklung der MBFR-Politik der Bundesrepublik zwischen 1968 und 1971", in Haftendorn et al., eds., Verwaltete Aussenpolitik, pp. 167-90.

[49] See, for instance, McGeorge Bundy's rejoinder to Kissinger's 1979 speech in Brussels, in the keynote address at the 1979 IISS Conference, in Survival (Vol. XXI, No.6, November/December 1979), pp. 268-72.

Americans who are uncomfortable about the uncertainties beyond the nuclear threshold. A declaration of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, is less welcome because it eliminates the vital link.[50] Achievement of that conventional balance - if it were possible - would instead provide the foundation for arms control in Europe that has so far not materialised. In the interim, détente and defence remain complementary functions of the alliance because neither is by itself a sufficient provider of alliance security.

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[50] Compare the proposal by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", Foreign Affairs (Vol.60, No.4, Spring 1982), pp. 753-68, and the reply by Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and General Franz-Joseph Schulze, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 June 1982. Egon Bahr's endorsement of "no first use" (International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1982) was not convincing: his argument ultimately rested on the certainty of the US nuclear guarantee.

CHAPTER 16

Conclusion: Strength and Vulnerability in an Interdependent Alliance

The postwar international system is a resilient political order insofar as it is defined by the basic adversary relationship between East and West. This thesis has examined the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany as that alliance both evolved in the shadow of that reality and considered the prospects for and implementation of a strategy of détente to deal with that reality. Détente is a limited instrument in managing the dynamics of East-West politics, not only because of the adversary relationship within which it must operate, but also because of the alliance relationship within which it must develop.

The prospect of a détente between East and West has periodically emerged in the postwar period as a function of four factors: strength, vulnerability, opportunity and inevitability. The last two reflect an essentially reactive aspect of Western policy. One could only engage in a détente process - principally characterised by negotiations on particular disputes in the adversary relationship - if the USSR and its allies were also willing to participate, even if the Soviet definition of détente and its operational principles were not identical to the West's. Even with optimism, one can speak only of an "adversary partnership"; what has and has not transpired in détente has been a product of competing national interests. The common denominator of these interests is the avoidance of direct military conflict; in that sense, mutual deterrence in the nuclear age provides the enduring - and perhaps only - foundation upon which a détente can be built, barring any fundamental transformation in the definition of national interests on both sides sufficient to remove the basic antagonism altogether. This fact has made the prospect of détente a continuous issue throughout the postwar era: the alternatives are costly, counterproductive, dangerous and unacceptable.

Nonetheless, détente has acquired a broader meaning: the extension of that mutual interest in war avoidance to the deliberate management of the adversary conflict in ways that either reduce tension or attenuate the effects of that tension. This entails two elements that require - unlike the recognition of that mutual interest - positive acts of policy. These acts of policy may be distinguished according to whether they are aimed at a political or a military détente. The latter is designed primarily to ensure the stability of the strategic relationship, at a minimum to disabuse the adversary from contemplating a resort to force to alter the status quo to its advantage. Through the mechanism of arms control, adversaries can thus reinforce the inevitability of détente by denying at least its most violent alternative. Adversaries can also seek to broaden their societal and economic interaction, pursuing certain associated benefits for their own sake and, perhaps, indirectly contributing to the peaceful resolution of the adversary conflict. Similarly, subject to a redefinition of vital interests by one or more adversaries, political détente may entail direct efforts at resolving particular disputes within that basic conflict. A key point of this thesis is that one's decision regarding these deliberate acts of policy is a question of strategy. How one chooses to relate or segregate these forms of active détente politics involves the issue of linkage. Such questions of strategy, moreover, entail the calculation of one's strength and vulnerability.

The strength of both nation and alliance is necessary because of the continuing basic adversary conflict. Strength - particularly military strength - sustains the condition of mutual deterrence upon which any détente must be built. This requires more than simply a certain quantity of destructive power, since deterrence is fundamentally a psychological phenomenon. The Federal Republic's preference for "calculability" applies especially to the physical presence of the United States, upon whom it remains dependent for its security; all else being equal, a lower but stable US military presence may well be preferable to a higher yet quixotic one. In the direct East-West face-off, military force is not readily usable but provides - as it did in the immediate aftermath of World War II - the psychological and symbolic assurance that one is free from political intimidation by the adversary. For the US, this strength supports its claim to special status in the international order; without it, the US would not - indeed, could not - play the role that it somewhat reluctantly assumed in 1947 and has since largely relished but occasionally regretted. For the FRG, this strength, and particularly the psychological security it provides, is the principal feature that distinguishes contemporary Germany from its historical predecessors: it offers a framework within which it can safely exist and prosper as a political entity without the profound security dilemmas of the past.

Herein lies the basic interdependence of the US and FRG: neither can sustain its position in the existing international order without the other. Strength is the antidote to vulnerability. If that vulnerability is chronic - either in the FRG's central geopolitical position or in the unprecedented strategic vulnerability of the US - then strength does not cure that vulnerability as much as it ameliorates it. Regardless if military power is unusable in the resolution of the postwar East-West antagonism, it cannot be dispensed with as irrelevant. Because that vulnerability is not eliminated, it also provides a motivation for détente even as strength provides its precondition. In this sense, détente is appropriately an element of alliance security. Because both the US and FRG are uniquely vulnerable to the threat of alliance fragmentation, each assesses the utility of a détente strategy according to its effect on the alliance. That particular vulnerability thus provides both a constraint on and an impetus for détente. Neither the US nor the FRG can set the agenda for the other; together they can determine that agenda. If they are in conflict regarding the utility of a détente strategy, other allies assume a decisive role.

The sources of such conflict lie in the specific circumstances and perceptions that exist at any given time. When those differences occur, they are more than simply issues of nuance or modality; they reflect differences relating to the utility of tension - and hence the utility of its relaxation - plus the manner and style with which a particular strategy is formulated and implemented. Throughout the Cold War, and particularly since the Berlin Crisis of the late 1950s, the US has sought to stabilise the postwar confrontation over Germany in such a way as to keep it from becoming a precipitant to war; support for Germany's claims derived less from a sympathy for those claims than a desire to sustain Bonn's stake in the Western alliance. The steps one took to stabilise that confrontation and keep Bonn from feeling isolated were not always compatible; moreover, they were important, although certainly not the only, occasions for intra-alliance squabbles, notably among France, the US and the UK. How to keep itself from being isolated dominated the FRG debate as well. The probing for détente in the 1960s - by the US principally in arms control, by France in a more nebulous political sense – foundered not least because the obligation to support Bonn's perceived vital interests could not be readily circumvented.

The significance of the post-1969 Ostpolitik lies in the unilateral removal of that obstacle in the only way that was possible: by surrendering what Bonn did not have and what neither ally nor adversary wanted to provide, in exchange for the opportunity to interact in the international system as a "normal" state. In retrospect, Ostpolitik responded to both internal and external pressures in a fashion that corresponded with few observers' exact prognoses or prescriptions. It was not a Four Power settlement of the "German Problem"; it asserted the Four Power framework that had suspended that problem for a quarter of a century. It was a unilateral policy that made not only Four Power agreement on Berlin possible but also allowed a broader, multilateral arms control process to proceed subject to its own inherent limitations. Instead of a negative linkage strategy designed to preclude allied disengagement from vital German interests, it sought to affirm that engagement by anticipating and thereby preempting an imposed solution and by creating positive links of interdependence. It was not a harbinger of a new Schaukelpolitik, but the continued adaptation both to specific external demands and general reality. Ostpolitik not only was anchored in a Westpolitik; it allowed it.

Amid a debate on whether or how détente would alter the postwar international system, Michael Howard wrote:[1]

> The objective of strategy has remained unchanged since before the advent of the nuclear age – coercing one's opponent into abandoning his preferred course of action by

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[1] Michael Howard, "The Relevance of Traditional Strategy", Foreign Affairs (Vol.51, No.2, January 1973), p. 264.

> posing the alternative of unacceptable punishment; but that object was now to be achieved less by manipulation of actual forces than by manipulation of risks.

On the one hand, détente has been a strategy to cope with the basic adversary conflict between East and West by reducing the risks associated with the "manipulation of actual forces", predicated on the assumption that these forces could no longer be employed commensurate with the political objectives such manipulation would serve. On the other hand, détente has opened up additional possibilities for the "manipulation of risks" outside a direct military context. It is thus an alternative to the "Policy of Strength" that dominated the Cold War: that strength, even if sufficient to deter aggressive attempts to resolve the dispute of the Cold War to the detriment of the West, was not sufficient to compel a resolution to Western advantage. Instead, one sought to manipulate the risks associated with the denial of certain benefits in order to affect Soviet behaviour.

Yet, one had to create those benefits before the risks of denial could be manipulated. Détente thus became an instrument to create an interdependence that would afford the West a degree of influence over the East that the "Policy of Strength" had not produced. On an economic level, East-West trade largely developed outside the interconnected network of the "era of negotiations". Brandt argued to Nixon that trade should not be linked to political negotiations: it was a means to "leaven" the Soviet system. Nixon remained sceptical that trade could lead to better negotiations; Kissinger argued for a "positive" linkage that afforded Moscow a stake in preserving a stable international order but rejected the direct linkage between trade and internal Soviet behaviour.[2] Likewise on a societal level, one could "manipulate risks" by increasing East-West interaction, not only for the direct benefits to be enjoyed - especially significant for the FRG - but also as a means of breaking down the ideological and psychological barriers that help sustain the East-West conflict.

Such methods of altering the behaviour of an adversary, however, have their limitations. First, it is not clear that the denial of newly created benefits - as with economic sanctions - is any more effective than the "Policy of Strength" in coercing an adversary, although it may provide a useful restraint. Creating a system of benefits and threatening to withhold them may, for example, help to *deter* Moscow from direct military intervention (as in Poland), but not necessarily *compel* a withdrawal after the fact (as in Afghanistan). Second, it requires that a state or *alliance* be willing to defer the benefits that accrue to it in suspending that interaction. Finally, such a strategy may be profoundly damaging to the alliance, whose members will be affected differently by such manipulation - witness the controversy over the Yamal pipeline.

These are tactical limitations, involving calculations over the means of a strategy designed to manipulate risks as a surrogate for an unusable military instrument. There is, however, a more fundamental dilemma relating to the ends of a détente strategy one is pursuing. On the one hand, détente is a subversive strategy to loosen Soviet control over Eastern Europe if not undermine the Soviet system itself; in this respect, it may be nothing more than a mirror image of "peaceful coexistence", making the world safe for ideological conflict. On the other hand, détente is a strategy of accommodating the status quo to make that ideological conflict less relevant and the political competition more benign. It may or may not be to the West's advantage, for instance, to exacerbate the political turmoil in Poland: to encourage liberalisation may be fundamentally destabilising and dangerous to both East and West; to discourage it in the name of stability, however, is to embrace Realpolitik to the exclusion of principles which remain significant forces in Western societies.

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[2] See Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1979), pp. 148-58, 966, and *Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 246-55. Also Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), pp. 189ff. Ironically, the US had a positive trade balance only in East-West trade in 1972, while the lure of markets played an insignificant role in the internal *Ostpolitik* debate. See Dieter Dettke, *Allianz im Wandel: Amerikanisch-europäische Sicherheitsbeziehungen im Zeichen des Bilateralismus der Supermächte* (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner, 1976), p. 132; and Michael Kreile, "*Ostpolitik* Reconsidered", in Ekkehard Krippendorf, ed., *West Germany's Foreign Policy: Formation and Contents* (London: SAGE, 1980), pp. 137-38.

No member of the alliance, least of all the US or the FRG, has a monopoly on one or the other points of view. It was common in the 1960s and early 1970s to stress that the US sought a détente as a ratification of the status quo while Bonn, like de Gaulle, sought to transform that status quo.[3] It is not clear, in the wake of the "era of negotiations", that this dichotomy is either accurate or relevant. In one sense, the FRG remains a "revisionist" state, seeking ultimately to gain the now nebulously defined reunification of the German nation. Likewise, the US remains a status quo power, attempting to preserve an international order in which it is preeminent but decreasingly so. On the other hand, the US is also a revisionist power: to a large extent the objectives of the Cold War retain their appeal. President Ford's removal of "détente" from the official lexicon in March 1976 reflected a general disillusionment that in part manifested itself in the subsequent emphasis on human rights as an issue of East-West relations.[4] To the extent that Bonn's *Ostpolitik* envisages an interdependence between East and West, encompassing both superpowers as well as the two parts of Europe, it is a *status quo* rather than revisionist vision. Having accepted the division of Germany into separate political entities with territorial integrity and inviolable borders, Bonn became a *status quo* power. One could only enhance Eurpean security through a détente that had both political and military foundations: that required "calculability" on the part of all actors; that in turn required interdependence to ensure that all actors had a continuing interest in European security and stability, which translates into West German security and stability.

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[3] See, for example, Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management of Détente (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), and his "The Boundaries of Détente", The World Today (Vol. XXX, June 1969), pp. 255-64.

In 1969, Helmut Schmidt wrote:[5]

> The task of the alliances is... to furnish guarantees against any serious and violent disruption of the evolutionary trend [toward détente] - but also against any possible reversal of it. Détente must not, indeed, jeopardise the protection furnished by the alliances; but mutual scaling down and a de-fusing of the military confrontation should be possible and would be useful... The task of trying to maintain the balance here in Europe will only succeed if a *balance of commitment on the part of the two superpowers* remains in being in Europe.

This perspective derives from the unique position of the Federal Republic that is the enduring legacy of the "German Problem": by virtue of that position, it is vulnerable to isolation. Historically, a *presumption* of isolation led to a policy that sought at least independence and self-sufficiency, features more than once defined on a grandiose scale to the detriment of the broader international system. In many respects, that option is no longer relevant in the postwar world, although the potential for isolation remains. The central task of West German foreign policy is to *avoid* that isolation; it has been and is still equally in the interests of its alliance partners, and particularly the US, to assist that process.

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[4] On this dilemma in US foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

[5] Helmut Schmidt, *The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Superpowers* (London: William Kimber, 1971; published 1969 in German), p. 225; emphasis added.

There are two ways of avoiding isolation: dependence and interdependence. When the postwar world was viewed as exclusively bipolar, while the FRG sought its rehabilitation and restoration within that structure, the dependency of a patron-client relationship was useful and appropriate. That could only be an initial condition, the termination of which was marked by the confluence of a superpower détente and *Ostpolitik*. Yet, Bonn could not trade dependence for *in*dependence; it could only trade it for *inter*dependence. It was thus important that the US recognise Bonn's increased need for freedom of manoeuvre in the pursuit of its own interests:[6]

> Within the scope of [NATO and West Germany's contribution to NATO], the foreign and security policies of the German Federal Government exploit to the full the margin of action open to the Federal Republic of Germany. This fact is exactly what distinguishes us from the preceding Governments...

Bonn has not become any less dependent on the United States. Good relations with the US, as Theo Sommer once noted, remain the "second Basic Law" of the Federal Republic.[7] Yet Bonn could not afford to be *exclusively* dependent on the US if it were to pursue its interests.

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[6] Schmidt, in a speech at Georgetown University, 9 February 1971, in *Bulletin*, 16 February 1976. Similarly, the FDP "Election Concept", 25 June 1969, in Boris Meissner, ed., *Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel (Dokumentation)* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971), pp. 362-64.

[7] In *Die Zeit*, 13 April 1973. Similarly, his "Ist alles anti, was Kritik ist?", in *Die Zeit*, 28 August 1981.

While Bonn's dependence on Washington is not exclusive, it has nonetheless increased commensurate with the intensity of its Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik accepted the Soviet position in Europe: no longer a deliberate attempt to ignore, bypass or subvert Moscow. Ostpolitik anticipated the de facto interdependence of the strategic nuclear relationship which, if it remained exclusive, could threaten a US disengagement. Bonn ultimately envisaged a broader interdependence between superpowers committed to European security, requiring in turn a form of interdependence between itself and each of the superpowers. Such was Bonn's unsuccessful argument to Washington on the merits of CSCE. Yet the potential for conflict between the US and FRG in détente strategy exists according to each one's willingness to accept Moscow's position in Europe. Bonn's acknowledgement that a form of vulnerability flows from this interdependence is precisely why its dependence on the alliance in general and the US in particular has likewise increased. The vulnerability that derives from the interdependence associated with détente is only significant if the strength of the alliance fails to provide an adequate antidote. This applies both to East-West economic relations and to arms control.

Détente between East and West has not heralded a new international order. It is instead a strategy for dealing with the international order created by the end of World War II. The principal requirement for the successful pursuit of such a strategy is the maintenance of the existing alliance structure. As such, it remains a central issue of alliance politics. Within that alliance, the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany has changed significantly. No longer can the US - if it ever could or should have - count on the unquestioning loyalty of the FRG. No longer can the FRG - if it ever could or should have - count on the total support of the US in the pursuit of a policy that seeks the benefits of both alliance and détente. Yet both remain dependent on the other for the security of their international position. Their national interests are fundamentally compatible; they must fulfil them in the context of an "equivalent partnership" for which there is no alternative.

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